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THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION. 
THE  QUALITIES  OF  MEN. 

THE  SUBCONSCIOUS. 

FACT  AND  FABLE  IN  PSYCHOLOGY. 

HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 
Boston  and  New  York 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY 
OF  CONVICTION 


A STUDY 

OF  BELIEFS  AND  ATTITUDES 

BY 

JOSEPH  JASTROW 

PBOFESSOB  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  IN  THE 
UNIVEESITY  OF  WISCONSIN 


BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK 

HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 


MDCCCCXVIII 


COPYRIGHT,  igi8,  BY  JOSEPH  JASTROW 
ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED 

Published  May  iqi& 


A'  * 

y-3.  1 i' 


/ / 

A'-v 

‘■.J‘  U\^ 


IN  MEMORIAM 

CHARLES  SIMPSON  PEIRCE 

MASTER  LOGICIAN 

WILLIAM  JAMES 

MASTER  PSYCHOLOGIST 


161 973 


PREFACE 


Thinking  is  an  art,  the  art  of  logic;  and  thinking  is  an 
expression  of  our  total  mental  nature,  which  brings 
it  under  the  domain  of  psychology.  Psychology  is  con- 
cerned with  explaining  how  we  incline  to  think;  logic 
undertakes  to  lay  down  the  law  of  how  we  must  think 
if  we  would  think  correctly.  The  actual  thinking  that 
we  do,  whether  true  or  false,  strong  or  weak,  original 
or  commonplace,  consistent  or  capricious,  direct  or 
rambling,  is  none  the  less  thinking.  The  results  are 
psychological  specimens,  however  well  or  ill  they  stand 
the  test  of  logic;  they  are  aU  plants,  whether  weeds  or 
flowers.  In  the  standard  patterns  of  thought,  the  proc- 
ess begins  with  premises  and  ends  with  conclusions, 
and  requires  some  sort  of  bond  to  hold  the  two  to- 
gether in  an  argument.  Formally  that  is  the  whole  pro- 
cedure; actually  it  is  httle  more  than  a bare  skeleton, 
lacking  all  the  features  of  the  flesh-and-blood  reality. 

What  makes  it  so  is  the  distribution  of  our  interests 
and  the  limitations  of  our  mental  nature.  Primarily 
we  are  interested  in  conclusions;  for  they  bear  upon 
our  conduct,  our  comfort,  our  emotional  security. 
Thinking  encounters  — as  it  is  stimulated  by  — the 
reality  of  facts  and  events,  the  complexity  of  experi- 
ence. We  live  under  a practical  stress;  thinking  must 
satisfy  needs.  We  are  ever  thrown  back  upon  our 
composite  psychology.  The  tangible  outcome  of  our 
taking  thought  is  the  reservoir  of  our  convictions,  that 
supplies  the  stream  of  action.  The  relation  between 


^ C1  'Oi 


PREFACE 


viii 

thinking  and  doing  is  elastic  as  well  as  complex.  Think- 
ing may  not  decide,  but  merely  incline;  it  gives  rise  to 
beliefs  and  attitudes,  tendencies  toward  conclusions, 
more  or  less  tempered,  beset  by  reservations,  qualifi- 
cations, doubts,  and  counter-inclinations.  Particularly 
are  we  moved  by  our  emotions,  our  hopes  and  desires, 
more  practically  by  our  interests,  always  by  our  varied 
relations  to  the  content  of  our  thought. 

As  a consequence,  though  we  share  a common  order 
of  reasoning  and  a common  human  nature,  we  reach 
very  different  conclusions,  approach  the  same  prob- 
lems in  different  attitudes,  with  different  inclinations. 
Yet  equally  are  we  affected  by  the  beliefs  of  others. 
Conviction  is  a social  process,  follows  the  herd  instincts. 
Tradition  and  convention  bear  heavily  upon  us,  and 
determine  what  we  believe  almost  as  rigidly  as  what 
we  eat  or  what  we  wear.  We  are  in  the  stream  and  are 
borne  along  by  the  general  current,  and  caught  in  the 
eddies  and  tossed  by  the  waves  of  our  immediate  sur- 
rounding. Still  we  must  each  sink  or  swim  by  om*  indi- 
vidual strokes  of  effort  and  give  them  the  direction  of 
our  purpose.  We  cannot  escape  the  obligation  of  set- 
ting a course,  and  in  following  it  we  show  the  impress 
of  our  psychology,  the  loyalty  of  our  minds. 

The  subject  of  this  volume  is  concerned  with  the 
interaction  of  our  logical  and  our  psychological  nature. 
It  attempts  to  deal  with  the  psychology  of  our  most 
complex  logical  products.  It  follows  the  “case  ” method 
as  the  only  pragmatic  procedure,  the  only  one  that  does 
justice  to  the  rich  content  of  a concrete  issue.  In  the 
course  of  the  analysis  principles  emerge  and  are  em- 
phasized; as  in  a trial  at  court,  the  judge  and  jury, 


PREFACE 


is 

though  concerned  with  evidence  and  argument,  are 
guided  by  principles.  The  sweep  is  a wide  one  and  in- 
cludes “eases”  from  the  past,  survivals  into  the  pres- 
ent, of  outgrown  behefs  which  still  linger  in  strange 
persistence,  popular  beliefs  in  conflict  with  expert  con- 
clusion, and  the  varied  range  of  controversy  in  which 
protagonists  contend  for  opposite  verdicts  upon  much 
the  same  though  differently  selected  evidence.  Since 
many  of  the  beliefs  thus  creditably  sponsored  must  in 
the  nature  of  things  be  more  wrong  than  right,  the 
analysis  has  to  consider  closely  the  psychology  of  fal- 
lacy and  prejudice,  the  tendencies  to  wrong  belief  that 
make  a strong  appeal  to  our  nature.^  For  hke  reason 
a comparative  survey  of  the  several  belief  processes  in 
terms  of  their  logical  structure,  introduces  the  study 
of  the  series  of  “cases.” 

A supporting  motive  in  the  enterprise  is  to  impress 
upon  a generation  over-impressed  with  the  practical 
side  of  material  achievement  and  the  stern  logic  of 
events  (so  many  of  them  plainly  the  complex  issues  of 
convietions  that  have  become  institutionally  strong), 
the  fundamental  obligation  of  clear  thinking,  the 
moral  obhgation  to  be  reasonable.  Reasonableness  is 
many-sided.  It  means  a competent  training  in  the 
process  of  evidence  and  argument;  it  imphes  a fair 
immimity  from  prepossession  as  well  as  from  fallacy; 
it  supposes  a fair-mindedness,  as  much  in  the  sporting 

* In  an  earlier  volume,  Fact  and  Fable  in  Psychology,  I have  con- 
sidered in  more  concrete  manner  a range  of  problems  of  more  direct 
interest  to  psychology.  Yet  in  some  measure  the  present  volume 
supplements  the  former  one,  and  carries  the  same  intention  to  dis- 
tinguish between  the  faet  and  the  fable  that  are  so  complexly  inter- 
woven in  the  fabric  of  our  thought. 


X 


PREFACE 


as  in  the  judicial  sense;  and  a tempered  and  well-poised 
sense  of  proportion,  which  is  the  essence  of  sanity.  At 
no  time  are  these  qualities  so  supremely  necessary  as 
in  the  critical  times  through  which  the  convictions  as 
well  as  the  emotions  of  men  are  now  passing.  The 
world  war  has  shaken  convictions  and  made  necessary 
an  examination  of  foundations,  and  a fundamental  in- 
quiry into  the  basis  of  those  values  that  keep  endeavor 
keen  and  civilization  alive.  In  such  times  we  learn  to 
cherish  with  an  increasing  fervor  the  convictions  that 
sustain  our  national  and  our  individual  being.  The 
shock  to  men’s  minds  has  been  as  serious  as  to  their 
senses.  That  German  minds  could  think  as  they  do 
seems  even  more  amazing  than  that  German  hands 
should  be  so  infamously  polluted  with  crime.  The  as- 
sault upon  reason  has  been  as  savage  and  as  deadly  as 
the  violation  of  law,  of  morality,  of  decency,  of  honor, 
of  humanity.  The  intellectual  violation  is  the  more 
responsible,  since  by  its  nature  it  emanates  from  the 
trained  leaders,  those  by  calling  competent  and  vowed 
to  the  defense  of  the  values  of  right  thinking.  The 
supreme  importance  of  conviction  is  thus  revealed  in 
Macchiavellian  motive  and  pan-Germanic  perspec- 
tive. But  equally  are  the  responsible  nations  of  a mor- 
alized world  determined  to  defend  to  the  uttermost  of 
their  resources  of  mind  and  hand,  of  wealth  and  blood, 
the  convictions  that  they  are  assured  by  all  the  evi- 
dence of  time  and  faith,  stand  at  the  root  of  sane  and 
humane  living. 

No  phase  of  the  quickening  of  convictions  that  comes 
in  war  time  can  compare  in  significance  with  this  source 
of  our  determination.  But  it  is  chastening  to  consider 


PREFACE 


XI 


also  the  lesser  menace  and  the  slighter  lessons,  inherent 
in  the  altered  psychological  attitude  that  war  brings. 
They  may  all  be  regarded  as  temptations  toward  in- 
tolerance under  emotional  stress;  and  they  find  their 
correction  in  the  conviction  that  sanity  and  keeping 
one’s  head  are  indispensable  supports  of  an  enduring 
patriotism.  As  an  instance  of  one  type  of  unreason  I 
have  considered  in  the  concluding  chapter  the  wide- 
spread distortion  of  the  position  of  pacifists,  which  has 
swept  over  the  country  in  a wave  of  inconsistency,  mis- 
understanding, and  malice.  That  any  word  or  deed, 
however  slight  or  indirect,  which  in  any  measure  inter- 
feres with  the  war  efficiency  of  the  nation,  is  to  be  imre- 
servedly  condemned;  that  those  who  persist  in  it  must 
be  restrained  by  force  if  need  be,  — all  this  and  more 
is  admitted  by  practical-minded,  loyal  citizens.  But  to 
direct  this  animus  blindly  against  those  who  repudiate 
with  vehemence  and  indignation  the  attitudes  ascribed 
to  them,  is  peculiarly  intolerant  in  a democratic  com- 
munity. The  most  lenient  explanation  of  the  matter  is 
that  those  guilty  of  the  sin  fail  to  distinguish  between 
a principle  and  the  mode  of  its  application,  and  again 
that  they  fail  to  distinguish  between  patriotism  and 
the  approved  manner  of  its  expression.  In  a country 
that  safeguards  the  right  of  opinion,  men  inevitably 
differ  in  their  views  of  attitudes  and  policies  that  will 
best  maintain  the  nation  in  its  determination  to  win 
the  war  and  win  it  rightly.  When  one  body  of  loyal 
patriots  attempts  to  impose  its  views  upon  another 
body  of  loyal  patriots,  the  path  of  intolerance  is  ap- 
proached. Fortunately  the  wise  authorities  of  the  cen- 
tral government  are  alert  to  the  menace  and  are  taking 


PREFACE 


xii 

steps  to  check  its  spread.  Fortunately,  also,  the  good 
sense  of  the  American  people  may  be  trusted  to  aid 
the  recovery  from  a temporary  lapse,  under  an  intelli- 
gible provocation. 

War  time  demands  that  minor  differences  of  opinion 
be  set  aside  in  favor  of  an  indispensable  unity  of  action; 
and  by  the  same  token  it  demands  that  no  portion  of 
the  community  be  estranged  from  the  common  cause 
by  a hostile  attitude  toward  tenets  and  principles 
which  in  times  of  peace  have  contributed  to  the  moral 
capitalization  of  the  nation.  Still  more  bindingly  the 
same  obligation  rests  upon  advocates  of  views  (in  what- 
ever field  of  opinion)  which  the  majority  regard  as 
false  and  dangerous,  but  which  under  ordinary  condi- 
tions are  accorded  a tolerant  hearing,  though  equally 
a vigorous  protest  under  approved  principles  of  con- 
troversy. A flagrant  violation  of  this  tolerance  appears 
in  the  suit  instigated  by  the  anti-vivisectionists  against 
the  Red  Cross  organization  to  prevent  the  use  of  fimds 
in  the  interests  of  medical  research;  and  that  means, 
to  mitigate  the  sufferings  and  save  the  lives  of  the  vic- 
tims of  war.  To  push  a private  prejudice  against  a 
public  interest  at  this  time  and  in  this  manner  is  an 
ignorant,  obstinate,  and  malicious  attack,  inhumane 
and  unpatriotic  even  though  sincere;  it  is  a tragic  dem- 
onstration of  the  menace  that  lies  in  unreason.  Though 
exceptional,  the  instance  should  be  used  to  strengthen 
the  forces  of  reason  and  loyalty.  Convictions  have  too 
momentous  a part  to  play  in  the  winning  of  the  cause 
of  the  pledged  allies  to  permit  any  encroachment  upon 
their  sacred  principles.  It  is  this  conviction  that  gives 
pertinence  to  the  general  consideration  of  our  logical 


PREFACE 


xm 


and  psychological  resources  — the  perfection  of  our 
intellectual  munitions  — at  this  critical  period  when 
right  thinking  must  prove  the  powerful  ally  of  right 
action. 

Most  of  the  chapters  have  appeared  in  periodical 
form;  all  have  been  thoroughly  revised,  and  some  re- 
written in  the  interests  of  a more  uniform  presentation, 
and  an  adjustment  to  timely  interests.  Acknowledg- 
ments are  made  for  permission  to  reprint  as  follows: 
To  the  Popular  Science  Monthly  (now  the  Scientific 
Monthly)  for  the  “Psychology  of  Conviction”;  “The 
Antecedents  of  the  Study  of  Character  and  Tem- 
perament ”;  “Fact  and  Fable  in  Animal  Psychology  ”; 
to  the  Educational  Review  for  “Belief  and  Credulity” 
and  “The  Democratic  Suspicion  of  Education  ”;  to  the 
Review  of  Reviews  for  “The  Case  of  Paladino”;  to 
Hampton's  Magazine  for  “Malicious  Animal  Magne- 
tism”; to  the  Nineteenth  Century  for  “The  Will  to  Be- 
lieve in  the  Supernatural.”  The  remaining  essays  have 
not  appeared  before,  the  printing  of  one  of  them  having 
been  delayed  by  the  exigencies  of  the  war.  The  obli- 
gation which  I owe  in  the  election  of  the  theme  and 
in  the  continued  pursuit  of  the  central  problem  that 
gives  unity  to  the  volume,  is  acknowledged  upon  the 
dedicatory  page.  The  preparation  of  the  manuscript 
for  the  press  has  had  the  critical  care  of  my  wife. 

Joseph  Jastkow 

Madison,  Wisconsin 
March  1918 


CONTENTS 


I.  The  Psychology  of  Conviction  . . . . 1 

The  forces  playing  upon  conviction;  imitation,  conserva- 
tive tendencies,  taboo,  conformity,  tradition;  why  men 
believe  and  what  they  believe.  Emotion  and  convention; 
the  function  of  conviction;  logic,  ethical,  aesthetic  regulation; 
relation  to  conduct.  The  “case”  method;  “cases”  of  inade- 
quate evidence;  credulity  and  weak  hjq>othesis.  Theories 
of  human  nature;  the  temperaments;  knowledge  and  wis- 
dom; “cases”  of  siuvival  of  cruder  notions;  belief  in  rare 
and  occult  power;  middle  ground  between  old-time  credul- 
ity and  present-day  controversies.  The  psychology  of  con- 
troversial issues;  the  “case”  of  indulgence;  the  “case”  of 
feminism;  the  “case”  of  pacifism.  The  personal  aspects 
of  conviction;  social  bearings  of  personal  conviction;  the 
Freudian  interpretation  of  sources  of  conviction;  Freudian 
mechanisms;  compensation  and  the  will  to  believe;  ration- 
alization of  motives;  consistency  and  the  pride  in  rational- 
ity; reserved  areas  of  belief;  attraction  of  irregular  beliefs; 
the  abnormal  field.  Logic  and  psychology  in  control  of  con- 
viction; the  scientific  realm. 

II.  Belief  and  Credulity 37 

Logical  evolution  of  belief;  the  fixation  of  opinion;  mo- 
tives of  tenacity,  of  authority,  of  inclination,  of  verifiability; 
their  history,  mode  of  their  operation,  and  survival.  Limi- 
tations of  scientific  application ; the  sources  of  credulity. 
Types  of  credulity;  prepossession  and  weak  sense  of  proof. 
Credulity  and  deception;  uncritical  acceptance  of  fact; 
ready  susceptibility  to  fallacy.  The  “case”  of  Taxil;  the 
“case”  of  Kaspar  Hauser;  the  “case”  of  Christian  Science. 

The  theoretical  and  the  practical  mind;  theory  and  practice; 
their  mutual  dependence;  the  worth  of  theory;  the  limita- 
tions of  practice;  belief-standards;  credulity  as  to  fact  re- 
sults from  ignorance  of  principle. 


XVI 


CONTENTS 


III.  The  Will  to  Believe  in  the  Supernat- 
ural   75 

Introductory;  the  satisfactions  of  belief;  unrest  of  doubt; 
older  belief-habits;  survivals;  the  belief-attraction  of  phre- 
nology; the  growth  of  inclination  to  believe.  The  composite 
character  of  an  individual’s  belief;  critical  and  uncritical 
attitudes;  tolerance  and  lax  standards;  reserved  areas  of 
belief.  Personally  centered  and  objective  beliefs;  their  in- 
compatibility; their  mutual  insulation.  Beliefs  entertained 
for  motives  of  satisfaction;  beliefs  defended  as  verifiable; 
hypothesis  of  reconciliation.  More  delicate  invasions  of  the 
will  to  believe;  the  value  of  acknowledging  the  inclination. 

rV.  The  Case  of  Paladino 101 

The  history  of  Paladino;  contradictory  testimony;  the 
logical  principles  of  the  “case.”  The  exposure  in  New  York, 

1910;  the  detailed  modus  operandi;  positive  detection  and 
negative  prevention.  Previous  exposures;  various  interpre- 
tations. The  “medium”  imposes  the  conditions;  ofifering 
of  prize  transfers  authority  over  conditions  to  rightful  place; 
loyalty  to  logic  would  make  investigation  needless.  The 
temper  of  acceptance;  the  national  temperaments;  most 
testimony  valueless;  the  attitude  required  for  detection. 

The  tendency  to  credit  such  performances  responsible  for 
much  of  their  ready  acceptance;  the  influence  of  favoring 
hypotheses.  The  public  interest;  prestige;  objective  stand- 
ards of  belief;  social  value  of  dramatic  exposure. 

V.  The  Antecedents  of  the  Study  of  Charac- 
ter AND  Temperament 128 

A type  of  belief  with  ancient  past  and  slow  evolution, 
alike  in  knowledge  and  in  logic;  the  persistent  interest  in 
human  nature;  Greek  origins.  The  doctrine  of  the  tempera- 
ments. Hippocrates;  “spirit”  theory  of  disease;  astrology, 
folk-lore,  and  the  humoral  doctrine;  literary  and  popular 
expressions  of  “humors.”  Physiognomy;  extravagant  no- 
tions of  Cardan  and  Porta.  The  system  of  Lavater;  limita- 
tions of  impressionism;  degradation  of  physiognomy.  Gall 
and  Spurzheim,  founders  of  phrenology;  the  assumptions  of 
phrenology;  Gall  as  a physiologist;  Braid  and  phreno-hyp- 


CONTENTS 


xvu 


notism.  The  career  of  phrenology;  practical  applications; 
extravagant  absurdities.  The  soiurces  of  psychology;  rigid 
standards  of  evidence;  knowledge  of  nervous  function;  the 
scientific  era.  The  anthropological  interest;  the  interest  of 
comparative  psychology;  the  study  of  character;  fusion  of 
these  interests. 

VI.  Fact  and  Fable  in  Animal  Psychology  . 173 

Sentimental  and  logical  attitude  toward  intelligence  of 
animals.  Psychological  criteria;  analysis  of  growth  of  mind 
in  the  child;  decisive  contrast  to  animal  limitations.  The 
performing  horse;  extravagant  pret*ensions  and  simple 
tricks;  inconsistency  of  belief  in  marvelous  powers  of 
trained  animals;  the  evidence  from  errors.  The  tendency  to 
credit  marvels;  the  uncritical  attitude;  self-deception. 

VII.  “Malicious  Animal  Magnetism”  . . . 191 

“M.  A.  M.”  as  Mrs.  Eddy’s  personal  delusion;  the  sources 
of  the  belief;  ancient  superstition  and  folk-lore  survival; 
mesmerism  and  “animal  magnetism.”  Mrs.  Eddy’s  indebt- 
edness to  Quimby;  mesmeric  manipulations;  the  incorpo- 
ration of  the  notion  in  “Christian  Science”;  the  victims  of 
the  beliefs  of  “M.  A.  M.”  Diagnosis  of  Mrs.  Eddy;  para- 
noiac sentiments.  Revival  of  the  belief  in  the  Christian 
Science  Church;  its  relations  to  Mrs.  Stetson.  Benevolent 
“absent  treatment”  finds  its  coimterpart  in  “M.  A.  M.”; 
the  pernicious  belief  resisted;  the  reserved  acceptance  by 
Mrs.  Eddy’s  followers,  of  the  principles  of  Christian  Science 
and  of  her  personal  vagaries;  the  true  psychology  and  false 
philosophy  of  mental  healing. 

Vni.  The  Democratic  Suspicion  of  Education  218 

Introduction  to  the  psychology  of  controversial  issues. 

The  older  suspicion  of  learning;  the  shifting  relations  of 
theory  and  practice.  The  democratic  control;  the  role  of  the 
universities;  in  Europe  and  America.  Democratic  provi- 
sions for  education;  the  retention  of  university  control  by 
an  external  body;  political  influence.  The  democratie  em- 
phasis of  practical  knowledge;  insistence  upon  results;  em- 
ployment of  learning  in  subordinate  capacity.  The  conflict 


CONTENTS 


xviii 

of  public  service  and  private  control;  the  political  suspicion 
of  education;  internal  control  the  solution. 

IX.  The  Psychology  of  Indulgence:  Alcohol 

AND  Tobacco 246 

The  special  psychology  of  a practical  controversy.  Phys- 
iological side  of  the  “cases”  of  alcohol  and  tobacco;  food- 
value  and  zest- value;  discriminating  appreciation  and  indul- 
gence; undiscriminating  antipathy  and  prohibitory  meas- 
ures; parallel  “cases”  of  anti-vaccination  and  anti-vivi- 
section; technical  interests  and  sane  regulation.  Judicial 
type  of  opposition;  moral  denunciation  and  aesthetic  objec- 
tion; the  legitimacy  of  sentiment;  Puritanism  and  tolerance; 
the  sympathetic  court  of  indulgence.  The  need-and-satis- 
faction  motives  of  indulgence;  the  attitude  and  environ- 
ment of  indulgence;  the  temperamental  factor;  the  holiday 
mood;  conflict  of  morality  and  indulgence.  The  psychology 
of  suppression;  the  Freudian  view;  the  release  of  tensions; 
tolerance  and  abuse,  their  regulation;  the  redemption  by  the 
setting. 

X.  The  Feminine  Mind 280 

The  several  phases  of  the  “woman  question.”  The  nature 
of  the  feminine  endowment;  the  biological,  the  academic,  and 
the  worldly  interpretations.  Natural  and  nurtural  common 
sex  traits;  derivative  traits;  heredity  and  original  sources  of 
power;  food,  sex,  and  play;  natural  and  acquired  values. 

Early  setting  of  masculine  and  feminine  qualities;  the  sex 
ardor  and  mental  aggressiveness  of  the  male;  nurture  reen- 
forces nature;  the  infusion  of  transferred  pursuits  by  original 
zest.  The  feminine  psychology;  larger  affectability;  qualities 
of  courtship  and  mothering;  their  transfer  and  the  feminine 
technique.  The  intellectual  sphere;  the  central  logical 
powers  and  the  supporting  psychological  traits.  The  evi- 
dence of  tests;  special  and  general  tests;  their  interpretation; 
tests  of  achievement;  vocation  selection  and  fitness;  the 
composite  sources  of  achievement;  disqualification  by  con- 
vention; qualities  and  their  expression.  Feminism  and  au- 
thentic sex  differences;  the  protest  against  disqualification; 
civilization  and  transformed  masculine  and  feminine  traits; 
the  division  of  labor;  the  masculinization  of  industry;  mis- 


CONTENTS 


XIX 


leading  assumptions;  educational,  social,  and  political  re- 
strictions; women’s  rights;  the  cultural  services  of  men  and 
women;  feminism  and  pacifism. 

XI.  Militaeism  and  Pacifism 326 

The  issue  as  a conflict  of  interests,  of  political  rule,  and 
of  ideas;  the  right  of  psychology  to  a voice.  The  values  at 
stake;  the  uncertainty  of  the  terms;  injustice  of  extreme 
positions;  war  disturbs  the  judicial  attitude;  the  need  of 
preserving  other  values;  the  limitations  imposed  by  war; 
the  conflict  of  ends  and  means;  the  sanction  of  the  Allied 
cause.  The  distorted  view  of  pacifism;  the  logical  paradox; 
pacifistic  reservations;  analogous  interactions  of  principle 
and  practice;  the  several  objections  to  the  world  war;  the 
proportion  of  pacifist  objection;  the  perversion  of  prejudice. 

The  principles  of  militarism;  the  German  upholders:  Hegel, 
Nietzsche,  Treitschke,  Bernhardi ; their  disciples.  The  tem- 
pered case  for  militarism;  political  service  and  the  “great  illu- 
sion ’’ ; economic  forces  and  internationalism  ; thephilosophy 
of  force ; elimination  of  war  and  the  impairment  of  the  po- 
litical structure ; substitutes  for  war  and  their  limitations ; 
the  spirit  of  their  administration.  The  moral  benefits  of 
war;  the  losses;  retention  of  benefits  in  other  service;  the 
moralization  of  war  derived  from  the  gains  of  peace;  the  ter- 
rible moral  degradation  proves  extreme  menace  of  militarism. 

The  pacifist  movement;  anti-militarism;  constructive  poli- 
cies; the  difficulty  of  establishment  or  refutation  of  claims; 
the  uncertain  bearing  of  precedents;  significant  lesson  from 
the  outgrown  causes  of  war;  summary  of  pacifist  arguments; 
the  appeal  to  conviction.  The  institutional  tendencies  of 
pacifism  and  militarism;  the  congeniality  of  militarism  and 
absolutism,  of  pacifism  and  democracy;  judicious  interpre- 
tation; difficulty  of  distinguishing  between  defense  and  of- 
fense; the  limitations  of  force;  the  German  assault  on  mili- 
tarism; the  international  spirit  and  the  claims  of  reason. 


Index 


383 


I 


I 

THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


I 

A NOTABLE  contribution  of  the  world  convulsion  of  1914 
and  thereafter  is  to  the  psychology  of  conviction.  It 
has  been  made  plain  as  never  before  that  the  strength 
and  directions  of  men’s  convictions  — authoritatively 
formulated  in  loyalties  — furnish  the  decisive  motive 
power  of  the  world’s  energies.  Under  this  stimulus  the 
need  of  inquiry  into  the  mental  processes  that  generate 
and  direct  convictions  becomes  increasingly  imperative. 
There  can  be  no  question  where  beginnings  lie.  The 
original  source  of  conviction  is  emotion.  In  terms  of  the 
world’s  crisis,  the  modus  vivendi  of  nations  is  still  expres- 
sible in  Mr.  Wells’s  phrase:  a “convention  between 
jealousies,”  and  jealousy  is  an  intense  and  disturbing 
emotion.  The  initial  factor  in  the  genesis  of  conviction 
is  the  rivalry  between  reason  and  emotion.  Convictions 
are  commonly  and  rightly  considered  as  products  of 
rational  consideration;  they  testify  to  the  distinctive 
quality  of  the  human  mind  — conceived  and  glorified 
as  the  instrument  of  thought,  the  creator  of  civilization. 
In  this  view  the  progress  of  science  unfolds  as  the  tri- 
umph of  reason.  Fundamentally  it  is  true  that  the  pat- 
tern of  conviction  is  designed  and  wrought  of  reason’s 
thread,  but  not  simply  so.  The  design  deviates,  the 
workmanship  is  irregular,  as  thinking  is  emotionalized 
and  favors  the  desired  conclusion. 


2 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


The  psychology  of  conviction  surveys  the  play  of 
forces  that  shape  the  aims  of  men,  however  fine-spun 
or  rough-hewn.  The  spirit  of  the  survey  is  analytic;  its 
method  utilizes  the  historic  retrospect,  studying  beliefs 
that  once  have  lived  and  flourished,  but  interprets  them 
by  insight  into  the  motives  of  convictions  warmly  vital, 
pragmatically  alive,  dispensing  mingled  profit  and  loss. 
Living  beliefs,  cherished  and  effective,  alone  supply 
adequate  specimens  for  study.  Their  analysis  is  vivi- 
sectional,  yet  proceeds  upon  a competent  control  of 
established  anatomical  and  physiological  relations. 

To  reach  convictions  implies  an  impulse  toward 
thinking;  it  implies  the  elementary  data  of  experience, 
and  the  standard  social  environment  in  which  beliefs 
operate  and  determine  conduct.  With  these  assumed, 
attention  may  be  focused  at  once  upon  a constant, 
world-old  and  ever  active  factor,  which  may  be  called 
docility,  contagion,  complacency,  imitation,  convention 
— one  and  all  of  a nature  compact.  In  this  broader 
view,  men’s  convictions,  generation  by  generation,  have 
been  accepted  traditionally,  as  they  still  are.  In  every 
direction  of  inquiry,  beliefs  have  been  embraced,  and 
have  kept  thinking  alive,  that  to  later,  more  enlightened 
views  appear  strange,  fanciful,  and  irrational.  Most 
generally,  people  have  believed  and  continue  to  believe 
what  they  are  told  and  taught  to  believe.  In  terms  of 
eflBciency  this  factor  in  the  psychology  of  conviction 
dwarfs  all  others,  and  may  throw  them  out  of  perspec- 
tive. Men  of  affairs  as  well  as  psychologists  must  con- 
tinue to  reckon  with  this  comprehensive  and  insist- 
ent— whether  wise  or  unwise  — imitative-conservative 
tendency.  Its  field  of  operation  is  wide.  In  the  inter- 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


3 


pretation  of  nature  and  man’s  place  in  it;  in  the  inti- 
mate contact  with  animals  as  quarry,  as  beasts  of  bur- 
den, and  as  companions;  in  the  regulation  of  human 
intercourse  — of  family  and  tribe,  of  industry  and  con- 
quest; in  the  formulation  of  myth  and  the  constructions 
of  religion;  in  the  establishment  of  the  social  order,  the 
dominant  procedure  by  which  uniformity  is  obtained 
is  that  of  unquestioning  acceptance;  as  in  the  practical 
domain  of  customs  and  morals,  it  is  a like-minded  ten- 
dency to  conformity.  In  regard  to  these  the  ordinary 
man  follows  responsively,  though  with  growing  educa- 
tion more  and  more  responsibly.  Penalties  are  attached 
to  violations,  and  the  taboo  rules  with  universal  tyranny. 
Laws  grow  in  strength  and  sanction  with  usage;  no 
phase  of  thought  or  action,  momentous  or  trivial,  is 
exempt  from  the  rigidity  of  the  established.  The  dead 
hand  of  the  past  lays  its  heavy  burden  upon  man’s 
thinking,  permeates  the  psychology  of  enlightened  as 
of  primitive  belief.  From  a kindred  source,  in  other 
temper,  are  derived  the  lessons  of  history,  the  conti- 
nuity of  science,  the  increasing  purposes  of  men  and 
nations. 

By  virtue  of  its  comprehensive  scope,  the  factor  of 
conventional  conformity  may  be  assumed  to  be  familiar. 
It  occupies  the  background,  constant  in  its  presence, 
shifting  in  its  setting,  against  which  ail  other  forces, 
jointly  operative,  are  projected.  Similarly  important 
is  the  fact  that  in  any  liberal  and  modern  environment, 
conformity  escapes  from  a narrow  and  stereotyped  pre- 
scription and  proscription,  and  encounters  the  rivalry 
of  conventions,  the  contests  of  opinions,  the  competi- 
tive selection  among  the  loyalties.  Congenial  beliefs 


4 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


are  absorbed,  uncongenial  ones  shunned,  or,  more  truly, 
fail  to  enter  the  orbit  of  consideration.  The  conventional 
combines  with  and  may  prevail  above  the  emotional 
factor  in  the  issue.  The  gregarious,  the  social,  the  coop- 
erative forces  draw  upon  the  supporting  emotions,  and 
merge  the  two.  Convictions  are  formed  and  sustained 
that  are  emotionally  acceptable  and  traditionally  ac- 
cepted by  a considerable  group  of  one’s  tribes-folk, 
neighbors,  fellow-citizens;  these  are  institutionally  rein- 
forced by  the  sanction  of  tradition  and  authority.  But 
with  the  systematization  of  knowledge  and  the  expand- 
ing tutelage  of  science,  the  play  of  logical  thinking 
increases  notably.  In  any  modern  approach  the  psy- 
chology of  conviction  presents  its  problems  as  those  of 
rival  reasoning  and  logical  selection;  it  requires  the  in- 
vestigation of  the  complex  processes  of  inclination  (or 
plausibility) , by  which  the  few  are  chosen  among  the 
many  called  or  calling.  It  asks  why  the  corner-stone 
of  one  man’s  mental  edifice  is  rejected  by  the  build- 
ers of  others. 

To  consider  the  processes  of  conviction  in  any  mea- 
sure of  detachment  from  its  content  is  a sterile  proce- 
dure. The  life  that  is  in  them,  however  spiritually  or  for- 
mally sustained,  flows  in  a definitely  conditioned  body. 
Lip-service  in  belief  and  hollow  observance  of  custom 
are  common  incidents.  The  recital  of  creeds  and  rituals 
with  a feeble  sense  of  meaning  finds  its  parallel  in  the 
allegiance  to  institutions,  cults,  laws,  systems,  parties, 
tenets,  and  practical  attitudes  with  slight  and  vague 
appreciation  of  their  basis,  either  by  way  of  import  or 
justification;  for  convention  and  the  congeniality  of 
adjustment  rule.  The  part  of  reason,  as  likewise  of  a 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


5 


less  explicit  intelligence,  in  the  maintenance  of  convic- 
tions that  are  none  the  less  warmly  cherished  and  em- 
braced, is  limited;  these  limitations  form  the  clues  to 
the  understanding  of  the  forces  by  which  beliefs  live  and 
move  and  have  their  being.  The  recognizable  features 
through  which  that  being  is  made  manifest  appear  as 
the  points  of  attachment  of  belief;  they  determine  what 
men  believe  as  well  as  in  another  phase  of  their  complex 
psychology  they  determine  why  men  believe. 

II 

If  this  approach  is  rightly  set,  the  chief  determinants 
of  the  psychology  of  conviction,  with  bearing  alike  upon 
process  and  content,  are  emotion  and  convention. 
Fundamentally  beliefs  are  formed  and  held  because 
they  satisfy,  because  they  minister  to  some  deep  psy- 
chological craving,  or  some  simpler  need  or  indulgence; 
equally  significant  is  the  sharing  of  such  beliefs  with 
others,  which  is  their  indispensable  social  reinforcement 
and  gives  the  added  value  of  a conscious  adjustment 
and  an  acknowledged  approval. 

Before  considering  at  closer  range  the  nature  of  the 
satisfactions  that  sustain  convictions,  their  psychology 
should  be  brought  into  relation  with  yet  more  compre- 
hensive, allied  processes.  The  general  formula  is  sup- 
plied by  sensibility,  which  stands  as  the  parent  type  of 
the  instrument  of  distinction.  As  ever,  the  feeling  fac- 
tor is  basic;  the  elemental  distinction  is  that  between 
pleasure  and  pain.  Recognition  promptly  enters,  and 
fuses  as  it  extends  the  lessons  of  comfort  and  discom- 
fort, of  profit  and  loss.  It  widens  rapidly  to  increasing 
circles  of  distinctive  mental  situations,  inherent  in  the 


6 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


indirect  responses  required  of  complexly  intelligent 
agents.  Eventually  distinction  becomes  an  explicit  and 
a logical  process  — a delineation  between  truth  and 
error.  In  simpler  situations  men  feel  their  way  by  sup- 
port of  sensibilities;  gradually  they  come  to  reason  their 
way  through  the  problems  that  confront  them.  In  any 
practical  modern  situation  the  rational  factor  is  so  per- 
vasive, so  intricate,  alike  by  nature  and  tradition,  that 
a prolonged  and  complex  process  of  education  is  neces- 
sary to  fit  the  individual  to  cope  with  it.  The  place  of 
the  keystone  in  the  educative  process  is  held  by  the 
structure  of  science,  composed  of  highly  specialized 
systems  of  relations,  orderly  analyses  of  causes  and 
effects,  rigid  establishment  of  principles.  These  guide 
and  support  the  most  directive  convictions  of  the 
human  mind.  In  them  appear  the  most  adequate  prod- 
ucts of  the  logical  mind,  not  detached  from  psychology, 
but  surmounting  it.  Yet  the  earlier  modes  of  reaching 
convictions,  and  the  satisfactions  attending  them,  per- 
sist; they  yield,  but  never  with  complete  surrender,  to 
the  later  discipline. 

The  varieties  of  distinctions  in  the  higher  reaches  of 
the  mind,  where  lies  the  psychology  of  mature  and 
complex  convictions,  comprise  more  than  the  logical 
ones.  The  regulations  of  attitude  and  action  which 
they  serve  are  commonly  distinguished  as  of  three 
orders : the  logical,  the  moral,  the  aesthetic.  In  all  there 
is  a rightness  and  a wrongness,  a principle  of  selection 
which  distinguishes  alike  the  decisions  and  the  natures 
of  men.  The  logically  right,  the  morally  right,  the 
aesthetically  right  is  set  apart  — sharply  it  may  be, 
with  delicacy  and  uncertainty  of  distinction  more  com- 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


7 


monly  — from  the  wrong.  More  specific  terms  are 
available.  Logically  there  is  the  correct  and  the  false, 
truth  and  error;  morally  there  is  good  and  bad  in  con- 
duct and  intention;  aesthetically  the  standards  are  more 
variable,  more  responsive  to  condition,  but  the  distinc- 
tion between  good  taste  and  bad  taste  and  their  prod- 
ucts is  no'less  real.  Convictions  reflect  these  several 
phases  of  a common  human  nature.  Conduct  is  deter- 
mined by  logical,  moral,  and  aesthetic  convictions.  The 
factors  cumulate  and  interact.  The  conviction  is  formu- 
lated as  one,  but  embodies  logical,  moral,  and  aesthetic 
considerations.  Now  one  and  now  another  phase 
dominates;  but  the  selecting  mind  is  at  once  and  com- 
positely  logical,  moral,  and  aesthetic  in  its  temper, 
expresses  loyalty  to  each  and  aU.  Hence  the  com- 
plexity of  the  psychology  of  conviction.  The  same 
conclusion  — which  practically  is  a regulation  of  con- 
duct through  attitude  and  belief  — is  reinforced  by 
logical,  moral,  and  aesthetic  supports.  Men  share  a 
common  allegiance  in  belief  or  action  upon  a somewhat 
different  grouping  of  motives  and  reasons. 

The  practical  criterion  throughout  is  conduct.  What 
men  do  depends  upon  what  they  believe,  and  how  they 
feel;  their  thoughts  and  feelings  are  important  because 
these  affect  their  actions.  The  common  utility  is  in 
the  regulation  of  behavior.  We  thus  return  to  the  role 
of  conviction  as  a determiner  of  conduct.  Schooling 
and  experience,  book-learning  and  practical  occu- 
pations, dealings  with  men  and  all  manners  of  social 
observances  and  institutions  — all  of  which  are  regu- 
lated by  beliefs  in  the  form  of  traditional  explanations 
— leave  as  their  deposit  a logical  sense,  which  acts 


8 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


after  the  manner  of  sensibility  of  the  sensory  type  but 
with  a more  complex  psychology.  The  logical  sense 
also  follows  its  type,  reflects  the  stage  of  culture  of  the 
times,  the  social  station,  the  mental  development.  It 
functions  by  accepting  congenial  orders  of  belief  and 
rejecting  others,  while  the  very  conditions  of  its  accept- 
ances preclude  from  its  horizon  orders  of  conviction 
beyond  its  ken.  All  this  is  familiar  because  the  like 
holds  of  every  evolutionary  product.  The  logical  sense 
is  the  slowest,  most  laborious,  as  well  as  the  most  pre- 
cious of  psychological  growths.  As  commonly  exercised 
by  the  average  man,  it  keeps  him  fairly  safe  from  crude 
error  so  long  as  he  remains  on  familiar  ground.  Within 
these  limitations  it  distinguishes  between  the  true  and 
the  false,  much  as  his  senses  — in  turn  not  so  well  pro- 
tected as  those  of  animals  — distinguish  (though  not 
infallibly)  between  wholesome  and  unwholesome  food. 
But  to  follow  the  lead  of  one’s  mind  is  a far  more  intri- 
cate matter  than  to  follow  one’s  eyes  or  one’s  nose. 
And  similarly  of  one’s  moral  sense  and  one’s  aesthetic 
sense:  these  select  among  the  alternatives  of  conduct 
and  preferences  of  attitude,  make  their  way  through 
situations,  and  in  their  exercise  according  to  one’s 
schooling  and  tradition  confer  alike  logical,  moral,  and 
aesthetic  sensibilities  and  their  satisfactions  — all  of 
them  capable  of  indefinite  expansion.  The  record  of 
that  expansion  is  in  a profound  sense  the  story  of 
civilization. 

The  moral  sense  and  the  aesthetic  sense  are  truer  to 
the  parent  type  in  that  their  affective  ingredient  is 
strong,  and  their  social  dependence  marked.  Moral 
convictions  and  the  satisfactions  which  they  bring  — 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


9 


and  with  a different  bearing  the  same  is  true  of  aesthetic 
ones  — affect  the  entire  psychology  of  conviction.  To 
neglect  in  any  measure  the  moral  and  aesthetic  mo- 
ments in  the  genesis  and  operation  of  convictions  is  to 
miss  the  genius  of  their  nature,  the  source  of  their 
strength.  Logical  convictions  and  the  satisfactions  at- 
taching to  them  are  in  all  respects  more  derivative 
and  more  artificial,  belong  characteristically  to  later 
educational  stages.  Yet  our  chief  concern  is  with  them, 
because  the  latter-day  issues,  which  alone  adequately 
illustrate  the  psychology  of  conviction  as  it  affects  our 
beliefs  and  attitudes,  are  so  largely  intellectual  mat- 
ters. Our  approach  to  them  and  our  faith  in  them  is  in 
the  main  a logical  one.  The  distmbances  of  the  even 
tenor  of  our  logical  ways  by  the  strong  currents  of 
moral  and  aesthetic  emotions  and  sentiments  form  a 
vital  part  of  our  problems.  They  shape  daily  preju- 
dices no  less  than  the  jealousies  and  unreasoning  loyal- 
ties that  precipitate  world’s  crises. 

Ill 

The  profitable  pursuit  of  the  psychology  of  convic- 
tion proceeds  by  the  “case”  method.  Outgrown  and 
discarded  beliefs  and  attitudes,  no  less  than  those 
within  our  living  experience,  furnish  the  data  for  in- 
structive analysis  and  suggestive  diagnosis.  Types  of 
belief  demonstrably  false,  yet  once  prevalent  and  com- 
manding the  allegiance  of  a considerable  portion  of  men 
of  fair  or  superior  intelligence,  still  bring  a valuable 
lesson  in  the  analysis  of  the  appeal  which  they  once 
made,  in  the  dissection  of  the  motives  and  arguments 
which  led  to  their  acceptance.  As  such  types  of  belief 


10 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


are  selected  from  among  modern,  even  contemporary 
movements,  the  use  of  latter-day  enlightened  criteria 
is  the  more  justifiable;  less  allowance  need  be  made  for 
an  imperfect  logic  and  for  the  as  yet  unexplored  regions 
of  the  continent  of  science.  In  point  of  fact  the  illus- 
trations are  continuous,  with  no  breach  of  analogy 
between  ancient  credulity  and  its  modern  representa- 
tives, no  abrupt  change  in  the  motives  or  the  mechan- 
isms of  appeal.  With  due  allowance  for  the  change  of 
outlook  and  attitude  of  other  days  and  other  ways, 
there  must  be  considered  the  parallel  changes  in  the 
grouping  of  forces  at  the  focus  of  each  problem  con- 
sidered. This  gives  the  set  to  the  psychology  of  the 
several  “cases”  of  conviction;  the  cases  fall  into  types, 
and  the  differentiation  of  types  becomes  the  psycholo- 
gist’s task. 

In  clinical  metaphor,  each  “case”  requires  the  study 
of  its  antecedents,  of  the  mode  of  life,  and  the  in- 
dividuality of  the  patient  and  of  the  nature  of  the 
disease  from  which  he  suffers.  Patient  and  disease 
are  at  once  one  and  distinct.  The  study  of  a “case” 
of  conviction  requires  knowledge  of  the  antecedents  of 
the  problems  and  its  bearings  upon  human  interests, 
along  with  a study  of  the  appeal  which  it  makes  and  the 
psychology  of  its  adherents.  There  is  the  psychology 
of  the  conviction  as  an  objective  belief,  and  the  psy- 
chology of  the  convinced  as  a subjective  issue.  If  one 
assumed  a detached  point  of  view,  one  might  separate 
the  strictly  logical  cases  and  recognize  beliefs  accepted 
upon  evidence  and  applied  coldly  and  consistently. 
In  this  view  the  logical  plant  — which  is  the  human 
mind  — would  accept  the  crude  material  in  the  form 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


11 


of  data  and  turn  out  the  finished  product  as  conclu- 
sions. If  the  result  proves  to  be  false,  the  fault  lies  in 
a too  ready  acceptance  of  premises  or  their  imperfect 
manipulation.  Such  an  analysis  is  bare  and  formal, 
literally  true  but  psychologically  barren.  Yet,  as  will 
presently  appear,  a fair  approximation  to  the  type  may 
be  selected.  The  inclination  to  accept  the  premises 
upon  the  (inadequate)  evidence,  and  the  tendency  to 
point  the  data  to  the  ends  reached  (prepossession)  are 
as  real  as  the  formal  logical  processes.  These  tenden- 
cies make  the  psychology  of  the  problem,  constitute 
its  character. 

“Cases”  of  this  order  may  readily  be  summoned 
from  the  annals  of  science.  Consider  the  explanation 
of  fossils.  Under  a scholastic  type  of  word-learning 
they  were  ascribed  to  a “stone-making  force,”  a “lapi- 
dific  juice,”  “seminal  air,”  “tumultuous  movement 
of  terrestrial  exhalations.”  To  our  type  of  science- 
drilled  mind,  all  this  is  the  mere  husk  and  shell  of  ex- 
planation, empty  verbiage,  stale  and  unprofitable.  Yet 
it  is  a factor  in  the  psychology  of  conviction.  Dogma 
and  formulae,  formidable  words,  like  popular  slogans, 
help  to  carry  conviction.  They  are  more  apt  to  con- 
tribute to  obvious  fallacy  and  pretense  than  to  subtle 
error;  but  they  play  their  part  variably.  On  the  other 
hand,  when  the  upholders  of  scriptural  literalism  ac- 
counted for  fossils  as  “sports  of  nature,”  as  models 
made  by  the  Creator  before  he  had  decided  upon  the 
most  suitable  forms  for  animals,  or  as  snares  hidden 
by  the  Almighty  to  tempt  the  unorthodox,  we  are 
plimged  at  once  into  definite  prepossessions  and  al- 
legiances to  accepted  doctrines  which  have  powerfully 


12 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


affected  not  only  the  beliefs  but  the  actions  of  men. 
Charges  of  heresy  lurk  in  the  background,  and  we 
enter  upon  the  warfare  of  science  ^ with  dogmatically 
established  conviction,  however  fortified.  When  Vol- 
taire argued  (one  does  know  how  seriously)  that  “fos- 
sil fishes  were  the  remains  of  fishes  intended  for  food, 
but  spoiled  and  thrown  away  by  travelers;  that  the 
fossil  shells  were  accidently  dropped  by  Crusaders 
and  pilgrims  retinning  from  the  Holy  Land,”  we  read 
the  explanation  with  a strange  sense  of  incongruity 
between  data  and  conclusion.  The  true  explanation 
might  have  appeared  strained  to  Voltaire,  because  the 
facts  underlying  it  were  so  completely  out  of  his  ken. 
Everywhere  facts  and  theories  cooperate  and  deter- 
mine plausibility.  We  reach  an  undisputed  “case”  of 
credulity,  not  merely  of  weak  hypothesis,  when  we 
learn  of  one  Beringer  who  presented  long  arguments 
to  prove  that  fossils  were  “stones  of  a peculiar  sort, 
hidden  by  the  Author  of  nature  for  his  own  pleasure.” 
It  is  related  that  Beringer’s  students  prepared  baked- 
clay  fossils  of  fish,  flesh,  and  fowl  — and  even  speci- 
mens with  Hebrew  and  Syriac  inscriptions  upon  them 
— and  buried  them  in  the  Herr  Professor’s  favorite 
digging  places.  Illustrations  of  these  miraculous  fossils 
were  published,  with  the  subsequent  attempt  of  the 
author  to  suppress  the  work  when  the  deception  be- 

* It  is  in  such  service  that  Andrew  D.  White’s  A History  of  the  War- 
fare of  Science  with  Theology  (1896),  has  become  a classic.  Science  is 
neutral  in  its  campaign.  It  necessarily  regards  dogma  as  its  enemy; 
it  respects  the  province  of  religion  when  the  latter  refrains  from  an 
invasion  of  occupied  territory.  The  tremendous  struggle  of  the  evo- 
lutionary position  to  gain  a foothold  in  the  nineteenth  century  is  an 
adequate  example  of  the  varied  prejudices  which  scientific  argument 
may  encounter,  in  enlightened  times. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


13 


came  known.  As  an  individual  “case”  of  credulity 
the  incident  would  be  amusing  only;  its  significance 
lies  in  this:  that  not  the  inherent  improbability  of  the 
conclusion  by  our  standards,  but  the  standard  of  judg- 
ment of  the  convinced  scholar  is  the  essential  consid- 
eration. The  tendency  to  accept  the  explanation  of  the 
origin  of  fossils  (the  theory)  is  congenial  to  the  accept- 
ance of  the  “finds”  as  corroborative  (the  facts).  But 
in  the  “case”  of  fossils,  however  explained,  an  objec- 
tive attitude  is  readily  taken.  The  conviction  carries 
no  social  or  emotional  consequences;  one’s  views  of 
fossils  have  no  bearing  upon  conduct,  or  at  best  a 
most  remote  one.  It  sets  up  no  allegiances  of  a prac- 
tical order,  creates  no  causes  or  loyalties,  except  as  the 
convictions  one  espouses  become  extensions  of  one’s 
personality,  defended  with  the  warmth  of  a cause 
embraced. 

IV 

It  is  the  peculiar  merit  of  beliefs  concerning  our  psy- 
chological nature  in  contrast  to  the  constitution  of 
natural  objects  like  fossils,  that  they  carry  such  a wide 
appeal,  play  so  largely  among  the  motives  that  sup- 
port vital  convictions,  while  yet  patterned  after  the 
manner  of  scientific  conclusions.  An  interesting  group 
of  beliefs  relates  to  the  interpretation  of  human  types 
and  differences.  The  ancient  doctrine  of  temperaments, 
explaining  the  psychological  types  of  men  by  the  domi- 
nance of  blood  (sanguine),  black  bile  (melanchohc),  yel- 
low bile  (choleric),  and  phlegm  (phlegmatic),  is  as  purely 
fictitious  and  as  baseless  as  the  cited  views  of  the  origin 
of  fossils;  but  it  persisted  with  remarkable  tenacity  and 


14 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


gave  rise  to  a varied  progeny  of  speculations  that  in 
turn  dominated  the  convictions  and  the  practices  of 
men.  The  doctrine  of  the  four  temperaments  was  in- 
corporated in  the  “humoral”  system  of  medieine. 
From  Hippocrates  to  Harvey,  diseases  were  diagnosed 
and  patients  treated  in  terms  of  the  “hot”  and  the 
“dry,”  the  “cold”  and  the  “moist,”  with  most  fan- 
tastic elaborations.  Chills  and  fevers,  parchings  and 
perspirations,  flushing  and  pallor,  eonfirmed  the  find- 
ings; and  the  recovery  of  the  patient  — by  the  assist- 
ance of  nature  or  in  spite  of  the  resistance  to  nature  — 
proved  the  value  of  the  system  and  established  the 
prestige  of  the  praetitioner.  The  explanation  of  disease 
(theory)  and  the  cure  of  ills  (practiee)  form  sueh  a 
powerful  motive  to  thought  and  action  that  the  entire 
armament  of  the  mind’s  powers  — seientific  and  im- 
aginative — was  brought  to  bear  upon  the  problem. 
The  most  ambitious  of  sueh  constructions  was  the 
medical  application  of  astrology,  seeking  the  fate  of 
men  in  the  positions  of  the  heavenly  bodies.  Medicines 
were  concoeted  and  administered  with  reference  to 
the  position  of  sun,  moon,  and  stars;  elaborate  corre- 
spondences were  set  up  connecting  the  mineral,  the 
vegetable,  the  animal  kingdoms  and  the  cosmic  sys- 
tems with  the  fates  of  men  and  the  cure  of  ills  that 
flesh  is  heir  to.  Disease  is  but  part  of  man’s  fate.  The 
prediction  of  the  future,  the  control  of  fortune,  the 
detection  of  talents  — all  combine  and  proceed  upon 
the  same  flimsy  logic  and  consoling  psychology.  The 
horoscope  summarizes  the  issue  astrologically  as  al- 
chemy, physiognomy,  palmistry,  phrenology,  and  their 
like  illustrate  the  persistence  of  the  notions  and  the  im- 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


15 


aginative  constructions  by  which  they  were  satisfied. 

These  vagaries  of  the  human  mind  in  the  realm 
of  conviction  — vagaries  to  us,  but  serious  beliefs  to 
former  generations  — embody  a common  psychological 
factor,  that  of  finding  what  one  seeks,  which  is  vital  to 
the  understanding  of  each  and  aU.  Also  central  to  their 
psychology  is  the  tendency  of  the  thought  to  shape  the 
issue  — the  peculiar  and  elusive  sense  in  which  think- 
ing aids  and  induces  the  result.  In  the  treatment  of 
disease  this  becomes  “mind-cure”  — the  faith  that 
facilitates  as  well  as  the  prejudice  that  blinds.  The  pos- 
session of  this  key  to  the  situation  — like  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  true  natme  of  fossils  — exposes  the  irrele- 
vance and  falsity  of  the  several  wild  if  shrewd  guesses 
and  proofs;  but  imlike  the  “case” -of  fossils,  the  mo- 
tives contributory  to  convictions  in  regard  to  human 
nature  and  the  control  of  human  fate  continue  in  subtle 
and  complex  form  to  shape  cmrent  views,  orthodox 
and  imorthodox  alike.  We  are  stiU  subject  to  disturb- 
ing influences  in  the  psychology  of  our  convictions,  in 
the  interpretation  of  our  own  psychology.  The  estab- 
lishment of  the  logic  of  science  in  these  realms  is  still 
imperfect  by  virtue  of  the  same  tendencies  — admit- 
tedly far  better  disciplined  — that  gave  currency  to 
beliefs  that  seem  to  us  preposterous  in  temper,  absurd 
in  evidence.  Thus  in  retrospect  the  dual  lesson  bear- 
ing upon  the  psychology  of  conviction  appears:  first, 
that  every  advance  in  understanding  is  a step  forward 
in  logic,  in  the  standards  of  evidence  and  the  rigidity 
of  conclusions,  in  the  conceptions  of  plausibility  and 
the  discipline  of  the  mind;  second,  that  the  forces 
inclining  to  behef  persist,  however  altered  their  per- 


16 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


spective,  and  continue  to  make  the  attainment  of 
reasonable  convictions  and  the  consistent  direction  of 
conduct  through  them,  a difficult  and  delicate  task  — 
the  art  of  intellectual  living.  Wisdom  is  the  name  for 
the  exercise  of  the  logical  function,  with  due  recogni- 
tion of  the  assets  and  liabilities  of  an  ancient  and  fal- 
lible human  psychology. 

Such  considerations  make  it  pertinent  to  look  upon 
persistences  or  revivals  of  beliefs  continuing  the  older 
patterns  of  conviction,  as  survivals  — never  simple, 
often  intricately  disguised.  Along  with  the  older  loy- 
alties they  incorporate  the  newer  ones;  particularly, 
they  profess  and  in  a measure  maintain  an  adherence 
to  high-grade  logical  standards.  Their  defection,  how- 
ever, is  as  commonly  and  as  essentially  a reversion  to 
older  psychological  habits  of  belief  as  to  a weakness 
in  logical  manipulation.  Such  “cases”  of  survival  are 
most  varied,  indeed  individual  in  composition.  Inter- 
esting examples  may  be  found  in  that  wide  domain 
already  surveyed,  belonging  to  psychology  in  a double 
sense:  the  one,  that  the  content  of  the  belief  relates 
to  the  conceptions  of  thinking  and  the  views  of  our 
psychic  nature;  the  other,  that  the  tendencies  shaping 
belief  in  this  realm  are  so  characteristic  of  the  “con- 
viction” phase  of  our  psychology.  One  of  these  “cases” 
and  the  most  typical  is  the  survival  and  revival  of  the 
belief  in  the  possession  of  powers  by  some  individuals 
in  defiance  or  transcendence  of  the  established  laws 
and  limitations  of  human  endowment.  So  character- 
istically psychological  is  this  conviction  that  the  phe- 
nomena associated  with  it  have  received  the  name  of 
“psychical  research”  — a term  irrelevant  or  mislead- 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


17 


ing,  but  harmless  if  accepted  as  a convenient  phrase. 
As  here  considered  there  is  no  choice  but  to  regard 
the  belief-tendency  thus  displayed  as  an  inclination  to- 
ward the  supernatmal.  This  trait  merits  detailed  analy- 
sis; its  “cases”  are  diflSciilt,  sometimes  baffling.  For 
the  belief  persists  in  minds  thoroughly  loyal  to  scien- 
tific ideals  in  other  realms.  The  “cases”  contribute  a 
further  factor  to  the  psychology  of  conviction,  and 
raise  the  interesting  question  of  consistency.  They 
suggest  the  existence  of  reserved  areas  of  belief,  more 
or  less  exempt  from  the  limitations  of  logic,  where  the 
satisfactions  of  belief  may  be  more  freely  sought  and 
accepted  without  logical  compimctions.  Such  indul- 
gences are  more  appropriately  considered  under  the 
personal  phases  of  belief;  but  they  contribute  essen- 
tially to  the  convictions  that  keep  alive  the  “proofs” 
of  telepathy  as  of  other  modes  of  mental  communica- 
tion unrecognized  by  psychology,  and  the  evidence  of 
survival  after  death  at  the  hands  or  mouths  of  me- 
diums. The  logical  interest  lies  in  the  elaborate  tech- 
nique which  such  convictions  have  developed  in  sup- 
port of  the  hypothesis,  and  the  continued  vitality  of 
the  belief,  despite  repeated  exposures  of  fraud  in  the 
accumulation  of  evidence  and  woeful  defects  in  logic 
in  the  arguments.  Much  of  the  belief  in  the  super- 
natural is  based  upon  the  conviction  that  the  facts 
cannot  be  otherwise  explained,  that  deception  is  im- 
possible. Such  assmnption  in  turn  has  its  reasons;  they 
lie  in  the  will  to  believe  and  the  gross  underestimation 
of  what  can  be  done  by  deliberate  or  subconscious  de- 
ception. 

It  is  fortunate  that  “cases”  of  belief  in  the  super- 


18 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


natural  occasionally  venture  into  the  domain  of  the 
physical  where  their  pretenses  invite  disclosure.  Such 
detective  service  is  in  no  way  obligatory  upon  physi- 
cists and  psychologists,  even  though  their  domain  is 
intruded  upon  and  their  title  challenged;  it  may  be 
accepted  as  an  obligation  in  the  interests  of  social  san- 
ity, which  any  competent  protagonist  of  science  may 
properly  imdertake.  Such  is  the  “case”  of  Paladino. 
Reduced  to  barest  outline,  in  the  presence  of  Eusapia 
Paladino  — a Neapolitan  woman  of  peasant  status  — 
tables  moved,  curtains  blew  to  and  fro,  tambourines 
rattled,  while  seemingly  her  hands  and  feet  were 
controlled.  Incidentally  the  large  compensations  for 
witnessing  the  performance  filled  her  purse.  AU  this 
exploitation  is  commonplace  and  sordid.  Upon  the  in- 
ability of  men  prominent  in  one  or  another  scientific 
field  to  detect  how  it  was  done,  is  reared  the  hypoth- 
esis that  these  occurrences  demonstrate  supernatural 
powers.  When  it  is  shown  by  counter-plotting  that 
the  “medium”  disengages  one  foot  and  lifts  the  table 
on  her  toes,  the  entire  logical  construction  tumbles 
ignominiously;  but  the  “psychology  of  conviction” 
of  the  case,  like  the  moral,  remains.  The  relation  be- 
tween premises  and  conclusion  before  the  convincing 
disclosure,  and  the  tendency  to  build  upon  them  the 
belief  in  the  supernatural,  are  just  the  same  as  before. 
The  factors  in  the  case  are  the  enormous  influence  of 
the  prestige  of  the  sponsors  for  a performance  that 
without  it  would  attract  slight  attention;  the  weak 
logical  sense  that  interprets  the  inability  to  detect  how 
a thing  is  done  as  strengthening  an  otherwise  unsup- 
ported hypothesis;  but  last  as  first,  the  tendency  be- 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


19 


low  the  surface  to  accept  the  supernatural  hypothesis 
is  responsible  for  the  “case.” 

This  group  of  survivals,  occupying  the  middle 
ground  between  old-time  credulity  and  present-day 
controversies,  is  a fairly  extensive  one.  It  may  be  ex- 
tended to  include  instances  in  which  older  conceptions 
are  applied  to  newer  problems  with  a weak  sense  of 
their  incongruity.  Such  is  the  problem  of  animal  in- 
telligence. The  inclination  to  ascribe  to  animals  re- 
markable powers  of  mind  is  more  creditable  to  human 
charity  than  to  human  logic;  it  is  more  a matter  of 
sentiment  than  of  logic.  The  science  that  speaks  with 
authority  on  this  issue  is  psychology.  In  view  of  the 
difficult  steps  by  which  man  has  slowly  gained  a criti- 
cal knowledge  of  his  own  endowment  and  its  work- 
ings, it  is  not  strange  that  the  like  is  true  of  his 
knowledge  of  the  animal  mind.  Psychology  has  es- 
tablished how  slow  and  laborious  are  the  steps  by 
which  a decent  logical  control  of  data  has  been  secured. 
The  process  is  illustrated  in  the  education  of  every 
child.  Yet  animal  prodigies  are  placed  on  exhibition, 
and  admiring  audiences  accept  simple  trick-perform- 
ances as  evidences  of  calculating  horses,  talking  dogs, 
and  educated  animal  geniuses.  Learned  books  are  writ- 
ten to  prove  that  neither  fraud  nor  self-deception  has 
entered;  the  interest  in  the  matter  is  so  disturbing  that 
commissions,  on  which  professors  of  psychology  serve, 
must  be  appointed  to  aUay  the  mental  unrest.  Once 
more  the  discrepancy  between  performance  and  con- 
viction is  flagrant.  A horse  paws  with  his  right  fore- 
foot (as  horses  do),  and  is  taught  to  continue  to  do 
so  imtil  he  perceives  a signal  to  stop.  The  performer 


20 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


advertises  that  the  horse  adds,  subtracts,  divides,  ex- 
tracts square  roots,  counts,  tells  people’s  ages,  knows 
grammatical  construction,  and  what  not.  (It  should  be 
added  that  a bright  horse  or  dog  is  so  keenly  observant 
that  owners  of  such  animals  may  believe  in  the  powers 
with  the  sincerity  of  self-deception.)  The  entire  “case” 
would  be  ludicrous  did  it  not  furnish  so  neat  an  ex- 
ample of  how  conviction  creates  miracles,  how  readily 
prepossessions  engender  credulity,  how  inadequate  is 
the  popular  notion  of  the  foundation  of  the  mental  pro- 
cesses used  by  all,  and  how  weak  may  be  the  logical 
sense  that  alone  can  protect  against  the  acceptance  of 
such  performances  at  their  alleged  value.  Even  in  the 
twentieth  century  the  case  of  “mathematical  horses” 
makes  a distinct  contribution  to  the  psychology  of 
conviction. 

V 

By  this  devious  route  we  come  to  the  present-day 
arena  of  contention  in  which  opposing  convictions,  all 
professing  a common  loyalty  to  logical  (or  it  may  be 
to  moral  or  aesthetic)  principles,  defend  opposite  con- 
clusions, favor  antagonistic  policies,  bid  for  support  as 
rivals,  and  array  men  in  parties  and  factions,  in  schools 
and  sects,  as  well  as  in  hostile  camps  and  campaigns. 
The  controversial  area  of  the  psychology  of  conviction 
is  a close  neighbor  to  those  considered;  their  boun- 
daries touch  and  overlap.  The  older  motives  reappear 
with  chastened  mien;  the  analysis  proceeds  more  con- 
siderately of  subtle  error  and  delicate  bias.  The  se- 
lection of  “cases”  is  difficult  by  embarrassment  of 
riches;  for  here  lies  the  source  of  the  saying:  many  men, 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


21 


many  minds.  The  desire  is  to  tap  the  controversial 
current  at  its  richest  flow,  to  illustrate  the  variety  of 
its  contributory  streams,  the  many  sources  of  its  hid- 
den springs.  As  a triad  of  such  issues,  sufficiently  typi- 
cal and  distinct,  may  be  selected  the  “case”  of  indul- 
gence, the  “case”  of  the  feminine  mind,  the  “case”  of 
militarism  and  pacifism.  In  the  one  issue  there  stand 
embattled  the  prohibitionists  and  those  who  favor  a 
sane,  even  an  indulgent  regulation  of  such  practices 
(admittedly  a serious  evil  in  excess)  as  the  use  of  to- 
bacco and  alcohol;  in  the  next,  the  feminists  contend- 
ing for  a nullification  of  the  restrictions  in  the  move- 
ments and  careers  of  women,  minimizing  the  differences 
of  the  sexes  and  their  inherent  consequences,  as  op- 
posed to  those  who  believe  these  differences  to  be 
vital,  comprehensive,  and  established;  in  the  last  the 
most  intensely  partisan  arraignment  by  believers  in 
peace,  of  the  horror,  waste,  and  unreason  of  war,  by 
believers  in  war  of  the  blindness,  sentimentalism,  and 
visionary  impracticality  of  pacifists.  The  fact  which 
the  psychology  of  “controversial”  convictions  faces  is 
that  in  the  presence  of  the  same  data  and  compar- 
able schooling  and  environments,  men  reach  deviating 
and  opposite  conclusions.  Each  party  believes  strongly 
that  he  has  definitely  proved  his  case.  Yet  it  cannot  be 
doubted  that  in  the  main  the  minds  thus  in  disagree- 
ment are  fairly  similar  problem-solving  instruments. 
They  are  not  identical  in  nature  nor  mechanical  in 
procedure.  The  human  mind  is  by  no  means  a loom 
receiving  raw  material,  and  with  the  pattern  once  set 
turning  out  a uniform  product.  For  simple  mathemati- 
cal processes  the  formula  holds;  it  makes  no  difference 


22 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


what  mind  performs  the  calculation.  In  controversial 
issues  and  practical  policies  it  makes  the  greatest 
difference  what  manner  of  mind  receives,  elaborates, 
considers,  and  concludes.  The  individual  factor  domi- 
nates and  yet  holds  true  to  type.  Differences  of  opin- 
ion as  of  policy  and  taste  are  not  chaotic  or  capricious 
or  arbitrary.  Despite  all  fluctuations,  reason  in  well- 
poised  minds  is  an  orderly  procedure,  and  principles 
endure.  The  temptations  to  depart  from  such  order 
are  precisely  the  points  of  interest  in  the  controversial 
phases  of  the  psychology  of  conviction. 

In  explanation  it  is  familiar  that  data  known  to  one 
mind  may  be  unknown  to  another,  and  that  the  impor- 
tance attached  to  one  group  of  data  may  differ  in  one 
mind  and  another.  But  behind  all  this  and  determin- 
ing it  is  the  predilection  that  selects  and  gives  weight 
to  groups  of  data  of  favorable  bearing,  inclines  the 
interpretation  to  a predetermined  bent,  and  reaches  a 
conclusion  more  by  reinforcement  of  an  anticipation 
than  by  any  progressive  step;  which  means  that  it  is 
not  the  force  of  evidence  but  the  magnetism  of  con- 
clusions that  attracts.  And  this  in  turn  is  true  because 
such  specific  predilections  in  regard  to  one  issue  or  an- 
other are  themselves  the  issue  of  a general  perspective 

— compositely  logical,  moral,  aesthetic,  and  practical 

— which  determines  the  values  of  experience  and  ar- 
guments, that  determine  the  set  of  one’s  convictions. 
We  may  call  this  character,  we  may  call  it  a point  of 
view  or  Weltanschauung,  and  bear  in  mind  that  this 
exists  as  really,  though  in  less  finished  and  articulate 
form,  for  the  unsophisticated  as  for  the  learned  mind. 
Indeed,  one  of  the  marked  differences  between  them 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


23 


is  the  relative  immunity  of  the  disciplined  mind  to 
the  disturbances  of  emotional  predilection  and  subcon- 
scious prejudice.  Yet  the  best-schooled  minds  take 
their  stand  determinedly,  with  stanch  convictions, 
claiming  no  exemption  from  human  bias,  but  mak- 
ing allowance  in  their  well-balanced  judgments  for  the 
psychology  of  conviction  as  operative  in  themselves 
and  in  the  world  in  which  their  influence  makes  itself 
felt.  Any  more  intimate  analysis  requires  the  con- 
creteness of  a specific  argument  with  all  its  ramifica- 
tions and  bearings,  its  traditional  relations  to  custom 
and  opinion.  By  considering  the  series  of  steps  by 
which  one  arrays  one’s  self  on  one  side  or  the  other  of 
such  controversies  as  those  concerning  prohibition, 
feminism,  and  militarism,  one  will  realize  the  manner 
in  which  facts,  arguments,  experience,  predilection,  and 
one’s  general  outlook  upon  the  values  and  precepts  of 
life,  cooperate  in  the  formation  of  positions,  attitudes, 
loyalties  — all  of  a practical  order.  In  this  estimate 
one  must  make  large  allowance  for  the  persistent  forces 
of  convention,  tradition,  and  imitation  as  individually 
operative;  for  these  spread  and  fix  conviction  quite 
as  they  disseminate  other  habits  of  reaction.  Parallel 
in  importance  remains  the  factor  of  a personal,  emo- 
tional, temperamental  congruity.  Furthermore,  in  con- 
troversial questions  where  so  commonly  the  data  are 
imperfectly  known  and  the  arguments  inadequately 
understood,  convictions  none  the  less  proceed  as  con- 
fidently — possibly  more  confidently  — imder  these 
limitations  as  in  their  absence.  For  doubt  is  an  im- 
pleasant  state  of  mind,  and  the  reaching  of  a decision 
and  the  taking  of  sides  constitutes  an  indispensable 
type  of  satisfaction. 


S4 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


The  incompleteness  of  this  analysis  of  the  psychology 
of  controversy  is  obvious.  It  is  intended  only  to  pre- 
pare for  the  analysis  of  concrete  cases;  for  the  “case” 
method  is  the  most  instructive  in  this  domain.  Two 
possible  factors  are  ignored:  the  one  the  element  of 
intentional  deception  or  the  distortion  of  a biased  in- 
terest; and  the  other  the  allied  element  of  hypocrisy 
and  inconsistency.  These  receive  some  attention  under 
the  consideration  of  the  personal  phases  of  belief;  yet 
they  play  a specific  part  in  controversial  issues.  In  il- 
lustration the  attitude  toward  education  as  a means  of 
fitting  the  mind  to  play  its  proper  part  in  life  offers  a 
pertinent  example.  The  ordinary  democratic  view  pro- 
fesses a cordial  support  of  education  and  an  admiration 
of  the  products  of  the  trained  mind.  But  actually  it 
distrusts  scholarship  and  deprives  it  of  a reasonable 
share  in  social  control.  Such  an  attitude  is  one  of 
suspicion  masked  by  avowed  confidence.  It  is  an 
excellent  and  by  no  means  isolated  instance  of  the 
inconsistency  between  theory  and  practice,  between 
profession  and  performance.  Since  most  controversies 
have  practical  issues,  this  phase  of  the  matter  is  often 
of  decided  consequence. 


VI 

We  turn  to  the  personal  aspect  of  conviction,  not  as 
a novel  factor  (for  everything  is  personal  in  the  sense 
that  there  are  no  beliefs,  only  believers),  but  as  a spe- 
cial emphasis.  What  men  believe  and  why  men  believe 
converge  in  the  satisfaction  of  belief  — which  is  a per- 
sonal reaction.  The  conviction  once  attained  in  con- 
formity with  one’s  psychology  yields  its  satisfaction 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


25 


in  the  removal  of  doubt,  the  support  of  conduct,  the 
consolation  of  faith,  the  guidance  by  principles,  the 
consistency  of  a system  or  point  of  view,  and  adds  to 
these  the  contented  feeling  of  adjustment.  Such  are  the 
common  functions  of  creed,  sect,  party,  principle,  code, 
custom,  loyalties.  The  act  of  subscription,  allegiance, 
enlistment,  settles  matters.  Patriotism  may  be  cited 
as  a comprehensive  expression  of  the  issue,  and  raises 
the  question  in  how  far  one’s  patriotism  is  a sentiment 
or  a conviction.  An  American  can  with  difficulty  con- 
ceive his  allegiance  of  country  as  otherwise  disposed. 
Yet  he  knows  that  milhons  of  his  fellow-citizens  of 
like  nature  with  himself  profess  an  adopted  allegiance, 
while  a divided  one  (neglecting  the  complexities  of 
the  great  war)  is  wholly  compatible  with  a proper  con- 
sistency of  purpose  and  attitude.  AU  this  is  fairly 
well  understood,  for  it  operates  close  to  the  surface  of 
our  dehberations  and  our  articulate  sentiments.  Fol- 
lowing this  trend,  one  might  conclude  that  the  desir- 
able order  of  satisfaction  is  as  obtainable  from  one  type 
of  belief  as  from  another.  Loyalty  is  everywhere  simi- 
larly conditioned;  the  sense  of  attachment  is  the  main 
thing  and  may  be  inculcated  as  readily  upon  the  plat- 
form of  absolute  autocracy  in  government  as  of  the 
freest  democracy.  It  is  not  in  such  types  of  conviction 
that  the  distinctively  personal  factor  is  conspicuous; 
quite  the  contrary,  it  is  in  such  larger  loyalties  — all 
supported  by  convictions  — that  the  individual  merges 
with  the  crowd,  with  the  collective  mass,  and  even  sur- 
renders to  it.  This,  however,  does  not  detract  from  the 
personal  intensity  of  the  convictions  thus  formed,  nor 
from  their  efficiency.  Upon  the  sentiment  of  patriot- 


26 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


ism,  and  the  conviction  that  one’s  country  is  in  the 
right,  is  based  the  integrity  of  nations,  even  to  the 
supreme  sacrifice  of  the  soldier.  Defection  in  this  atti- 
tude may  mean  mutiny  and  treason.  It  is  a sobering 
reflection  that  the  ultimate  bond  of  nations,  as  every- 
where the  unity  of  a collective  purpose,  rests  upon  the 
integrity  of  the  personal  convictions  of  those  enlisted. 
This  is  the  fundamental  reality  and  gives  to  the  study 
of  conviction  its  unique  importance.  That  such  per- 
sonal intensity  of  conviction  may  come  from  any  or 
many  sources,  must  ever  be  borne  in  mind. 

It  is  in  the  more  individual  affiliations  and  in  the 
narrower  circle  of  one’s  loyalties  that  the  personal 
element  appears  in  stronger  relief.  There  is  one  sys- 
tem of  psychology,  with  bearings  upon  the  genesis  and 
nature  of  conviction,  that  is  entitled  to  precedence  in 
our  considerations.  The  psychology  of  Freud  is  reared 
upon  the  relation  between  motive  and  belief,  upon 
the  wish  as  father  to  the  thought.  In  broader  outline 
the  Freudian  system  explores  among  the  subterranean 
roots  of  motives  to  discover  the  promptings  of  thought 
and  action.  It  emphasizes  the  subconscious;  and  it 
builds  upon  a group  of  mechanisms,  by  which  the  appar- 
ent, superficial  stream  of  thinking  is  brought  in  rela- 
tion with  the  deeper,  hidden  sources  of  its  flow.  To  no 
mental  product  does  the  system  apply  more  intimately 
than  to  convictions.  ‘ For  the  first  and  last  things  in 

1 The  parallel  applications  of  equal  importance  are  to  the  free 
material  of  dreams,  reveries,  imaginative  excursions  (also  to  seem- 
ingly accidental  lapses,  like  forgetting  and  mislaying)  and  to  impul- 
sive, aberrant  conduct.  All  these  orders  of  expression  lose  their  de- 
tached character  when  supplied  with  the  clue  of  motive.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  accept  the  extreme  Freudian  interpretation,  particu- 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


27 


the  Freudian  psychology  are  motives;  and  the  clue  to 
conviction  (beyond  the  realm  of  imdisputed  reason)  is 
motive.  In  the  view  of  Freud  the  mental  life  is  a strug- 
gle — a conflict  between  what  is,  what  we  are,  what 
we  must  do,  what  we  should  like  to  be  and  do,  and 
how  we  should  hke  to  have  things.  So  imagination 
enters  to  bridge  the  gap,  and  the  flctitious  pleasures  of 
day-dreaming  and  of  conclusions  not  untouched  by 
delusion  yield  their  satisfactions.  Truly  rationaliza- 
tion enters,  and  we  justify  our  beliefs  and  acts  by  rea- 
sonings to  conceal  their  real  motives  in  emotion  and 
desire.  The  mechanisms  of  thought  are  mechanisms 
of  concealment  — a psychological  camouflage;  reason 
masks  emotion,  m that  the  acknowledgment  of  the 
emotion  is  unpleasant  or  otherwise  tabooed,  while 
the  appeal  to  reason  is  accredited  and  creditable.  The 
masking  devices  are  varied,  some  dramatic,  others 
shrewd,  others  subtle.  The  most  typical  is  the  device 
of  compensation.  Lacking  one  satisfaction  we  minimize 
its  loss  by  setting  up  another  in  its  place.  A salient 
example  is  that  of  a man  of  checkered  and  uncertain 
career,  in  all  essential  respects  a failure  in  life  despite 
conspicuous  talents,  who  in  announcing  the  subject  of 
his  personal  reminiscences  as  a platform  topic  chose 
the  title:  “How  I Achieved  Success.”  That  title  is  a 
Freudian  confession  of  failure,  disguised  to  the  self  that 
makes  it.  Similarly,  if  the  German  mind  is  prepared 
to  stand  by  its  Austrian  (Freudian)  ally  in  the  psy- 
chological fleld,  the  Teutonic  insistence  upon  the  supe- 

larly  the  reference  of  all  these  mental  products  to  the  motives  of  sex. 
The  Freudian  view  is  entitled  to  respectful  consideration;  it  has 
proved  suggestive  in  many  directions. 


28 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


riority  of  German  “Kultur”  may  be  interpreted  as  a 
Freudian  confession  of  a sense  of  lack,  the  inability  to 
achieve  that  delicate  appreciation  of  the  values  of  life 
that  is  characteristic  of  the  French,  or  the  weU-poised 
directive  capacity  and  clean-cut  analysis  of  the  Eng- 
lish mind.  The  compensation  is  the  gigantic  and  im- 
modest delusion  of  superiority.  Suspicion  or  accusa- 
tion is  often  of  the  same  nature,  imputing  to  others 
motives  present  in  one’s  self,  but  disowned.  The  same 
applies  to  apology  in  that  it  implies  a self -accusation: 
qui  s' excuse  s' accuse.  The  conception  of  convictions 
as  formed  or  supported  by  this  mechanism  of  emo- 
tional transfer  — in  consolation  or  compensation 
yields  a restricted  but  authentic  application  of  the 
Freudian  principles.  The  Freudian  mechanisms  apply 
more  fully  to  expressions  of  stronger,  more  original 
emotional  tone  — like  the  instinct  of  motherhood  lack- 
ing its  authentic  outlet  and  seeking  substitutes  in  the 
mothering  of  pets  or  causes;  yet  like  these,  convic- 
tions serve  as  a temperamental  satisfaction  by  em- 
ployment of  similar  devices.  Other  common  Freudian 
factors  may  be  noted.  There  is  over-determination, 
overdoing  — in  excess  of  recoil  (through  some  inter- 
nal resistance  or  scruple)  swinging  far  to  the  opposite 
extreme.  The  characteristically  Freudian  aspect  of 
the  issue  is  that  the  impulse  to  the  extreme  is  felt,  but 
the  motive  source  remains  subconscious;  yet  it  oper- 
ates and  projects  from  its  depths  a sense  of  trouble  and 
difficulty.  Conviction  may  be  held  waveringly  though 
longingly,  shifting  in  successive  devotion  to  fads  and 
“isms.” 

The  “conviction”  aspect  of  the  conflict  is  a struggle 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


29 


for  consistency  as  well  as  for  contentment,  which  in 
its  ripeness  aims  at  the  harmony  of  one’s  beliefs  and 
conduct.  Such  a consistent  whole  is  a personality, 
many-sided  but  single-minded.  Thus  in  tracing  the 
orbit  of  conviction,  we  constantly  return  to  the  emo- 
tional motive  — an  emotion  close  to  will.  The  com- 
mon name  for  this  is  desire,  the  Freudian  wish.  In  so 
far  as  the  Freudian  diagnosis  apphes,  it  is  the  unful- 
filled wish,  the  thwarted  desire  that  shapes  the  true 
motive  of  conviction.  It  operates  in  so  far  as  the  behef 
is  by  nature  or  adoption  warmly  cherished,  with  a deep 
personal  absorption;  it  is  peculiarly  applicable  to  ex- 
treme semi-pathological  temperaments,  in  which  the 
processes  are  emotionally  intensified.  But  a more  com- 
mon Freudian  mechanism  peculiarly  applicable  to  the 
genesis  and  support  of  convictions  is  rationalization, 
which  is  the  justification  of  belief  to  reason.  We  actu- 
ally believe  by  virtue  of  a trend  anchored  in  personal 
desire,  and  have  recourse  to  reason  to  mask  this  source 
— to  clothe  a personal  conviction  in  more  presentable 
garb.  Accepting  the  motive  as  a “reason,”  we  believe 
for  one  reason  and  defend  conviction  for  another;  such 
is  the  Freudian  defensive  and  self-deceptive  mechan- 
ism. In  some  measure  the  conviction  may  be  imrea- 
sonable,  yet  it  seciu’es  and  maintains  its  hold  by  con- 
formity to  authentic  psychological  processes. 

The  mechanisms  thus  described  in  Freudian  man- 
ner have  been  otherwise  and  previously  recognized; 
the  Freudian  setting  adds  to  their  illumination  and  to 
their  relation  to  our  general  psychology.  In  applica- 
tion to  conviction,  we  must  proceed  more  delicately, 
with  discerning  allowance  for  the  type  of  convietion 


30 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


involved.  We  recognize  that  we  are  committed  to  a cer- 
tain pride  in  om  rationality;  we  make  claim  to  be  rea- 
sonable beings;  and  for  this  end  our  dress-parade  selves 
argue  and  defend  as  well  as  ignore  and  conceal.  By 
quite  the  same  route  in  practical  matters,  we  admit 
that  our  interests  come  to  determine  our  positions, 
though  we  know  that  scientific  judgments  must  be  dis- 
interested and  unprejudiced. 

Intense  conviction  obscures  vision;  yet  enthusiastic 
interest  opens  our  eyes.  We  must  accept  the  liabilities 
along  with  the  assets  of  our  own  psychology.  In  Freu- 
dian aspect  beliefs  avoid  contact  with  reality  by  sur- 
rounding themselves  with  a defensive  smoke-cloud  of 
security;  in  scientific  employment,  hypothesis  and  spec- 
ulations extend  the  study  of  reality,  alike  in  detail  and 
in  scope.  Neither  the  one  nor  the  other  issue  is  neces- 
sarily involved  nor  readily  avoided.  In  consequence 
the  consistency  of  the  varied  convictions  of  all  sorts 
and  conditions  of  men  on  all  sorts  and  conditions  of 
questions  is  a partial  one.  An  equal  consistency  in  all 
one’s  varied  interests  is  an  attainable  but  rare  ideal, 
possibly  not  even  a desirable  one.  A common  form  of 
inconsistency  suggests  the  hypotheses  of  reserved  areas 
of  conviction  in  which  predilection  may  disport  itself 
in  freedom  from  the  restraints  of  too  rigid  a logic.  It  is 
possible  that  a man  of  science  may  be  cautious  and 
logical  in  his  special  domain,  but  in  matters  outside  of 
it,  in  which  a personal  bias  enters,  he  may  be  uncritical, 
even  credulous,  and  accept  or  propose  arguments  falla- 
cious or  weak.  Such  defection  constitutes  the  personal 
factor  in  the  prevalence  of  the  “survival”  types  of 
conviction  aheady  reviewed.  The  hypotheses  of  “re- 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OP  CONVICTION 


31 


served  areas  of  belief”  applies  characteristically  to  the 
spiritualistic  phase  of  “psychical  research”  — that  is 
the  acceptance  of  evidence  of  the  communication  by 
the  departed  through  mediums;  it  applies  particu- 
larly to  the  “case”  of  Paladino,  while  yet  this  “case” 
is  made  by  the  prestige  attaching  to  the  scientific 
reputation  of  her  sponsors.  The  hypothesis  applies 
sporadically  through  the  several  incidents  that  have 
attended  the  renaissance  of  spiritualism  since  1850.  In- 
clination to  accept  the  spiritualistic  belief  is  the  main 
factor;  the  evidence  plays  a secondary  part.  Those 
responsible  for  such  evidence  contribute  to  the  psy- 
chology of  deception,^  as  the  deceived  contribute  to 
the  psychology  of  credulity.  This  holds  for  the  vast 
majority  of  believers;  but  for  the  few  and  the  leaders 
of  the  movement,  the  conviction  suggests  the  oper- 
ation of  a reserved  area  of  belief.  Whether  the  res- 
ervation is  due  to  a Freudian  complex  is  an  individual 
question. 

There  is  a further  aspect  of  such  allegiances:  namely, 
the  attraction  which  a belief  excites  by  its  very  depar- 
ture from  rationahty;  the  tendency  is  due  to  the  lure 
of  the  obscure.  Its  most  philosophic  expression  is  mys- 
ticism. But  the  cooperation  of  other  factors  is  appar- 
ent. Such  occult  and  irregular  beliefs  grow  by  conta- 
gion; they  grow  by  prestige;  they  grow  by  a congenial 

* I have  considered  these  problems  in  an  earlier  volume.  Fact 
and  Fable  in  Psychology  (1900),  particularly  in  the  earlier  chapters. 
Accordingly  the  types  of  belief  in  which  credulity,  intentional 
deception,  and  weakness  of  logical  sense  play  the  leading  parts  in 
the  dissemination  of  false  beliefs,  are  not  emphasized  in  the  pres- 
ent consideration.  The  portions  of  the  volume  just  referred  to  may 
be  accepted  as  an  amplification  of  this  position,  in  terms  of  analysis 
and  illustration. 


32 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


selection  of  adherents;  and  a factor  in  the  last  contri- 
bution is  the  satisfaction  of  clinging  to  the  esoteric,  of 
belonging  to  a different  order,  a less  conventional  cult 
than  that  which  secures  the  adherence  of  the  ordinary 
man.  Even  radicalism  makes  its  converts  by  some 
measure  of  such  appeal.  But  simple  credulity,  or  logi- 
cal weakness  is  never  absent,  and  constitutes  a per- 
sonal factor  in  the  issue.  Consider  such  a belief  as 
that  in  phrenology,  which  is  fairly  modern  and  persists 
with  revivals  to  recent  times.  What  the  attraction  of 
such  a belief  may  once  have  been  or  how  it  continues 
to  exist,  albeit  with  lowered  caste,  is  not  easy  to  de- 
termine. Lack  of  scientific  training  may  be  the  chief 
factor  in  its  spread;  but  each  such  belief  offers  the 
problem  of  how  this  particular  belief  selects  its  re- 
cruits. The  same  is  true  of  homoeopathy.  In  both 
cases  those  who  follow  the  system  may  have  diflSculty 
in  describing  either  the  basis  of  the  principles,  or  their 
own  adherence  to  them.  Such  excursions  into  the 
history  of  personal  attachments  might  add  to  the 
psychology  of  conviction;  but  their  pmsuit  leaves  the 
central  problem  of  the  present  study.  Obviously  such 
beliefs  linger  with  a low  vitality,  and  the  change  of 
their  clientele  suggests  the  degeneration  of  a city  neigh- 
borhood when  a residential  district  loses  its  prestige. 

Continuing  in  the  direction  of  the  irregular,  we  come 
to  beliefs  that  may  properly  be  called  pathological. 
Such  beliefs  are  so  strikingly  individual  that  they  are 
ordinarily  not  shared  by  others.  They  are  called  delu- 
sions and  are  characteristic  of  insanity  in  its  various 
forms.  Here  the  personal  factor  reaches  its  maximum 
scope.  Such  delusions  may  likewise  appear  as  Freu- 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


33 


dian  compensations;  their  modes  of  rationalization  are 
so  irregular  that  therein  is  recognized  the  mental  aber- 
ration which  represents  the  extreme  issue  of  personal 
conviction  in  its  deviation  from  logical  standards.  The 
manner  of  reaching  one’s  convictions  as  well  as  the 
convictions  reached  thus  become  a criterion  of  one’s 
sanity.  Such  (delusional)  beliefs  do  not  affect  others; 
nor  are  they  taken  seriously.  The  rare  “case”  in  which 
an  individual  belief  of  this  type  plays  a part  in  a sys- 
tem of  wide  acceptance  in  modern  times  is  supplied  by 
the  case  of  Mrs.  Eddy.  Her  personal  delusion  of  a 
“malicious  animal  magnetism  ” runs  through  “Christian 
Science”  so  far  as  that  system  reflects  her  life-history. 
She  accused  disciples  who  had  escaped  from  her  influ- 
ence, of  this  peculiar  form  of  sorcery  (mental  poisoning, 
she  called  it),  and  took  aU  sorts  of  precautions  to 
avoid  its  dire  effect.  Naturally  the  great  mass  of  her 
followers  ignore  this  strange  belief;  yet  their  attitude 
to  the  tenets  promulgated  by  Mother  Eddy,  if  con- 
sistent, implies  a subscription  to  this  belief  also.  The 
inclusion  of  Mrs.  Eddy’s  belief  in  mahcious  animal 
magnetism  is  accordingly  pertinent  to  the  personal 
and  pathological  aspects  of  conviction. 

VII 

The  practical  issue  of  the  operation  of  these  sev- 
eral cooperating  and  conflicting  factors  is  the  toler- 
ance of  aU  manners  of  convictions  and  compromises 
and  makeshifts  in  the  mental  household.  No  one  is 
completely  logical,  and  no  one  is  devoid  of  the  logical 
impulse  and  a certain  logical  consistency.  But  the 
psychological  trend  runs  more  deeply,  more  perva- 


34 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


sively.  Conviction  appears  as  a compromise  of  logic 
with  psychology.  The  solution  of  our  problems  de- 
pends not  alone  on  the  discovery  of  truth,  but  on  the 
control  of  the  means  of  securing  its  acceptance.  To 
gain  for  beliefs  their  proper  recognition  amid  the  riv- 
alry of  convictions  and  of  the  forces  sustaining  them, 
is  an  art.  The  slowness  and  laboriousness  of  human 
progress  is  a direct  consequence  of  these  conditions 
and  limitations  of  the  human  mind.  The  acceptance 
of  new  truth  meets  with  all  sorts  of  oppositions  and 
resistances,  which  though  collectively  expressed  are 
individually  experienced.  The  conflicts  of  men,  as  of 
nations,  take  place  in  the  arena  of  personal  conviction. 
Purposes,  policies,  jealousies,  ambitions,  sentiments, 
converge  in  the  formulation  of  a conviction,  which 
may  be  as  simple  as  a slogan  and  as  complex  as  a 
destiny. 

Viewed  retrospectively,  the  greatest  triumph  of  the 
human  mind  was  the  gradual  removal  of  large  areas 
of  belief  from  the  influence  of  the  personal  psychology 
of  conviction.  Scientifically  established  truth  came  to 
proceed  objectively,  undisturbed  by  interest  in  the 
outcome  of  inquiry  and  determined  by  the  sanction 
of  verification.  The  gradual  disestablishment  of  the 
anthropocentric  view  of  the  universe  culminated  in 
the  removal  of  human  desire  from  its  place  of  domin- 
ion in  the  formation  of  belief.  The  process  is  but  par- 
tially accomplished  even  in  disciplined  minds,  and  for 
the  great  masses  of  men  plays  a subordinate  part  in 
the  scheme  of  their  lives.  Moreover,  the  existence  of 
so  many  controversial  issues,  in  which  conclusions  are 
far  from  clear  and  yet  action  is  demanded  by  condi- 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


35 


tion,  imposes  the  exercise  of  judgment  upon  mixed 
motives  of  logical  loyalty  and  psychological  appeal. 
For  aU  these  reasons  the  understanding  of  the  stream 
of  influences  that  play  upon  the  genesis  and  shift  of 
conviction  is  a permanent  occupation  of  the  psycholo- 
gist. The  obligation  to  seek  control  of  human  convic- 
tions through  a study  of  their  natm-e  applies  with  pecu- 
liar force  to  twentieth-century  conditions  in  which  a 
sentiment  of  democracy  prevails;  for  democracy  im- 
poses or  encourages  the  consideration  of  convictions 
by  inviting  adherence  to  parties  and  confirming  the 
verdict  of  the  ballot.  Democratic  forces  operate  far 
beyond  the  political  realm;,  there  is  hardly  a page  of 
the  daily  press  that  does  not  make  an  appeal  to  men’s 
actions  by  prevailing  upon  their  convictions.  Rival 
newspapers  bring  to  their  selected  clientele  the  rein- 
forcement of  convictions  already  espoused.  Towering 
above  all  other  issues  are  the  set  of  convictions  that 
have  arrayed  the  dominant  nations  of  the  world  in  a 
colossal  life-and-death  struggle.  The  world-war  is  a 
war  of  convictions,  tragically  consigned  to  the  ordeal 
of  a scientific  armament  of  destruction;  and  the  deci- 
sion, however  reached,  will  establish  one  set  of  convic- 
tions in  the  minds  of  men,  and  depose  its  rivals.  Once 
the  normal  relations  of  men  and  nations  again  prevail, 
we  shall  be  able  to  look  back  upon  the  struggle  with 
the  saner  logic  of  a scientific  judgment.  While  the 
awful  struggle  continues  and  in  its  progressive  steps, 
we  become  the  passionately  interested  witnesses  of  the 
play  of  psychological  forces  on  the  largest  scale  that 
has  ever  been  enacted.  Parallel  with  the  clash  of  arma- 
ment is  the  conflict  of  conviction;  both  will  participate. 


36 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


and  presumably  tbe  latter  with  greater  influence,  in 
the  negotiations  of  peace  — in  the  restoration  of  a 
normal  outlook  upon  the  values  of  life  and  their  con- 
trol by  sane  convictions. 


II 

BELIEF  AND  CREDULITY 

The  introductory  essay  has  set  forth  that  the  approach 
to  the  psychology  of  conviction  is  through  the  portals 
of  logic.  The  individual  faces  the  problem  in  the  ques- 
tion: What  beliefs  shall  I accept  and  what  reject?  The 
principles  determining  selection  and  rejection  at  once 
engage  the  student;  for  their  function  is  not  only  to 
determine  the  critical  standards,  but  to  defend  them. 
The  fixation  of  belief  as  a practical  process,  which  each 
shares  as  well  as  witnesses,  must  be  studied  not  only 
as  a process,  but  in  terms  of  its  foundations.  The  pres- 
ent study  undertakes  a critical  survey  of  these  foun- 
dations. In  its  course  it  uses  the  method  of  contrast 
to  illustrate  the  consequences  of  defection  in  the  logi- 
cal standards  of  evidence.  While  the  central  issue  is 
the  logical  principle  of  fixation,  the  determination  of 
the  logically  acceptable  is  the  natural  completion  of  the 
problem.  Right  belief  and  credulity  refer  to  habits  of 
mind  as  well  as  to  standards  of  evidence.  Their  joint 
consideration  determines  the  course  of  argument. 

I 

The  vital  history  of  human  development  is  to  be 
sought  in  the  history  of  beliefs.  The  inscriptions  of 
Egypt  or  of  Babylon,  though  rendered  in  modern 
tongues,  speak  an  imperfect  message  until  illuminated 
by  some  insight  into  the  beliefs  which  these  cultures 


38 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


cherished.  The  amazing  ruins  of  Copan,  the  serpent 
mound  of  Ohio,  remain  mute  and  inglorious  until  we 
solve  the  riddle  of  the  beliefs  of  their  builders.  Dead 
Pompeii  becomes  a living  city  when  we  people  its 
streets  with  the  hopes  and  fears,  the  beliefs  and  opin- 
ions of  its  last  inhabitants.  The  history  of  the  arts  and 
the  sciences,  of  society  and  of  religion,  specifically  in- 
volves an  account  of  the  succession  of  beliefs  and  of  the 
growth  of  belief-habits.  The  story  of  men’s  doings  is 
likewise,  in  large  measure,  a reflection  of  their  beliefs; 
conduct,  whether  of  individuals  or  of  masses  of  men, 
remains  an  undeciphered  record  until  interpreted  as 
the  concrete  expression  of  definite  beliefs.  The  spring 
of  action  is  motive,  and  the  intellectual  impetus  to  mo- 
tive is  belief. 

Of  the  outward  and  of  the  inward  marks  of  the  stages 
of  learning  none  are  more  notable  than  the  beliefs 
which  as  the  result  of  such  learning  come  to  be  accepted 
and  promulgated.  With  these  is  associated  an  attitude 
of  inclination  or  disinclination  in  regard  to  the  various 
and  ever-enlarging  problems  that  engage  the  interests 
of  men.  The  possession  of  certain  beliefs  and  a defi- 
nite belief-attitude  differentiates  the  educated  from  the 
uneducated,  the  scholar  from  the  dilettante,  the  ex- 
pert from  the  layman,  the  modern  spirit  from  the  medi- 
eval, the  traits  of  this  generation  from  those  of  its 
immediate  predecessors.  For  those  who  would  search 
out  the  motives  and  the  justifications  of  their  beliefs, 
it  is  of  constant  importance  to  realize  the  more  potent 
and  the  more  patent  tendencies  and  influences  by 
which  are  shaped  the  opinions  alike  of  the  many  and 
of  the  few;  to  consider  the  characteristics  which  give 


BELIEF  AND  CREDULITY 


39 


to  certain  beliefs  and  belief-attitudes  their  logical  co- 
gency, their  ethical  worth,  and  their  social  power,  and 
deprive  other  classes  of  beliefs  from  any  possible  par- 
ticipation in  these  values.  Such  an  inquiry  naturally 
includes  an  outlook  upon  the  regions  of  unwarranted 
belief,  of  error  and  prejudice  and  credulity. 

An  attractive  approach  to  the  problem  thus  sug- 
gested may  be  found  in  a remarkable  essay  by  C.  S. 
Peirce.^  Belief  is  presented  as  a mental  trait  possessing 
and  developed  by  plain  advantages  of  an  evolutionary 
or  adaptively  useful  kind.  Such  at  least  would  be  the 
case  for  all  simple  and  practical  matters  upon  which 
the  incipient  rationality  of  primitive  man  cut  its  teeth. 
Logicality,  Peirce  teUs  us  — and  by  that  is  meant  a 
habit  of  mind  that  leads  to  the  detection  of  truth,  to 
thinking  about  things  as  they  are,  to  bringing  our 
thoughts  into  agreement  with  reaUty  — “logicality  in 
regard  to  practical  matters  is  the  most  useful  quality 
an  animal  can  possess,  and  might,  therefore,  result 
from  the  action  of  natural  selection;  but  outside  of 
these  it  is  probably  of  more  advantage  to  the  animal 
to  have  his  mind  filled  with  pleasing  and  encouraging 
visions,  independently  of  their  truth;  and  thus,  upon 
unpractical  subjects,  natural  selection  might  occasion 
a fallacious  tendency  of  thought.”  Natural  selection 
certainly  has  not  interfered  with  the  persistence  of 
untrue  and  illogical  beliefs.  While  some  truth  ward 
tendency  is  clearly  a part  of  the  natural  endowment 
of  homo  sapiens,  such  tendency  by  no  means  dominates 
his  mental  habits.  Indeed,  it  is  brought  to  its  fruitage 

* “ The  Fixation  of  Belief,”  Popular  Science  Monthly,  November, 
1877. 


40 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


only  after  so  much  struggle  and  the  learning  of  so  many 
hard  lessons  of  experience  and  of  such  slow  accumula- 
tions of  ages  of  thinking,  that  it  may  be  appropriately 
described  as  an  artificial,  weakly  possessed,  and  imper- 
fectly disseminated  acquisition.  Furthermore,  practi- 
cality, hke  much  else,  is  a matter  of  degree;  groups  of 
ideas  and  ways  of  thinking  are  more  or  less  practical, 
and  influence  action  more  or  less  indirectly  and  by 
variously  roundabout  paths;  as  the  range  of  human 
thought  widens  and  diversifies,  deepens  and  becomes 
more  complex,  an  ever-enlarging  circle  of  human  in- 
terests and  concerns  comes  to  be  of  this  indirectly  prac-  * 
tical  kind.  Precept  and  practice,  instead  of  being  con- 
nected by  a short  and  straight,  stout  cord,  are  no  less 
effectively  bound  by  a complicated  network  of  strands, 
many  of  them  delicate  in  textiu’e,  elaborate  in  weave, 
and  difficult  to  trace.  For  present-day  purposes  we 
may  consider  belief  as  characteristically  of  this  type 

— complex  in  structure,  subject  to  endlessly  varying 
influences,  modifiable  by  diverse  factors  and  circum- 
stances, responsive  to  social,  hereditary,  educational, 
and  transitory  as  well  as  to  more  permanent,  natmal, 
and  artificial  influences. 

A prominent  result  and  indeed  a purpose  of  belief 
is  the  concordant  settlement  of  opinion.  Yet  this  result 
may  be  brought  about  — has  often  been  brought  about 

— by  other  than  logical  processes;  or,  speaking  with 
reference  to  the  experience  of  history,  it  may  be  said 
that  it  proceeds  by  methods  which  are  condemned  by 
the  most  approved  logical  (and  ethical)  sanctions  of 
more  advanced  stages  of  knowledge,  though  it  receives 
the  endorsement  of  the  cruder  and  less  enlightened  at- 


BELIEF  AND  CREDULITY 


41 


titude  of  the  period.  For  every  work  of  science  — and 
something  analogous  is  true  of  other  progressive  move- 
ments— “great  enough  to  be  remembered  for  a few 
generations,  affords  some  exemplification  of  the  defec- 
tive state  of  the  art  of  reasoning  of  the  time  when  it 
was  written;  and  each  chief  step  in  science  has  been  a 
lesson  in  logic”  (Peirce).  Of  distinctive  methods  of 
fixing  belief  Peirce  describes  four:  the  method  of  te- 
nacity, of  authority,  of  inclination,  of  scientific  veri- 
fiability. The  first,  when  stated  baldly,  seems  devoid 
of  all  merit;  yet  it  expresses  in  extreme  form  a tendency 
which  the  student  of  belief  is  certain  to  encounter.  The 
man  of  tenacity  proceeds  upon  a faith  that  the  opinion 
which  he  holds  is  the  truth,  that  it  is  his  duty  to  affirm 
this  conviction,  to  reiterate  it  and  to  cherish  it,  to  re- 
frain from  entertaining  any  considerations  which  may 
tend  to  shake  the  belief,  and  to  seek  all  the  influences 
that  may  strengthen  it.  Naturally  this  does  not  re- 
main a coldly  intellectual  process,  but  becomes  suffused 
with  an  emotional  intensity  which  leads  the  devotee 
to  look  with  pity  or  contempt  or  horror  upon  any  con- 
trary opinion;  even  to  scorn  “weak  and  illusive  rea- 
son,” and  to  take  refuge  in  the  calm  satisfaction  of  a 
firm  and  immutable  faith.  “When  an  ostrich  buries  its 
head  in  the  sand  as  danger  approaches,  it  very  likely 
takes  the  happiest  comse.  It  hides  the  danger  and  then 
calmly  says  there  is  no  danger;  and  if  it  feels  perfectly 
sure  there  is  none,  why  should  it  raise  its  head  to  see?” 
(Peirce.) 

Such  an  attitude  is  possible  only  to  an  intellec- 
tual recluse  and,  to  be  consistently  maintained,  must 
be  kept  remote  from  earthly  realities.  Even  when  re- 


42 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


served  for  non-practical  considerations,  it  breaks  down 
under  the  social  impulse;  man  was  not  meant  to  live 
alone  and  neither  feels,  acts,  nor  thinks  alone.  A com- 
mon influence  is  necessary  to  fix  men’s  beliefs  alike, 
and  the  most  expeditious  method  of  producing  a con- 
sensus of  opinion  has  proved  to  be  that  of  imposed 
authority.  History  is  too  full  of  the  triumphs  and  the 
failures  of  this  method  — both  equally  sad  to  contem- 
plate— to  make  it  necessary  to  bring  forward  illus- 
trations of  its  procedure.  Dogma  and  manifesto,  the 
trial  for  heresy  and  the  Index  Expurgatorius,  the  In- 
quisition and  the  stake,  scholasticism  and  pedantry, 
the  literalism  of  the  expounders  of  the  Scriptures  or  of 
the  commentators  of  Aristotle,  the  refusal  of  the  ortho- 
dox to  look  through  the  telescope  to  see  what  they  had 
no  authority  for  observing,  or  the  E pur  si  muove  of 
Galileo  — bring  to  mind  realistically  the  heroic  scenes 
of  the  dramas  for  which  the  method  of  authority  fur- 
nishes the  common  plot.  The  limitations  of  this  method 
are  certain  to  be  irritatingly  felt  by  the  few,  however 
lightly  tolerated  by  the  many.  The  saving  remnant 
that  enjoys  a wider  outlook,  and  penetrates  the  mist 
with  which  dogma  has  enveloped  the  atmosphere,  real- 
izes that  infallibility  is  theoretically  an  idle  dream,  and 
practically  an  artificial  fiction:  and  in  so  far  as  others 
use  their  eyes  and  look  in  forbidden  places,  they  ob- 
serve that  many  of  the  beliefs  of  men  do  not  fall  under 
the  shadow  of  the  pronunciamento,  but  thrive  in  the 
sunshine  of  common  sense.  And  if  this  be  true  of  some 
opinions,  why  not  of  others?  Unless  doubt  and  ques- 
tioning and  inquiry  on  all  subjects  be  utterly  suppressed, 
the  error  of  imposed  authority  will  be  suspected,  the 


BELIEF  AND  CREDULITY 


43 


means  whereby  a sounder  belief  may  be  discovered  will 
be  at  least  dimly  realized,  and  some  resort  to  other 
methods  of  shaping  belief  be  attempted. 

But  even  when  freed  from  the  fetters  imposed  by 
authority,  the  minds  of  the  leaders  of  men  have  not 
always  followed  in  the  footsteps  of  wisdom.  They  have 
been  prone  to  overlook  the  tyranny  of  their  own  or- 
ganization and  inheritance,  and  have  come  to  accept 
a more  liberal  and  humane  dictator  and  one  of  their 
own  seeking  — but  a dictator  none  the  less.  They  be- 
lieved what  was  agreeable  to  reason;  they  accepted  that 
to  which  they  naturally  inclined;  and  the  philosophers 
of  cultivation  inclined  to  beliefs  that  were  plausible, 
or  comforting,  or  stimulating,  or  uplifting,  or  liberahz- 
ing.  Congenial  spirits  found  one  another  or  a com- 
mon leader,  and  schools  of  opinion  came  and  went. 
The  pendulum  swimg  now  this  way  and  now  that;  here 
a dominant  leader  impressed  his  personality  strongly 
upon  his  contemporaries;  there  a reaction  from  an  ex- 
treme doctrine  induced  attention  to  new  lines  of  thought; 
everywhere  opinion  came  to  be  more  responsive  to 
influences  from  without,  from  practice  and  experience, 
from  custom  and  institution.  But  whatever  progress 
results  under  this  regime  is  fitful,  and  hazardous,  and 
ill-defined;  it  is  only  when  the  causes  of  our  inclina- 
tion are  scrutinized  and  the  objective  worth,  not  the 
agreeableness,  of  om  reasoning  comes  to  be  regarded 
as  of  primary  import,  that  the  pursuit  of  knowledge, 
and  the  fixation  of  belief  in  which  it  results,  realize 
their  allegiance  to  a higher  power.  Strange  gods  have 
been  worshiped  in  strange  ways  by  the  followers  of 
their  inclinations;  the  intuitionalists  and  the  mystics 


44 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


and  those  who  believed  themselves  inspired  — though 
the  inspiration  of  one  was  folly  and  anathema  to  an- 
other — have  therein  found  exercise  for  their  inalien- 
able right  to  liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness. 
“Truth,”  Lowell  explains,  “is  said  to  lie  at  the  bottom 
of  a well  for  the  very  reason,  perhaps,  that  whoever 
looks  down  in  search  of  her  sees  his  own  image  at  the 
bottom,  and  is  persuaded  not  only  that  he  has  seen  the 
goddess,  but  that  she  is  far  better-looking  than  he  had 
imagined.” 

The  method  of  scientific  verification  has  been  so 
wrought  into  the  fiber  of  our  thinking  that  we  find  it 
difficult  to  realize  the  power  and  dominion  of  other 
sovereigns;  we  the  scientifically  minded  are  the  Hel- 
lenes, and  the  others  are  the  harharoi.  And  rightly  so; 
for  the  credentials  of  our  sovereignty  are  the  rewards 
of  generations  of  patient  study  of  the  ways  of  nature, 
sanctioned  by  the  logical  anticipation  of  natural  events, 
by  the  practical  utilization  of  natural  principles,  by  a 
conscientious,  impartial,  and  objective  analysis  of  our 
own  mental  processes.  For  the  scepter  in  the  hands  of 
science  is  neither  a symbol  of  wanton  authority,  nor  a 
badge  of  unearned  privilege,  nor  a license  for  extrava- 
gance and  caprice,  but  an  emblem  of  law  and  order  — 
safeguarding  to  all  the  most  cherished  opportimities 
for  right  knowledge,  right  beliefs,  and  right  actions,  in 
what  measure  each  is  wise  enough  to  consent  to  be  thus 
governed.  It  is  the  prerogative  of  the  scientific  method 
that  it  enthrones  the  logical  right  — the  true  — as  the 
moral  law  within  enthrones  the  ethical  right  — the 
good.  The  crowning  virtue  becomes  not  conviction, 
nor  the  approval  of  authority,  nor  acceptability,  nor 


BELIEF  AND  CREDULITY 


45 


general  credence,  but  provability.  The  adoption  of 
this  as  our  sovereign  method  alters  our  ideals,  even 
where  it  modifies  but  little  our  practices;  it  radically 
transforms  our  behef-attitude  and  our  outlook,  even 
though  we  cannot  as  yet  apply  the  one  nor  enter  into 
possession  of  the  other. 

Yet  we  must  not  complacently  assume  that  the  ad- 
vantages are  exclusively  incorporated  with  the  one 
method,  or  that  its  adoption  is  unencumbered  with 
conflict  and  sacrifice.  We  shall  continue  to  feel  the 
natural  proneness  to  shape  our  beliefs  by  other  and 
less  strenuous  standards;  we  are  vmwiUing  to,  and  we 
need  not,  abate  our  appreciation  of  what  the  other 
methods  have  accomplished  in  the  trials  and  tribula- 
tions of  the  past.  We  cannot  lightly  shake  off  the  te- 
nacity of  our  convictions,  however  obtained,  nor  the 
inertia  that  easily,  and  the  incapacity  that  necessa- 
rily, appeals  to  authority;  we  shall  continue  to  yearn 
to  believe  what  is  agreeable  and  to  resist  unpleasant 
truths;  we  may  stiU  reserve  some  corner  of  our  belief- 
chamber  which  shall  be  exempt  from  the  intrusion  of 
inquiry;  but,  on  the  whole,  however  we  may  defend 
these  tendencies,  or  apologize  for  them,  or  struggle 
against  them,  we  make  some  decent  attempt  to  clothe 
them  with  the  semblance  of  plausibility  and  to  present 
them  garbed  in  fashion  scientific.  “Yes,”  Peirce  ad- 
mits, “the  other  methods  do  have  their  merits:  a clear 
logical  conscience  costs  something  — just  as  any  vir- 
tue, just  as  all  that  we  cherish,  costs  us  dear.  But  we 
should  not  desire  it  to  be  otherwise.  The  genius  of  a 
man’s  logical  method  should  be  loved  and  reverenced 
as  his  bride,  whom  he  has  chosen  from  all  the  world. 


46 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


He  need  not  condemn  the  others;  on  the  contrary  he 
may  honor  them  deeply,  and  in  so  doing  he  only  honors 
her  the  more.  But  she  is  the  one  that  he  has  chosen, 
and  he  knows  that  he  was  right  in  making  that  choice. 
And  having  made  it,  he  will  work  and  fight  for  her,  and 
will  not  complain  that  there  are  blows  to  take,  hoping 
that  there  may  be  as  many  and  as  hard  to  give,  and 
will  strive  to  be  the  worthy  knight  and  champion  of 
her  from  the  blaze  of  whose  splendors  he  draws  his  in- 
spiration and  his  courage.” 

From  this  survey  of  the  methods  by  which  opinion 
comes  to  be  established  and  disseminated,  we  emerge 
with  an  appreciation  of  how  it  arises  that  the  history 
of  belief  — not  unlike  history  in  general  — is  an  affair 
of  war  and  peace;  that  it  deals,  on  the  one  hand,  with 
the  accounts  of  the  warfare  of  the  scientific  method 
with  its  rivals,  and,  on  the  other,  with  the  internal 
development,  the  institutional  absorption,  and  the  col- 
onization of  its  own  spirit  among  outlying  cultimes. 
“Logic,”  Mr.  White  reminds  us,  “is  not  history.  His- 
tory is  full  of  interferences  which  have  cost  the  earth 
dear.  Strangest  of  all,  some  of  the  direst  of  them  have 
been  made  by  the  best  of  men,  actuated  by  the  purest 
of  motives,  and  seeking  the  noblest  results.”  And  in 
the  same  strain  Morley:  “It  is  surely  the  midsummer 
madness  of  philosophic  complacency  to  think  that  we 
have  come  by  the  shortest  and  easiest  of  all  imagi- 
nable routes  to  our  present  point  in  the  march;  to  sup- 
pose that  we  have  wasted  nothing,  lost  nothing,  cruelly 
destroyed  nothing  on  the  road.” 

From  a consideration  of  the  principles  by  which  be- 
lief may  be  rightly  and  rationally  fixed,  we  proceed 


BELIEF  AND  CREDULITY 


47 


to  a contemplation  of  these  principles  in  action.  Coim- 
sel  may  be  wise,  but  not  practical.  We  know  that  the 
aetual  formation  of  true  belief  is  beset  with  serious 
diflSculties;  that  the  process  is  likely  to  be  a response 
to  a condition  of  affairs  rather  than  to  a statement  of 
theory.  Yet,  though  it  be  a condition  and  not  a theory 
that  confronts  us,  a knowledge  of  the  theory  may  be 
the  most  effective  armament  for  meeting  the  eondi- 
tion.  If  knowledge  is  power,  it  is  as  much  because 
method  is  better  than  shift  as  that  acquaintanee  with 
fact  is  better  than  ignorance.  Now  that  seience  has 
entered  into  her  kingdom  and  the  vastness  of  her  do- 
main is  willingly  recognized,  — for  in  a vital  sense  all 
that  may  be  known  by  human  ken,  supported  by  evi- 
dence, presented  in  orderly  arrangement,  related  to 
other  knowledge,  and  developed  by  fiu-ther  study  may 
be  called  science,  — the  busy  problem  is  the  infusion 
of  the  seientific  method  into  all  our  ways  of  thinking, 
its  application  to  all  the  various  kinds  of  beliefs  that 
affect  our  ideals,  our  working  conceptions,  and  our 
actions.  In  so  far  as  this  is  accomplished  there  is  de- 
veloped a scientific-mindedness,  a rationality  and  sym- 
metry of  judgment,  which  shall  give  to  the  conception 
of  what  is  possible  and  what  impossible,  what  prob- 
able and  what  improbable,  what  established  and  what 
disproved,  a maximum  of  clearness,  soundness,  accu- 
racy, and  practicality.  It  is  this  habit  of  mind  that 
makes  one  keen-scented  for  right  beliefs  and  secure, 
not  from  error  indeed,  but  from  rash  credulity. 

It  would  be  most  imscientific  to  overlook  the  fact 
that  many  departments  of  human  interest  are  not  ready 
for  — and  in  their  nature  may  not  be  readily  subject 


48 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


to  — the  concrete  and  exact  application  of  the  scien- 
tific method.  But  this  recognition  offers  no  excuse  for 
removing  such  classes  of  beliefs  from  the  influence  of 
the  rationalizing  spirit  and  of  the  same  scientific  habits 
of  mind  that  have  created  such  a beneficent  and  stim- 
ulating atmosphere  in  more  exact  realms  of  thought. 
Such  an  influence  results  in  what  may  be  termed  a 
belief-attitude;  and  this  in  turn  is  reflected  in  one’s 
standards  of  evidence,  contributes  to  one’s  expertness 
of  judgment,  determines  one’s  inclination  or  the  will  to 
believe.  Yet  this  consummation  is  compatible  with 
diversity  among  the  opinions  of  the  wisest  as  well  as 
to  the  more  glaring  disagreements  of  all  sorts  and  con- 
ditions of  minds.  But  where  there  is  accord  in  regard 
to  a general  fundamental  method,  such  diversities  are 
not  to  be  feared.  What  Lord  Morley  aptly  notes  of 
personal  companionship  — that  its  painful  element  is 
not  difference  of  opinion,  but  discord  of  temperament 
— is  equally  true  of  intellectual  pursuits  in  general. 
“Harmony  of  aim,  not  identity  of  conclusion,  is  the 
secret  of  the  sympathetic  life.”  Such  differences  of 
opinion  fall  within  the  range  of  valid  beliefs.  Those 
that  do  not  — and  many  of  them  fall  beyond  the  pale 
because  of  their  discord  of  temperament,  their  alliance 
with  other  methods  of  fixing  belief  — may  be  variously 
characterized  as  prepossession,  error,  fallacy,  supersti- 
tion, extravagance;  and  for  the  habits  of  mind  that 
tend  to  the  acceptance  of  false  beliefs  the  terms  il- 
logicality and  credulity  are  apposite.  The  former  is 
commonly  understood  as  referring  to  the  proneness 
when  confronted  with  the  premises  to  draw  false  con- 
clusions therefrom;  the  latter  as  a too  great  readiness 


BELIEF  AND  CREDULITY 


49 


to  accept  the  premises  on  insufficient  evidence.  Yet  in 
practice  they  are  often  found  as  close  companions  and 
appear  at  the  summons  of  prejudice,  ignorance,  inertia, 
and  of  that  weakness  of  judgment  and  vacillation  of 
standards  of  belief  that  flourish,  weed-like,  when  the 
scientiflc  habit  of  mind  is  not  assiduously  cultivated. 

It  is  important  to  demonstrate  that  the  forces  that 
have  been  most  productive  of  error  in  the  past  are  not 
wholly  shorn  of  their  strength  in  the  present;  that  the 
tendencies  to  act  upon  data  credulously,  with  perverted 
logic  and  distorted  evidence,  however  different  the 
fashion  of  the  garments  in  which  they  are  paraded,  are 
still  recognizably  the  same  persistent  human  frailties 
that  detract  from  the  complete  appropriateness  of  the 
definition  of  man  as  a rational  animal.  It  is  further  to 
be  noted  that  quite  too  many  of  these  misdemeanors 
are  laid  to  the  charge  of  ignorance;  in  truth  ignorance 
cannot  usually  prove  an  alibi,  but  what  remains  to  be 
discovered  are  the  influences  that  prevented  the  dispel- 
hng  of  the  ignorance,  and  therein  will  be  foimd  the  vera 
causa  of  the  credulity.  Lecky  reminds  those  who  would 
investigate  the  causes  of  existing  beliefs  that  a change 
of  opinion  is  apt  to  imply,  more  than  anything  else,  a 
change  in  the  habits  of  thinking.  “Definite  arguments 
are  the  symptoms  and  pretexts,  but  seldom  the  causes 
of  the  change.”  “Reasoning  which  in  one  age  would 
make  no  impression  whatever,  in  the  next  age  is  re- 
ceived with  enthusiastic  applause.”  As  we  travel  in 
retrospect  along  the  stepping-stones  from  myth  to 
science,  from  credulity  to  logicality,  we  find  rather  httle 
disproof  and  very  much  outgrowth.^  It  is  because  we 

^ What  Dr.  Holmes  observes  of  the  homoeopathic  extravagances  is 
characteristically  true  of  many  another  error.  “Were  all  the  hospi- 


50 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


have  a more  appropriate,  that  is,  a truer  way  of  re- 
garding a certain  cluster  of  phenomena,  that  we  dis- 
card the  old  way;  and  this  truer  conception,  reached 
partly  by  new  fact,  partly  by  new  argument,  partly 
by  new  insight,  partly  by  new  applications  of  method, 
is  the  logical  legacy  which  the  successive  “heirs  of  all 
the  ages”  — each  in  turn  “in  the  foremost  ranks  of 
time”  — bequeath  to  their  descendants. 

It  is  not  easy  to  reach  a decision  in  regard  to  the 
erroneous  views  of  the  past,  as  to  how  far  preposses- 
sion blinded  men  to  actual  evidence,  how  far  decisive 
facts  were  not  available,  how  far  logical  methods  were 
weakly  handled;  each  of  these  was  frequently  present 
and  acted  both  as  cause  and  effect.  This,  however, 
is  deserving  of  emphasis:  that  when  the  method  of 
science  is  put  in  the  first  place,  significant  facts  will  be 
observed  and  looked  for,  arguments  pro  and  con  will 
be  weighed,  the  dangers  of  prepossession  will  be  real- 
ized. Not  that  this  will  always  be  done  wisely  and  well, 
nor  that  error  will  necessarily  be  avoided;  but  that  the 
steps  that  are  taken,  even  though  they  be  small  and 
tentative  and  meandering,  are  more  likely  than  by  any 

tal  physicians  of  Europe  and  America  to  devote  themselves,  for  the 
requisite  period,  to  this  sole  pursuit,  and  were  their  results  to  be 
unanimous  as  to  the  total  worthlessness  of  the  whole  system  in  prac- 
tice, this  slippery  delusion  would  slide  through  their  fingers  without 
the  slightest  discomposure,  when,  as  they  supposed,  they  had  crushed 
every  joint  in  its  tortuous  and  trailing  body.”  “Many  an  error  of 
thought  and  learning  has  fallen  before  such  a gradual  growth  of 
thoughtful  and  learned  opposition.  But  such  things  as  the  quadra- 
ture of  the  circle,  etc.,  are  never  put  down.  And  why?  Because 
thought  can  influence  thought,  but  thought  cannot  influence  self- 
conceit;  learning  can  annihilate  learning,  but  learning  cannot  anni- 
hilate ignorance.  A sword  may  cut  through  an  iron  bar,  and  the  sev- 
ered ends  will  not  unite;  let  it  go  through  the  air,  and  the  yielding 
substance  is  whole  again  in  a moment.”  (De  Morgan.) 


BELIEF  AND  CREDULITY 


51 


other  method  to  be  in  the  right  direction.  Our  scales 
may  be  crude,  our  weights  only  approximate;  but  even 
so,  the  result  is  more  likely  to  be  trustworthy  than  if 
we  abandon  them  and  resort  to  guesswork,  or,  retain- 
ing them,  put  down  a fist  on  one  end  of  the  beam. 

It  thus  seems  proper  to  speak  of  the  combined  logi- 
cal and  psychological  weaknesses  that  tend  to  the  ac- 
ceptance of  unreal  evidence  and  of  irrelevant  explana- 
tion as  credulity;  and  the  problem  of  problems,  alike 
in  the  voyages  of  discovery  and  in  everyday  cruising 
on  waters  great  and  small,  is  to  equip  the  pilot  to  steer 
his  course  by  right  belief  and  not  by  credulity.  The 
intellectual  mariner’s  compass,  for  all  purposes  alike, 
is  the  method  of  science;  none  the  less  pilotage  is  an 
art.  Many  shores  are  imperfectly  charted;  there  are 
reefs  and  shoals,  storms  and  fogs,  breakages  in  the 
machinery  and  lack  of  training  in  the  crew.  These  are 
the  dangers  of  the  seas  — and  shipwrecks  are  not  un- 
common; but  how  much  more  imminent  the  dangers, 
and  how  almost  impossible  the  traffic,  without  any 
compass  or  with  a less  reliable  one!  It  is  the  worthy 
ambition  that  brightens  the  hopes  of  many  a scholar 
to  contribute  some  aid  to  the  extension,  the  greater 
availability,  the  greater  convenience  and  safety  of  the 
highways  or  of  the  equipment  of  intellectual  naviga- 
tion. 


II 

The  central  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  indicate  the 
foundations  of  scientific  belief.  These,  like  piles  driven 
deep  down  below  the  surface,  are  often  unconsidered 
by  those  who  use  the  structure  which  they  support. 


62 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


Equally  is  it  the  purpose  to  consider  the  habits  of  mind 
that  lead  to  the  guidance  of  conduct  by  scientifically 
minded  conviction.  A notable  defect  in  this  respect  is 
credulity  — a common  quality,  but  cogently  or  dramat- 
ically illustrated  only  in  terms  of  somewhat  elaborate 
pretenses  accompanied  by  some  measure  of  successful 
currency.  When  thus  presented,  credulity  is  paralleled 
by  deception;  there  must  be  deceiver  as  well  as  de- 
ceived. This  complicates  the  issue  without  adding  no- 
tably to  the  psychological  interest.  In  addition,  the 
two  roles  may  be  united,  and  there  results  seK-decep- 
tion,  which  in  turn  may  vary  from  a fairly  plain  to  a 
decidedly  obscure  diagnosis. 

Retrospectively  credulity  attaches  to  the  formation 
of  beliefs  under  outgrown  standards.  A weak  logical 
sense  inheres  in  them;  but  more  positively  they  result 
from  prepossessions,  which  means  a willingness  to  dis- 
pense with  logical  requirements  in  the  interests  of  a 
cherished  conviction.  Examples  of  the  one  type  are 
easily  found  by  going  back  to  older  systems  of  think- 
ing.^ The  more  dramatic  types  of  credulity  are  to  be 

1 A credulous  age  or  a credulous  standard  of  belief  finds  expression 
in  the  acceptance  as  true  of  reports  or  statements  eontrary  to  fact, 
and  again  of  interpretations  of  facts  or  evidence  contrary  to  sound 
reason  or  plausibility.  In  the  former  case  the  lack  is  the  criterion 
of  evidence,  in  the  latter  in  the  criterion  of  proof.  The  former  is 
more  closely  related  to  ignorance,  the  latter  to  prepossession;  the  com- 
bination of  the  two  is  common.  The  belief  in  unicorns,  mermaids, 
sea-serpents  and  all  manner  of  travelers’  tales  represents  the  one 
type;  beliefs  in  fossils  as  shells  carried  and  dropped  by  Crusaders, 
in  horoscopes,  palmistry,  the  elixir  of  life,  the  conversion  of  baser 
metals  into  gold,  as  well  as  such  projects  as  rain-making,  perpetual- 
motion  schemes,  or  again  calculating  horses,  and  clairvoyant  mediums. 
Such  examples  of  psychological  fables  or  myths  and  again  of  psycho- 
logical fallacies  or  delusions  are  touched  upon  in  various  studies  in 
this  volume. 


BELIEF  AND  CREDULITY 


53 


found  in  cases  of  deliberate  deception.  Though  often 
sordid  in  motive  and  ingenious  in  execution,  they  de- 
serve attention.  A few  instances  are  as  instructive  as 
many,  and  may  be  presented  as  standard  examples. 
In  approaching  them,  we  may  stop  to  consider  the 
sources  of  credulity,  in  so  far  as  it  inclines  to  error 
or  weakens  the  inclination  to  rationahty.  Credulity  is 
shown  in  an  uncritical  acceptance  of  statements.  There 
is  no  simple  rule  for  its  avoidance,  no  automatic  switch 
that  makes  connection  when  truth  presses  the  button, 
but  refuses  to  work  for  the  touch  of  error.  There  is  the 
possibility  of  reaching  principles  that  guide  judgment. 
One  must  consider  both  the  statements  and  the  source. 
A man  may  deliberately  lie;  he  may  belong  to  the  class 
to  which  Huxley  refers  when  he  speaks  of  “the  down- 
right lying  of  people  whose  word  it  is  impossible  to 
doubt”;  he  may  be  more  or  less  consciously  or  subcon- 
sciously misled  by  his  imagination;  he  may  be  hope- 
lessly deficient  in  his  powers  of  observation,  or  in  his 
knowledge  of  fact,  or  in  his  capacity  to  handle  evidence 
and  argument;  and  none  of  these  ethical  or  logical 
shortcomings  seems  to  interfere  at  all  in  certain  persons 
with  their  powers  of  holding  and  publishing  opinions 
on  aU  manners  of  subjects  — even  on  those  on  which 
no  human  soul  has  the  possibility  of  possessing  knowl- 
edge. It  is  also  important  to  note  how  far  the  issue  in- 
volved is  a matter  of  fact  or  of  the  interpretation  of 
fact.  Both  fact  and  its  interpretation,  or  argmnents, 
appear  as  prominently  on  the  side  of  error  as  of  truth; 
yet,  though  not  reducible  to  anthropometric  measure- 
ments, the  physiognomies  of  the  two  are  recognizably 
different  to  the  trained  observer. 


54 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


It  seems  ludicrously  easy  to  collect  facts  of  any  de- 
sired quality  and  to  point  them  in  any  desired  direc- 
tion. Dr.  Holmes  effectively  describes  these  abuses: 
“Foremost  of  all,  emblazoned  at  the  head  of  every 
column,  loudest  shouted  by  every  triumphant  dispu- 
tant, held  up  as  paramount  to  all  other  considerations, 
stretched  like  an  impenetrable  shield  to  protect  the 
weakest  advocate  of  the  great  cause  against  the  weap- 
ons of  the  adversary,  was  that  omnipotent  monosyllable 
which  has  been  the  patrimony  of  cheats  and  the  cur- 
rency of  dupes  from  time  immemorial,  — Facts!  Facts! 
Facts!”  Yet  in  the  crucible  of  logic  it  is  possible  to 
separate  the  dross  from  the  gold.  The  arguments  em- 
ployed have  a like  suspicious  appearance:  they  “have 
been  so  long  bruised  and  battered  round  in  the  cause 
of  every  doctrine  and  pretension,  new,  monstrous,  or 
deliriously  impossible,  that  each  of  them  is  as  odiously 
familiar  to  the  scientific  scholar  as  the  faces  of  so  many 
old  acquaintances,  among  the  less  reputable  classes, 
to  the  officers  of  police.”  The  former  type  of  credulity 
— the  rash  acceptance, of  facts  — is  the  more  simple 
and  the  more  usually  considered;  the  latter  type  — the 
rash  acceptance  of  explanations  or  interpretations  of 
facts  — is  frequently  the  more  vital  and  instructive. 
Ingenious  and  successful  lying  is  doubtless  a fine  art; 
yet  the  more  difficult  part  of  it  is  the  gaining  of  cre- 
dence for  one’s  inventions.  That  depends  largely  upon 
the  belief-attitude  of  the  public  and  upon  the  psycho- 
logical climate  in  which  they  live.  It  is  quite  obvious 
that  the  conscienceless  prevaricator  or  charlatan  must 
play  upon  the  prejudices  and  vanities  and  ignorance 
and  cupidities  of  his  clientele.  He  presents  what  they 


BELIEF  AND  CREDULITY 


55 


wish  to  believe,  appeals  to  their  passions  and  emotional 
weaknesses,  and  when  necessary  berates  his  opponents 
with  no  gentle  hand,  and  indulges  in  what  Huxley 
speaks  of  as  “varnishing  the  fair  face  of  truth  with  that 
pestilent  cosmetic,  rhetoric.”  But  the  psychologist’s 
interest  is  predominantly  on  the  other  side,  with  the 
duped  rather  than  with  the  knave,  especially  when  con- 
tagion has  a fair  field  and  judgment  is  lost  in  a psychic 
epidemic  of  credulity.  Such  we  are  apt  to  associate 
with  dark  ages  and  ignorant  communities,  with  isolated 
cultures  and  inhospitable  mental  climates.  A few  in- 
stances from  the  days  of  the  telegraph  and  the  omni- 
present daily  paper  may  accordingly  be  the  more  in- 
structive.^ 

1 Dr.  Holmes’s  Homoeopathy  and  its  Kindred  Delusions,  first  pub- 
lished about  sixty  years  ago,  was  substantially  a study  of  credulity 
as  applied  to  medical  matters.  Readers  of  this  will  recall  that  besides 
the  minute  exposure  of  the  baselessness  of  the  Hahnemannian  cult, 
there  are  there  considered  (1)  the  royal  cure  of  the  King’s  Evil;  (2) 
the  Weapon  Ointment  and  the  Sympathetic  Powder,  the  first  rather 
lukewarmly  considered  by  Bacon,  the  latter  brought  into  notoriety 
by  Sir  Kenelm  Digby;  (3)  the  Tar-Water  mania  of  Bishop  Berkeley; 
(4)  the  history  of  the  Metallic  Tractors,  or  Perkinsism.  These  are 
thus  summarized:  “Th&  first  two  illustrate  the  ease  with  which  nu- 
merous facts  are  accumulated  to  prove  the  most  fanciful  and  senseless 
extravagances.  The  third  exhibits  the  entire  LnsuSiciency  of  exalted 
wisdom,  immaculate  honesty,  and  vast  general  aequirements  to  make 
a good  physician  of  a great  bishop.  The  fourth  shows  us  the  intimate 
machinery  of  an  extinct  delusion,  which  flourished  only  forty  years 
ago;  drawn  in  all  its  details,  as  being  a rich  and  comparatively  recent 
illustration  of  the  pretensions,  the  arguments,  the  patronage,  by 
means  of  which  windy  errors  have  long  been,  and  will  continue  to 
be,  swollen  into  transient  consequence.  All  display  in  superfluous 
abimdance  the  boundless  credulity  and  excitability  of  mankind  upon 
subjects  connected  with  medicine.”  The  account  of  Perkins  and  his 
Metallic  Tractors  falls  in  well  with  the  instances  here  considered. 


56 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


III 

The  name  of  Leo  Taxil  — a pseudonym  for  Gabriel 
Jogand-Paves  — may  be  unknown  to  many  readers;  it 
should  not  remain  so,  for  the  judgment  which  has  been 
pronounced  upon  Mme.  Blavatsky  — also  a modern 
of  the  moderns  — may  with  modifications  be  applied 
to  Taxil;  that  he  “has  achieved  a title  to  permanent 
remembrance  as  one  of  the  most  accomplished,  in- 
genious, and  interesting  impostors  in  history.”  Only 
Taxil’s  accomplishments  were  of  a rather  gross  order; 
his  boldness  surpassed  his  ingenuity;  and  the  interest 
is  centered  in  his  deeds  rather  than  in  his  personality. 
Like  most  disciples  of  Cagliostro,  his  career  was  a 
checkered  one.  In  1885,  at  the  age  of  thirty-one,  he 
was  engaged  upon  his  magnum  opus,  having  already 
appeared  as  a violent  radical  in  politics,  — he  is  a 
product  of  France,  — a rabid  anti-clerical,  and  the 
author  of  a libelous  pamphlet  on  the  “Secret  Amotus 
of  Pius  IX.”  The  suggestion  for  his  chef  d’ oeuvre  was 
the  encyclical  of  Leo  XIII  (1884)  directed  against  the 
Freemasons,  who  with  others  were  placed  under  the 
ban  as  subjects  of  the  realms  of  Satan.  After  a full  con- 
fession of  the  errors  of  his  former  ways,  Taxil  wns  re- 
ceived back  with  rejoicing  into  the  bosom  of  the  Church, 
and  thereupon  published  four  volumes  of  wholly  imag- 
inary revelations,  revealing  the  sacrilegious  orgies  and 
devil-worship  of  the  Masonic  mysteries.  For  this  he 
received  in  person  the  solemn  benediction  of  the  Vati- 
can, as  well  as  the  material  rewards  of  the  sale  of  one 
hundred  thousand  copies  of  his  work  and  the  honor 
of  its  translation  into  English,  German,  Italian,  and 
Spanish.  If  it  be  stated  that  the  German  version 


BELIEF  AND  CREDULITY 


57 


omitted  the  volume  on  the  “Masonic  sisters,”  for  the 
reason  that  it  was  not  thought  proper  to  outrage  the 
moral  sense  of  the  community  by  recounting  “the  filthi- 
ness of  the  hellish  crew,”  the  character  of  the  work  may 
be  surmised.  Taxil  extended  the  sphere  of  influence 
of  his  imaginary  devil-worshipers  to  all  parts  of  the 
world  — even  from  Singapore  to  Charleston,  at  which 
latter  point  the  Masonic  Grand  Master  figmes  as  a 
Satanic  Pope,  who  has  at  his  disposal  a telephone,  in- 
vented and  operated  by  devils,  whereby  he  puts  a gir- 
dle round  about  the  earth  in  forty  seconds,  and  a magic 
bracelet  by  which  he  summons  Lucifer  at  his  pleasure. 
Intoxicated  by  his  success  and  the  credulity  of  his  ad- 
herents, Taxil’s  invention  rims  riot;  and  he  tells  the 
story  of  a serpent  inditing  prophecies  on  the  back  of  a 
demon  who,  “in  order  to  marry  a Freemason,  trans- 
formed himself  into  a young  lady,  and  played  the  piano, 
evenings,  in  the  form  of  a crocodile.”  Taxil  gained  con- 
federates in  other  countries,  who  contributed  to  the 
movement  according  to  their  several  needs  and  talents. 
One  of  the  most  interesting  figures  in  the  story  is  the 
fictitious  personage,  Diana  Vaughan  — the  pucelle  of 
the  drama  and  of  its  dmouement.  She  was  given  out  to 
be  the  descendant  of  Thomas  Vaughan,  the  seventeenth- 
century  mystic,  and  the  goddess  Astarte;  her  Luci- 
ferian  origin  and  principles  were  shown  by  her  horror 
of  all  religious  observances,  by  the  devils  who  attended 
her,  and  through  whose  aid  she  made  excursions  to 
Mars,  where  she  “rode  on  Schiaparelli’s  canals,  saUed 
on  the  Sea  of  the  Sirens,  and  stroUed  among  the  gigan- 
tic inhabitants  of  the  planet.”  Many  remarkable  inci- 
dents of  her  curious  personality  are  retailed  for  the 


58 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


benefit  of  the  believers;  while  poetic  justice  is  appeased 
by  her  final  conversion  to  the  Church  through  the  in- 
strumentality of  the  spirit  of  Jeanne  d’Arc. 

When  it  became  necessary  to  materialize  Diana 
Vaughan  for  the  benefit  of  the  privileged  few  and  to 
satisfy  the  skepticism  of  others,  she  was  cleverly  im- 
personated by  “a  bright  American  girl,  employed  as 
a copyist  in  a Parisian  typewriter  establishment,  who 
wrote  all  the  letters  at  Taxil’s  dictation  and  received  a 
monthly  salary  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  francs  for  her 
services.”  This  was  hardly  a fair  appreciation  of  Ameri- 
can talent,  considering  that  the  money  remitted  to 
Diana  Vaughan  in  ten  years  amounted  to  more  than 
half  a million  francs.  In  1896  Taxil  was  a prominent 
figure  in  a great  anti-Masonic  congress  held  at  Trent, 
where  indeed  he  was  treated  as  a hero  and  a saint.  On 
April  19,  1897,  in  Paris,  there  was  held  by  invita- 
tion of  Diana  Vaughan  a highly  sensational  function, 
at  which  it  had  been  announced  that  the  miraculous 
lady  would  appear.  When  the  moment  arrived,  Taxil 
stepped  forward  and  said:  “Reverend  Sirs,  ladies  and 
gentlemen!  you  wish  to  see  Diana  Vaughan.  Look  at 
me!  I myself  am  that  lady.”  Then  followed  an  explicit 
account  of  the  twelve  years  of  imposture  and  an  impu- 
dent expression  of  thanks  to  the  clergy  for  the  unwit- 
ting aid  in  his  deviltries;  a forced  retreat  to  a neigh- 
boring caf6  to  escape  the  vengeance  of  the  crowd;  a 
momentary  furore,  some  discussion  pro  and  con;  and 
then,  so  far  as  can  be  learned,  the  world  wagged  on  and 
the  story  ends.^  Surely  this  is  a remarkable  instance  of 

‘ The  account  ot  Taxil  is  derived  from  E.  P.  Evans,  “Siu'vival  of 
Mediaeval  Credulity,”  Popular  Science  Monthly,  March  and  April,  1900. 


BELIEF  AND  CREDULITY 


59 


fin-de-siecle  credulity,  and  one  that  will  hardly  suffer 
by  comparison  with  mediaeval  superstition.  Its  impor- 
tance in  the  present  connection  lies  in  the  illustration 
which  it  furnishes  of  what  may  happen  in  extreme 
eases  when  verifiability  and  scientific-mindedness  are 
wholly  ignored,  and  the  methods  that  appeal  to  au- 
thority and  to  prepossessions  are  allowed  to  run  riot. 
Then  standards  of  probability,  as  well  as  the  critical  at- 
titude, are  wholly  absent  or  hopelessly  distorted,  and 
credulity  has  the  open  door. 

Prepossessions  are  not  always  so  prominent  in  the 
evolution  of  myths  that  gain  acceptance  by  preying 
upon  credulity.  The  presence  of  an  indolent  atmos- 
phere and  of  a sympathetic  milieu  is  all  that  is  neces- 
sary. Of  this  the  story  of  Kaspar  Hauser,  the  “wild  boy 
of  Nxiremberg,”  furnishes  a fairly  modern  instance;  for 
the  Nestors  of  our  generation  may  easily  remember 
the  interest  which  his  case  aroused  throughout  Eu- 
rope. The  commonly  accepted  tale  made  him  out  as 
an  abandoned  child,  cruelly  confined  in  a dark  cell,  cut 
off  from  aU  association  except  with  the  monster  who 
gave  him  his  daily  bread.  He  became  the  classic  ex- 
ample of  the  condition  of  a human  being  in  the  absence 
of  all  education;  he  was  heralded  as  a child  of  nature, 
as  an  example  of  the  mnocence  of  man  before  the  fall, 
as  a realization  in  the  flesh  of  Rousseau’s  Emile.  It 
was  proposed  to  adopt  him  as  the  child  of  Europe,  and 
he  was  actually  adopted  as  a son  by  the  Earl  of  Stan- 
hope. The  interest  in  his  case  was  maintained  by  the 
accounts  of  his  marvelous  psychic  powers,  as  also  by 
the  speculations  as  to  his  origin,  which  brought  slander 
upon  more  than  one  noble  house.  He  could  see  a gnat 


60 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


in  a spider’s  web  a long  distance  off,  and  after  twi- 
light; he  could  distinguish  between  a pear  and  an  apple 
and  a plum  tree  by  their  odor  at  a distance  at  which 
others  could  barely  see  the  tree;  he  was  overcome  by 
the  exhalations  of  a graveyard  several  streets  off;  he 
could  distinguish  metals  by  their  different  attractions 
for  his  fingers,  while  the  vicinity  of  a hardware  shop 
brought  on  convulsions;  when  examined  by  a homoeop- 
athist,  he  proved  in  his  own  person  the  truth  of  homoe- 
opathy. His  origin  was  a matter  of  eager  speculation. 
Gossips  and  scholars  were  equally  busy;  and,  with 
characteristic  Teuton  thoroughness,  a bibliography  of 
nearly  three  hundred  numbers  was  accumulated,  re- 
counting the  various  versions  of  the  story  of  Kaspar 
Hauser. 

The  sifted  facts  out  of  which,  or  in  spite  of  which, 
the  various  myths  sprouted  and  flourished,  are  few  and 
luminous.  The  boy  appeared  on  the  streets  of  Nurem- 
berg with  a letter  in  his  hand,  which  he  had  doubtless 
written,  and  was  put  in  prison  as  a helpless  wayfarer. 
The  original  protocol  shows  that  he  walked  a mile  on 
that  day,  recited  the  Lord’s  prayer,  spoke  with  dialec- 
tical peculiarities,  said  that  he  had  gone  to  school, 
showed  his  fondness  for  horses,  and  admitted  that  the 
object  of  the  letter,  addressed  to  a captain  of  cavalry, 
was  to  secure  him  a post  in  the  service.  He  seemed  to 
feign  simple-mindedness  and  to  avoid  answering  ques- 
tions. In  the  one  letter  was  another  purporting  to  have 
been  written  sixteen  years  previously  by  the  mother 
of  the  boy,  but  obviously  a forgery.  This  started  the 
story  to  which  the  Burgomaster  gave  wings  by  a proc- 
lamation elaborating  the  “wild  boy  of  nature’’  theory, 


BELIEF  AND  CREDULITY 


61 


and  embellishing  it  with  fantastic  “details  calculated 
to  give  verisimilitude  to  an  otherwise  improbable  tale.” 
Learned  ignorance  in  the  person  of  a Professor  Dau- 
mer  — to  whom  Kaspar  was  entrusted  for  his  educa- 
tion — still  further  distorted  the  simple  facts.  Though 
at  first  the  boy  could  not  speak  (this  is  Daumer’s  story) 
and  could  only  understand  those  who  treated  him  as 
an  infant,  this  helpless  and  untutored  babe,  after  three 
days,  played  on  the  piano,  soon  after  knitted  a stock- 
ing, and  in  four  weeks  was  able  to  entertain  the  Burgo- 
master with  an  accoimt  of  his  years  of  solitary  confine- 
ment. Within  a month  this  worthy,  but  mentally  blind, 
professor  had  transformed  the  wild  boy  into  a model 
of  social  elegance,  who  carried  on  witty  conversations, 
made  graceful  allusions  to  the  ancient  Romans,  and 
played  checkers  and  chess.  The  story  is  too  full  of  de- 
tail to  be  fiuther  considered;  but  enough  has  been  given 
to  show  the  glaring  inconsistency  of  the  theory  of  ex- 
planation either  with  the  real  facts,  which  almost  no 
one  knew,  or  even  with  the  alleged  facts,  which  were 
widely  circulated.  Kaspar’s  lot  simply  chanced  to  fall 
in  pleasant  places;  by  accepting  the  part  which  the 
credulity  of  his  surroundmgs  thrust  upon  him,  he  was 
buoyed  into  fame  and  made  the  subject  of  a neuge- 
schichtliche  Legende.^  It  is  proper  to  add  that  the  back- 
ward stage  of  a practical  psychology  seventy  years  ago 
made  possible  the  acceptance  of  such  a caricature  of 
an  untutored  child  of  nature.  Doubtless  many  gave 
no  credence  to  the  tale;  but  its  ready  acceptance  in 
almost  all  circles  gives  it  a permanent  place  in  the 

The  true  Kaspar  Hauser  is  disclosed  in  Antonius  von  der  Linde’s 
Kaspar  Hauser  (2  vols.,  1887). 


62 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


history  of  credulity.  In  contrast  with  the  affaire  Taxil, 
the  Kaspar  incident  appeals  more  to  the  intellectual 
than  to  the  emotional  weaknesses,  and  involves  a larger 
share  of  misinterpretation  of  fact;  while  the  laek  of 
proper  standards  to  estimate  the  improbability  of  what 
is  given  out  for  fact  is  glaringly  obvious  in  both  cases. 
This  personal  characteristic  of  the  duped  may  be  more 
foreibly  described  as  gullibility. 

To  complete  the  collection  of  types  of  eredulity,  we 
should  have  an  instance  in  which  a system  of  interpre- 
tation of  faets  — not  a mere  narrative  — in  itself  star- 
tling and  eontradictory  to  ordinary  experienee,  gains 
widespread  credence,  and  that  in  spite  of  pronounced 
inconsistency  with  verifiable  observation  and  common 
sense.  These  conditions  are  remarkably  well  satisfied 
by  the  recent  promulgation  of  the  doctrines  of  Chris- 
tian Science.  Even  in  this  field  of  intellectual  effort, 
the  land  of  the  free  and  the  home  of  the  brave  has  con- 
tributed an  article  worthy  to  compete  with  the  foreign 
product.  Eagle-like,  this  system  spreads  its  wings  and 
soars  free  from  the  bonds  of  sense  or  earth-bound  reali- 
ties, free  from  human  logic  and  the  errors  of  mortal 
mind,  free  from  the  material  impediments  which  nature 
has  inconsiderately  set  in  our  paths,  free  to  make  things 
so  by  thinking  them  so,  free  to  set  method  and  learn- 
ing and  experience  at  naught.  And  surely  it  calls  for 
courage  of  no  common  order  to  resist  the  seductive 
appeals  of  eye  and  ear,  to  sail  steadily  on  heedless  of 
the  calls  of  the  sirens  of  rationality,  convinced  at  the 
outset  that  things  cannot  be  as  they  are,  and  refusing 
the  nod  of  recognition  to  the  plebeian  idols  of  the  ills 
of  flesh.  It  is  not  necessary  in  this  connection  to  re- 


BELIEF  AND  CREDULITY 


63 


count  the  beliefs  of  this  system;  it  is  sufficient  to  point 
out  that  when  thousands  of  intelligent  persons  give 
practical  adherence  to,  and  enroll  themselves  under  the 
banner  of  one  who  teaches  that  a bimion  would  be  an 
adequate  cause  of  insanity,  if  only  we  held  the  same 
belief  about  the  bimion  as  we  do  about  congestion  of 
the  brain;  that  smallpox  is  contagious  by  reason  of 
the  same  agencies  as  make  weeping  or  yawning  con- 
tagious; that  fear  may  be  reflected  in  the  body  as  frac- 
tured bones,  just  as  shame  is  seen  rising  to  the  cheek; 
that  anatomy  and  physiology  and  hygiene  are  the 
husbandmen  of  sickness  and  disease,  while  the  reading 
of  a textbook  of  Christian  Science  is  equally  effective 
in  produciug  health;  that  when  a healthy  horse  takes 
cold  without  his  blanket,  it  is  on  account  of  the  poor 
creature’s  knowledge  of  physiology  — then  such  per- 
sons can  hardly  complain  if  they  are  cited  as  instances 
of  modern  credulity. 

IV 

Such,  then,  is  the  backgroimd  against  which  logical 
belief  shines  forth  with  contrasted  splendor;  such  are, 
admittedly  in  their  extreme  form,  the  results  of  follow- 
ing after  strange  gods  and  deserting  the  narrow  path 
of  strenuous  rationality,  of  critically  trained  judgment, 
of  adherence  to  verifiable  standards  of  belief.  The  tale 
needs  no  adornment,  and  the  moral  is  sufficiently 
pointed  to  require  no  hard  blows  to  drive  it  home.  It 
will  be  profitable  in  continuation  to  survey,  though 
perforce  briefly,  the  middle  distance,  the  practical  field 
of  compromise  and  of  the  necessity  for  action,  in  which 
we  needs  must  travel  up  hill  and  down  dale  and  cannot 


64 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


take  the  level  road  which  we  wish  were  possible;  in 
which  we  must  risk  error  constantly  if  we  would  move 
at  all. 

In  entering  the  practical  arena  that  philosopher  is 
indeed  insensitive  or  unobservant  who  does  not  be- 
come conscious  of  a decided  climatic  change.  He  is 
presumably  familiar  with  various  uncomplimentary 
remarks  concerning  his  unfitness  to  assume  a due  share 
of  the  responsibilities  of  life,  from  the  tribute  of  Fred- 
erick the  Great  (“If,”  he  said,  “I  wanted  to  ruin  one 
of  my  provinces,  I would  make  over  its  government 
to  the  philosophers  ”)  to  the  fashionable  gibes  against 
the  scholar  in  politics  for  the  professor  in  practical 
affairs.  There  is  certainly  much  exaggeration  in  the 
current  notions  of  the  incompatibility  of  the  reflective 
and  the  directive  (perhaps  it  would  be  unwise  to  say 
the  active)  temperament;  and  there  is  much  reason 
for  the  claim  that  the  science-moulded  philosopher 
may  say,  “Nous  avons  changSs  tout  cela”  Indeed,  a 
recent  writer  has  forcibly  maintained  that  the  nearest 
analogue  of  the  man  of  science  is  the  “so-called  man 
of  business,  and  the  chief  distinction  between  the  two 
is  that  the  one  deals  with  the  unfamiliar,  the  other  with 
familiar  things.”  ^ This  significant  difference  was  long 
ago  presented  by  De  Morgan  as  one  of  the  advantages 
that  a logical  training  secures.  “I  maintain  that  logic 
tends  to  make  the  power  of  reason  over  the  imusual 
and  the  unfamiliar  more  nearly  equal  to  the  power  over 
the  usual  and  familiar  than  it  would  otherwise  be.  The 
second  is  increased;  but  the  first  is  almost  created.” 
This  is  but  one  of  the  differences  in  training,  interest, 
‘ F.  W.  Clarke,  Popular  Science  Monthly,  February,  1900. 


BELIEF  AND  CREDULITY 


65 


thought-habit,  and  temperament  that  estrange  the 
scholar  from  the  man  of  afPairs.  Yet  much  of  this  im- 
familiarity  is  a matter  of  technique,  and  as  such  be- 
longs equally  to  the  arts  of  life  and  to  the  sciences;  the 
ignorance  of  one  another’s  techniques  is  no  cause  for 
lack  of  sympathy  and  comprehension  of  the  aims  and 
efforts  of  practical  and  scientific  specialists.  A further 
contrast  is  emphasized  by  philosophical  historians. 
“In  practical  life  the  wisest  and  soimdest  men  avoid 
speculation  and  insure  success  because,  by  limiting 
their  range,  they  increase  the  tenacity  by  which  they 
grasp  events;  while  in  speculative  life  the  cotmse  is  ex- 
actly the  reverse,  since  in  that  department  the  greater 
the  range,  the  greater  the  command,  and  the  object 
of  the  philosopher  is  to  have  as  large  a generalization 
as  possible”  — this  is  Buckle’s  formulation.  “Noth- 
ing can  be  more  fatal  in  politics  than  a preponderance 
of  the  philosophical,  or  in  philosophy  than  a prepon- 
derance of  the  political,  spirit,”  says  Lecky.  Fiske,  in 
commenting  upon  the  relations  of  Huxley  and  Glad- 
stone (whom  Huxley  himself  spoke  of  as  a “copious 
shuffler”),  says:  “One  could  no  more  expect  a prime 
minister,  as  such,  to  tmderstand  Huxley’s  attitude  in 
presence  of  a scientific  problem,  than  a deaf-mute  to 
comprehend  a symphony  of  Beethoven.” 

And  yet  these  occupations  are  not  mutually  exclu- 
sive; philosophy  and  politics  are  not  December  and 
May,  and  the  temperate  zone,  in  which  (in  theory,  at 
least)  we  pass  our  existence,  is  a composite  of  the  two. 
Indeed,  a divorce  of  theory  and  practice  is  disastrous 
to  both  parties  of  the  alliance;  theory  is  the  more  real 
and  vital  for  its  consideration  of  and  adaptation  to 


66 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


tangible  conditions;  and  practice  is  more  rational  and 
more  liberal,  embraces  a larger  expediency  than  if  re- 
sponsive only  to  the  status  quo.  Learning  dissociated 
from  doing  is  threatened  with  the  decadence  of  mere 
erudition,  pedantry,  and  disputation.  Exercise  is 
equally  good  for  mind  and  body;  but  there  is  danger 
of  falling  in  love  with  the  mere  mechanism  of  thought 
— the  absorption  in  the  feeling  of  one’s  mental  muscles 
contracting  and  of  plodding  in  treadmill  routine,  ever 
moving,  but  never  advancing.  The  danger  of  practice 
dissociated  from  principle  is  that  of  becoming  time- 
serving, narrow,  partisan,  short-sighted;  it  tacks  for 
every  wind,  loses  its  bearings,  and  sacrifices  larger  for 
smaller  gains.  Emerson  said  of  the  English  some  fifty 
years  ago,  “They  are  impious  in  their  skepticism  of  a 
theory,  but  kiss  the  dust  before  a fact”;  and  Emer- 
son’s own  countrymen  are  curiously  like  and  curiously 
unlike  the  people  whose  traits  he  characterizes.  Lord 
Morley  deplores  the  same  tendency  from  a more  mod- 
ern point  of  view.  He  notes  the  inclination  to  reply 
to  an  advocate  of  improvement  by  “some  sagacious 
silliness  about  recognizing  the  limits  of  the  practical 
in  politics,  and  seeing  the  necessity  of  adapting  theories 
to  facts.  As  if  the  fact  of  taking  a broader  and  wiser 
view  than  the  common  crowd  disqualifies  a man  from 
knowing  what  the  view  of  the  common  crowd  happens 
to  be,  and  from  estimating  it  at  the  proper  value  for 
practical  purposes.”  These  various  opinions,  when 
judiciously  strained,  leave  a weighty  deposit  of  truth; 
and  they  have  a direct  bearing  upon  the  issues  of  right 
and  wrong  belief.  They  make  it  abundantly  clear  that 
the  relations  of  right  knowing  to  right  doing  as  ur- 


BELIEF  AND  CREDULITY 


67 


gently  demand  illumination  to-day  as  when  Socrates 
perplexed  the  Athenian  youth  by  maintaining  that  no 
man  would  willingly  do  wrong  or  wittingly  hold  to 
error.  On  the  one  hand,  we  are  told  that  for  wild  specu- 
lation and  rash  credulity,  the  practical  man  takes  the 
lead,  whether  it  be  by  subscribing  in  coin  to  schemes 
for  extracting  gold  from  sea- water,  or  “backing”  the 
rain-makers,  or  the  “Keeley  motor”;  or  in  subscrib- 
ing in  faith  to  the  reality  of  curative  mental  vibrations, 
the  accounts  of  signaling  with  the  inhabitants  of  Mars, 
the  evolution  of  gray  matter  in  Helen  Keller’s  finger- 
tips, or  any  other  of  the  items  of  the  progress  of 
science  with  which  newspaper  paragraphers  regale 
their  readers  when  copy  is  scarce.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  men  of  books  and  apparatus  are  charged  with  the 
pmsuit  of  fads,  of  a contempt  for  journals  and  ledgers, 
of  an  ignorance  of  business  ways,  and  an  incapacity 
to  deal  executively  with  men  and  things.  The  truth  is 
that  there  are  all  shades  and  grades  of  men  in  both 
careers.  The  important  things  to  be  observed  are 
tendencies  and  their  causes,  not  individuals  and  their 
peculiarities.  It  is  these  tendencies  that  are  reflected 
in  opinion  and  conduct  indirectly,  and  directly  in  the 
relations  of  theory  to  practice,  as  acted  upon  or  con- 
sidered. 

This  relation  — between  the  theoretical  and  the 
practical  factors  in  the  progress  of  knowledge  — may 
be  pictured  as  similar  to  that  pertaining  between  mas- 
ter and  dog.  The  dog  runs  ahead  of  the  master,  takes 
short  excursions  on  his  own  accovmt,  comes  to  a turn 
of  the  road  and  wanders  hesitatingly  about  until  he 
detects  the  direction  in  which  his  master  turns;  then 


68 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


dashes  confidently  onward  with  an  air  of  having  in- 
tended to  go  that  way  all  along,  and  probably  imagines 
— and  the  appearances  are  in  his  favor  — that  he  is 
leading  the  man.  Yet  the  wise  dog  does  not  wander  far 
out  of  scenting  distance,  is  on  the  alert  for  the  call  of 
the  master,  and  quickly  retraces  his  steps  when  he 
finds  that  his  master  has  turned  the  other  way.  It  is 
doubtless  true  that  the  dog  may  light  upon  valuable 
discoveries;  and  the  master  will  do  well  to  heed  any 
xmusual  signs  of  alarm  or  excitement  on  the  part  of  his 
keen-scented  companion;  and  if  it  happens  that  the 
shades  of  night  close  in  upon  him  or  that  his  own  sight 
grows  dim,  he  that  walks  in  darkness  is  fortunate  in 
having  so  trustworthy  a guide.  From  which  we  may 
learn  that  the  formation  of  belief  in  practical  affairs, 
while  seemingly  independent  of  theory  and  indeed 
running  ahead  of  theory  for  short  stretches  in  a restless 
striving  to  enrich  experience,  is  none  the  less  directed 
by  theory,  and  prospers  best  when  following,  though 
with  judgment  and  self-reliance,  the  indications  of 
principles  and  formulae. 

The  mutual  recognition  of  the  fimctions  of  theorist 
and  practitioner  is  one  of  the  desired  and  not  improb- 
able consummations  of  modern  civilization,  and  upon 
it  depends  in  considerable  measure  the  practical  fate 
of  right  and  wrong  beliefs.  It  is  still  pertinent  to  re- 
peat Buckle’s  complaint  that  “a  theorist  is  actually 
a term  of  reproach  instead  of  being,  as  it  ought  to  be, 
a term  of  honor;  for  to  theorize  is  the  highest  function 
of  genius,  and  the  greatest  philosophers  must  always 
be  the  greatest  theorists”;  yet,  in  so  doing,  we  may 
add  the  condition  that  the  philosophers  shall  theorize 


BELIEF  AND  CREDULITY 


69 


wisely  and  with  appreciation  of  the  actualities  of  exist- 
ence, not  dogmatically  or  capriciously.  In  brief,  there 
is  scientific  theorizing,  as  there  is  scientific  practice; 
belief  and  credulity,  truth  and  error,  economy  and 
waste,  profit  and  loss,  are  possible  in  each.  Yet  in  the 
end,  rational  progress  in  belief  and  practice,  though 
truly  a question  of  proportion,  must  take  its  illumi- 
nation not  diffusely  from  countless  scattered  sources, 
but  directly  from  a central  luminous  principle.  “The 
devotion  to  the  practical  aspect  of  truth”  — to  cite 
again  from  Lord  Morley  — “ is  in  such  excess  as  to 
make  people  habitually  deny  that  it  can  be  worth 
while  to  formulate  an  opinion,  when  it  happens  at  the 
moment  to  be  incapable  of  realization  for  the  reason 
that  there  is  no  direct  prospect  of  inducing  a sufficient 
number  of  persons  to  share  it.”  “As  if  the  mere  possi- 
bility of  the  view  being  a right  one  did  not  obviously 
entitle  it  to  a discussion.”  “The  evil . . . comes  of  not 
seeing  the  great  truth  that  it  is  worth  while  to  take 
pains  to  find  out  the  best  way  of  doing  a given  task, 
even  if  you  have  strong  grounds  for  suspecting  that  it 
will  ultimately  be  done  in  a worse  way.”  “It  makes 
all  the  difference  in  the  world,”  says  Whately,  “whether 
we  put  Truth  in  the  first  place  or  in  the  second  place.” 
Lord  Morley  thus  protests  against  what  he  calls  the 
House  of  Commons  view  of  life,  which  subordinates 
principle  to  expediency,  — which  may  be  unfortunate, 
but  necessary,  — but  in  so  doing  sacrifices  the  para- 
mount significance  of  principle,  — which  is  both  un- 
necessary and  pernicious. 

The  practical  arena  wherein  truth  and  error,  right 
and  wrong,  the  better  and  the  worse  cause,  principle 


70 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


and  expediency,  are  engaged  in  combat  is  obviously 
too  complex  to  admit  of  ready  description  or  analysis; 
the  few  groups  of  combating  influences  that  have  been 
brought  within  the  field  of  view  occupy  but  a modest 
corner  of  the  arena.  Other  equally  important  contests 
are  going  on  at  the  same  time;  the  ethical  aspects  of 
belief  are  nearly  as  complex  as  the  intellectual,  and  as 
worthy  of  consideration;  and  people  still  find  an  in- 
terest in  discussing  how  far  truth  should  be  dissemi- 
nated when  it  undermines  traditional  convictions  seem- 
ingly essential  to  happiness  or  even  to  virtue;  how 
far,  in  Clifford’s  words,  “Truth  is  a thing  to  be  shouted 
from  the  housetops,  not  to  be  whispered  over  rose- 
water after  dinner,  when  the  ladies  are  gone  away,” 
and  how  far  the  dissemination  of  right  belief  is  itself 
controlled  by  considerations  of  practical  as  well  as 
of  theoretical  morality.  Philosophers  of  so  opposite  a 
calling  as  a Harvard  psychologist  and  a Parliamentary 
leader  ‘ unite  in  telling  us  that,  in  the  last  analysis, 
with  regard  to  disputed  questions  of  a not  too  practical 
sort,  men  do  and  have  a right  to  believe,  at  their  own 
risk,  that  which  seems  to  them  most  elevating,  fitting, 
satisfying,  and  rational;  that  in  this  process  we  all 
follow  custom  and  temperamental  impulse,  though  we 
cover  our  retreat  with  arguments.  These  enticing  rami- 
fications of  the  central  problem  of  right  and  wrong 
belief,  however  germane  to  the  comprehension  of  the 
forces  that  make  for  truth  and  error,  require  indepen- 
dent consideration.  The  issues  in  which  these  various 
factors  — and  especially  the  aspects  just  presented  of 
the  relations  of  theory  to  practice  — culminate  is  that 
1 James,  The  Will  to  Believe;  Balfour,  The  Foundations  of  Belief. 


BELIEF  AND  CREDULITY 


71 


of  the  formation  of  belief-standards.  It  is  in  the  com- 
mon possession  of  these  that  the  logical  man  of  theory 
and  the  logical  man  of  practice  should  find  their  sym- 
pathetic companionship;  and  to  the  appreciation  of 
this  underlying  requisite  for  harmonious  and  profitable 
intercourse,  nothing  will  contribute  more  directly  and 
effectively  than  a comprehension  of  the  relations  that 
do  and  should  exist  between  the  guiding  principles  of 
belief  and  their  wise  embodiment  in  conduct.  If  the 
leaders  of  men,  leaders  of  small  companies  and  of  large 
ones,  those  who  are  listened  to  and  likewise  listen  to 
others,  can  be  induced  to  absorb  somewhat  of  the  spirit 
and  the  sensitiveness  to  real  distinctions  that  result 
from  the  successful  devotion  to  the  aims  of  science,  the 
danger  of  the  ready  acceptance  of  false  beliefs,  the  fos- 
tering of  credulity,  would  be  materially  lessened. 

In  an  age  when  many  marvelous  things  have  been 
accomplished,  some  of  them  on  the  surface  as  imex- 
pected  and  as  unconnected  with  other  knowledge,  in- 
deed as  seemingly  contradictory  of  such  knowledge, 
as  the  ostensible  miracles  and  startling  paradoxes  that 
are  paraded  as  demonstrable  truth,  it  is  natural  enough 
that  the  man  in  the  street  should  be  bewildered  and 
not  know  what  to  believe  nor  whom  to  believe.  Be- 
tween the  Scylla  of  ignorant  and  obstinate  skepticism 
and  the  Charybdis  of  ignorant  and  rash  credulity,  the 
channel  seems  perplexingly  narrow;  nor  is  it  always 
possible  to  assume  the  expertness  and  disinterestedness 
of  those  who  offer  themselves  as  pilots.  The  possibility 
of  seeing  one’s  bones  through  the  skin  seems  as  remote 
as  the  possibility  of  perpetual  motion;  telepathy  no 
more  wonderful  than  wireless  telegraphy;  the  predic- 


72 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


tions  of  the  astrological  almanac  as  credible  as  the 
determination  by  the  spectroscope  of  the  physical  con- 
ditions of  other  planets;  the  phrenological  faculties 
as  satisfying  as  the  results  of  the  physiological  study 
of  brain-localizations;  the  mental  vibrations  of  the 
“absent  treatment”  healer  as  fairly  supported  by  the 
results  as  the  therapeutic  action  of  drugs;  the  pres- 
entation of  the  mathematical  triturations  and  the  ho- 
moeopathic potencies  as  learned  and  convincing  as  the 
enigmatic  formulae  and  manipulations  of  the  chemist. 
And  yet  these  resemblances  are  quite  superficial,  the 
analogies  of  their  likeness  quite  misleading.  On  the 
one  shore  lies  the  orderly  kingdom  of  rational  belief; 
across  the  border  the  chaotic  realm  of  credulity. 

Any  one  who  cares  to  take  the  trouble  of  examining 
the  literature  of  the  propaganda  of  logical  imortho- 
doxy  can  readily  satisfy  himself  of  the  reality  and  the 
character  of  the  realm  over  which  credulity  holds  sway. 
He  will  observe  the  truly  unbalanced,  the  “cranks,” 
those  possessed  with  what  has  been  described  as  the 
“unconquerable  determination  of  the  human  race  to 
believe  what  it  knows  is  not  so,”  the  iimocently  and 
naively  deluded,  the  faddists  and  extremists,  the  seem- 
ingly normal  and  wholly  intelligent.  The  shades  and 
grades  of  believers  are  as  pronounced  as  on  the  other 
shore.  And  yet  to  the  man  of  sturdy  intellectual  vir- 
tue these  distorted  though  not  wholly  valueless  beliefs 
offer  no  temptation.  And  equally  true  is  it  that  the 
logically  moulded  thinker  knows  that  it  is  useless  to 
demand  any  ready-made  prescription  which  shall  save 
all  men  from  credulity,  not  only  in  extreme  cases  — 
which  most  people  do  not  really  fear  — but  in  the 


BELIEF  AND  CREDULITY 


73 


intermediate  and  more  frequent  and  actual  perplexi- 
ties of  the  practical  life. 

The  nature  of  the  antidote  which  is  most  worth  the 
seeking  it  has  been  the  pmpose  of  this  study  to  set 
forth.  And  last  as  first  should  it  be  emphasized  that 
there  is  in  many  of  the  vital  and  typical  problems  of 
knowing  and  doing,  an  objectively  best  method  of 
fixing  belief  to  which  we  may  reasonably  approximate 
in  practice.  Neither  the  logical  requirements  of  philo- 
sophical thought  nor  the  actualities  of  the  practical 
life,  when  rightly  interpreted,  appear  to  be  seriously 
antagonistic  to  — indeed  are  wholly  compatible  with 
— the  absorption  of  the  principles  rooted  in  the  scien- 
tific analysis  of  belief.  This  infusion  of  the  blood  of 
science  permeates  the  organic  structure  of  the  belief- 
attitude,  and  creates  a sturdy  affinity  for  right  belief 
and  a deep-seated  aversion  for  the  intellectual  man- 
ners that  error,  attractive  to  credulity,  is  apt  to  bear. 
In  truth  this  protecting  aegis  is  in  some  measure  an 
aesthetic  trait  — a certain  intellectual  fastidiousness 
which,  as  is  also  true  of  the  ethical  life,  becomes  a po- 
tent ally  of  virtue.  And  this  logical  virtue  becomes 
recognizable  in  the  ability  to  guide  action  and  belief 
by  reference  to  fundamental  principles;  it  requires  the 
quality  of  mind  that  easily  holds  the  impress  of  an 
argument,  whose  beliefs  are  deep-rooted  in  the  soil  of 
human  experience  critically  interpreted. 

When  confronted  with  the  noisy  demonstrations  of 
some  new  revolutionary  claimant  for  public  favor,  the 
well-bred  mind,  though  plastic  to  worthily  formative 
influences,  is  not  easily  disturbed  in  its  convictions,  nor 
readily  affected  by  the  contagion  of  popular  approval. 


74 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


Even  though  unable  to  explain  fully  the  status  of  the 
ambitious  aspirant,  it  does  not  become  panic-stricken 
and  lightly  transfer  its  allegiance,  nor  madly  follow 
a fashionable  prestige,  however  brilliantly  heralded. 
Rather  is  comfort  sought  in  the  reflection  that  often 
before  have  meteors  flashed  across  the  sky  and  dis- 
appeared, and  stiU  the  stars  shine  fixedly.  Across  a 
gap  of  twenty  centuries  it  finds  the  touch  of  natme 
that  renders  the  whole  world  kin,  and  repeats  approv- 
ingly the  sentiment  of  Lucian:  “To  defend  one’s  mind 
against  these  follies  a man  must  have  an  adamantine 
faith,  so  that,  even  if  he  is  not  able  to  detect  the  pre- 
cise trick  by  which  the  illusion  is  produced,  he  at  any 
rate  retains  his  conviction  that  the  whole  thing  is  a lie 
and  an  impossibility.”  Such  a man  knows  full  well  that 
the  baser  metals  cannot  be  converted  into  gold;  and 
though  at  credulity’s 

“booth  are  all  things  sold. 

Each  ounce  of  dross  costs  its  ounce  of  gold,”  — 

he  realizes,  too,  the  potent  reality  of  truth:  that  truth 
is  neither  a metaphysical  abstraction  nor  a matter  of 
taste,  and  least  of  all  a matter  of  expediency.  While 
judiciously  responsive  to  the  practical  demands  of  the 
conditions  under  which  belief  must  be  wrought  out  and 
expressed,  he  is  assured  with  Lowell  that  “compromise 
makes  a good  umbrella,  but  a poor  roof”;  while  sym- 
pathetic with  the  more  intimate  discussion  of  the 
belief  process,  he  holds  clearly  in  mind  the  functional 
utility  and  categorical  imperative  of  right  belief. 


Ill 


THE  WILL  TO  BELIEVE  IN  THE 
SUPERNATURAL 

The  present  study  aims  to  illustrate,  in  terms  of  a 
widely  disseminated  belief,  the  manner  in  which  the 
inclination  toward  a conclusion  affects  the  process  of 
argument  and  the  perspective  of  evidence.  The  influ- 
ence may  be  coarse  and  obvious;  it  may  be  subtle  and 
indirect.  On  the  part  of  those  subject  to  its  sway,  the 
influence  is  disavowed,  often  indignantly  repudiated; 
for  the  analysis  thus  becomes  vivisectional  in  its  attack. 
An  objective  psychology  must  perforce  overrule  while 
yet  it  considers  such  protests. 

The  topic  may  be  introduced  by  a personal  remi- 
niscence. Among  the  indiscreet  memories  of  an  im- 
eventful  curriculum  of  many  college  generations  ago, 
one  survives  in  fair  rehef  — the  study  of  Bishop  But- 
ler’s “Analogy  of  Religion,  Natural  and  Revealed,  to 
the  Constitution  and  Course  of  Nature”  (a.d.  1736). 
So  much  of  this  non-elective  study  as  reached  my  im- 
derstanding  aroused  an  aversion  to  the  type  of  argu- 
ment primarily,  to  the  matter  incidentally.  Yet  by  the 
hght  of  that  benign  essay  I have  again  and  again  ap- 
preciated the  comfort  of  sighting  the  terminus  from 
the  starting-point  of  a logical  journey.  It  seems  to  be 
simpler  and  safer  to  reason  or  to  travel  when  the  des- 
tination is  greeted,  not  with  the  uncertain  scrutiny  of 


76 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


a stranger,  but  with  the  welcome  familiarity  of  a 
friend. 

I do  not  confuse  this  experience  with  the  earlier 
school- boy  discovery  of  the  disappearance  of  mathe- 
matical entanglements  by  the  simple  device  of  looking 
up  the  answers  in  the  book.  The  procedures  that  were  re- 
sorted to,  to  bridge  the  gap  of  non-comprehension  were 
ingenious,  but  not  convincing.  The  irrelevant  Q.E.D. 
served  only  to  call  attention  to  the  absence  of  any 
visible  harness  to  join  horse  and  cart  in  proper  rela- 
tion. The  adept  argument,  whether  proceeding  by 
analogy  or  otherwise,  is  more  circumspect.  It  knows 
full  well  that  conclusions  do  not  travel  on  logical  cre- 
dentials alone;  nor  is  their  circulation  determined  by 
the  quality  of  their  construction.  The  successful  argu- 
ment presents  the  manners  likely  to  impress  the  minds 
to  which  it  addresses  itself;  it  finds  a sympathetic  au- 
dience and  displays  its  wares  with  an  easy  confidence 
in  their  acceptability;  or  if  it  meets  with  indifference 
or  doubt,  it  proceeds  to  create  an  atmosphere  con- 
genial to  its  purposes.  It  uses  all  the  arts  of  influence, 
from  social  prestige  and  aesthetic  charm  to  flattery, 
and  the  backing  of  influential  patrons.  It  distracts 
attention  from  the  logical  procedme,  and  until  brought 
to  bay  never  discloses  its  methods,  never  openly  seeks 
a conversion,  but  insinuates  its  persuasions  so  unob- 
trusively that  the  mind  addressed  moves  as  with  its 
own  initiative,  and  participates  in  the  conclusion  as 
in  an  original  discovery,  reflecting  an  exceptional  in- 
sight. It  is  into  the  mental  reactions  of  the  clientele, 
when  thus  addressed,  that  I propose  to  inquire;  and 
my  interest  in  the  theme  has  been  continuous  from 


THE  SUPERNATURAL 


77 


the  days  when  the  drastic  encounter  with  Butler’s 
“Analogy”  first  revealed  the  commanding  supremacy 
of  conclusions,  and  the  subsidiary  function  of  prem- 
ises. 


I 

For  many  of  the  issues  which  impart  to  the  intellec- 
tual life  some  of  the  complex  and  perplexing  aspects  of 
a problem-play,  the  function  of  reason,  like  that  of  the 
play,  is  not  primarily  to  convince,  but  to  corroborate 
and  to  console.  Self-esteem  and  the  logical  proprieties 
require  that  the  beliefs  which  have  been  admitted  to 
the  privileges  of  hearth  and  home  shall  be  presented 
in  the  prevalent  garb  of  reason.  It  certainly  is  pru- 
dent to  hide  their  nakedness,  if  not  their  actual  deformi- 
ties; and  well-behaved  visitors  are  not  usually  unduly 
inquisitive.  It  will  readily  be  conceded  that  our  seH- 
esteem,  our  social  and  personal  reputation,  require 
that  we  be  rated  as  logical  beings,  that  our  views  and 
conduct  alike  shall  be  accepted  as  substantially  the 
result  of  piue  reason.  This  rationality  is  among  our 
choicest  assets  in  every  public  declaration  of  our  men- 
tal possessions.  We  confess  quite  as  freely  to  a bad 
memory  as  to  an  illegible  handwriting;  but  we  would 
as  soon  own  to  being  bad  reasoners  as  to  having  bad 
taste.  The  actual  possessor  of  bad  taste  enjoys  his 
taste  beeause  the  taste  is  his;  he  is  not  even  ready  to 
admit  that  “it  is  a poor  thing,”  though  he  is  aware 
that  “it  is  his  very  own,”  and  many  of  the  ranges 
of  belief  bear  a suspicious  resemblance  to  matters  of 
taste.  What  has  been  said  of  butter  and  boys  may, 
with  about  the  same  wisdom,  be  said  of  arguments  or 


78 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


systems  of  beliefs:  there  is  none  so  bad  but  that  it  is 
somebody’s  darling.  And  if  William  James  prop>oses 
to  increase  the  happiness  of  Bostonians,  as  well  as  of 
other  equally  human  “men  and  women,”  by  persuad- 
ing them  once  for  all  to  “abandon  the  notion  of 
keeping  up  a musical  self,  and  without  shame  let  peo- 
ple hear  them  call  a symphony  a nuisance,”  “and 
thereby  reap  the  same  reward  that  comes  with  the 
day  when  we  give  up  striving  to  be  young  or  slender,” 
is  not  the  recipe  as  applicable  to  arguments  as  to  sym- 
phonies? Are  there  not  as  many  and  equally  desirable 
citizens  vainly  seeking  inspiration  and  meaning  in 
reasoning  and  evidence,  when  their  heart’s  desire  is 
an  aesthetic  or  a dramatic  satisfaction,  and  one  that  is 
genuine  and  effective?  And  would  it  not  be  conducive 
to  happiness  for  the  one  to  find  it  in  “rag-time”  or 
opera  bouffe,  and  the  other  in  spirit-seances  and  other 
encouragers  of  mysticism? 

But  this  consummation  is  not  to  be  looked  for. 
Homo  sapiens  is  too  tenacious  of  his  wisdom  as  em- 
bodied in  beliefs,  and  of  none  more  so  than  of  the  belief 
that  his  own  beliefs  are  rationally  reached  and  logi- 
cally defensible.  Doubt  is  an  unpleasant,  unstable, 
and  irritating  condition,  akin  to  the  hesitation  that  is 
fatal.  It  is  a transitory  status  that  must  be  absorbed 
and  find  relief  in  action  or  conviction.  We  need  beliefs 
to  guide  conduct,  to  sustain  thinking,  and  to  restrain 
impulses;  and  we  acquire  them  as  best  we  may,  and 
make  them  as  serviceable  as  we  can.  Primitive  man 
was  and  is  as  adept  in  the  art  as  ourselves;  his  world 
is  decidedly  different  from  ours,  his  needs  less  so. 
It  is  ever  matters  of  deep  and  intimate  human  welfare 


THE  SUPERNATURAL 


79 


that  attract  the  belief -habits  of  mankind;  and  to  primi- 
tive man  almost  all  phenomena  were  eloquent  with  a 
personal  message.  He  sought  the  aid  of  kindly  forces 
and  appeased  hostile  ones;  and  his  beliefs,  like  his  at- 
titudes, were  direct  and  genuine.  Plagues  and  storms, 
comets  and  eclipses,  were  the  heralds  of  warning  or  of 
pimishment.  But  beliefs  are  yet  more  illuminating  as 
forestalling  the  future  than  as  reflecting  the  past;  the 
prophet  and  the  seer  speak,  and  prove  their  calling  by 
the  exercise  of  transcendent  powers. 

Slowly,  irregularly,  and  laboriously  there  encroaches 
upon  this  primitive,  emotionally  sustained  system  of 
causahty  a drastic,  objective  type  of  explanation, 
inconsiderate  of  the  individual.  Medicine  comes  to 
accoimt  for  the  plague,  meteorology  for  the  storms; 
while  the  very  ability  of  the  astronomer  to  predict  the 
time  of  the  eclipse  and  to  trace  the  path  of  the  comet, 
robs  them  of  portentous  meaning.  The  history  of 
opinion  teaches  that  before  beliefs  acquire  citizenship 
in  a scientific  commonwealth,  they  develop  under  the 
protectorate  of  an  anthropocentric  regime,  in  which 
hope  and  fear,  desire  and  consolation  are  the  reigning 
powers;  though  the  citadel  which  they  occupy  comes 
to  be  more  and  more  commonly  represented  as  forti- 
fied by  the  armor  of  logic  and  by  its  natural  impreg- 
nable advantages.  Before  astronomy  came  to  its  own, 
astrology,  shaping  celestial  “oppositions”  to  human 
ends,  flomished  as  a living  belief;  until  the  chemist 
established  his  elements  and  his  formulae,  the  alchemist 
found  an  occupation  in  ministering  to  human  ambi- 
tion. So  long  as  the  laws  of  hving  matter  were  but 
vaguely  surmised,  it  was  possible  for  men  to  believe  in 


80 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


and  seek  the  elixir  of  life  and  the  fountain  of  eternal 
youth.  These  beliefs  are  now  dead;  the  habit  of  mind 
that  favored  them  is  for  the  most  part  outgrown.  To 
such  extent  have  medicine  and  chemistry,  astronomy 
and  physics,  physiology,  and  hygiene  come  to  regulate 
the  order  of  our  thinking,  that  any  relation  claimed 
by  these  sciences  is  at  once  relegated  to  their  undis- 
puted sway.  We  accept  the  astronomer’s  predictions, 
the  chemist’s  analysis,  the  physicist’s  experiment,  the 
physician’s  diagnosis.  As  laymen  we  comprehend 
them  so  far  as  we  may;  yet  our  attitude  is  inspired  by 
a like  allegiance  to  the  same  logic  that  guides  the  ex- 
pert. To  such  extent,  at  all  events,  has  the  natural 
trend  of  our  beliefs  been  scientifically  disciplined,  and 
in  such  measure  are  our  emotional  leanings,  so  far  as 
we  still  feel  them,  silenced  by  an  acquired  logical  out- 
look. 

Yet,  for  the  majority  of  men,  it  remains  natural  that 
the  belief-habits  of  an  older  nature,  when  thus  sup- 
pressed or  expelled,  should  seek  refuge  elsewhere  — 
partly  in  unexplored  frontiers  and  partly  by  setting 
up  reservations  within  the  ceded  territory.  The  out- 
grown beliefs  which,  like  the  fancies  of  childhood,  have 
been  wholly  laid  aside,  we  are  willing  to  call  supersti- 
tions; but  for  the  beliefs  of  no  very  different  status 
that  yet  glow  like  fading  embers  or  occasionally  biust 
into  flame  when  a new  fagot  is  placed  upon  the  ashes, 
we  have  some  lingering  fondness.  It  is  difficult  to  select 
a belief  of  intermediate  position,  that  is  not  in  rigor 
mortis^  but  still  shows  a flickering  vitality;  for  any 
selected  belief  offers  but  an  individual  range  of  ap- 
peal, circumstance,  and  composition.  Phrenology,  as  a 


THE  SUPERNATURAL 


81 


fairly  modern  instance,  may  serve.  There  is  distinct 
truth  in  the  differentiation  of  functions  in  the  brain 
and  of  their  relation  to  specific  areas,  some  general 
eonformity  of  brain  development  to  cranial  contours; 
but  the  anatomy  is  warped,  the  physiology  crude,  and 
the  psychology  arbitrary.  A re-survey  of  the  field  with 
finer  instruments  of  research  imder  a profoimdly  altered 
attitude  led  the  way  to  a physiological  psychology  and 
to  cautious  but  useful  application  of  its  teachings.  This 
system  secured  a following  and  still  survives,  not  by 
virtue  of  the  strength  of  its  evidence,  nor  by  the  appeal 
of  its  principles,  but  by  the  underlying  interest  which 
it  firrthers  in  the  ready  determination  of  human  traits 
and  as  a means  of  prospecting  among  human  careers. 
If,  then,  we  ask  why  any  one  is  still  loyal  to  phrenology, 
we  may  satisfy  our  cmiosity  by  assuming  that  some 
are  misled  by  a faulty  estimation  of  the  evidence  and 
in  so  far  display  the  weakness  of  their  logical  powers; 
yet  the  majority  of  its  adherents  are  plainly  biased  in 
its  favor  by  the  consolation  or  insight  which  an  accep- 
tance of  its  tenets  promises.  Since  the  advantages  it 
extends  are  rather  vague  and  affeet  only  the  more  se- 
date, unemotional  aspects  of  human  fate,  and  since  its 
disregard  of  estabhshed  knowledge  is  rather  barefaced, 
and  since  in  competition  with  other  and  more  striking 
beliefs  it  lacks  the  attractions  of  excitement  and  charm, 
its  vitality  is  rather  low.  Yet  the  question,  which  might 
well  serve  to  fill  a gap  in  a lagging  conversation,  “Do 
you  believe  in  phrenology?”  has  the  precise  signifi- 
cance which  is  germane  to  the  present  discussion.  Logi- 
cally, the  question  should  mean,  “Have  you  examined 
the  data  upon  which  the  correlation  of  mental  traits 


82 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


and  cranial  contours  is  founded,  and  do  you  appreciate 
the  measure  of  consistency  of  the  phrenologieal  hypoth- 
esis with  the  established  findings  of  science?”  Aetu- 
ally  it  means,  “Do  you  find  the  conclusions  of  phre- 
nology interesting  and  satisfying,  and  does  it  appeal  to 
your  quasi-dramatic  notions  of  how  things  should  be, 
and,  incidentally,  have  you  happened  to  meet  with  any 
confirmations  of  its  principles?”  Plainly,  it  is  not  the 
force  of  evidence,  but  the  magnetism  of  conelusions, 
that  attracts;  and  intense  conviction,  far  from  making 
keen-sighted,  obscures  the  vision.  Milder  inclinations 
mildly  distort  the  view,  yet  bring  it  about  that  some 
sort  of  view  is  attainable.  The  lukewarm  leaning  to- 
ward phrenology  is  illuminating  both  in  resemblance 
and  in  contrast  to  the  status  of  other  beliefs  that  form 
the  background  of  this  survey. 

There  is  no  oecasion  to  emphasize  unduly  the  emo- 
tional or  sesthetie  faetor  in  the  determination  of  beliefs. 
No  one  supposes  that  for  the  larger,  and  indeed  the 
lesser,  concerns  of  the  intellectual  life  people  affect 
beliefs  as  they  do  fashions.  No,  they  proceed  ration- 
ally; and,  according  to  disposition  and  training,  they 
infuse  into  their  attitudes  and  actions  the  spirit  of 
rationality.  Yet  this  admission,  obvious  and  compre- 
hensive, does  not  lessen  the  potency  of  the  will  to  be- 
lieve. Beliefs,  not  unlike  fashions,  are  followed  mildly 
or  violently;  and  the  lighter  leanings  which  many  con- 
fess for  palmistry  or  telepathy  are  endured,  possibly 
cherished,  not  embraced.  Beliefs  of  feeble  vitality  sur- 
vive so  far  as  they  avoid  a direet  clash  with  conduct, 
so  far  as  they  do  not  obscure  the  mental  outlook.  In 
gauging  the  intellectual  caliber  of  our  fellow-men  we 


THE  SUPERNATURAL 


83 


lay  as  .much  stress  upon  why  and  how  deeply  they 
believe  as  upon  what  they  believe.  Yet  we  do  not 
hesitate  to  attach  a certain  qualified  rating  to  the  ad- 
herents of  this  or  that  “ology”  or  “opathy,”  in  so  far 
as  we  regard  such  adherence  to  indicate  obtuse  logical 
sensibilities.  We  apply  such  judgments  gingerly,  and 
seek  not  to  offend.  No  one,  however  astute  or  expert, 
can  determine  just  how  homoeopathists  are  made, 
unless  it  be  that,  like  poets,  they  are  born.  He  com- 
pares A with  B and  with  C and  with  D — all  homoe- 
opathists through  diverse  combinations  of  evidence, 
argument,  and  circumstance  — and  looks  for  some 
common  streak  in  their  mentality.  He  may  or  may  not 
find  it.  He  supposes  an  underlying  will  to  believe,  re- 
sponsive to  some  such  appeal,  which  by  some  play  of 
fortime  has  tipped  the  scale  in  favor  of  homoeopathy. 
He  does  not  assmne  a predilection  to  believe  in  homoe- 
opathy. With  but  slight  change  in  the  psychological 
formula  of  A,  B,  C,  and  D,  and  with  moderately  differ- 
ent environments  and  careers,  A might  have  been  an 
ardent  adherent  of  regular  medicine,  B a passionate 
devotee  of  psychotherapy,  C might  have  gone  over 
wholly  to  “absent”  treatment,  while  D alone  would 
continue  to  feel  the  call  of  homoeopathy.  The  most 
common  bias  seems  to  be  a tendency  to  cherish  per- 
sonally consoling  and  irregular  beliefs.  Were  this  not 
a fairly  widespread  and,  for  a considerable  group  of 
humanity,  a very  deep-seated  mental  trait,  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  understand  how  the  great  numbers  of  these 
systems  thrive  and  leave  a progeny. 


84 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


n 

Such  is  the  potency  of  the  -vnll  to  believe.  Unac- 
knowledged, though  operative,  it  gives  direction  and 
furnishes  motive  power  to  conscious  beliefs;  it  gathers 
argument  and  evidence,  seeks  affinities,  and  makes 
or  mars  careers.  In  the  extreme  it  develops  a fanatic 
or  a propagandist;  ordinarily  it  makes  alliances  with 
common  sense  and  some  measure  of  scientific  training, 
with  the  wholesome  benefit  of  experience  and  with  a 
reasonable  regard  for  evidence  and  authority.  And  if 
this  analysis  assumes  that  the  spirit  of  scientific  veri- 
fication is  not  developed  to  a commanding  dominance, 
is  there  any  good  reason  why  for  the  majority  of  man- 
kind it  should  be  so?  Lacking  much  incentive  from 
within  or  without  to  wander  from  the  beaten  track, 
the  ordinary  devotee  of  common  sense  proceeds  com- 
fortably, even  complacently.  He  trips  occasionally  and 
stubs  his  toe;  but  in  the  give  and  take  of  a praetical 
world  this  is  at  once  part  of  the  discipline  and  part  of 
the  game.  Any  tendency  that  he  may  feel  towards 
financial  credulity  or  an  uncritical  confidence  in  human 
virtue  is  likely  to  be  checked  by  costly  experience.  But 
there  is  no  recognized  clearing-house  for  his  intellec- 
tual speculations.  His  investments,  whether  moder- 
ate or  extensive,  in  the  beliefs  quoted  on  the  belief- 
exchange,  yield  their  interest  in  the  satisfaction  which 
they  bring.  He  avoids,  for  the  most  part,  depressed 
and  undesirable  views,  and  affects  those  which  the  mar- 
ket of  the  day  records  as  steady  and  inchned  to  rise; 
and  the  demands  of  decent  consistency  are  thus  met. 
Even  the  academic  mind,  though  withholding  its  sanc- 
tion from  any  such  logical  compromise,  in  its  confes- 


THE  SUPERNATURAL 


85 


sional  moods  aclaiowledges  the  logical  imperative  of 
the  status  quo.  And  to  this  add  another  consideration: 
every  mind  is  composite,  even  a mind  that  has  achieved 
a well-knit  unity  of  personality.  There  are  all  sorts  and 
conditions  of  belief-attitudes  within  the  same  mind, 
as  inevitably  as  there  are  many  minds  where  there  are 
many  men.  We  admit  compatibilities  and  incompati- 
bilities, sympathies  and  antagonisms;  but  these  are 
limited  alike  in  scope  and  degree.  It  takes  a serious 
incompatibility  of  temper  or  a flagrant  violation  of 
logical  propriety  to  cause  a family  rupture  in  the  men- 
tal household ; and  concessions  and  makeshifts  are 
freely  advanced  to  maintain  a conventional  peace. 

Many  minds  are  broadly  and  others  but  narrowly 
streaked  with  rationality,  but  none  are  of  wholly  uni- 
form texture;  and  the  varieties  of  patterns  and  their 
combination  which  thus  result  add  to  the  interest  of 
human  ideals  and  management,  and  on  the  whole 
prove  adequate  to  current  standards.  There  is,  accord- 
ingly, hardly  any  combination  of  adherences  which 
cannot  find  coherence  in  some  minds.  If  we  conduct 
our  search  diligently  and  discreetly  we  shall  somewhere 
find  a John  Doe  who  is  at  once  a Republican,  a “votes- 
for-men”  man,  a Presbyterian,  a vegetarian,  with  a 
leaning  toward  osteopathy  and  palmistry;  while  his 
friend,  Richard  Roe,  proves  to  be  a Democrat,  an  equal 
suffragist,  an  ex-Episcopalian  become  a Christian 
Scientist  who  still  clings  to  the  material  reality  of  roast 
beef,  and  is  more  than  haff  convinced  of  the  genuine- 
ness of  telepathy  and  spirit  materializations,  though 
he  pooh-poohs  the  notion  of  “malicious  animal  mag- 
netism” which  forms  a tenet  of  his  sect.  And  the  two 


86 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


may  have  a mutual  friend  with  whom  they  hold  ami- 
cable intercourse,  despite  the  fact  that  he  is  a Socialist, 
an  ethical  culturist,  a Fletcherite,  and  a very  stolid 
individual  generally,  who  yet  feels  uneasy  when  seated 
as  one  of  thirteen  at  table  or  when  asked  to  float  a ven- 
ture on  Friday,  the  thirteenth  of  the  month.  AU  these 
individuals  and  their  near  and  remote  kin  are  more  or 
less  logical,  and  in  plain  and  familiar  situations  unaf- 
fected by  prejudice  are  likely  to  reach  reasonable  posi- 
tions. They  may  not  always  reason  correctly  or  accu- 
rately, but  they  exercise  a respectable  logical  attitude 
and  intent.  They  may  not  be  expertly  critical,  may 
indeed  jump  at  conclusions,  or  hurdle  to  them;  but 
these  forms  of  mental  agility  in  no  way  stamp  them  as 
exceptional  or  condemnable.  In  the  summer  of  1909 
it  would  have  been  natural  to  find  one  of  the  above 
triumvirate  an  advocate  of  Cook,  the  other  of  Peary, 
as  the  true  discoverer  of  the  Pole;  while  by  rare  chance 
the  third,  through  lack  of  interest  or  excessive  ration- 
ality, might  have  had  no  opinion  at  all.  The  will  to 
believe  is  aroused  by  the  malaise  of  uncertainty;  and 
it  acquires  a positive  force  and  direction  by  sympathy 
of  temperament,  and  thus  makes  converts  through  a 
composite  rational  and  emotional  appeal. 

And  for  the  rest,  let  us  assume  that  the  subjects 
of  our  logical  survey  are  high-grade  thinkers,  loyal  to 
the  principles  of  a consistent  interpretation  of  things 
as  they  are;  let  us  assume  that  from  such  downward 
to  the  common-schooled,  bourgeois  layman,  tempera- 
mentally hard-headed  or  the  reverse,  there  will  be 
found  in  a natural  series  diverse  shades  and  grades 
of  rationality  and  consistency.  Within  the  series,  the 


THE  SUPERNATURAL 


87 


most  significant  variable  is  the  whole-mindedness  of 
loyalty  to  the  scientific  attitude.  This  quality  testi- 
fies to  the  profound  and  comprehensive  encroachment 
of  a scientific  surveillance  over  the  entire  range  of 
human  activities  and  belief.  Clearly,  every  thoughtful 
man  of  to-day  regards  a vast  range  of  opinion  as  wholly 
withdrawn  from  the  exercise  of  personal  preference 
and  as  ruled  by  formulse  and  demonstrations,  by  sta- 
tistics and  the  laboratory.  But  the  circle  of  hmnan 
interests  is  larger  than  the  syllogism,  and  cannot  be 
described  by  the  compass  of  the  induction.  The  com- 
plexity and  incalculability  of  our  psychology,  the 
breadth  and  depth  of  the  intellectual  and  the  emo- 
tional life,  defies  the  most  comprehensive  formulae. 
Yet  nowhere  does  rationality  fijid  its  occupation  gone. 
The  habit  of  mind  which  we  bring  to  our  most  personal 
and  insoluble  problems  is  profoundly  influenced  by 
the  trend  and  the  discipline  of  the  same  principles,  the 
same  conceptions  of  cause  and  effect  and  of  the  uni- 
formities of  nature,  which  have  inspired  the  contribu- 
tions of  pure  and  applied  science. 

To  repeat:  a sincere  logical  loyalty  and  a discern- 
ment subject  only  to  the  inevitable  limitations  of 
endowment  and  experience  may  be  conceded.  If  rep- 
resentatives of  this  type  of  mind  subscribe  to  a belief 
that  heavy  pieces  of  furniture,  while  ordinarily  subject 
to  commonplace  laws  of  matter,  may  occasionally  be 
moved  by  an  occult  force  emanating  from  a spiritually 
empowered  medium,  or  if  they  believe  that  premoni- 
tions and  coincidences  are  vitally  and  personally  sig- 
nificant, it  seems  but  fair  to  regard  such  beliefs  as  set- 
tled upon  a reservation  set  apart  from  the  ordinary 


88 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


habitations  of  their  intellectual  world.  Possibly  such 
openness  of  mind  may  be  no  more  than  an  evidence  of 
the  estimable  virtue  of  tolerance.  The  open  mind  is 
as  desirable  in  science  as  the  open  door  in  commerce. 
But  when  examined  closely,  the  mode  of  reception  of 
these  reserved  issues  suggests  a backdoor  traflSc,  which 
does  not  mingle  with  the  stream  that  animates  the 
public  highways.  It  remains  significant  that  the  tem- 
per of  the  attitude  and  the  trend  of  the  conclusions 
which  pervade  these  reserved  areas  will  not  square 
with  the  everyday  regulation  of  affairs,  nor  with  the 
imderlying  conceptions  which  make  possible  our  theo- 
retical and  our  practical  outlook.  It  is  also  significant 
that  these  irregular  attitudes  and  conclusions  are  ap- 
plied to  a limited  range  of  phenomena,  which  are  held 
together  largely  by  their  persistent  appeal  to  the  in- 
terpretation of  laws  and  events  as  personally  signifi- 
cant. 

The  tendency  to  be  affected  by  such  aspects  of  pher 
nomena,  the  tendency  to  permit  the  growth  of,  or  to 
cultivate,  reserved  areas  in  the  logical  garden  remains 
a temperamental  matter;  and  since  professional  men 
of  science,  in  spite  of  well-earned  reputations  and  not- 
able achievements,  in  spite  of  proved  ability  to  handle 
the  logical  tools  of  their  science  effectively,  are  yet  not 
exempt  from  the  influences  of  their  personal  composi- 
tion, there  need  be  no  surprise  to  find  men  of  this 
stamp  among  the  adherents  of  the  beliefs  in  question. 
It  must  be  very  definitely  imderstood  that  men  of  sci- 
ence (in  fair  number)  may  be  professionally  critical 
and  temperamentally  credulous.  What  most  needs  em- 
phasis is  that  the  bias  which  they  express  grows  out 


THE  SUPERNATURAL 


89 


of  personal  traits,  not  out  of  the  qualities  that  support 
their  technical  acquisitions.  The  physicist  who  sub- 
scribes to  the  genuineness  of  “spirit-levitation,”  and 
the  biologist  who  records  the  appearance  of  “super- 
numerary spectral  limbs,”  are  convinced  of  such  phe- 
nomena, not  because  the  one  is  technically  conversant 
with  the  imiform  behavior  of  inanimate  matter,  and 
the  other  with  the  limitations  of  organic  structure,  but 
by  virtue  of  quite  other  and  ordinarily  suppressed  fac- 
tors of  their  psychological  composition,  which  find  no 
exercise  in  the  procedures  of  the  laboratory.  The  spe- 
cial knowledge  of  the  physicist  is  hardly  necessary  to 
the  discovery  that  auto-motor  wardrobes  and  self- 
elevating  parlor-tables  are  outlaws  in  the  realm  of 
gravitation;  the  technique  of  the  biologist  is  unneces- 
sary to  the  recognition  that  the  spontaneous  genera- 
tion of  hands  and  arms  and  their  speedy  absorption  in 
the  natural  members  is  a violation  of  the  laws  of  organic 
genesis  of  the  most  stupendously  amazing  proportions. 
The  layman’s  appreciation  of  these  contradictions  is 
quite  as  definite  as  that  of  the  professional  scientist; 
and  the  predilections  of  the  two  for  similar  views  are 
of  a nature  all  compact.  The  common-sense  specialist 
and  the  common-sense  layman  are  in  this  aspect  quite 
on  a par,  and  stand  and  fall  equally  by  a like  logical 
virtue  and  like  logical  or  psychological  failings.  Nine 
times  out  of  ten,  and  oftener,  it  is  not  the  physicist, 
but  the  temperamental  man  in  the  investigator,  that 
is  responsible  for  the  extra-scientific  conclusion;  and 
hardly  less  often  does  the  manner  and  measure  of  his 
conversion  reflect  far  more  correctly  and  intimately 
his  personal  psychology  than  his  professional  physics. 


90 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


It  is,  indeed,  most  natural,  if  we  concede  the  wide  dis- 
tribution of  the  “mental  reservation”  habit  of  mind 
amongst  high-grade  and  loyal  thinkers,  that  such  pheno- 
mena should  be  endorsed,  such  hypotheses  favored, 
by  a small  number  of  men  who  happen  to  be  physi- 
cists, or  chemists,  or  astronomers,  or  physiologists,  or 
anthropologists.  Parenthetically  it  is  worth  nothing 
that  the  chemist  does  not  subscribe  to  a belief  in  al- 
chemy, nor  does  the  astronomer  go  over  to  astrology, 
nor  does  the  physiologist  guide  his  estimate  of  men 
by  phrenological  precepts,  nor  does  the  anthropologist 
resort  in  perplexing  situations  to  charms  and  amulets 
and  incantations.  Let  there  be  no  confusion  as  to  the 
legitimate  and  illegitimate  bearing  of  professional  pres- 
tige upon  the  status  of  a belief  of  this  extra-scientific 
tenor.  If  John  Doe  and  Richard  Roe  are  inclined  to 
believe  in  “materializations”  or  “telekinesis”  because 
they  learn  that  this  and  that  scientific  man  has  ex- 
amined and  been  convinced,  their  inclination  is  war- 
ranted only  in  so  far  as  it  bases  itself  upon  an  ascrip- 
tion to  the  men  of  science  of  a superior  equipment  to 
decide  this  issue,  and  upon  an  equal  assurance  that  the 
same  qualities  of  mind  are  used  in  their  professional 
as  in  their  non-professional  research. 

Ill 

This  view  is  brusquely  stated.  Without  withdrawing 
from  any  of  its  consequences,  it  should  be  tempered 
to  fit  more  elastically  the  varying  conditions.  In  spite 
of  reserved  areas  of  divergent  beliefs,  a man’s  mind 
remains  a unit,  though  a complex  one;  and  the  facul- 
ties which  he  employs  in  his  scientific  work  do  not  for- 


THE  SUPERNATURAL 


91 


sake  him  when  he  becomes  involved  in  these  personally 
centered  systems.  By  the  same  token,  does  not  an 
adherence  to  the  law-defying  theories  of  the  seance- 
room  reflect  upon  the  soimdness  of  his  logic  in  his  rigid 
specialty?  The  reply  cannot  be  precise  or  decided, 
though  it  must  not  be  equivocal.  Consider  a practical 
situation  : an  inhabitant  of  Wall  Street  keenly  real- 
izes the  complexity  and  precariousness  of  his  predic- 
tions, and  the  investments  based  upon  them.  He  forms 
conclusions  by  considering  as  best  he  can  the  state  of 
the  market,  the  condition  of  the  crops,  the  truth  of 
certain  rumors,  the  remote  political  situation,  and  the 
like;  thus  he  reasons  and  estimates  and  carries  on  his 
business.  But  in  exceptional  cases,  when  his  confidence 
forsakes  him,  he  consults  a fortune-teller  to  decide 
whether  to  throw  his  fate  with  the  bulls  or  the  bears. 
The  factors  in  his  natme  that  take  him  to  the  “me- 
dium” are  precisely  similar  to  those  that  bring  to  the 
same  high  priestess  the  most  innocent  lamb  that  ever 
nibbled  at  coupons.  What  the  stock-broker  discovers, 
or  supposes,  concerning  the  soothsayer’s  real  methods 
will  depend  upon  various  circumstances,  of  which  the 
chief  is  the  shrewdness  of  the  common-sense  individual 
that  keeps  house  in  the  same  tenement  of  clay  with  the 
stock-broker.  And  whether  his  associates  on  the  ex- 
change shake  their  heads,  and  whether  his  clients  trans- 
fer their  business  to  other  brokers,  when  they  learn  of 
his  visits  to  the  fortune-teller,  will  depend  likewise  upon 
his  good  luck  and  upon  the  character  of  the  associates 
and  the  clients.  And  just  as  these  situations  vary,  so 
likewise  is  there  a difference  between  the  stock-brok- 
er’s reliance  upon  the  clairvoyant  and  the  physi- 


92 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


cist’s  allegiance  to  materializations.  All  analogies  are 
weak  and  partial;  but  the  most  conspicuous  difference 
of  the  two  cases  is  the  least  important,  namely,  that 
the  man  of  Wall  Street  tries  to  apply  his  belief  to  actual 
concerns,  while  the  physicist’s  belief  remains  theoreti- 
cal. In  both  cases  we  have  the  employment  in  one  field 
of  attitudes  and  conceptions  which  have  a very  dis- 
tinct status  from  those  that  obtain  in  the  other.  In 
the  main,  no  reconciliation  is  possible;  yet  the  two 
manage  to  make  terms  by  adroitly  and  tactfully  avoid- 
ing one  another’s  sensibilities.  But  all  this  within  limits; . 
if  the  stock-broker  begins  to  be  unduly  reckless,  and 
transacts  all  his  affairs  by  telepathy  or  premonitions, 
there  is  likely  to  be  trouble  even  before  his  sanity  is 
questioned.  If  the  physicist  contributes  to  his  “Physi- 
cal Journal”  experiments  in  which  his  observations  of 
Hertzian  waves  or  radio-activity  are  altered  to  make 
room  in  his  equations  for  spirit  influence  or  disturbance, 
there  can  be  little  doubt  as  to  his  fate  at  the  hands 
of  his  fellow-physicists.  Likewise,  in  making  allowance 
for  the  common  temper  of  the  two  activities;  if  a 
physicist  or  a biologist  or  a stock-broker  or  a layman 
of  any  calling  were  to  exhibit  in  his  investigations  of 
spirit  manifestations  a marked  credulity,  a clear  de- 
tachment from  the  obligations  of  a critical  logic  and  a 
prudent  common  sense,  we  could  not  but  look  askance 
at  this  exhibition,  and  could  not  but  discount  the  rat- 
ing of  his  ability  in  his  special  field.  We  should  then 
decide  that  these  divergent  streaks  were  not  superficial 
and  isolated,  but  ran  deep  and  broad  through  his  men- 
tal tissue.  Such  judgments  we  cannot  avoid;  such  con- 
siderations constantly  and  legitimately  circulate  in  the 


THE  SUPERNATURAL 


93 


arena  of  opinion,  and  by  them  reputations  stand  and 
faU. 

It  has  been  implied  that  the  investigator  of  the  su- 
pernatural does  and  must  keep  apart  his  law-defying 
conclusions  in  the  “spirit”  realm  and  his  law-abiding 
conclusions  in  the  material  realm.  It  has  been  indicated 
how  far  the  usage  of  logical  society  tolerates  such  in- 
tellectual division,  and  how  far  such  conduct  may  ren- 
der him  subject  to  suspicion;  also  the  disaster  that 
awaits  him  who  attempts  to  put  wholly  asimder  what 
is  yet  joined  in  natiu'al  unity.  Yet  justice  has  been 
done  to  neither  aspect,  neither  to  judicial  tolerance 
nor  to  judicial  rigor.  Doubtless  the  largest  tolerance 
would  go  out  toward  personal  and  private  beliefs  for 
which  faith  and  a religious  earnestness  stand  sponsor. 
If  in  private  life  a distinguished  physieist  were  a 
known  believer  in  the  inspired  character  of  Sweden- 
borg’s revelations,  or  if  a distinguished  astronomer 
announced  himself  a literal  believer  in  the  views  ex- 
pressed by  Brigham  Young,  we  might  make  what  com- 
ments we  chose  upon  this  combination,  but  we  should 
in  no  measure  be  called  upon  to  examine  the  value  of 
such  beliefs  by  the  same  attitude  and  standards  by 
which  we  examine  the  legitimacy  of  his  physical  or 
astronomical  contributions.  It  is  also  om  privilege  to 
consider  the  connection  between  undogmatic  and  lib- 
eral religious  views  and  the  advances  of  science.  We 
should  indeed  be  utterly  blind  to  the  lessons  of  the 
past  were  we  not  impressed  with  the  direct  power  of 
the  larger  belief-attitudes  to  make  or  mar  the  fortunes 
of  science.  We  may,  if  we  choose,  express  surprise  that 
out  of  this  or  that  intellectual  environment  so  worthy 


94 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


a scientific  contribution  should  come;  but  it  seems 
obvious  that  we  must  hold  distinct  the  belief  of  Pro- 
fessor A in  the  necessity  of  total  immersion  as  a pro- 
cedure in  baptism  and  his  belief  in  the  correctness  of 
a theory  of  radio-activity.  Neither  we  nor  the  profes- 
sor cite  his  authority  as  a physicist  in  favor  of  the 
religious  ceremony.  We  feel  no  tendency  to  join  the 
Swedenborgians  because  this  or  that  man  of  science 
has  joined  them,  and  we  observe  that  the  latter  does 
not  apply  his  physics  to  the  questions  of  his  faith.  It 
is  hardly  necessary  to  add  that  these  hypothetical  cases 
are  recorded  wholly  objectively  and  without  particular 
reference;  that  very  objectivity  is  as  indispensable  to 
the  student  of  belief  as  it  is  to  the  achievement  of 
scientific  results  in  any  field. 

IV 

This  illustration  has  been  added  mainly  to  indicate 
that  if  the  advocates  of  spontaneous  “elevation”  and 
spirit-made  plaster  casts  and  supernumerary  spectral 
limbs  were  only  such  as  assembled  for  the  good  of  their 
souls,  and  invited  to  their  meetings  those  to  whom 
such  beliefs  brought  real  and  reasonable  consolation, 
and  held  seances  to  foster  and  give  tangible  reenforce- 
ment to  such  beliefs,  they  would  doubtless  receive 
such  tolerant  appreciation  as  their  behavior  incites. 
But  such  is  exactly  the  reverse  of  the  actual  situation. 
They  desire  nothing  more  earnestly  than  the  scientific 
warrant;  they  desire  no  other  consideration  for  the 
reality  of  spectral  limbs  than  for  the  verification  of 
six  toes  on  the  human  foot;  they  put  X-rays  and  tele- 
kinetic, spirit-guided  powers  of  mediums  in  the  same 


THE  SUPERNATURAL 


95 


class;  they  hold  that  the  communications  of  spirits 
shall  be  received  no  differently  than  messages  by  wire- 
less telegraphy.  There  is  no  asking  for  quarter  here, 
but  a direct  challenge,  or  rather  a challenge  modified 
by  an  appeal.  The  most  convineed  devotees  of  the 
modern  supernatural  do  not  maintain  that  the  struc- 
ture of  science  is  all  askew  and  its  foundations  totter- 
ing. They  do  not  ask  that  our  physical  laboratories 
be  dismantled  and  rearranged  in  aceordance  with  the 
extra-physical  or  super-physical  systems  which  their 
hypotheses  involve.  They  are  not  militant,  and  they 
sincerely  respect  the  methods  and  results  of  scientific 
research.  They  wear  the  same  uniform,  display  the 
same  equipment  as  do  the  regulars  in  the  army  of  sci- 
ence; but  the  motives  that  arouse  their  patriotism  and 
the  foe  which  they  wish  to  scatter  give  to  their  war- 
fare a wholly  different,  a truly  foreign,  and  often  a 
confusing  complexion.  They  ask;  Are  the  boimdaries 
of  scienee  so  securely  marked  that  there  is  no  break 
or  irregularity  in  its  contours?  May  there  not  be  con- 
ditions of  a rare  and  exceptional  nature  that  do  not 
conflict  with  the  solidarity  of  the  universe  for  the  rea- 
son that  their  primary  allegiance  is  to  another  order 
of  events?  May  it  not  be  that  interpenetrated  with 
this  world,  which  we  know  only  so  far  as  we  have 
senses  responsive  to  the  vibrations  of  its  contained 
energies,  there  is  yet  another  to  which  we  are  ordi- 
narily insensitive,  but  whieh  now  and  then  by  a happy 
conflux  of  conditions  suddenly  rings  out  with  a con- 
vincing resonance  by  virtue  of  a higher  sympathetic 
vibration?  Concede  this  to  even  a slight  degree  of 
possibility,  and  why  may  not  the  whole  range  of 


96 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


mediumistic  phenomena,  to  say  nothing  of  telepathy 
and  premonitions  and  apparitions  and  veridical  coinci- 
dences, all  shoot  together  into  a sort  of  interstitial  sys- 
tem that  leaves  the  world  of  daily  contact  quite  inte- 
gral and  consistent  and  yet  itself  holds  together? 

Now  the  point  of  view  that  entertains  this  compre- 
hensive query  may  be  squarely  met;  but  this  issue 
involves  a very  different  tale,  little  of  which  is  relevant 
here.  The  query  is  relevant,  because  it  illustrates  an 
important  phase  of  the  will  to  believe  in  the  supernat- 
ural — the  desire  to  bring  belief  into  daily  harmony, 
if  that  may  be,  to  bring  to  occasional  speaking  terms, 
if  that  alone  is  possible,  the  extra-scientific  realm  with 
the  accepted  scientific  regime,  even  though  the  latter 
must  give  way  to  receive  the  rapprochement.  Let  it  be 
clearly  understood  that  the  point  is  not  the  strength 
of  this  and  the  other  hypothesis  or  the  value  of  the 
evidence  in  terms  of  demonstrable  facts,  but  only  the 
source  of  the  tendencies  to  believe.  Evidence  is  rele- 
vant only  so  far  as  it  is  the  primary  and  actually  effec- 
tive source  of  the  belief.  In  these  issues  it  is  maintained 
that  evidence  plays  a wholly  subsidiary  role.  The  plot 
for  the  middle-class  and  the  upper-class  minds  — fun- 
damentally or  incidentally  dramatic  in  their  require- 
ments — proceeds  upon  the  basis  of  quite  a different 
range  of  motives;  and  the  similarity  of  the  denouement 
must  not  mislead.  What  is  true  of  the  super-physical 
feats  of  the  mediums  may  be  accepted  as  sufficiently 
typical  of  the  whole  range  of  evidence.  In  regard  to  this, 
it  seems  no  unpardonable  inaccuracy  to  say  that  the 
evidence  reduced  to  a single  sentence  is  this:  That  upon 
such  and  such  occasions  the  performances  have  been 


THE  SUPERNATURAL 


97 


satisfactorily  accounted  for  as  more  or  less  clever  utili- 
zations of  plain  everyday  physical  forces  (involving 
fraud  on  the  part  of  the  medium);  and  that  on  such 
and  such  other  occasions,  the  particular  observers  have 
been  unable  to  discover  how  what  seemed  to  them  to 
occur  was  really  accomplished.  In  one  case  the  de- 
tectives find  a elue  and  disclose  the  modus  O'perandij 
let  us  say,  of  the  murder  or  the  robbery;  in  another 
case  they  fail.  Detectives  happen  to  be  most  wary 
of  concludiug  that  the  crime  could  not  have  been  com- 
mitted in  this  way  or  in  that,  and  they  seem  curiously 
disinclined  to  consider  spirit  interference  and  super- 
nmnerary  spectral  limbs;  they  have  a prepossession  in 
favor  of  theories  that  involve  skeleton-keys  and  “jim- 
mies” and  accomplices.  On  the  other  hand,  the  sitters 
at  a seance  are  quite  siue  that  “it”  could  not  have 
been  fraud,  that  the  medium  could  not  know  their 
private  affairs,  that  such  and  such  a maneuver  was  out 
of  the  question;  hence  “ it  ” must  be  the  work  of  spirits 
or  super-physical  agencies.  Obviously  this  is,  and  must 
be,  an  inaccurate,  shorthand  transcript  of  the  evidence; 
yet  the  evidence  is  referred  to  only  to  indicate  in  what 
way  evidence  does  actually  affect  the  belief -attitudes. 
It  is  contended  that  the  step  from  fact  to  explanation 
is  taken,  not  as  a logical  inference,  but  as  a psycho- 
logical inclination;  and  that,  for  purposes  of  such  illus- 
tration, this  summary  of  the  type  of  reasoning  is  fair 
and  typical. 


V 

All  this  is  added  to  make  room  for  the  admission  that 
for  a very  small  and  select  group  of  adherents  of  super- 


98 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


physical  beliefs,  who,  indeed,  have  carefully  examined 
the  whole  range  of  phenomena,  who  have  curbed  what 
prepossessions  they  may  have,  for  whom  the  belief  in 
the  reality  of  the  phenomena  brings  little  consolation, 
even  some  distress  — for  these,  the  insistence  of  the 
“facts”  does  seriously  affect  and  determine  their  con- 
clusions. The  group  is  small,  possibly  larger  than  one 
supposes;  but  as  the  terminal  group  in  a series  thus 
hypothetically  constructed,  it  finds  a natural  place. 
Such  men  are  not  credulous;  they  are  critical.  They 
reject  a large  part  of  the  evidence;  but  they  find  a ker- 
nel, which  they  say  is  wholly  different  in  significance 
from  the  shell.  Some  make  this  nucleus  a center  of  a 
system;  others  refrain  from  speculation,  but  insist  that 
a common  physics  and  a common  psychology  do  not 
render  a satisfactory  account.  Here  the  doctors  plainly 
disagree;  and  when  doctors  disagree,  it  is  not  surpris- 
ing to  learn  that  they,  too,  express  their  temperamental 
as  well  as  their  professional  inclinations.  Such  men 
must  be  less  sensitive  to  the  deterrent  force  of  violent 
logical  incompatibilities  than  are  their  stubborn  col- 
leagues who  will  not  concede  that  the  heavens  may 
occasionally  fall.  They  must  be  more  sensitive  to  the 
conviction  that  grows  out  of  personal  experience,  to  the 
unpleasant  bewilderment  of  a baffled  understanding; 
they  may  be  a little  over-impatient  of  doubt  and  the 
restraint  of  judgment,  a little  more  likely  to  give  large 
values  to  the  subjective,  and  small  ones  to  the  objec- 
tive factors  in  the  formulae  of  conviction.  And,  by  such 
tokens,  do  they  not  give  evidence  to  a refined  suscep- 
tibility to  the  will  to  believe? 

The  public  is  intolerant  of  fine  distinctions;  and  this 


THE  SUPERNATURAL 


99 


attempt  to  be  appreciative  of  all  sorts  and  conditions 
of  belief-attitudes  may  prove  wearisome.  Yet  because 
these  beliefs  are  alive  they  must  be  handled  with  the 
caution  of  the  vivisector.  The  psychologist  must  not 
shrink  from  the  operation,  though  the  nerves  which 
he  exposes  are  those  of  self-esteem.  Ideals  determine 
standards,  and  standards  determine  actions.  The 
pride  of  rationality  need  suffer  no  rebuff;  but  a ra- 
tional view  of  om*  own  rationality  is  itself  a worthy 
ideal.  Men  need  find  no  more  fault  with  themselves 
for  failing  to  disclose  the  procedures  of  mediums  than 
for  a like  failure  in  unraveling  the  mysteries  of  the 
disappearing  lady  on  the  conjurer’s  platform.  There 
is  no  element  of  intellectual  feebleness  involved  in 
guessing  how  either  effect  is  produced  — and  in  guess- 
ing wrongly.  The  most  expert  political  writers  gauge 
the  situation  the  day  before  the  election  and  make 
the  most  confident  predictions;  and  twenty -four  hours 
later  the  prophecy  proves  wholly  wrong,  but  the  pro- 
phet does  not  remain  without  honor  in  the  land.  He 
continues  as  the  accredited  correspondent  on  politi- 
cal events.  It  is  a consummation  devoutly  to  be  wished 
that  any  remote  stigma  of  logical  incapacity  that  by 
imphcation  seems  to  be  attached  to  the  inability  to 
divine  how  such  and  such  phenomena  are  to  be  ac- 
counted for  shall  be  speedily  removed.  We  live  very 
comfortably  and  with  no  loss  of  poise  imder  the  most 
imperfect  explanations  of  many  of  the  things  of  which 
the  world  is  so  puzzlingly  full.  But  last  as  first,  it  is 
not  the  phenomena,  but  the  personal  hold  of  the  the- 
ories advanced  to  account  for  them,  that  arouses  a 
misproportioned  and  a misguided  interest;  and  these 


100  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


same  theories  achieve  their  commanding  place  in  con- 
temporary interest  because  of  the  unacknowledged  but 
recognizable  vitahty  of  the  will  to  believe  in  the 
supernatural. 

A modern  psychological  theory  restates  the  Aris- 
totelian view  of  the  value  of  the  mental,  or,  more  cor- 
rectly, the  emotional  cathartic.  It  tells  sufferers  from 
ingrown  psychic  trouble,  that  if  only  they  will  dig  deep 
down  and  bring  to  the  surface  the  suppressed  and  ostra- 
cized parasite  that  is  preying  upon  their  psychic  tissue, 
the  very  act  of  explicit  confession  will  bring  peace 
to  their  souls.  May  not  the  general  recognition  of  the 
will  to  believe  as  a legitimate  factor  in  the  tenacity  of 
beliefs  bring  about  a more  wholesome  attitude  toward 
the  phenomena  that  keep  alive  the  conception  of  the 
supernatural? 


IV 

THE  CASE  OF  PALADINO 

A PERSISTENT  problem  in  the  regulation  of  conduct  by 
belief  is  the  maintenance  of  right  relations  between 
theory  and  practice,  between  principles  and  their  ap- 
plication, conclusions  and  their  evidence,  facts  and  the 
interpretation  of  facts.  At  times  the  distinction  is  clear 
or  becomes  so  in  a nearer  approach;  at  times  it  is  un- 
certain, and  resists  analysis.  A prevalent  logical  fault 
is  a certain  impatience  with  principles  and  a corre- 
spondingly eager  rehance  upon  facts.  Such  attitudes 
reflect  a temperamental  contrast.  Those  fond  of  handi- 
craft have  been  divided  temperamentally  according 
as  they  find  pleasure  in  large  constructions,  bold  mas- 
sive work,  or  in  delicate  operations  and  finished  detail. 
The  intellectual  counterpart  of  this  contrast  is  some- 
what diSerently  disposed.  The  hard-headed,  matter- 
of-fact  reasoner  finds  his  convictions  set  by  facts  and 
is  somewhat  suspicious  of  principles,  which  exist  for 
him  mainly  as  summaries  of  facts.  The  convictions  of 
the  theoretical  temperament  respond  sensitively  to 
the  illumination  conferred  by  orderly  principles,  and 
accepts  the  fact  or  the  “case”  as  a welcome  but  not 
indispensable  confirmation.  To  minister  to  both  in- 
terests, but  particularly  to  the  former,  the  following 
circumstantial  narrative  is  set  forth.  While  yet  the 
tale,  adorned  or  imadorned,  points  its  moral,  its  main 


102 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


service  is  to  reinforce  in  terms  of  “fact”  the  emphasis 
of  logical  principles  in  reaching  theories  or  accepting 
statements. 


I 

The  case  of  Paladino  finds  its  origin  in  interests  as 
old  and  as  widespread  as  humanity;  its  closest  affilia- 
tion is  with  the  time-worn,  crude  practices  and  beliefs 
of  primitive  peoples.  Its  survival  into  these  science- 
saturated  days  makes  it  notable;  and  the  attempt  to 
parade  in  academic  dress  and  to  take  a place  among 
the  accredited  representatives  of  latter-day  research 
is  astounding,  whether  regarded  as  shrewd  bravado 
or  as  a sincere  propaganda,  and  remains  so  in  what- 
ever temper  we  review  the  successes  and  reverses  of 
its  checkered  career.  The  woman  in  the  case  attracts 
attention.  Though  in  the  main  a willing  instrument  of 
a movement  that  gets  its  headway  from  motives  and 
interests  that  far  transcend  her  personality,  she  can- 
not be  dismissed  as  a lay  figure  upon  which  the  prod- 
ucts of  an  eager  imagination  have  been  skillfully  draped. 
The  affaire  Paladino  might  have  been  the  affaire  Smith 
or  Jones;  but  the  combination  of  circumstances  that 
gave  it  name  and  more  than  a local  habitation  is  un- 
usual in  complexion,  and  has  become  international  in 
its  setting. 

The  notorious  Eusapia  of  New  York  in  the  year 
1910  is  a surprisingly  unprogressive  replica  of  the 
obscure  Eusapia  of  Naples  of  the  period  of  1890.  Un- 
der the  encom-agement  of  convinced  votaries,  one  and 
another  phenomenon  has  been  added  to  her  repertoire; 
yet  her  stock  in  trade  has  undergone  little  alteration 


THE  CASE  OF  PALADINO 


103 


beyond  the  artful  cutting  of  the  garment  to  suit  the 
cloth  — the  requirements  of  her  clientele  being  suffi- 
ciently met  by  the  standard  patterns  of  her  produc- 
tions. It  must  be  definitely  and  clearly  grasped  at  the 
outset  that  what  Eusapia  does  affords  but  the  slightest 
clue  to  her  fame  or  to  the  attitude  of  her  sponsors,  lay 
or  scientific.  The  story  will  be  blind  and  its  meaning 
lost  if  thus  read.  The  case  of  Eusapia,  like  a divorce 
suit  or  an  embezzlement,  gets  its  prestige  from  the 
standing  of  the  parties  concerned.  The  incidents  are 
about  as  sordid,  about  as  commonplace,  and  carry  about 
the  same  lesson  in  one  set  of  circumstances  as  in  an- 
other. But  when  the  proceedings  move  in  intellectual 
high  life.  Mother  Grimdy,  enterprising  editors,  and  all 
sorts  and  conditions  of  men  and  women  take  notice. 
This  heightened  interest  in  the  personnel  of  defendant, 
prosecution,  and  witnesses  must  not  be  permitted  to 
obscure  or  distort  in  any  measure  the  simple  findings 
of  the  case,  which  alone  form  the  subject-matter  for  the 
jury’s  consideration. 

A sifting  of  the  personal  evidence  in  the  case  of 
Paladino  discloses  that  Eusapia  was  born  in  1854,  of 
lowly  origin,  and  was  early  left  an  orphan  without  rel- 
atives or  resources;  that  her  girlhood  was  imeventful 
save  for  the  chance  discovery,  in  a spiritualistic  circle, 
of  her  powers  as  a medium.  It  appears  that  her  debut 
was  in  the  form  of  a letter  in  1888  from  Professor 
Chiaia,  of  Naples,  to  Professor  Lombroso.  The  latter 
was  firmly  convinced  of  her  supernormal  powers  as 
early  as  1891.  In  1892  a group  of  men  of  science  in- 
vestigated her  case  in  Milan,  among  them  Professor 
Richet,  of  Paris,  who,  at  first  skeptical,  later  be- 


104  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


came  an  enthusiastic  convert  to  the  “genuineness” 
of  the  manifestations.  The  years  1893,  1894,  and  1895 
brought  forward  new  and  distinguished  converts,  in 
Italy,  in  Russia,  in  France.  Two  English  observers. 
Sir  Oliver  Lodge  and  F.  W.  H.  Myers,  took  part  in  the 
seances  held  at  Professor  Richet’s  house  on  the  lie 
Roubaud  in  1894;  through  their  interest  Eusapia  visited 
England  in  1895,  and  there  met  her  first  serious  re- 
verses. Those  who  have  subscribed  to  the  occurrence 
of  supernormal  phenomena  in  her  presence,'  through 
agencies  inexplicable  by  fraud  or  by  known  physical 
forces,  form  a distinguished  group;  many  of  them 
have  written  learned  articles  framing  elaborate  theo- 
ries to  account  for  the  motive  forces  responsible  for 
the  phenomena.  Mr.  Hereward  Carrington  has  de- 
voted a volume  to  her  case.  It  is  his  opinion  “ that 
Eusapia  is  genuine;  but  she  is,  so  far  as  I know,  almost 
unique.  That  in  her  may  now  be  said  to  culminate  and 
focus  the  whole  evidential  case  for  the  physical  phe- 
nomena of  spiritualism.”  If  it  could  be  shown  that 
“nothing  but  fraud  entered  into  the  production  of 
these  phenomena,  then  the  whole  case  for  the  physi- 
cal phenomena  would  be  ruined  — utterly,  irretrievably 
ruined.” 

It  thus  appears  that,  if  we  are  to  decide  the  case  of 
Paladino  according  to  the  extent  of  the  evidence,^  the 

1 The  roll  of  Eusapia’s  sponsors  includes  many  men  of  scientific 
professions;  of  these  the  more  enthusiastic  show  unmistakable  ten- 
dencies to  accept  supernormal  explanations.  The  Italians,  Professors 
Lombroso  and  Morselli,  and  the  French  writers,  Professor  Flam- 
marion.  Colonel  de  Rochas,  Dr.  J.  Maxwell,  and  M.  de  Fontenay 
have  contributed  the  most  elaborate  and  extravagant  accounts.  The 
two  most  important  reports  are  those  of  the  Institut  General  Psy- 


THE  CASE  OF  PALADINO 


105 


scientific  as  well  as  personal  reputation  of  the  wit- 
nesses, there  can  be  no  doubt  of  a verdict  in  her  favor: 
that  phenomena  occur  in  her  presence  independently 
of  her  initiative,  and  indicate  some  unrecognized 
agency,  presumably  that  of  spirits.  But  the  case  does 
not  stand  alone;  it  is  part  of  an  historical  development; 
it  is  full  of  psychological  complications;  the  step  from 
the  data  to  the  verdict  is  beset  with  subtle  difficulties. 
The  circumstances  of  the  settings  are  of  command- 
ing importance  in  all  such  issues;  indeed,  they  make 
the  case  of  Paladino,  make  it  or  mar  it.  From  Eusapia 
herself  we  obtain  no  aid.  She  permits  the  Eusapian 
facts  and  the  Eusapian  legends  to  take  their  course; 
she  confesses  to  a faith  in  the  spiritualistic  interpre- 
tation, and  calls  upon  her  trance-control  (one  “John 
King”  of  spiritualistic  origin)  to  stand  by  her.  In  brief 
she  adopts  the  lingo  of  her  cult  and  adapts  her  atti- 
tude to  the  atmosphere  of  her  sitters.  In  addition  she 
commands  larger  and  larger  compensation  for  her  serv- 
ices with  the  extension  of  her  fame,  and  yields  to  the 
importunity  of  interviewers  to  provide  the  reputation 

chologique  (Paris,  1908)  and  of  the  Society  for  Psychical  Research 
(1909).  The  standard  phenomena  are  signals  and  raps  at  command; 
table  levitations;  movement  of  objects  in  and  from  the  cabinet; 
touches  by  invisible  hands;  the  apparition  of  a hand  above  the  me- 
dium’s head;  and  a cold  breeze  issuing  from  the  medium’s  forehead. 
The  more  unusual  phenomena  include  the  change  in  weight  of  the 
medium’s  person,  and  her  levitation  to  the  table;  the  moving  of 
heavy  bodies,  and  the  approach  of  light  ones  in  distant  parts  of  the 
room;  the  appearance  of  arms,  heads,  and  faces,  often  recognized; 
the  mysterious  impression  of  hands  and  faces  on  plaster  or  putty; 
the  creation  of  an  additional  arm;  the  disappearance  of  the  medium’s 
legs,  and  other  details  too  remarkable  to  mention.  While  these  sev- 
eral documents  are  different  in  reliability,  it  is  unnecessary  to  dis- 
tinguish between  them.  An  admirable  brief  review  appeared  in  Pid- 
nam's  Magazine  of  January,  1910,  by  Professor  Leuba. 


106  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


favorable  for  a remunerative  specialty.  Besides,  she 
admits  that  she  tricks  if  she  gets  a chance,  and  suggests 
that  all  mediums  do;  hence  the  need  of  control.  The 
clue  to  the  case  lies  in  the  close  logical  analysis  of  the 
situation,  in  the  intimate  study  not  so  much  of  the 
evidence  as  of  the  conditions  of  men  and  events  out  of 
which  the  evidence  grows.  The  case  of  Eusapia  is  a 
case  for  the  logician,  for  the  sturdy  reasoner  with  com- 
mon sense,  fortified  as  well  with  some  special  knowl- 
edge of  the  psychology  of  the  atmosphere  in  which  the 
case  moves  and  has  its  being. 

It  is  fortunate  that  legal  procedure  has  familiarized 
the  public  with  the  emergence  of  truth  — that  is,  of 
substantial  truth  for  practical  purposes  — from  a glar- 
ing contradiction  of  testimony.  Juries  promptly  learn 
that  evidence  must  be  weighed  and  not  measured  by 
its  superficial  area;  that  it  may  be  necessary  to  decide 
upon  complex  probabilities  which  party  is  lying  or 
finessing  or  is  hopelessly  incompetent,  or  pitiably  self- 
deceived.  Whether  Eusapia  is  a monster  or  a martyr, 
a marvel  or  a mountebank,  a medium  of  the  unknown 
or  a manipulator  of  the  undetected,  is  just  the  kind 
of  a verdict  that  our  common  sense  is  quite  capable 
of  reaching,  if  only  we  hold  fast  to  the  inalienable  right 
to  light,  logic,  and  the  pursuit  of  deception. 

II 

A helpful  procedure  in  the  case  will  be  to  call  atten- 
tion to  Exhibit  A as  reported  by  eye-witnesses.  At  a 
seance  held  at  a residence  in  New  York  City  on  April 
17,  1910,  there  were,  so  far  as  Eusapia  was  concerned, 
the  usual  arrangements:  the  chairs  of  sitters  about  the 


THE  CASE  OF  PALADINO 


107 


table,  the  curtained  corner  called  the  cabinet,  contain- 
ing the  paraphernalia  affected  by  spirits  (tambourine, 
tabouret).  The  unusual  arrangement  was  the  conceal- 
ment of  observers  beneath  the  chairs  of  the  sitters 
within  closest  range  of  the  medium’s  person.  The  de- 
tectives were  smuggled  to  their  positions  under  cover 
of  a screen  of  the  bystanders,  while  Eusapia’s  atten- 
tion was  engaged  in  the  attempt  to  influence  by  her 
supposed  supernormal  power  an  electroscope  brought 
to  the  seance  to  serve  as  a psychological  decoy.  They 
escaped  imder  cover  of  the  darkness  at  a later  stage  of 
the  proceedings,  wriggling  their  way  along  the  floor 
and  carrying  with  them  a knowledge  of  the  motive 
power  of  table  levitations  that  should  make  others 
wiser  if  not  happier  men.  To  understand  their  testi- 
mony, the  ceremonies  of  the  table  must  be  familiar. 
The  decisive  evidence  of  the  belief  that  the  medium 
does  not  move  the  table  is  that  her  hands  and  feet  are 
controlled  by  the  two  sitters  on  her  right  and  left  re- 
spectively. She  gives  the  control  of  her  right  hand  to 
the  left  hand  of  her  right  sitter,  and  the  control  of  her 
left  hand  to  the  right  hand  of  her  left  sitter;  the  latter 
is  the  post  of  honor,  since  Eusapia  is  left-handed. 
Similarly  her  left  foot  (at  the  outset)  is  secured  (?)  by 
contact  with  the  right  foot  of  her  left  “control,”  and 
the  like  for  the  other  foot. 

To  prove  an  unknown  force,  all  that  is  necessary  is 
to  slip  away  the  left  foot,  make  the  right  foot  serve  to 
keep  contact  with  one  foot  of  each  “control,”  and  to 
apply  said  agile  and  versatile  left  member  to  the  leg 
of  the  table.  The  unobserved  but  observing  observer 
under  the  table  reports  that 


108  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


a foot  came  from  underneath  the  dress  of  the  medium  and 
placed  the  toe  imderneath  the  leg  of  the  table  of  the  left  side 
of  the  medium,  and  pressing  upward,  gave  it  a little  chuek 
into  the  air.  Then  the  foot  withdrew,  and  the  leg  of  the  table 
dropped  suddenly  to  the  floor.  More  wobbling  of  the  table 
occurred.  [This  is  done  by  pressure  of  the  medium’s  hands.] 
Again  the  foot  came  from  underneath  the  dress  of  the  medium 
and  placed  itself  underneath  the  leg  of  the  table,  forced  the 
table  upward  from  the  floor  about  half  a foot,  held  it  there 
for  a moment  and  repeated  the  “phenomenon.”  Each  time 
after  a levitation,  the  medium  would  appear  to  rest  her  left 
foot  upon  the  top  of  the  right,  which  remained  eonstantly 
in  an  oblique  position  upon  the  feet  of  the  left  and  right  “con- 
trols.” At  no  time  did  she  have  her  left  foot  hampered  in 
any  way.  It  was  constantly  moving  in  the  space  about  her 
chair;  and  I was  lying  with  my  face  on  the  floor  within  eight 
inches  of  the  left  leg  of  the  table;  and  each  time  that  the  table 
was  lifted,  whether  in  a partial  or  a complete  levitation,  the 
medium’s  foot  was  used  as  a propelling  force  upward. 

Next,  let  it  be  noted  that  the  “controls”  on  this  oc- 
casion were  well  versed  in  the  tricks  of  mediums  and 
in  the  observation  of  significant  details  in  this  elusive 
sleight-of-hand  and  foot.  Knowing  when  to  expect 
action  on  the  part  of  the  released  foot,  the  “control” 
cautiously  probed  the  space  with  his  own  foot  and  “was 
unable  to  touch  her  left  leg  from  the  knee  down,  at 
the  place  where  it  should  have  been.”  The  phenom- 
ena of  the  cabinet  were  similarly  disclosed.  The  mo- 
tive power  proved  to  be  partly  the  released  foot  and 
partly  the  released  hand.  The  substitution  of  the  right 
hand  to  do  duty  for  both  hands  is  effected  imder  cover 
of  the  curtain,  which  is  first  flimg  over  the  table  by 
the  left  hand:  this,  too,  was  perfectly  apparent  to  the 
skilled  “controls,”  to  whom  such  tricks  were  stale  and 
improfi table.  Her  right  “control”  was  in  the  favored 
position  to  detect  the  movements  of  her  released  left 


THE  CASE  OF  PALADINO 


109 


hand  during  the  later  cabinet  feats  that  require  des- 
perate darkness.  He  says;  — 

She  took  my  left  hand  and  placed  it  over  her  right  shoulder, 
far  enough  to  let  me  feel  her  left  shoulder-blade,  where  I 
exerted  some  pressure  with  the  finger-tips.  With  my  hand 
in  this  position  it  was  almost  impossible  to  know  whether  she 
were  moving  her  left  arm  or  not;  hence  I took  the  liberty  of 
placing  the  ball  of  my  left  wrist  where  the  tips  of  my  fingers 
had  been  [in  other  words  a substitution-trick  of  his  own];  and 
this  gave  me  ample  opportunity  to  feel  with  my  fingers  thus 
freed,  the  movements  of  the  sleeve  of  her  left  arm  without 
her  knowing  it.  Then  it  was  plain  that  whenever  the  curtain 
was  sharply  “blown”  forward,  it  was  done  by  her  throwing 
it  forward  with  her  left  hand  in  a quick  impulsive  jerk.  It 
was  also  plain  that  the  hand  we  saw  at  the  parting  of  the  cur- 
tains was  none  other  than  hers. 

These  details  indicate  how  circumstantial  was  the 
detection  of  the  simple  and  tricky  fraud  that  under- 
lies the  standard  performances  of  Paladino;  and  they 
indicate  the  training  and  insight  which  the  detection 
requires.  Had  this  type  of  cross-examination  been 
drastically  administered  early  and  often,  it  seems  un- 
likely that  there  would  have  been  a case  of  Paladino. 
Having  thrown  upon  the  situation  these  illuminating 
side-lights,  it  will  hardly  be  necessary  to  rehearse  the 
further  corroboratory  testimony.  The  performance  sug- 
gested throughout  that  the  medium  worked  for  con- 
ditions favorable  to  the  evasion  of  the  control. 

To  fortify  the  conclusion,  a second  seance  was  ar- 
ranged (Eusapia  being  ignorant  of  the  outcome  of  the 
first)  at  which  there  were  no  concealed  observers,  and 
at  which  the  usual  phenomena  took  place  so  long  as 
the  “controls”  exercised  such  lax  guardianship  as  the 
amateur  commands.  But  upon  signal  the  control  was 


110  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


made  real  and  effective;  and  the  result  was  decisive. 
From  that  moment  on,  nothing  happened.  The  medium 
grew  excited  and  irritable,  complained  of  the  holding 
which  was  in  reality  gentle  but  properly  directed,  tried 
again  and  again  to  throw  the  observers  off  their  guard, 
but  all  to  no  avail.  Expert  control  stopped  the  phe- 
nomena under  the  precise  conditions  under  which  a 
half-hour  before,  with  complacent  and  ordinary  con- 
trol, they  had  occurred  in  profusion.  The  “forces”  re- 
quired the  use  of  Eusapia’s  hands  and  feet. 

Ill 

The  case  of  Eusapia  puzzles  many  a candid  inquirer. 
If  this  crude  deception  lies  at  the  basis  of  a career  that 
had  acquired  a literatiire  of  its  own,  why  had  it  not 
been  discovered  before?  The  answer  is  that  it  had,  and 
repeatedly;  the  strange  fact  remains  that  those  who  de- 
tected Eusapia  in  fraud  continued  to  believe  in  her  gen- 
ume  powers. 

As  early  as  1893  Professor  Richet,  of  Paris,  com- 
mented on  the  general  suspiciousness  of  the  whole  pro- 
ceeding, and  said,  “To  the  extent  to  which  the  condi- 
tions were  made  rigid,  the  phenomena  decreased”;  and 
yet  the  same  distinguished  scientist  attests  physiolog- 
ical miracles  in  the  presence  of  Eusapia  that  require 
larger  credulity  than  many  a sympathetic  layman  can 
command.  Both  Dr.  Moll  and  Dr.  Dessoir,  of  Berlin, 
detected  the  precise  substitution-tricks  that  were  used 
in  New  York. 

The  main  point  is  cleverly  to  distract  attention  and  to  re- 
lease one  or  both  hands  or  one  or  both  feet.  This  is  Pala- 
dino’s  chief  trick. 


THE  CASE  OF  PALADINO 


111 


Dr.  Moll  records  the  throwing  out  of  the  curtain  to 
cover  the  hand  substitution;  and  notes  that,  by  watch- 
ing for  it,  he  could  detect  the  exact  moment  when  the 
hand  or  foot  was  freed. 

She  boldly  raises  her  left  hand  above  her  head,  and  this  is 
accepted  as  a spirit  hand.  In  spite  of  the  nine-tenths  dark- 
ness, I distinctly  saw  the  movements,  as  she  raised  her  arm. 

In  the  seances  in  1895  in  England,  Dr.  Richard 
Hodgson  repeatedly  detected  Eusapia  in  fraud,  and 
the  verdict  of  his  committee  was  “systematic  fraud 
from  first  to  last.”  The  temper  of  that  day  is  worth 
recalling.  Myers,  though  a thorough  believer  in  super- 
normal phenomena,  was  imwilling  to  connect  his  con- 
victions with  the  Eusapian  phenomena.  Eusapia  was 
for  seven  weeks  a guest  in  his  house  and  gave  twenty 
seances. 

During  all  that  time  Eusapia  persistently  threw  obstacles 
in  the  way  of  proper  holding  of  the  hands.  She  only  allowed 
for  a part  of  the  time  on  each  occasion  the  only  holding  of  the 
feet  which  we  regarded  as  secure,  i.e.,  the  holding  by  the 
hands  of  a person  under  the  table.  Moreover,  she  repeatedly 
refused  any  satisfactory  test  other  than  holding.  Generally 
we  endeavored  to  make  the  holding  as  good  as  she  would 
allow  us  to  make  it;  although  toward  the  end  we  occasionally 
left  her  quite  free  to  be  held  or  to  hold  as  she  pleased;  on 
which  occasions  she  continued  the  same  frauds,  in  a more 
obvious  manner.  The  frauds  were  practiced  both  in  and  out 
of  the  real  or  alleged  trance,  and  were  so  skillfully  executed 
that  the  “poor  woman”  must  have  practiced  them  long  and 
carefully. 

Professor  Sedgwick  likewise  discredited  Eusapia. 
The  investigations 

placed  beyond  reasonable  doubt  the  facts  that  the  frauds  dis- 
covered by  Dr.  Hodgson  at  Cambridge  had  been  systemat- 


112  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


ically  practiced  by  Eusapia  Paladino  for  years.  In  accord- 
ance, therefore,  with  our  established  custom,  I propose  to 
ignore  her  performances  for  the  future,  as  I ignore  those  of 
other  persons  engaged  in  the  same  mischievous  trade. 

Professor  Le  Bon  has  presented  an  admirable  survey 
of  the  significance  of  this  “Renaissance  of  Magic”  ^ 
in  the  course  of  which  he  records:  — 

We  saw  on  several  occasions  in  quite  good  light  a hand 
appear  above  her  head;  but  when  I had  my  assistant  observe 
her  shoulders  illuminated  from  behind  without  her  knowledge 
one  could  follow  all  her  movements,  and  readily  secure  proof 
that  the  materializations  were  simply  the  natural  hands  of 
the  medium  freed  from  the  control  of  her  observers.  As  soon 
as  Eusapia  began  to  be  suspieious,  the  apparitions  of  the 
hand  ceased  altogether  and  did  not  reappear  until,  yielding 
to  the  desire  of  some  credulous  friends,  I consented  to  help 
them  by  withdrawing. 

To  return  to  the  earlier  attitudes  (again  1895),  Sir 
Oliver  Lodge’s  conclusion  is  cmious:  — 

I am  therefore  in  hopes  that  the  present  decadent  state  of 
the  Neapolitan  woman  may  be  only  temporary  and  that 
hereafter  some  competent  and  thoroughly  prepared  witness 
may  yet  bring  testimony  to  the  continued  existence  of  a genu- 
ine abnormal  power  existent  in  her  organism. 

Since  this  decadent  state  persisted  for  another  fif- 
teen years  it  is  idle  to  consider  it  temporary;  and  it 
seems  unfortunate  for  the  case  of  Paladino  that  the 
presence  of  competent  and  thoroughly  prepared  wit- 
nesses so  regularly  induces  attacks  of  decadence. 

IV 

The  case  of  Eusapia  Paladino  is  peculiarly  a case  for 
the  logician,  for  the  incorruptible  advocate  of  a sturdy 
* Revue  Scieniifique,  March  26  and  April  2,  1910. 


THE  CASE  OF  PALADINO 


113 


common  sense.  Thinking  straight  is  essential  to  seeing 
straight.  The  evidence  grows  out  of  the  attitude  far 
more  than  the  attitude  results  from  the  evidence;  and 
this  tenet  forms  the  cardinal  principle  of  any  judi- 
cial review.  The  conditions  attaching  to  the  inquiry 
present  om  first  concern.  Mediums  form  a privileged 
class;  they  place  themselves  beyond  the  range  of  sci- 
entific procedure,  and  challenge  the  contempt  of  court. 
It  cannot  be  too  strongly  emphasized  that  if  those  who 
profess  to  influence  physical  objects  without  contact 
were  willing  to  submit  to  the  experimental  rules  of 
the  laboratory,  the  investigation  would  be  a matter 
of  minutes  and  not  of  years.  The  reply  to  impatient 
critics,  private  and  editorial,  who  ask  why  the  inves- 
tigators do  not  bring  the  matter  to  an  issue  by  intro- 
ducing obviously  decisive  tests,  is  uniformly  simple: 
They  are  not  permitted  to. 

However  shrewdly  it  is  made  to  appear  to  be  the 
contrary,  the  fact  is  that  the  medium  imposes  the  condi- 
tions and  the  conduct  of  the  performance.  Like  the 
performing  conjurer,  the  medium  yields  to  inquiry 
graciously  and  eagerly  within  the  limits  of  the  trick, 
but  is  most  adroit  in  gliding  over  the  critical  moments 
at  which  examination  would  be  inopportune.  But  the 
incomparably  great  advantage  of  the  medium  ^ is  that 
he  is  posing  as  the  minister  of  the  unknown,  not  as  an 
illusionist,  and  must  be  accorded  the  privileges  of  his 

* A medium,  recording  his  confessions,  says:  “A  medium  of  ex- 
perience can  always  outwit  a looker-on  even  more  than  a conjurer, 
because  a conjurer  would  not  be  allowed  to  play  the  antics  which  we 
can.”  A French  conjurer  corroborates  from  his  side:  “Mediums  use 
tricks  so  coarse  that  no  prestidigitator  would  dare  to  show  them  in 
public;  so  they  are  reserved  for  the  scientists.” 


114  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


cult.  Likewise  he  has  ready  excuses,  which,  like  good 
intentions,  are  as  common  as  paving-stones,  and  serve 
their  purpose  more  generally  in  unsanctioned  than  in 
holy  causes.  Light  diminishes  the  force;  passing  the 
hand  between  the  medium  and  the  leg  of  the  table  at 
the  critical  time  breaks  the  circuit;  skeptical  and  inquis- 
itive observers  interfere  with  the  conditions;  and  as 
much  more  such  explanations  as  the  accepted  cant  or 
the  clientele  will  tolerate. 

It  is  waste  of  time  to  point  out  the  glaring  incon- 
sistency of  mediums  who  profess  and  print  the  proofs 
of  their  performance  of  the  most  marvelous  prodigies 
in  complete  light,  and  yet  object  to  light  as  interfering 
with  their  power.  These  apologies  are  distracting;  the 
essential  fact  is  that  the  medium  sets  the  conditions 
and  refuses  decisive  tests.  Mr.  Carrington,  — for  whom 
Eusapia  is  the  black  swan  of  spiritualism,  — in  an  ear- 
lier volume  bears  evidence:  — 

In  the  first  place,  it  must  be  stated  that  the  medium  never 
allows  himself  to  be  placed  absolutely  under  control,  i.e.,  held 
in  various  places  by  several  sitters,  at  the  same  time,  as  an 
escape  from  such  control  would  be  an  obvious  impossibility. 

And  this  is  Mr.  Carrington’s  advice  to  investigators 
of  mediums  in  general:  — 

Instead  of  binding  the  medium  with  ropes,  tapes,  etc.,  and 
sealing  them  so  profusely,  suggest  that  the  medium  employ, 
instead,  a simple  piece  of  white  thread,  and  see  how  quickly 
your  offer  is  rejected. 

The  most  practical  method  of  bringing  the  matter 
to  a test  seems  to  be  to  transform  the  issue  from  an 
investigation  to  a contest;  for  then  he  who  offers  the 
prize  naturally  determines  the  conditions  of  the  award. 


THE  CASE  OF  PALADINO 


115 


Sport  commands  greater  loyalty  than  science.  So  Pro- 
fessor Le  Bon,  with  the  assistance  of  Dr.  Darieux  and 
of  Prince  Roland  Bonaparte,  arranged  a prize  of  two 
thousand  francs  for  any  one  who  would  make  an  object 
move  without  contact  (say  a light  block  of  wood  lying 
upon  a table),  but  imder  conditions  determined  by  a 
scientific  commission  — surely  the  merest  child’s  play 
for  Eusapia  and  the  other  “physical”  mediums,  in 
whose  presence  these  phenomena  occur  so  regularly 
that  their  learned  sponsors  have  invented  a term  for 
the  effect  and  call  it  “telekinesis.”  Professor  Le  Bon 
received  several  thousand  letters  from  persons  ready 
to  admit  that  they  exercised  this  power;  but  less  than 
half  a dozen  came  to  learn  the  conditions;  they  all 
promised  to  compete  for  the  prize,  but  none  appeared. 
In  New  York  an  offer  of  one  thousand  or  even  two 
thousand  dollars  for  a like  proof  of  Eusapia’s  powers 
under  simple  but  rigid  conditions  was  evaded,  and 
then  declined  upon  the  usual  irrelevant  grounds.  It 
would,  indeed,  be  tantamount  to  a conviction  of  im- 
becility for  a physicist  not  to  be  able  to  determine 
whether  an  object  can  be  moved  without  contact,  pro- 
vided he  determines  the  conditions  of  the  experiment;  hnt 
between  this  and  the  issue  of  a challenge  on  the  part  of 
the  medium  to  discover  how  the  said  medium  accom- 
plishes his  alleged  “telekinesis”  under  conditions  arbi- 
trarily set  by  him,  there  is  more  difference  than  between 
the  equator  and  the  pole.  It  is  because  the  medium 
will  not  consent  to  play  the  game  according  to  the  rules 
of  science  that  the  scientist  is  forced  — in  the  interests 
of  maintaining  the  sanity  of  the  community  — to 
demean  himself  by  meeting  the  medium  on  the  latter’s 


116  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


ground,  and  outwit  him  or  expose  him  as  best  he  can. 
For  this  travesty  public  sentiment  is  responsible. 

It  thus  appears  that  the  reputation  of  Eusapia  and 
the  voluminous  documents  in  the  case,  and  the  wide- 
spread tendency  to  credit  her  with  rare  powers  un- 
recognized by  contemporary  science,  all  find  their 
support  in  a single  momentous  circumstance:  that  this 
and  that  group  of  observers  witnessing  effects  arranged 
by  Eusapia  were  unable  to  account  for  what  they 
saw,  or  that  Eusapia,  under  these  conditions,  was  able 
to  bring  about  the  phenomena  without  revealing  her 
methods,  whatever  they  might  be.  The  evidence  is 
essentially  negative  up  to  a certain  point,  which  is  the 
critical  one  of  direct  exposure;  and  beyond  that  point, 
the  flimsy  support  of  the  supernormal  hypothesis  is  at 
once  laid  bare. 

The  lesson  thus  enforced  is  a very  simple  one  in  ele- 
mentary logic,  within  easy  grasp  of  every  one  who  exer- 
cises and  cherishes  his  common  sense:  that  the  flim- 
siness of  the  support  of  the  hypothesis  should  have  been 
perfectly  apparent  quite  independently  of  the  covering 
under  which  it  took  refuge.  It  really  should  not  have 
required  an  exposure  to  lay  bare  what  should  have  been 
recognizable  by  the  general  suspiciousness  of  its  appear- 
ance. It  was  public  sentiment,  not  the  needs  of  science, 
that  required  the  exposure, 

V 

Since  what  Eusapia  does  affords  but  partial  enlight- 
enment, the  further  clue  must  be  sought  in  the  attitude 
of  the  witnesses  in  whose  behalf  the  effects  are  pro-  • 
duced.  Professor  Le  Bon  considers  the  national  tern- 


THE  CASE  OF  PALADINO 


117 


perament  a fair  index  of  the  degree  of  marvel  with 
which  the  Eusapian  performance  is  reported.  In  Eng- 
land (and  let  us  add  in  our  own  Anglo-Saxon  land) 
there  was  no  mystery,  but  plain  fraud;  “in  France  the 
success  varied  according  to  the  milieu  and  the  intel- 
lectual status  of  the  sitters  — it  was  considerable  in 
polite  circles  and  m general  very  limited  in  a scientific 
atmosphere”;  “in  Italy,  the  land  of  poets  . . . effects 
appeared  more  marvelous  than  the  magicians  of  legend 
ever  achieved.”  It  is  the  personal  qualification  of  the 
observer  that  determines  the  quality  of  the  perform- 
ance; it  is  reported  as  marvelous  or  as  moderately  puz- 
zling or  commonplace  or  transparent,  according  to  the 
temperament  of  the  spectator  and  his  susceptibility 
to  “take  stock  in”  strange  powers  that  he  knows  not 
of.  This  is  a famiUar  psychological  principle,  but  one 
by  no  means  obsolete.  Eusapia’s  tricks  are  corre- 
spondingly time-worn,  but  served  so  long  as  eager  or 
complacent  witnesses  were  inclined  to  interpret  their 
inability  to  discover  how  the  effects  are  produced  as  a 
presumption  in  favor  of  unknown  forces. 

Everything  depends  upon  the  degree  of  caution  with 
which  the  first  step  is  taken;  it  is  the  first  few  hair- 
breadths that  irrevocably  determine  the  direction  of  a 
straight  line.  If  you  pause  at  the  threshold  long  and 
resolutely,  and  refuse  to  be  impressed  with  any  effects, 
however  apparently  marvelous,  until  the  fact  that  they 
are  produced  independently  of  the  medimn’s  initiative 
has  been  definitely  established,  your  report  will  be 
brief,  and,  if  we  may  judge  by  the  past,  stupid  and  de- 
pressing. If  you  are  decidedly  critical  you  may  record 
(as  some  of  the  French  observers  have  done)  that  the 


118  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


phenomena  are  in  part  suggestive  of  fraud,  in  part 
inexplicable,  but  that  it  would  be  premature  to  regard 
them  as  supporting  any  super-scientific  hypothesis;  if 
you  assume  the  typical  amateur  attitude,  and  have 
the  usual  high  confidence  in  your  powers  of  observa- 
tion, a successful  seance  will  leave  in  you  a vague  and 
mixed  impression  of  bewilderment  and  paradox;  if  you 
treat  the  control  yet  more  charitably  and  are  half  con- 
vinced that  the  effects  support  beliefs  already  cherished, 
distinct  marvels  will  occur,  and  as  your  conviction 
grows,  the  medium  grows  in  boldness,  your  critical 
faculties  are  dulled,  and  mysteries  multiply.  The  last 
stage  of  all  is  that  of  perfect  conviction  due  to  repeated 
indulgence  in  uncritical  seances,  to  the  full-fledged 
devotion  to  irregular  theories,  to  the  abandonment  of 
all  caution,  and  the  eager  awaiting  of  novel  miracles, 
determined  by  the  ingenuity  of  the  medium  and  the 
depth  of  yom*  logical  intoxication:  sans  sense,  sans 
eyes,  sans  reason,  sans  everything.  It  is  at  this  stage 
that  a considerable  portion  of  the  literature  of  the  case 
of  Eusapia  has  been  composed.  The  secret  of  it  all  is 
not  in  the  performance,  not  in  the  miracle,  but,  as  the 
French  neatly  say,  in  the  miracule,  in  the  mental  sus- 
ceptibility of  the  subject  to  the  marvelous. 

The  great  bulk  of  such  testimony  is  accordingly  quite 
valueless  except  in  illustration  of  the  workings  of  the 
prepossessed  mind.  Yet  it  is  not  prejudice  alone  that 
is  responsible  for  the  fertility  of  the  evidence.  A fallacy 
of  observation  is  operative.  It  is  almost  impossible 
to  make  the  uninitiated  realize  how  diflScult  it  is  to 
demonstrate  fraud  when  decisive  tests  are  barred,  and 
how  deceptive  is  the  evasion  of  what  appears  to  be  a 


THE  CASE  OF  PALADINO 


119 


rigid  control.  The  average  sitter,  ignorant  of  the  inade- 
quacy of  the  uneducated  sense  of  touch,  replies:  “I 
know  that  her  hand  was  on  mine  aU  the  time;  I am  sure 
that  she  could  not  have  released  her  foot  without  my 
feeling  it  or  have  brought  out  that  tabouret  without 
my  seeing  it;  my  senses  are  not  so  easily  duped.”  This 
overweening  confidence  is  responsible  for  many  a 
ruined  mind.  Professor  MiUer  asks  us  to  look  upon 
Eusapia  and  her  tribe 

as  the  incarnation  of  specious  evidence,  a symbol  of  sophis- 
try. When  you  go  to  see  her,  she  really  sees  you  to  better 
purpose.  When  you  want  to  “control”  her  — that  is,  make 
sure  where  her  hands  and  feet  are,  — she  controls  you.  That 
is,  she  gets  you  to  sit  in  the  circle  at  the  table,  touching  your 
neighbor’s  hands,  and  thus  forming  what  she  calls  “the 
chain.”  It  is  weU  called  the  chain,  for  by  it  the  sitter  is  bound. 
By  dint  of  “substitution”  her  own  hand  is  soon  free  and  you 
do  not  know  where  it  is,  but  she  knows  very  well  that  your 
hands  are  in  fuU  view  on  the  table.  You  cannot  be  exploring 
in  awkward  places.  The  reason  she  gives  for  the  chain  is,  of 
course,  that  it  enables  the  current  to  flow  roimd  the  circle. 

Her  greatest  accomplishment  of  all  is  this,  that  she  knows 
where  every  one  is  putting  his  attention.  If  you  should  look 
at  the  critical  place,  nothing  would  happen  there.  But  she 
is  a consummate  mistress  of  all  arts  to  direct  your  attention 
away  from  the  critical  place.  If  she  wants  to  do  something 
with  the  hands,  she  bids  you  be  careful  that  you  have  good 
control  of  the  feet.  If  she  wants  to  slip  her  foot  on  yours  so 
as  to  get  the  heel  where  the  toe  has  been  and  put  the  toe  on 
another  foot,  she  will  make  mystic  passes  in  the  air  in  front 
of  your  eyes,  and  at  each  stroke  of  her  hand,  slip  goes  the 
foot  — a slight  motion  which  it  is  virtually  certain  that  you 
will  not  notice.  A jerk  in  one  place  covers  a lesser  jerk  in  an- 
other.  She  is  a supreme  eluder. 

And  the  medium’s  table  adds  insult  to  injiuy.  The 
very  instriunent  that  serves  to  prove  the  existence  of 


120  THE  rSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


the  unknown  serves  as  a screen  to  render  the  move- 
ments of  the  medium  secure  from  observation. 

There  is  no  need  to  draw  any  invidious  distinction 
between  those  who  are  able  to  detect  Eusapia’s  tricks 
and  those  who  are  not.  It  is  still  a cause  for  gratitude 
that  the  world  is  not  so  degenerate  as  to  make  a course 
in  detective  work  an  essential  of  a liberal  education. 
What  education  should  bring  about  is  a saner  attitude 
of  mind  that  is  satisfied  with  the  disclosures  rendered 
by  the  competent;  and  yet  more,  the  attitude  that  is 
sufficiently  impressed  with  the  general  suspiciousness  of 
the  whole  affair  to  require  but  a few  ounces  of  expo- 
sure to  add  to  the  pounds  of  damning  circumstance. 
Dramatically  the  exposure  has  value  in  compelling 
attention,  and  this  because  ears  have  become  deaf  to 
the  still,  small  voice  of  reason. 

VI 

There  is  another  and  larger  significance  of  the  case 
of  Paladino.  There  must  be  some  deep  reason  for  the 
weak  logical  response  to  this  type  of  issue;  some  real 
force  to  throw  the  observation  out  of  function  so  seri- 
ously, and  produce  such  widespread  mental  disaster. 
The  distorting  influence  lies  in  the  psychology  of  be- 
lief. Were  there  not  some  strong  pull  urging  one  on 
to  the  acceptance  of  the  effects  as  transcending  known 
experience,  we  should  not  be  so  ready  to  overlook  or 
scantily  attend  to  the  requirements  of  the  premises. 
It  is  the  attraction  of  conclusions,  often  subconscious 
and  subtle,  as  well  as  slight  and  seemingly  feeble,  that 
throws  reasoning  out  of  its  orbit  and  dulls  the  vision. 
Small  forces,  if  applied  at  the  critical  point,  produce 


THE  CASE  OF  PALADINO 


121 


notable  disturbances,  and  particularly  in  the  case  of 
delicate  instruments  like  the  average  human  thinking 
machine.  For  that  instrument  has  a most  complex 
psychology.  It  is  logical  in  part  only,  and  often  in 
small  part,  and  by  virtue  of  severe  and  protracted 
training.  Men  are  interested  in  conclusions  and  im- 
wittingly  select  and  shape  the  evidence  to  support  cher- 
ished beliefs;  that  is  why,  in  the  case  of  Paladino,  the 
evidence  is  far  more  the  result  of  the  attitude,  than  the 
attitude  of  the  evidence.  The  psychological  is  pitted 
against  the  logical  make-up;  and  the  issue  is  imcertain. 

Belief  is  not  a coldly  objective  attitude.  Beliefs  are 
cherished;  they  sustain  life  and  make  life  worth  living. 
Yet  one  cherishes  also  his  rationality  and  the  honor  of 
the  definition  of  a man  as  a rational  animal.  The  edu- 
cated man  remains  decently  rational  so  long  as  there 
is  not  too  strong  temptation  to  depart  from  the  con- 
clusions which  logic  indicates.  It  becomes  clear,  when 
one  thinks  below  the  sm'face  of  the  Paladino  situation, 
that  perhaps  the  largest  single  fact  contributing  to  her 
reputation  and  to  the  excitement  which  her  very  simple 
and  vulgar  performances  aroused,  has  been  the  strong 
inherent  tendency  to  believe  the  hypothesis  which  she 
enpouraged  in  regard  to  her  “manifestations.”  It  is  not 
the  plausibility  of  that  hypothesis,  but  the  tendency 
to  credit  it,  that  is  the  really  efficient  motive  in  Eu- 
sapia’s  favor.  Hypotheses  attract  belief  according  to 
their  power  to  console,  to  satisfy,  to  remove  uncer- 
tainty; hypotheses  are  plausible  according  to  their 
conformity  with  the  established  system  of  consistent 
truth,  called  science. 

The  hypothesis  that  some  rare  and  unrecognized 


122  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


force  is  responsible  for  the  Eusapian  phenomena  need 
not  be  ruled  out  of  court  arbitrarily.  We  are  far  from 
having  boxed  the  compass  of  knowledge.  But  when 
any  such  evidence  of  a new  force  appears,  we  may  be 
certain  that  it  will  invite  and  meet  the  criteria  of  logic 
and  the  conditions  of  a fair  and  unreserved  examina- 
tion. It  will  not  appear  as  a new  game  or  as  a challenge 
or  emerge  shrouded  in  the  darkness  of  a curtained  cor- 
ner with  “hands  off”  displayed  on  it  in  large  letters. 
It  will  appear  as  an  effect,  obscure  and  vague  possibly, 
but  seeking  definition  and  illumination  in  the  same 
clear  light  of  observation  and  experiment,  avoiding 
arbitrary  or  suspicious  precautions,  as  now  pervades 
every  laboratory  experiment  and  conditions  the  success 
of  every  inquiry.  By  all  means  let  us  cultivate  an 
open  mind,  but  not  one  so  perforated  with  loopholes 
that  much  that  should  remain  out  drifts  in,  and  much 
that  should  be  rigidly  retained  drops  out.  There  is 
sanity  in  the  perspective  of  exclusion  and  retention 
here  as  elsewhere. 

If  it  be  urged  that  the  conditions  imposed  on  the 
manifestations  may  be  the  means  of  their  prevention, 
that  darkness  is  not  intended  to  conceal  the  medium’s 
movements,  but  happens  to  be  inimical  to  the  display 
of  his  “force,”  the  issue  is  again  one  of  logical  con- 
sistency. Not  alone  would  the  interference  by  this  ca- 
pricious “force,”  as  set  forth  by  its  discoverers,  make 
nonsense  of  many  chapters  of  science,  and  require  the 
abandonment  of  laboratory  equipments  as  so  much 
misguidedly  accumulated  junk,  but  the  behavior  of 
this  “force”  is  completely  consistent  with  the  psycho- 
logical interests  of  the  medium  in  outwitting  his  vie- 


THE  CASE  OF  PALADINO 


123 


tims.  It  is  just  such  issues  that  expert  and  lay  juries 
must  decide.  Nor  may  refuge  be  taken  in  the  plea  that 
one  cannot  disprove  the  existence  of  the  rare  powers. 
The  logic  of  evidence  places  the  burden  of  proof  on 
those  who  maintain  the  hypothesis.  One  imaginative 
mind  can  propose  more  hypotheses  than  ninety-nine 
men  can  disprove.  Similarly,  in  regard  to  the  argu- 
ment that  Eusapia’s  recourse  to  cheating  does  not  dis- 
prove the  possession  by  her  of  genuine  powers:  were 
the  existence  of  such  powers  made  probable  by  other 
evidence,  Eusapia  might  be  dismissed.  But  since  all 
the  evidence  is  affected  with  the  same  suspicion  as  sur- 
rounds this  case,  it  is  flagrantly  illogical,  not  to  say 
foolish,  to  build  a house  on  the  sand  in  the  hopes  that 
if  it  stands,  it  will  prove  the  sand  to  have  been  rock. 
To  attempt  to  shift  the  burden  of  proof  to  the  other 
side  is  mere  jugglery  and  evasion.  To  accept  it  places 
the  law-defying  claimant  face  to  face  with  his  law- 
abiding  rival.  Does  it  not  seem  more  rational  and 
illuminating  to  agree  with  Professor  Le  Bon:  “I  be- 
lieve with  the  mediums,  that  darkness  is  more  favor- 
able to  the  development  of  — creduhty  ? ” 

vn 

The  concluding  considerations  belong  to  the  larger 
interests  of  the  public.  Juries  must  on  many  issues 
decide  by  general  appearances.  They  know  that  many 
scientiflc  wonders  have  been  produced  in  this  day  and 
generation;  they  know  that  men  of  science  indulge  in 
a good  deal  of  remote  speculation.  They  are  also  aware 
that  in  the  history  of  science  some  fruitful  trees  have 
sprung  from  rejected  seeds.  It  is  natural  that  these 


124  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


analogies  of  truth  and  error  should  mislead.  Why 
should  not  the  age  that  has  brought  forward  wireless 
messages  and  X-rays  have  discovered  as  well  telepathy 
and  “telekinesis”?  The  one  sounds  as  learned,  and  to 
the  uninitiated  is  just  as  mysterious,  as  the  other. 
Most  of  us  must  be  content  to  go  through  the  world 
pressing  buttons  and  reasonably  ignorant  of  the  force 
that  does  the  rest.  But  it  is  a logical  duty,  and  one 
within  reach  of  all,  to  hold  rational  notions  of  the  na- 
ture of  these  unseen  forces.  Eusapia  at  her  cabinet 
calling  upon  the  dematerialized  “John  King”  to  help 
her  lift  a tabouret  to  the  table,  and  the  “wireless” 
operator  on  a distressed  vessel  signaling  for  aid  may 
appear  to  present  analogous  and  equally  dramatic 
situations.  The  incidents  may  have  occurred  on  the 
same  night;  but  in  units  of  culture  they  are  centuries 
apart.  And  similarly  of  the  arguments:  the  entire  logi- 
cal trend,  the  intellectual  temper  in  which  the  man 
of  science  speculates  is  indefinitely  removed  from  the 
mode  of  approach  of  those  who  fly  to  capricious  sys- 
tems based  on  the  undetected  movements  of  tables,  or 
the  acrobatics  of  cabinet  properties,  or  the  insipid 
drivel  of  materialized  spirits.  It  is  the  most  flagrant 
abuse  of  intellectual  charity  to  ask,  under  the  guise 
of  the  tolerance  which  science  approves,  that  the  like 
consideration  be  extended  to  candidates  that  present 
such  different  credentials,  such  imlike  qualities  in  their 
appeal. 

Public  opinion  is  tremendously  influenced  by  pres- 
tige. Great  names  properly  carry  great  weight;  but 
glitter  also  blinds.  The  problem  is  ever  the  same,  that 
of  drawing  distinctions  rightly.  The  argument  from 


THE  CASE  OF  PALADINO 


125 


prestige  is  within  its  field  wholly  legitimate,  but  is  like- 
wise subject  to  abuse.  The  pursuit  of  science  vouches 
for  honesty  (except  in  rare  instances);  and  that  itself 
disposes  to  faith.  But  the  largest  factor  of  the  sugges- 
tion of  prestige  is  the  assumption  that  the  same  quali- 
ties which  have  been  exercised  in  the  labors  which 
have  brought  men  their  scientific  standing,  have  fitted 
them  for  this  particular  problem  and  have  been  used 
in  trying  to  trace  it  to  its  source.  Now,  the  latter  sup- 
position is  very  far  from  true.  How  one  will  acquit 
himself  in  such  an  inquiry  depends  far  more  on  one’s 
personal  temperament  and  general  logical  attitude  in 
the  smaller  affairs  of  life,  than  on  the  value  of  one’s 
scientific  memoirs.  Some  scientific  men  happen  to  be 
peculiarly  well  suited  for  such  inquiry;  and  many  are 
doubtless  peculiarly  unsuited.  Their  fitness  is  more 
likely  to  be  the  outcome  of  other  qualities  than  those 
which  have  contributed  to  their  scientific  expertness; 
and  possibly  those  who  hold  back  may  be  better  suited 
to  the  task  than  those  who  seek  it.  Yet  this  consid- 
eration, important  as  it  is,  is  not  quite  as  important 
as  the  converse,  which  is  that  even  the  testimony  of  a 
small  group  of  perfectly  sincere,  able,  and  well-trained 
observers,  despite  their  reputation,  cannot  be  of  such 
supreme  weight  as  to  overturn  well-established  prin- 
ciples and  particularly  to  overtm-n  them  on  the  basis  of 
a mere  negative  inability  on  the  part  of  these  men  to 
detect  the  particular  modus  operandi  of  some  especially 
shrewd  individual. 

The  objectivity  of  science  determines  that  facts  are 
true  and  important  independently  of  the  personality 
of  their  advocates.  Science  demands  proof  and  sin- 


126  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


cerity  — just  the  same  sanctions  that  the  law  or  soci- 
ety cherishes.  The  scientific  man  gets  his  reputation 
from  the  confirmation  of  his  discoveries,  not  the 
discovery  from  the  man.  It  is  not  in  the  main  that 
Eusapia  is  so  superior  in  attainments  to  many  another 
of  her  guild  or  is  so  peculiarly  original;  she  is  excep- 
tionally fortunate.  Instead  of  living  and  dying  ob- 
scmely  with  a local  reputation  in  her  Neapolitan  home, 
she  has  become  an  international  figure  through  the 
advertisement  of  men  of  distinction,  who  have  failed 
to  detect  her  deceptions.  The  significant  lesson  of  the 
story  is  the  necessity  of  examining  data  objectively, 
of  freeing  them  at  once  from  the  suggestion  of  pres- 
tige and  from  the  prejudices  of  individual  observers, 
and  of  realizing  that  scientific  principles  and  common 
sense  alike  are  more  enduring  and  more  important  than 
the  apparent  exceptions  thereto. 

The  social  and  moral  aspects  of  the  case  of  Pala- 
dino  fall  outside  the  scope  of  this  review.  The  spirit 
of  the  laws  and  the  rigor  of  their  enforcement,  the  social 
condemnation  of  dubious  practices,  sufficiently  illus- 
trate the  familiar  inconsistency  with  which  we  look 
upon  the  pursuit  of  wealth  by  false  pretences  and 
shrewd  deception.  As  a logical  product,  fraud  is  usu- 
ally so  sordid  and  so  stupid  that  we  are  inclined  to  look 
upon  it  leniently  when  it  is  interesting;  and  we  must 
remember  that  those  who  paid  large  sums  to  see  Eu- 
sapia’s  table  move,  paid  it  by  reason  of  their  suscep- 
tibility to  the  psychology  of  the  situation  as  above 
duly  set  forth.  They  could  have  attended  quite  as 
good  a “show”  for  a much  smaller  admission  fee.  Pub- 
lic interest  has  put  money  in  her  purse,  as  it  brought 


THE  CASE  OF  PALADINO 


127 


reputation  to  her  name.  There  may  even  be  some  com- 
pensating service  performed  by  distinguished  “fakirs” 
in  that  they  stimulate  dormant  critical  faculties.  Too 
much  intellectual  security  makes  for  a complacent  and 
lazy  confidence.  The  well-to-do  are  apt  to  bestow  their 
beliefs,  like  their  alms,  indiscriminately.  Even  though 
science  serves  as  a faithful  watch-dog  of  our  logical  in- 
terests, we  should  be  equal  to  a little  watchfulness  on 
our  own  account.  Business  relations  and  political  strife 
keep  men  wide  awake  and  bring  them  in  direct  con- 
tact and  conflict  with  others  whose  motives  and  moves 
they  are  quite  prepared  to  suspect;  but  the  traffic  in 
beliefs  seems  a safe  speculation.  The  mental  organ- 
ism, like  the  bodily,  seems  to  require  occasional  sources 
of  irritation  to  keep  it  in  normal  condition.  It  may  be 
a good  thing  from  time  to  time  for  large  groups  of 
people  to  be  shaken  out  of  their  lethargy  and  realize 
that  their  rationality  is  stUl  exposed  to  attacks  of  this 
kind.  This  may  be  a very  costly  way  of  gaming  expe- 
rience, and  of  regulating  public  mental  health,  but 
when  it  is  done  on  so  conspicuous  a scale,  it  is  likely 
to  be  effective.  Large  bodies  require  strong  doses  dras- 
tically administered. 


V 

THE  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  STUDY  OF 
CHAEACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT 

To  illustrate  adequately  the  formation  of  conviction, 
it  is  desirable  to  include  a long-range  survey  in  which 
the  successive  phases  of  belief  in  regard  to  one  and  the 
same  problem  shall  stand  forth  as  a progression,  reflect- 
ing stages  of  logical  skill  and  psychological  insight.  To 
present  the  play  of  factors  in  their  abundant  fruition, 
the  problem  must  concern  large  and  deep  human  in- 
terests, and  consequently  venerable  ones.  These  con- 
ditions are  admirably  met  by  the  group  of  beliefs  con- 
cerning human  differences  in  terms  of  the  relation  of 
mental  traits  to  their  conditions  in  bodily  structure 
and  function.  The  term  “character  and  temperament” 
may  serve  to  indicate  the  theme;  it  is  the  antece- 
dents of  modern  conceptions  regarding  the  nature  of 
our  inherited  temperamental  traits  and  our  acquired 
characteristics,  that  supply  an  interesting  series  of 
beliefs.  These  spread  in  time  from  Hippocrates  to 
Darwin,  and  in  scope  from  the  diagnosis  of  disease 
through  forecast  of  fate,  to  the  reading  of  character, 
and  detection  of  talents,  by  outward  signs,  up  to  a 
scientific  physiological  psychology.  Extravagant  no- 
tions, ancient  superstition,  fanciful  mediaeval  systems, 
modern  survivals  and  elaborations,  along  with  the 
slow  advances  of  psychology,  that  had  to  wait  the 


CHARACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT 


129 


proper  development  of  supporting  sciences,  all  appear 
in  the  unfoldment. 

Parallel  with  it  run  the  successive  steps  in  the  stand- 
ards of  conviction.  The  largest  contrast  is  that  of  the 
play  of  the  subjective  as  opposed  to  the  objective 
method.  Notions  attract  by  reason  of  their  plausi- 
bility, and  once  adopted  find  ready  confirmation  in 
observations,  and  in  turn  lead  to  practices.  Such  no- 
tions and  practices  must  not  be  considered  too  exclu- 
sively in  the  light  of  our  rigid  logical  standards  and 
our  modern  knowledge.  In  their  day  they  were  really 
plausible.  True,  they  often  wandered  in  a eircle,  touch- 
ing a truth  here  and  there,  and  again  straying  off  to 
barren  deserts  of  speculation : — 

“ Wie  von  ein  bosen  Geist  im  Kreis  herumgefiilirt 
Und  ringsherum  liegt  schone  griine  Weide.” 

Confidence  in  a subjective  plausibility  characterizes 
the  antecedents  of  the  conceptions  of  human  nature. 
The  most  explicit  example  is  not  ancient  but  modem; 
it  is  furnished  by  Lavater,  who  raised  this  subjective 
impression  which  countenances  make  upon  us  to  the 
dignity  of  a “physiognomical  sense.”  All  this  illustrates 
pointedly  how  well  we  may  use  our  mental  powers 
and  remain  ignorant  of  the  true  processes  upon  which 
they  proceed.  This  circumstance  establishes  the  need 
of  a science  of  psychology  as  well  as  accounts  for  its 
diflBculties.  It  calls  attention  to  the  fact,  readily  over- 
looked, that  psychology,  like  all  sciences,  has  a long 
history;  its  stages  are  not  so  distinct  as  those  of  more 
objective  sciences,  such  as  astronomy  or  physics  or 
chemistry;  they  must  be  sought  in  the  antecedents, 
the  by-ways  as  well  as  highways,  of  ancient  thought. 


130  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


The  stages  of  progression  are  not  quite  serial  or  regu- 
lar. For  the  most  part  the  notions  and  systems  that 
come  and  go  are  not  disproved,  but  outgrown.  The 
reign  of  one  is  followed  by  the  reign  of  another,  some- 
times of  the  same  dynasty,  sometimes  of  quite  differ- 
ent ancestry.  None  the  less  they  form  an  historical 
series,  an  evolutionary  development. 

Throughout  the  course  the  imperfect  logic  that  holds 
the  notions  or  the  system  together  is  quite  as  impor- 
tant as  the  imperfect  insight  into  the  facts  and  their 
meaning,  to  which  it  is  applied.  This  remains  the 
central  consideration  — the  lesson  of  the  story  — and 
constitutes  the  value  of  its  contribution  to  the  history 
of  conviction. 

I 

The  strong  practical  interest  in  the  soimces  and  va- 
rieties of  human  powers,  and  their  proper  direction  and 
training,  may  be  utilized  in  behalf  of  the  retrospee- 
tive  aspects  of  the  subject.  The  antecedents  of  “charac- 
ter and  temperament”  concern  in  the  main  the  story 
of  false  and  ambitious  leads  and  ventm-esome  solu- 
tions of  the  sources  of  human  nature.  However  com- 
pletely discredited,  they  belong  to  the  irrevocable 
stages  of  our  intellectual  heritage,  and  show  how  un- 
certain has  been  the  occupation  of  the  psychological 
realm.  The  historical  connection  between  the  antece- 
dents and  present-day  views  is  irregular;  the  succession 
of  opinion  is  largely  by  replacement  and  outgrowth. 
None  the  less  the  points  of  connection  are  frequent 
with  the  body  of  knowledge  which  we  draw  upon  so 
readily  for  the  satisfaction  of  our  systematized  and 
rationalized  inquiries. 


CHARACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT 


131 


The  popular  interest  in  human  nature  is  itself  an 
expression  thereof.  Actions  are  largely  regulated  as 
well  as  interpreted  by  psychological  considerations; 
and  these  turn  attention  to  the  nature  of  the  mind. 
The  feeling  of  strong  impulse,  the  sense  of  conflict  be- 
tween emotions  as  also  between  desire  and  sanctioned 
conduct,  the  search  for  motives,  as  well  as  the  shrewd- 
ness of  the  battle  of  wits,  and  the  reading  of  another’s 
intentions  shape  psychological  insight.  “Know  thy- 
self” is  an  ancient  precept  — at  once  a moral  injxmc- 
tion  and  an  invitation  to  psychological  study.  The 
early  contributions  to  the  fleld  to  be  surveyed  came 
from  the  learning  aptly  called  “the  humanities”  and 
reflected  the  insight  of  experience,  directed  by  an 
unschooled  but  worldly  wise  analytical  temper.  Quite 
as  science  is  glorified  common  sense,  so  is  literature 
elevated  common  sentiment;  either  may  fail  to  rise 
above  a suggestive  type  of  opinion  or  pleasing  conjec- 
ture. The  delineation  of  character  springs  from  the 
impressionistic  attitude  towards  the  products  of  nature 
and  the  vicissitudes  of  fortune.  It  is  animated  by  a 
fimdamental  interest  in  one’s  kind.  It  trains  men  to 
be  practitioners,  empirics  in  large  measure,  in  the  arts 
of  human  iatercourse,  and  tends  to  establish  man  as 
the  proper  study  of  mankind. 

The  distinctive  service  of  Greek  thought  was  to 
launch  the  permanently  engaging  intellectual  problems; 
to  this  rule  the  problem  of  character  is  no  exception. 
It  presents  the  two  tendencies  — the  impressionistic 
and  the  analytic  — in  characteristic  form.  Theophras- 
tus (370-288  B.C.)  is  the  prototype  of  the  impres- 
sionistic delineators,  yet  is  not  without  an  analytic 


132  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


strain.  He  sets  forth  his  intentions  thus:  That  although 
all  Greece  is  of  one 

clime  and  temperature  of  air,  and  Grecians  in  general  bred 
and  trained  up  after  one  fashion,  should  notwithstanding,  in 
manners  and  behavior  be  so  different  and  unlike.  I therefore, 
O Polycles,  having  a long  time  observed  the  divers  dispo- 
sitions of  men,  having  now  lived  ninety-nine  (?)  years,  having 
conversed  with  all  sorts  of  natures  good  and  bad,  and  com- 
paring them  together:  I took  it  my  part  to  set  down  in  this 
discourse  their  several  fashions  and  manners  of  life.  For  I 
am  of  the  opinion,  my  Polycles,  that  our  children  will  prove 
the  honester  and  better  citizens,  if  we  shall  leave  them  good 
precedents  of  imitation:  that  of  good  children  they  may 
prove  better  men. 

The  “Characters”  of  Theophrastus  form  a group 
of  sketches  of  human  foibles,  holding  the  mirror  up  to 
nature.  They  comprise  the  dissembler,  the  flatterer,  the 
gossip,  the  toady,  the  fop,  the  miser,  the  superstitious, 
the  mistrusting,  the  querulous,  the  bully,  the  coward, 
the  stubborn,  the  pompous,  the  boor  and  the  bore, 
the  malaprop  of  either  sex,  the  well-intentioned  fool 
and  the  public-disregarding  autocrat.  This  gallery  of 
mental  and  moral  shortcomings  served  as  a model  for 
distant  ages.  A group  of  delineations  of  character  ap- 
peared in  England  in  the  seventeenth  centmy;  and 
the  model  was  still  suggestive  when  George  Eliot  chose 
the  title  for  her  “Impressions  of  Theophrastus  Such.” 
The  modern  delineations  emphasize  circumstance,  the 
vocations  and  social  stations,  reflect  a more  varied,  a 
more  specialized,  and  a more  complicated  world.  The 
“idle  gallant,”  the  “meer  dull  physician,”  the  “up- 
start country  knight,”  the  “pot-poet,”  the  “plodding 
student,”  the  “down-right  scholar,”  as  well  as  the 
“self -conceited  man,”  the  “vulgar-spirited  man,”  the 


CHARACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT 


133 


“too  idly  reserved  man,”  and  men  of  other  dispositions 
are  subjected  to  keen  strictures  in  the  “Microcosmog- 
raphy, or  a Piece  of  the  World  Discovered  in  Essays 
and  Characters,”  by  John  Earle  (1628).  Such  portrai- 
tures of  human  peculiarities,  gauged  by  their  moral 
or  social  desirability  as  examples  to  be  followed  or 
avoided,  form  an  attractive  compendiiim  for  the  in- 
terpretation of  men  and  their  ways.  Their  considera- 
tion, ranging  from  gossip  to  philosophy,  supplies  the 
common  touch  of  natme  that  makes  the  world  of  every 
time  and  clime  akin,  and  presents  graphically  for  our 
psychological  contemplation  the  outward  issues  of 
disposition  as  shaped  by  opportimity  and  circum- 
stance. 


II 

This  vein  of  character-mining  failed  to  yield  the 
native  ore  of  disposition.  The  more  fundamental  prob- 
lem was  early  recognized  in  the  venerable  doctrine 
of  the  temperaments  as  the  alleged  determinants  of 
the  original  yet  distinctive  nattnes  of  men,  and  in  the 
general  notion  that  outward  imcontrollable  forces,  such 
as  climate,  and  directive  ones,  such  as  breeding  and 
training,  were  responsible  for  the  types  of  individuals 
and  races  — as  duly  indicated  by  Theophrastus.  The 
doctrines  of  the  school  of  Hippocrates  (fifth  century 
B.c.)  formulated  the  Greek  point  of  view.  Its  philo- 
sophical procedure  followed  that  of  Empedocles  in  the 
search  for  elements  and  in  the  explanation  of  manifold 
appearance  as  their  variable  combination.  The  ele- 
ments of  creation  were  regarded  as  fourfold:  air,  fire, 
earth,  and  water.  These  are  distinctive  by  virtue  of 


134  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


elemental  qualities:  namely,  dry  and  moist,  hot  and 
cold,  heavy  and  light,  which  by  combination  yield  the 
qualities  of  the  elements:  fire  as  hot,  dry  and  light; 
water  as  cold,  moist  and  heavy,  and  so  on.  The  four- 
fold elements  of  the  body  are  the  humors  or  fluids : the 
blood,  the  (yellow)  bile,  the  phlegm,  and  the  black  bile. 
Subjected  to  the  play  of  analogy  and  correspondence 
in  the  speculative  manner  then  employed,  hlood  be- 
comes related  to  air,  has  the  quality  of  being  warm 
and  moist;  the  season  which  it  typifies  is  spring,  and  its 
temperament  is  the  sanguine.  Its  direct  opposite  is 
earth,  which  is  cold  and  dry,  finds  its  bodily  correspon- 
dent in  the  hlacTc  Idle  and  its  season  in  the  fall  of  the 
year;  its  temperament  is  the  melancholic.  Fire  as  warm 
and  dry  has  special  relations  to  summer,  is  represented 
in  the  body  by  the  yellow  hile,  and  produces  the  fiery 
or  choleric  temperament;  while  water  as  cold  and  moist 
is  allied  to  the  phlegm,  to  the  sluggish  season  of  win- 
ter, and  to  the  languid  temperament  which  we  still,  in 
deference  to  Hippocrates,  call  phlegmatic. 

These  views  were  held  as  much  more  than  specula- 
tive possibilities;  they  were  practically  applied.  Dis- 
eases were  regarded  as  defects  in  the  composition  of 
the  humors,  to  be  counteracted  by  appropriate  appli- 
cations of  heat  and  cold,  or  of  dry  and  moist,  to  restore 
a favorable  equilibrium.  Winter  was  held  to  be  the 
dangerous  season  for  a temperament  lacking  in  fire; 
the  body  must  not  be  too  full  of  humors  nor  yet  be  too 
dry  and  sapless.  The  several  ages  of  man,  from  child- 
hood to  senility,  reflected  the  natural  sequence  of  domi- 
nance of  the  several  humors. 

The  doctrine  of  temperaments  is  historically  impor- 


CHARACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT 


135 


tant  quite  beyond  any  illumination  that  it  affords. 
It  is  obvious  that  the  philosophers  of  the  school  of 
Hippocrates  had  no  means  of  ascertaining  that  cheer- 
fulness was  resident  in  the  blood,  laziness  in  the  phlegm, 
testiness  in  the  yellow  bile,  and  low-spiritedness  in  the 
black  bile;  nor  that  any  such  fimdamental  vital  basis 
was  afforded  by  the  “humors”  thus  distinguished. 
Their  habits  of  mind  inclined  them  to  such  an  opinion; 
and  their  sense  of  plausibility  was  gratified  (where  we 
see  only  far-fetched  and  irrelevant  analogy)  by  observ- 
ing the  hot  moist  fluidity  of  blood  and  the  damp 
cold  sluggishness  of  phlegm.  The  originators  of  the 
doctrine  of  temperaments  were  empirical  psychologists, 
who  observed  that  differences  of  mental  disposition, 
like  cheerfulness  and  testiness,  were  common  and  con- 
spicuous traits  of  men.  They  were  also  medical  prac- 
titioners with  a fair  knowledge  of  the  body  and  its  ills, 
and  recognized  that  mental  dispositions  were  inti- 
mately related  to  bodily  condition.  Their  philosophi- 
cal temper  foimd  satisfaction  in  connecting  these  two 
varieties  of  information  through  the  doctrine  of  the 
temperaments. 

This  doctrine  does  not  stand  alone  as  such  an  at- 
tempt. The  “spirit”  theory  of  disease  has  a like  basis 
and  purpose;  it  reaches  from  primitive  medicine  to 
Christian  exorcism  and  beyond.  The  reference  of 
epilepsy  or  other  mental  invasion  to  a foreign  and 
malignant  spirit  is  not  unrelated  to  the  notion  of  ani- 
mal spirits  coursing  through  the  body  and  finding  a 
local  habitation  in  the  ventricles  of  the  brain.  Again, 
the  doctrine  of  signatures,  in  accordance  with  which 
red  flowers  were  considered  efficacious  in  the  treat- 


136  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


merit  of  blood  diseases  and  yellow  ones  in  the  treat- 
ment of  jaundice,  or  “heart’s-ease”  was  prescribed  for 
heart  trouble,  and  walnuts  for  mental  disorders  (by  vir- 
tue of  the  resemblance  of  their  outer  shell  to  the  skull 
and  of  their  convoluted  kernels  to  the  brain)  illustrate 
the  force  of  native  analogy  in  cruder  practices. 

When  notions  of  this  order,  instead  of  being  carried 
along  as  the  folk-lore  products  of  primitive  thought, 
assume  a systematic  form,  they  become  more  fantas- 
tic in  the  analogies  employed  as  well  as  more  remote 
from  a corrective  common  sense.  Astrology  is  the  most 
ambitious  of  such  efforts  both  in  design  and  scope 
of  application.  The  three  persistent  motives  in  this 
world-wide  and  world-old  expression  — a composite  of 
primitive  culture,  superstitious  survivals,  and  pseudo- 
scientific elaboration  — seem  to  be  the  cure  of  disease, 
the  reading  of  character,  the  fore-knowledge  of  the  fu- 
ture; and  in  all,  the  control  of  fate.  The  motives  com- 
bine. Astrology  aims  to  determine  the  character  as 
well  as  the  careers  of  men,  to  predict  their  liability 
to  disease  and  its  issues,  and  to  prescribe  the  set  of 
disposition  — making  one  of  jovial  temperament  if 
the  hour  of  birth  showed  favorable  relations  to  Jupiter, 
or  gloomy  (saturnine)  if  Satmn  ruled  the  critical  mo- 
ment. These  and  related  notions  and  systems  form 
a vast  background  of  belief,  continuously  influencing 
the  views  of  character  and  its  sources.  Whether  the 
causes  or  the  signs  of  dispositions  were  regarded  as 
resident  in  the  fluids  of  the  body,  or  in  the  stars  and 
planets,  or  in  the  detailed  contours  of  the  features 
of  the  face  and  head  — as  in  the  later  physiognomy, 
itself  a revival  of  classic  and  popular  lore  — or  with 


CHARACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT 


137 


more  modern  but  no  less  fanciful  elaboration,  in  the 
“bumps”  of  phrenology,  or  again  in  the  creases  of 
the  hand  upon  which  palmistry  specializes,  there  ap- 
pears in  all  a common  practical  motive  in  the  control 
of  fate  through  insight  or  revelation,  and  a common 
quasi-logical  attempt  to  establish  its  basis  by  read- 
ing the  secret  of  its  conditioning  — the  insignia  of  its 
dominion.  The  logic  of  the  procedme,  as  judged  by 
our  standards,  is  of  the  feeblest;  but  these  standards 
are  the  issue  of  many  generations  of  experience,  each 
critically  testing  the  conclusions,  revising  and  enlarging 
the  data,  of  its  predecessors.  The  stress  of  practice, 
we  must  bear  in  mind,  is  insistent.  Men  will  apply 
what  knowledge  they  have;  they  can  not  await  its  per- 
fection. Ideals  and  systems  support  the  intercourse 
with  reality,  but  they  also  express  the  progress  attained 
in  reading  its  meaning;  the  ideal  “has  always  to  grow 
in  the  real,  and  often  to  seek  out  its  bed  and  board 
there  in  a very  sorry  way”  (Carlyle). 

The  ancient  and  honorable  place  of  the  doctrine  of 
the  temperaments  in  the  evolution  of  psychological 
knowledge  warrants  its  further  consideration.  Most 
influential  were  the  contributions  of  Galen  (a.d.  130- 
200),  who  developed  the  views  of  Hippocrates  and 
whose  authority  dominated  the  medical  world  for  cen- 
turies. The  doctrine  became  a classical  heritage  through 
its  incorporation  in  the  Galenic  system  of  medicine. 
Its  survival  in  the  transfer  of  Greco-Roman  science 
and  tradition  across  the  desert  of  improgressive  ages, 
with  their  uncertain  and  irregular  caravans  of  learning, 
was  due  largely  to  its  association  with  the  “humoral” 
theory  of  disease.  This  remained  a central  as  well  as  a 


138  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


controversial  issue  in  mediaeval  and  Renaissance  medi- 
cine, and  was  effectively  retired  only  by  the  complete 
transformation  of  physiological  conceptions  inaugurated 
by  Harvey’s  discovery  of  the  circulation  of  the  blood 
(1628).  Along  with  this  decisive  reform  in  knowledge 
and  method  there  was  established  the  clinical  tem- 
per of  the  practice  of  medicine,  which  was  as  largely 
set  by  Sydenham  (1624-89),  as  were  the  experimental 
standards  by  Harvey,  as  similarly  the  anatomical  pre- 
requisite had  been  supplied  by  Vesalius  (1514-64). 
Cumulatively  these  advances  served  to  cast  off  the 
spell  of  Galen  and  to  install  verification  and  observa- 
tion in  place  of  authority.  As  a herald  of  the  new 
learning,  the  philosopher  John  Locke,  a friend  of  Syden- 
ham’s, wrote:  — 

You  cannot  imagine  how  a little  observation,  carefully 
made  by  a man  not  tied  up  to  the  four  humors  (Galen)  or 
salt,  sulphur,  and  mercury  (Paracelsus),  or  to  acid  and  alkali 
(Sylvius  and  Willis)  which  has  of  late  prevailed,  wM  carry  a 
man  in  the  curing  of  diseases,  though  very  stubborn  and 
dangerous;  and  that  with  very  little  and  common  things,  and 
almost  no  medicine  at  all. 

These  considerations  show  to  what  extent  practices 
kept  alive  systems  precariously  supported  by  prin- 
ciples. Symptoms  such  as  fevers  and  chills,  parching 
and  perspiration,  substantiated  the  hot  and  cold,  the 
dry  and  moist  as  clinical  realities.  Remedies  were  pre- 
scribed to  counteract  them;  diets  were  arranged  accord- 
ing to  degree  of  dryness  and  moisture.  Even  when  the 
classic  doctrines  were  discarded,  they  were  replaced  by 
others  developed  in  like  manner.^ 

1 Medical  theories  and  practices  were  reflected  in  popular  lore.  To 
recall  the  spirit  of  the  ministrations  it  is  suflBcient  to  cite  the  vener- 


CHAEACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT 


139 


It  is  fortunate  that  the  older  currents  of  thought, 
medical  and  otherwise,  were  summarized  at  the  very 
period  at  which  they  were  destined  to  retirement  by 


able  Chaucerian  diagnosis  made  by  Pertelote  of  Chanticlere’s  afiright- 
ing  dream.  This  was  ascribed  to 

“ the  grete  superfluitie 
Of  your  reede  colera,  parde. 

Which  causeth  folk  to  dremen  in  her  dremes 
Of  arwes,  and  of  fyre  with  reede  leemes. 


Right  as  the  humour  of  malencolie 
Causeth  ful  many  a man,  in  sleep,  to  crye. 

For  fere  of  beres,  or  of  boles  blake. 

Or  elles  blake  develes  wole  him  take. 

Of  othere  humours  couthe  1 telle  also. 

That  wirken  many  a man  in  slep  ful  woo; 

But  I wol  passe  as  lightly  as  I can.  . . 

She  then  advises  digestives  and  laxatives  to  purge  him  of  “choler” 
and  of  “melancolie,”  though  she  bids  him  remember  that  he  is  “full 
colerick  of  compleccioun”  and  should  beware  of  the  “sonne  in  his 
ascensioun.”  Among  the  artists,  Albrecht  Diirer  reflected  the  cur- 
rent belief  that  temperament  was  responsible  for  the  differences  of 
men.  He  urged  that  artists  should  present  the  features  and  propor- 
tions suitable  to  the  characters  of  their  subjects.  One  of  his  ripest 
productions,  commonly  known  as  “The  Four  Apostles,”  also  bore 
the  title  of  “ The  Four  Temperaments,”  St.  John  representing  the 
melancholic,  St.  Peter  the  phlegmatic,  St.  Paul  the  choleric,  and  St. 
Mark  the  sanguine. 

The  affiliation  of  “humors”  and  temperaments  appears  in  the 
transferred  use  of  the  former  term.  The  dramatic  material  of  the  age 
of  Elizabeth,  with  its  free  emphasis  of  personality,  was  typically 
staged  in  Ben  Jonson’s  (1574-1637)  Every  Man  in  His  Humour  and 
Every  Man  out  of  His  Humour.  The  following  is  from  the  induction 
to  the  latter: — 

“ To  give  these  ignorant  well-spoken  days  some  taste  of  their  abuse 
of  this  word  humour,”  the  argument  proceeds: — • 

“ Why,  humour  as ’t  is  ens,  we  thus  define  it. 

To  be  a quality  of  air,  or  water. 

And  in  itself  holds  these  two  properties. 

Moisture,  and  fluxure:  as,  for  demonstration, 

Poim  water  on  this  floor,  ’t  will  wet  and  run: 

Likewise  the  air,  forced  through  a horn,  or  trumpet. 


140  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


Harvey’s  fundamental  discovery.  Burton’s  “Anat- 
omy of  Melancholy  ” is  a collection  of  all  the  mystic, 
fantastic,  engaging,  and  (to  our  minds)  incredible  pro- 
cedures of  an  ambitious  science,  suggestive  of  the  waste- 
products  of  the  mind.  Bmton  anatomizes  the  humors, 
recognizing  the  four  primary  juices 

without  which  no  living  creature  can  be  sustained;  which 
four,  though  they  be  eomprehended  in  the  mass  of  the  blood, 
yet  have  their  several  afiPections.  . . . Blood  is  a hot,  sweet, 
temperate,  red  humour,  prepared  in  the  meseraic  veins,  and 
made  of  the  most  temperate  parts  of  the  chylus  in  the  liver, 
whose  office  is  to  nourish  the  whole  body,  to  give  it  strength 
and  eolour,  being  dispersed  by  the  veins  through  every  part 
of  it.  And  from  it  spirits  are  first  begotten  in  the  heart,  which 
afterwards  by  the  arteries  are  communicated  to  the  other 
parts;  — 

and  so  on,  with  a like  conjectural  anatomy  and  acro- 
batic physiology  for  the  other  humors.  Burton’s  appe- 
tite for  the  occult  inevitably  made  him  a believer  in 
astrology.  It  is  a fact  that  his  horoscope  is  pictured  on 
his  tombstone,  but  it  is  presumably  but  a rumor  that 
he  assisted  the  fulfillment  of  the  prediction  of  the  time 

Flows  instantly  away,  and  leaves  behind 
A kind  of  dew;  and  hence,  we  do  conclude. 

That  whatsoe’er  hath  fluxure,  and  humidity. 

As  wanting  power  to  contain  itself. 

Is  humour.  So  in  every  human  body. 

The  choler,  melancholy,  phlegm,  and  blood. 

By  reason  that  they  flow  continually 
In  some  one  part,  and  are  not  continent. 

Receive  the  name  of  Humours.  Now  thus  far 
It  may,  by  metaphor,  apply  itself 
Unto  the  general  disposition: 

As  when  some  one  peculiar  quality 
Doth  so  possess  a man,  that  it  doth  draw 
All  his  affects,  his  spirits  and  his  powers. 

In  their  conductions,  all  to  run  one  way. 

This  may  be  truly  said  to  be  a humour.” 


CHARACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT 


141 


of  his  death  by  hanging  himself.  Burton’s  work  is  sug- 
gestive in  view  of  the  career  of  the  doctrines  which 
superseded  the  “temperaments”  as  practical  expo- 
nents of  character.  It  indicates  the  ready  temptation 
for  views  of  this  nature  to  degenerate  into  vain  pseudo- 
science, and  under  a common  enthusiasm  and  pre- 
possession to  bring  together  in  mutual  tolerance  diverse 
notions  of  like  conjectmal  basis.  Their  common  mo- 
tive is  a strong  leaning  toward  the  occult. 

m 

The  parent  view,  that  mental  traits  are  conditioned 
by  bodily  composition,  affiliated  with  views  of  similar 
ancestry,  holding  that  the  traits  were  revealed  in  bodily 
signs.  Such  is  the  principle  of  physiognomy,  a doc- 
trine as  old  as  Aristotle,  and  older.  There  is  the  tradi- 
tional story  that  the  physiognomist  Zopyrus,  in  read- 
ing the  character  of  Socrates,  pronoimced  him  full  of 
passionate  tendencies,  thus  showing  in  the  opinion  of 
the  disciples  of  Socrates,  the  vanity  of  his  art.  But 
Socrates  came  to  his  defense  and  confessed  the  reality 
of  the  impulses,  which,  however,  he  was  able  to  resist. 
Aristotle’s  advocacy  of  physiognomy  was  not  pro- 
nounced; it  may  have  been  little  more  than  an  inclina- 
tion to  recognize  the  reflection  of  emotion  in  feature, 
or  the  coordinate  growth  of  body  and  mind.  But  the 
tractate  on  “Physiognomy”  ascribed  to  him  served 
as  the  text  to  the  Renaissance  adepts  in  occult  lore. 
Thus  restated,  even  more  than  in  its  original  setting, 
it  presents  the  characteristic  dependence  upon  weak 
analogy  in  connecting  specific  bodily  features  with 
specific  mental  traits.  Coarse  hair,  an  erect  body,  a 


142  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


strong  sturdy  frame,  broad  shoulders,  a robust  neck, 
blue  eyes  and  dark  complexion,  a sharp  but  not  large 
brow,  were  together  regarded  as  marks  of  the  coura- 
geous man,  while  the  timid  man  showed  opposite  charac- 
teristics. The  doctrine  was  reinforced  by  such  analo- 
gies as  that  timid  animals,  like  the  rabbit  and  the  deer, 
had  soft  fine  hair;  while  the  comageous  ones,  like  the 
lion  and  the  wild  boar,  were  coarse-haired. 

A mental  trait  may  have  at  once  a natural  bodily 
cause  and  a manifest  or  covert  sign.  The  “humorist” 
may  also  be  a physiognomist,  may  both  accoxmt  for 
and  read  human  character,  may  prescribe  for  its  ail- 
ments according  to  the  one  set  of  influences,  and  advise 
as  to  course  and  career  according  to  the  other. 

There  is  no  more  instructive  instance  to  illustrate 
how  the  old  learning  was  reinstated  with  slight  altera- 
tion in  precept  and  practice,  than  the  career  of  Jerome 
Cardan  (1501-76).  Esteemed  by  his  contemporaries, 
shrewd  and  able,  he  was  urged  in  one  direction  by  his 
taste  for  science  and  in  another  by  his  credulity.  His 
autobiography  reveals  his  analytic  bent  as  well  as  his 
strong  personahty.  It  has  been  said  of  him  that  for 
all  for  which  his  contemporaries  thought  him  wise,  we 
should  think  him  mad;  and  for  what  we  think  him  wise, 
they  would  have  thought  him  mad.  So  great  was  his 
reputation  that  he  was  invited  and  then  inveigled  to 
travel  from  Naples  to  Scotland  to  treat  the  Bishop  of 
St.  Andrews.  The  prelate’s  ailment  had  been  described 
as  a periodic  asthma  due  to  a distillation  of  the  brain 
into  the  lungs,  which  left  a “temperature  and  a con- 
dition too  moist  and  too  cold,  and  the  flow  of  the 
humors  coinciding  with  the  conjunctions  and  opposi- 


CHARACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT  143 


lions  of  the  moon.”  With  the  characteristic  prestige 
that  results  from  finding  others  in  the  wrong,  Cardan 
promptly  found  that  the  Archbishop’s  brain  was  too 
hot  and  too  dry.  He  put  his  distinguished  patient  on  a 
cold  and  humid  diet  to  resist  the  attraction  of  the  brain, 
yet  had  him  sleep  on  a pillow  of  dry  straw  or  seaweed, 
and  had  water  dropped  upon  his  shaven  crown;  in 
addition,  however,  he  prescribed  a regimen  of  simple 
food,  much  sleep,  and  cold  showers.  The  improve- 
ment that  resulted  — naturally  ascribed  to  the  “hu- 
moral” procedures  — added  much  to  the  glory  of  Car- 
dan’s reputation  and  the  profit  of  his  purse.  This 
physician,  learned  and  wise  for  his  day,  was  yet  the 
very  embodiment  of  all  things  superstitious.  Every 
trivial  occurrence  was  an  omen  or  potent.  He  cast 
horoscopes,  wrote  on  all  manners  of  cosmic  influences, 
and  espoused  the  role  of  a physiognomist.  His  distinc- 
tive contribution  was  an  astrological  physiognomy, 
based  upon  the  underlying  notion  that  the  furrows  or 
lines  of  the  forehead  correspond  to  the  seven  dominant 
celestial  bodies;  and  that  the  qualities  which  they  de- 
noted were  those  connected  with  the  powers  and  vir- 
tues conferred  by  Venus,  or  Jupiter,  or  Saturn,  or  Mer- 
cmy,  etc.,  in  the  current  astrological  system.  Across 
the  forehead  he  drew  seven  parallel  lines,  the  spaces  in 
succession  dedicated  to  the  moon  and  the  six  planets, 
and  by  the  proportions  and  prominences  of  these  lines 
he  read  the  fortune  of  the  subject,  not  hesitating  in  one 
case  to  predict  from  the  grouping  of  these  wrinkles 
that  the  owner  thereof  was  doomed  to  die  by  hanging 
or  drowning. 

In  such  manner  the  humoral  doctrine  served  to  de- 


144  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


termine  the  diagnosis  of  disposition  and  ailment,  while 
from  astrology  and  physiognomy  were  drawn  further 
indications  of  personal  character  and  probable  fortune. 
Hardly  less  significant  for  the  logical  temper  of  these 
pre-Harveian  days  were  the  contributions  of  Giovanni 
Baptista  della  Porta  (1538-1615),  He  was  impressed 
by  the  comparative  physiognomy  sketched  in  the  Aris- 
totelian writings  — a field  in  turn  indicating  the  strong 
impression  that  the  traits  of  animals  make  upon  the 
thought-habits  of  primitive  people;  it  appears  in  to- 
temic  practices,  as  well  as  in  animal  fables  from  ^sop 
to  Br’er  Rabbit.  The  notion  that  stubborn  persons 
carry  the  outward  sign  of  their  obstinacy  by  having 
features  in  common  with  the  face  of  a mule,  or  that  fool- 
ish ones  show  a like  resemblance  to  a sheep,  impresses 
the  modern  reader  as  a strange  joke.  The  analogy  will 
barely  support  a pleasantry  or  a metaphor.  We  are 
fully  conscious  of  the  metaphor  of  our  epithets,  when 
we  caU  an  obstinate  person  mulish,  or  a shy  one  sheep- 
ish, or  a man  of  sly  ways  an  old  fox,  or  speak  of  a social 
lion  or  a wise  owl  or  a gay  butterfly;  it  is  significant 
that  what  was  once  serious  logic  is  now  playful  figure 
of  speech.  It  is  also  in  accord  with  the  principle  of  sur- 
vivals in  culture  that  the  notions  made  current  by 
generations  of  credulous  “physiognomists”  continue 
to  be  circulated  in  the  popular  manuals  sold  to  simple 
folk  to  teach  them  the  art  of  reading  faces  and  futmes.^ 

* Nothing  less  than  a glance  at  the  illustrations  which  the  earlier 
physiognomists  employed  will  convey  an  adequate  impression  of 
the  vagaries  of  Porta  and  his  kind.  They  show  that  what  was  once 
pictorial  proof  has  become  the  artist’s  pastime.  The  material  pre- 
sented for  amusement  in  Lear’s  Nonsense  Botany  or  Wood’s  Animal 
Analogues  is  hardly  more  remote  than  that  which  served  Porta  as  a 


CHAKACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT 


145 


IV 

All  this  would  be  as  irrelevant  retrospectively  as  it 
is  to  our  central  purpose,  were  it  not  that  it  indicates 
the  presence  throughout  the  ages  of  a considerable 
body  of  popular  lore  and  systematized  doctrine  — both 
saturated  with  flimsy  analogy  and  engaging  prepos- 
sessions — which  was  available  for  the  ambitious  re- 
naissance of  the  interest  in  character  and  its  signs  in 
the  face,  through  its  best  known  apostle,  Johann  Cas- 
par Lavater  (1741-1801).  The  contrast  between  Lava- 
ter  and  such  men  as  Cardan  and  Porta  is  as  marked  as 
that  of  the  spirit  and  scope  of  the  scientific  study  of 
their  respective  times.  The  vagaries  of  the  sixteenth 
century  may  have  stood  measurably  aloof  from  the 
real,  if  slow  and  uncertain,  advances  in  the  knowledge 
of  mind  and  nature  then  maturing;  but  they  were  not 
wholly  remote,  not  wholly  tangential  to  its  orbit.  This 
was  no  longer  true  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Lava- 
ter, despite  his  reputation  and  associations  and  the 
imposing  effect  of  his  ambitious  publications,  failed  to 
affect  seriously  or  to  divert  the  increasing  stream  of 
scientific  discovery  to  which  the  early  eighteenth  cen- 
tury gave  momentmn.  The  scientific  contemporaries 
of  Lavater  judged  his  views  as  critically,  appreciated 
their  wholly  subjective  basis  in  a personal  predilection 

serious  instrument  of  research.  Thus,  a portrait  of  Plato  is  printed 
side  by  side  with  that  of  a dog,  and  one  of  Vitellus  Csesar  is  paral- 
leled by  that  of  a stag;  and  in  each  case  some  of  the  most  deserving 
qualities  of  the  animal  are  regarded  as  typical  of  the  human  embodi- 
ment. Similarly  distorted  illustrations  show  human  resemblances  to 
a lion,  or  a bull,  or  a donkey,  or  a deer;  while  the  picture  of  a girl  is 
ungallantly  made  to  approach  the  features  of  a pig.  These  and  yet 
more  capricious  ventures  in  animal  physiognomy  were  incorporated 
into  later  systems,  often  in  complete  ignorance  of  their  source.  ^ 


146  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


and  their  lack  of  objective  warrant  quite  as  justly  as 
we  of  to-day.  The  contrast  of  attitude  appears  equally 
in  the  all  but  complete  desuetude  of  the  old  persistent 
pseudo-sciences,  astrological  and  others. 

, Lavater  had  nothing  new  to  offer  in  principle  or  data 
or  method.  He  was  an  impressionistic  enthusiast,  set- 
ting forth  conclusions  with  a minimum  of  argument 
and  convictions  with  a minimum  of  proof.  His  system 
was  based  upon  subjective  interpretation.  His  delinea- 
tion of  character  has  a direct  reading  of  detailed  men- 
tal traits  by  an  interpretation  of  their  equivalents  or 
representatives  in  features  and  expression.  Lavater’s 
activities  were  manifold.  Preacher,  orator,  philan- 
thropist, political  reformer,  dramatist,  writer  of  bal- 
lads, he  was  a conspicuous  man  of  his  times,  highly 
regarded  by  his  eminent  contemporaries  — among 
them  Goethe,  whose  contribution  to  the  “Fragments 
of  Physiognomy”  have  been  identified.  He  was  quite 
without  scientific  bent  or  training.  Yet  his  name  was 
so  commanding  in  the  annals  of  physiognomy  as  to 
distract  attention  from  the  slightness  of  the  founda- 
tions upon  which  his  elaborate  superstructure  was 
raised.  Indeed,  the  impressiveness  of  elaborate  plates 
and  luxurious  editions,  and  the  support  of  distinguished 
but  uncritical  patrons,  were  responsible  for  much  of 
his  fame.  The  reader  who  desires  first-hand  acquain- 
tance with  Lavater  must  be  prepared  for  tedious  as- 
sertion, for  generalities  that  do  not  even  glitter,  for 
persistent  avoidance  of  real  issues,  for  the  futile  con- 
tention and  misimderstanding  of  a propagandist.  Of 
method  he  had  little,  and  for  the  most  part  translated 
directly  and  by  use  of  a dictionary  of  fanciful  etymolo- 


CHARACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT 


147 


gies,  from  the  language  of  a superficial  anatomy  into 
that  of  a wholly  arbitrary  psychology.  He  presented  a 
popular,  empirical  grouping  of  feature-interpretation 
by  virtue  of  a certain  common-sense  shrewdness,  which 
he  elevated  to  the  dignity  of  a universal  physiognom- 
ical sense  — “those  feelings  which  are  produced  at 
beholding  certain  countenances,  and  the  conjectures 
concerning  the  qualities  of  the  mind,”  which  the  fea- 
tures suggest.  The  extensive  collection  of  portraits 
alone  offset  the  tedium  of  the  text.  Lavater  was  an 
expert  draftsman,  and  a diligent  collector  of  engravings, 
outline  drawings,  and  the  silhouettes  then  in  vogue. 
To  each  picture  he  attached  a character -reading,  which 
reflected  little  more  than  his  personal  impression  or 
knowledge  of  the  subject,  to  which  occasionally  were 
added  special  correlations  of  such  traits  as  prudence, 
cmming,  industry,  caution,  determination  or  what  not, 
with  the  forehead,  the  eye,  the  nose,  the  mouth,  the 
chin. 

It  was  inevitable  that  the  practical  interest,  lacking 
the  compensations  of  Lavater’s  serious  purpose,  rap- 
idly turned  physiognomy  into  vulgar  quackery.  The 
followers  of  Lavater  developed  a craving  for  handy 
recipes  by  which  to  interpret  the  meaning  in  terms  of 
character,  of  chin,  forehead,  eyebrows,  and  of  the  sev- 
eral distinctive  combinations  of  feature,  by  an  arbi- 
trary or  plausible  system  of  signs.  Physiognomy  de- 
generated into  a baseless  and  senseless  empiricism. 
Oblique  wrinkles  in  the  forehead  were  held  to  indicate 
an  oblique  or  suspicious  mind;  small  eyebrows  with 
long  concave  eyelashes  were  made  the  sign  of  phleg- 
matic melancholia;  long  high  foreheads  were  advised 


148  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


not  to  contract  friendships  or  marriages  with  spherical 
heads.  Such  was  the  detailed  but  arbitrary  eorrelation 
oracularly  set  forth  with  no  more  analysis  or  under- 
standing of  facial  traits  than  of  mental  ones. 

Lavater’s  work  ^ supplies  a convincing  and  not  too 
ancient  example,  if  such  be  needed,  of  the  limitations 
of  impressionism  as  a basis  for  the  study  of  character 
and  of  its  utter  futility  for  the  purposes  of  a sound  psy- 
chology; and  that  apart  from  the  like  disqualifications 
resulting  from  an  ignorance  of  the  significance  of  such 
somatic  features  as  those  which  formed  the  basis  of 
the  system.  It  shows  how  readily  an  enthusiastic  but 
unintelligent  industry  may  build  a monumental  con- 
struction upon  a hollow  foundation.  It  illustrates  as 
well  a specific  psychological  fallacy:  that  of  exagger- 
ating the  significance  of  traits  in  which  we  have  an 
interest.  It  is  the  general  human  appeal  of  the  face  and 
its  expression  and  its  place  in  human  intercourse  that 
supplies  the  interest  so  readily  abused  by  popular 

* A possible  redeeming  feature  of  Lavater’s  work  is  his  recognition 
of  facial  expression  as  worthy  of  study;  in  this  he  followed  the  lead- 
ership of  the  artist  LeBrun.  Expression  is  much  more  generic  and 
more  readily  interpreted  than  are  peculiarities  of  feature.  In  such 
Biblical  maxims  as  “though  a wicked  man  constrain  his  countenance, 
the  wise  can  distinctly  discern  his  purpose,”  Lavater  found  a text  for 
his  exposition.  Of  the  true  meaning  of  expression,  so  far  as  it  was 
possible  before  Darwin,  he  had  slight  understanding.  His  physiog- 
nomical sense  conferred  no  physiological  comprehension.  Indeed, 
so  far  as  he  ventured  into  the  biological  territory,  he  reverted  to  the 
older  notions,  and  made  fish  and  fowl  and  even  insects  reveal  their 
character  by  their  effects  upon  the  human  impression.  In  an  engrav- 
ing of  the  heads  of  snakes  he  pointed  out  the  reprobate  qualities  dis- 
tinguishable in  their  form,  the  deceit  of  their  colors,  and  the  natural- 
ness with  which  we  shrink  from  such  a countenance.  The  logic  of 
physiognomy,  ancient  or  modern,  learned  or  ignorant,  is  of  one  kin- 
ship; it  is  the  family  associations  that  in  time  and  circumstance  come 
to  be  less  and  less  respectable. 


CHARACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT 


149 


writers  or  commercial  charlatans.  It  is  just  this  realm 
of  loose  analogy  and  unchecked  ambitious  conclusions 
that  attracts  feeble  minds  with  a taste  for  speculation 
and  an  inclination  for  the  occult,  the  bizarre,  the  eso- 
teric; such  a taste,  as  if  to  appease  a neglected,  logical 
conscience,  usually  finds  refuge  in  a forced  semblance 
of  verification.  It  is  this  combination  of  interests  that 
supports  physiognomy  or  phrenology,  palmistry  or 
fortime-telling,  and  (with  an  altered  complexion)  Chris- 
tian Science  or  Theosophy,  — in  which  latter  exam- 
ples cures  or  miracles  instead  of  readings  supply  the 
realistic  support. 


V 

The  next  and  last  stage  in  the  antecedents  of  the 
study  of  character  presented  a new  role,  or,  it  may  be, 
an  old  one  in  a new  and  distinctive  costume.  In  its 
practical  effect  and  later  career  it  resembles  the  system 
of  Lavater,  and  invited  still  greater  popular  abuse.  Its 
founder  was  Dr.  Franz  Joseph  Gall  (1757-1828);  and 
it  achieved  popularity  under  the  name  of  ‘‘Phrenol- 
ogy.” While  Lavater  stood  beyond  the  pale  of  the 
scientific  activity  of  his  day.  Gall  was  an  influential 
part  of  it.  Gall’s  scientific  service  must  be  acknowl- 
edged, even  if  he  be  held  responsible  for  the  extrava- 
gances of  phrenology.  The  system  was  extended  and 
popularized  by  Dr.  Johann  Caspar  Spm’zheim  (1776- 
1832),  Gall’s  associate,  and  his  successor  as  leader  of 
the  movement. 

There  are  two  distinct  aspects  to  the  work  of  Gall 
and  Spurzheim;  and  it  is  not  easy  to  understand  or  to 
set  forth  just  how  the  connection  stood  in  the  minds 


150  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


of  these  contributors  to  the  anatomy  and  physiology  of 
the  nervous  system,  and  advocates  of  the  locations  of 
elaborate  mental  faculties  by  means  of  cranial  promi- 
nences. The  two  orders  of  contributions  are  difficult 
to  reconcile  either  in  spirit  or  in  method.  The  motive 
of  “character-reading”  was  operative,  though  restricted 
by  scientific  considerations.  It  was  forcibly  made  the 
consummation  of  a system  quite  irrelevant  to  the  pur- 
pose. In  the  end,  the  practical  temper  prevailed;  and 
phrenology  allied  with  physiognomy,  palmistry,  or 
other  character-reading  pretenses,  degenerated  to  the 
woeful  state  of  a declassS  pseudo-science.  Its  nearness 
to  the  illuminating  truth  served  but  to  intensify  the 
obscurity  of  its  shadows.  The  contrast  in  the  two 
spheres  of  the  career  of  Gall  and  Spurzheim  serves  to 
explain  why,  as  they  traveled  about  Europe,  they  were 
by  some  called  “a  pair  of  vainglorious  mountebanks,” 
and  by  others  placed  with  Newton  and  Galileo  as  illus- 
trious contributors  to  science.  Yet  the  fact  that  phre- 
nology called  larger  attention  to  the  study  of  character 
than  had  any  other  movement,  gives  it  an  important 
place  in  a retrospective  view. 

The  impressionistic  origin  of  his  phrenological  in- 
terests is  thus  recounted  by  Gall.  When  at  school,  he 
was  struck  by  the  fact  that  his  schoolmates  had  fa- 
cilities independent  of  instruction;  that  one  was 
musical,  another  artistically  endowed,  and  that  this 
innate  ability  rather  than  application  was  most  deci- 
sive in  determining  progress.  He  seems  to  have  been 
annoyed  at  being  surpassed  by  schoolmates  who  had  a 
capacity  for  memorizing;  and  in  an  inauspicious  mo- 
ment he  observed  that  these  schoolmates  all  had  promi- 


CHARACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT 


151 


nent  eyes.  At  the  university  he  directed  his  attention 
to  students  with  prominent  eyes,  and  persuaded  him- 
self that  in  every  case  such  men  had  exceptionally 
good  verbal  memories;  and  thus  was  the  fatal  correla- 
tion made.  Not  unlike  Lavater,  he  trusted  to  his  “phys- 
iognomical sense”  to  recognize  the  prominences  which 
were  to  find  a local  habitation  and  a name  upon  the 
phrenological  chart.  At  church  he  observed  the  most 
devout  of  the  attendants,  detected  what  portions  of 
the  skull  were  well-developed  in  them,  and  discovered 
the  organs  of  veneration.  He  compared  the  heads  of 
murderers  and  found  an  organ  of  murder,  and  similarly 
studied  the  heads  of  thieves  and  located  the  organ  of 
theft.  He  had  organs  for  the  preeminent  quahty  of  each 
of  the  five  senses;  an  organ  of  tune  for  the  musical,  and 
one  of  number  for  the  mathematical.  He  thus  accumu- 
lated a group  of  some  twenty -four  organs  (which  Spurz- 
heim  enlarged  to  thirty-five  or  more),  and  in  this  con- 
tribution disclosed  with  strange  unconcern  at  once  his 
self-deception  and  the  shallowness  of  his  psychological 
notions. 

The  common  assumptions  of  physiognomy  and 
phrenology  (as  we  readily  detect,  though  not  thus  ob- 
vious to  the  minds  of  their  defenders)  are  these:  (1)  that 
there  are  distinct  mental  traits,  qualities  or  capacities, 
which  ordinary  human  intercourse  and  observation 
reveal;  (2)  that  these  are  caused  by  (or  correlated 
with)  prominent  developments  of  parts  of  the  brain; 
(3)  the  critical  assiunption  (presumably  least  explicit 
of  all)  that  we  may  accept  as  established  the  relation 
whereby  the  one,  the  bodily  feature,  becomes  the  in- 
dex of  the  other,  the  mental  trait.  The  asstimed  prin- 


152  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


ciple  of  relation  was  plainly  empirical,  had  no  warrant 
in  principle.  The  clue  in  all  such  systems  was  merely 
a sign  or  trade-mark  displayed,  in  Lavater’s  theologi- 
cal view,  by  a beneficent  Providence  to  indicate  the 
virtues  and  vices  of  men.  For  phrenology  the  alleged 
principle  was  wholly  different.  It  grew  out  of  the  sub- 
division of  the  functions  of  the  brain.  The  evidence, 
it  must  be  admitted,  was  sought  by  approved  scien- 
tific methods.  But  the  stupendous  assumption  was 
made  that  the  presumption  in  favor  of  the  existence 
of  such  specialized  brain-areas  included  a knowledge  of 
their  terms,  and  that  their  nature  was  indicated  by  the 
specific  differences  in  the  observed  traits  of  men;  fur- 
ther, that  such  mental  traits,  giving  rise  to  or  condi- 
tioned by  marked  local  development  of  brain-areas, 
could  be  detected  in  the  corresponding  prominences 
of  the  skull.  So  supremely  unwarranted  was  this  cumu- 
lative series  of  assumptions  that  the  scientific  knowl- 
edge and  procedure  associated  with  its  alleged  estab- 
lishment failed  to  confer  upon  phrenology  any  more 
respectable  status  or  accredited  position  than  was 
accorded  to  the  far  more  extravagant  assumptions  of 
physiognomy.  Clearly,  if  the  assumptions  of  phrenol- 
ogy held  — itself  an  extravagant  supposition  — the 
study  of  character  and  temperament  would  be  com- 
pletely shaped  by  its  conclusions.  Since  they  are  nei- 
ther pertinent  nor  illuminating,  physiological  and  psy- 
chological studies  still  have  a message  for  the  student 
of  human  nature. 

The  chief  warrant  for  a fiuther  consideration  of  the 
position  of  Gall  and  Spurzheim  is  that  their  views  came 
into  direct  contact  with  the  advances  in  the  knowl- 


CHARACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT 


153 


edge  of  the  nervous  system,  which  — as  will  duly  ap- 
pear — became  the  requisite  for  true  psychological 
progress.  The  central  question  at  issue  was  whether 
the  brain  functioned  as  a whole,  or  whether  distinct 
functions  could  be  assigned  to  its  several  parts.  The 
former  position  was  defended  by  Flourens  (1794-1867), 
who  maintained  that  the  removal  of  a part  of  the  brain 
of  a pigeon  weakened  its  general  intelligence,  but  that 
the  intact  portion  still  exercised  the  complete  range 
of  brain-functions,  though  with  diminished  efficiency. 
Gall’s  position  required  a detailed  and  specialized  divi- 
sion of  function.  He  drew  attention  to  the  fact  that 
the  mutilated  pigeon,  while  retaining  physical  sight 
and  hearing,  became  mentally  blind  to  the  meaning  of 
what  it  was  clearly  able  to  see,  and  mentally  deaf  to 
the  meaning  of  sounds;  he  drew  attention  to  the  im- 
portant evidence  supplied  by  the  association  of  men- 
tal symptoms  with  injury  or  disease  of  different  por- 
tions of  the  hmnan  brain,  and  noted  that  these  were 
very  different  according  to  the  region  affected.  His 
contentions  proved  to  be  correct  in  fact,  in  interpre- 
tation, and  in  method.  In  this  controversy  Gall  ar- 
gued physiologically,  not  phrenologically.  In  another 
controversy  the  reverse  was  the  case.  Flourens  re- 
stricted his  conclusions  of  the  unity  of  function  to  the 
cerebrum,  and  confirmed  the  experiments  on  pigeons 
which  showed  that  the  cerebellum  regulated  locomo- 
tion. Gall  had  made  the  cerebellum  the  organ  of  ama- 
tiveness; if  it  regulated  the  love-affairs,  it  could  not 
regulate  the  gait.  He  replied  first  physiologically,  that 
the  experiment  was  defective,  and  the  motor  impair- 
ment due  to  concomitant  injury  of  other  parts  of  the 


154  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


brain;  and  then  phrenologically,  that  if  the  cerebellum 
were  the  organ  of  locomotion,  it  would  follow  that 
persons  with  large  cerebellums  should  be  acrobats,  and 
asked  whether  women  (who  in  Gall’s  view  possessed 
a small  cerebellum)  “walked  and  danced  with  less 
regularity,  less  art,  less  grace  than  men.”  Controver- 
sies of  this  kind  were  futile  in  view  of  the  wholly  ir- 
reconcilable positions  of  the  advocates.  In  the  end,  the 
phrenological  position  became  an  obsession. 

At  one  other  point  phrenology  came  in  contact  with 
the  advances  leading  to  modern  psychology;  this  was  in 
its  alliance  with  the  study  of  hypnotism  in  the  career 
of  James  Braid  (1795-1860).  The  remarkable  insight 
of  this  investigator  enabled  him  to  recognize  under 
disadvantageous  conditions  the  true  nature  of  this 
mental  state  as  a partial  disqualification  of  the  nerv- 
ous system;  but  it  did  not  prevent  his  temporary 
subjection  to  the  phrenological  fallacy.  He  refuted  the 
position  that  the  hypnotic  state  was  an  histrionic  de- 
ception; he  demonstrated  its  reality,  but  unwittingly 
brought  it  within  range  of  suggestion  or  self-deception. 
Later  he  realized  the  error  of  his  earlier  work;  but  his 
association  with  phrenology  injured  his  reputation, 
and  delayed  the  recognition  of  his  pioneer  work  in  a 
difficult  field.  The  following  suggests  the  comse  of  the 
experiments;  — 

I placed  a cork  endwise  over  the  organ  of  veneration  and 
bound  it  in  this  position  by  a bandage  under  the  chin.  The 
patient  thus  hypnotized  at  once  assumed  the  attitude  of 
adoration,  arose  from  his  seat  and  knelt  down  as  if  engaged 
in  prayer.  On  moving  the  cork  forward,  active  benevolence 
was  manifested,  and  on  its  being  pushed  back  veneration 
again  manifested  itself. 


CHARACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT 


155 


This  observation  seems  the  very  parody  of  science.  It 
illustrates  that  prepossession,  even  in  men  of  shrewd 
observation  and  ability,  is  disastrous  to  logical  integ- 
rity; and  further  that  not  until  the  true  natme  of  nerv- 
ous functioning  was  raised  to  a fundamental  directive 
position  in  all  psychological  considerations,  were  false 
leads  of  this  kind  entirely  discredited. 

VI 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  vogue  of  phrenology  in 
the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  represents  the 
largest  collective  interest  in  the  study  of  character  that 
ever  gained  a temporary  foothold,  it  seems  proper  to 
consider  the  nature  of  its  pretensions  and  their  follow- 
ing. Propagandists  have  an  enviable  if  perilous  vigor 
and  enthusiasm  — an  element  of  reckless  abandon  not 
unrelated  to  the  extravagances  of  mania  in  the  ex- 
aggeration and  self-deception  which  it  entails.  Lavater 
had  the  simpler  problem  of  collecting  drawings  and 
engravings  in  imposing  array  to  enforce  the  principles 
of  physiognomy.  Gall  collected  skulls  and  casts,  and 
induced  persons  with  marked  mental  peculiarities  to 
have  their  heads  shaven  so  that  their  replicas  in  plaster 
might  be  at  his  service.  He  asked  that  “every  kind 
of  genius  make  me  heir  of  his  head.  . . . Then  indeed 
(I  will  answer  for  it  with  my  own)  we  should  see  in  ten 
years  a splendid  edifice  for  which  at  present  I only  col- 
lect materials.”  The  critical  peril  of  false  theories  lies 
in  their  application.  Gall’s  interests  seem  to  have 
remained  for  the  most  part  scientific  and  objective; 
but  in  association  with  Spurzheim,  whose  direction  of 
the  phrenological  movement  largely  determined  its 


156  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


course,  they  took  a more  practical  turn,  and  therein 
found  their  degradation.  The  extension  of  the  phreno- 
logical principle  to  races  and  animals  as  a zoological 
problem  appealed  to  Gall.  He  tells  with  ludicrous  if 
pathetic  simplicity  of  his  baffling  attempt  to  interpret 
the  prominence  of  a part  of  the  cranium  which  mon- 
keys and  women  have  in  common.  Finally:  — 

In  a favorable  disposition  of  mind,  during  the  delivery  of  one 
of  my  lectures,  I was  struck  with  the  extreme  love  that  these 
animals  have  for  their  offspring.  Impatient  of  comparing 
immediately  the  crania  of  male  animals,  in  my  collection, 
with  all  those  of  females,  I requested  my  class  to  leave  me, 
and  I found,  in  truth,  that  the  same  difference  exists  between 
the  male  and  female  of  all  animals,  as  existed  between  man 
and  woman. 

Thus  was  the  cranial  localization  of  “love  of  offspring” 
discovered. 

Phrenology  similarly  offered  the  clue  to  racial  differ- 
ences : — 

The  foreheads  of  negroes  are  narrow,  and  their  musical  and 
mathematical  talents  are  in  general  very  limited.  The  Chin- 
ese are  fond  of  colors,  and  have  their  eyebrows  much  vaulted. 
According  to  Blumenbach,  the  heads  of  the  Calmucks  are 
depressed  from  above,  but  very  large  laterally,  about  the 
organ  which  gives  the  inclination  to  acquire;  and  this  na- 
tion’s propensity  to  steal,  etc.,  is  admitted. 

It  was  seriously  set  forth  that  the  dog,  the  ape,  and 
the  ox  do  not  sing  because  the  shape  of  their  heads 
shows  the  absence  of  the  faculties  for  music;  that  the 
thrush  and  the  nightingale  had  heads  with  developed 
musical  faculties,  and  the  hawk  and  the  owl  lacked 
these  parts;  that  in  the  male  nightingale  or  mocking 
bird  the  head  was  square,  angular,  and  more  promi- 


CHARACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT  157 


nent  above  the  eyes,  while  in  the  female  these  parts 
were  conical,  thus  endowing  the  male  and  not  the  fe- 
male with  the  gift  of  song.  “Observe  the  narrow  fore- 
head of  the  dog,  the  ape,  the  badger,  the  horse,  in  com- 
parison with  the  square  forehead  of  man,  and  you  will 
have  the  solution  of  the  problem  why  these  animals 
are  neither  musicians,  nor  painters,  nor  mathemati- 
cians.” Extravagant  as  this  may  appear  to  our  scien- 
tifically minded  generation,  it  yet  represents  the  more 
sober  conclusions  of  men  conversant  with  the  science 
of  the  day.  In  the  hands  of  system-mongers  and  quacks 
the  doctrines  were  carried  to  far  more  capricious  con- 
clusions. 

It  was  the  practical  tendency  to  read  character  and 
predict  capacity  or  even  career  that  was  responsible 
for  the  rapid  deterioration  of  phrenology.  This  course 
was  set  by  Spurzheim,  imder  whose  influence  phreno- 
logical societies  were  founded  in  England  and  America, 
and  the  world  deluged  with  books,  pamphlets,  man- 
uals, lessons,  exhibitions,  charts,  plaster-casts,  insti- 
tutes, parlor  talks,  and  street  demonstrations  for  the 
dissemination  of  character-reading  by  the  bumps  of 
the  head  — a movement  the  waves  of  which  stiU  beat 
feebly  along  the  remote  frontiers  of  intellectual  ven- 
ture. An  exclusion  into  these  disorderly  bypaths  — 
suggestive  of  the  shims  of  psychology  — would  yield 
little  profit;^  it  would  but  indicate  that  slight  devia- 

' The  excursion  would  indeed  serve  to  justify  the  general  conclu- 
sion that  the  sporadic  survival  or  revival  of  such  systems  as  physiog- 
nomy, astrology,  phrenology,  palmistry,  fortime-telling,  dream-inter- 
pretation, etc.,  is  due  not  to  the  appeal  of  their  evidence,  but  to  the 
persistence  of  the  attraction  of  the  occult  as  well  as  to  the  prom- 
ise of  practical  revelation.  For  it  is  characteristic  that  this  class  of 


158  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


lions  in  principle  lead  to  the  widest  divergence  of  re- 
sult. An  intellectual  degradation  ensues  as  the  move- 
ment descends  to  lower  strata,  an  issue  not  unlike 
the  social  degradation  of  sections  of  cities  where  ques- 
tionable occupants  inhabit  the  dwellings  that  sheltered 
the  respectable  citizens  of  other  days.  Though  we  can- 
not hold  the  founders  responsible  for  this  issue,  it  is  yet 
true  that  they  prepared  the  way  for  it  by  their  own 
practices.  Gall  and  Spurzheim  conducted  tours  in 
prisons  and  asylums,  reading  from  the  shapes  of  the 
heads  of  the  inmates  the  propensity  for  forgery,  theft, 
violence,  or  lack  of  thrift  which  brought  them  to  their 
fate.  One  prisoner  showed  the  “organs  of  theft,  mur- 
der, and  benevolence  all  well  developed,  and,  true  to 
his  organs,  robbed  an  old  woman  and  had  the  rope 
around  her  neck  to  strangle  her,  when  his  benevolence 
came  to  the  surface,”  and  prevented  the  fatality. 

Such  was  the  practical  degeneration  and  such  the 
fallacious  principles  by  which  phrenology  attempted  to 
oust  physiology  from  its  domain.  At  the  time  psy- 
chology was  not  sufficiently  developed  to  assert  its 
claim  against  the  phrenological  pretensions.  Spurz- 
heim had  a stronger  psychological  bent  than  Gall,  and 
developed  an  arbitrary  psychology  to  fit  the  scheme. 


latter-day  compendium  upon  “character”  through  the  reading  of 
heads,  faces,  hands,  etc.,  combines  and  resurrects  with  curious  igno- 
rance of  their  source,  with  a strange  insensitiveness  to  their  mutually 
contradictory  positions,  all  the  varied  bypaths  of  obscure  and  dis- 
credited lore  which  we  have  ciursorily  surveyed.  Aristotle,  Porta, 
Cardan,  Lavater,  Gall,  Spurzheim  reappear  in  doctrines,  without 
assignment  of  source,  in  support  of  “systems”  purporting  to  reveal 
the  secrets  of  human  nature  for  the  small  consideration  of  the  pur- 
chase of  the  volume.  The  occult  — representing  poverty  if  not  mis- 
ery of  mind  — like  misery,  makes  strange  bedfellows. 


CHARACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT 


159 


He  distinguished  between  the  emotional  and  the  in- 
tellectual powers,  dividing  the  former  into  propensi- 
ties, which  were  direct  impulses  to  action  (like  the 
desire  to  live,  the  tendency  to  fall  in  love,  destructive- 
ness) and  sentiments  which  were  complex  human  powers 
(like  self-esteem,  hope,  mirthfulness,  ideality) ; the 
latter  were  either  perceptive  (like  size,  tune,  time),  or 
reflective  (like  causality  and  comparison).  This  con- 
struction was  distorted  and  confused,  but  yet  not  so 
strikingly  divergent  from  other  contributions  as  to 
arouse  suspicion  of  its  forced  adjustment  to  the  alleged 
findings.  It  was  these  latter,  apparently  substantiated 
by  anatomical  evidence,  that  kept  the  system  alive. 
In  the  actual  procedures  of  proof  the  simple  psychol- 
ogy of  self-deception  was  the  dominant  factor.  Either 
the  trait  was  marked  and  the  phrenologist  readily  per- 
suaded himself  that  the  prominence  — at  best  slight 
and  not  clearly  defined  — was  present;  or  in  the  pres- 
ence of  a marked  “bump,”  he  was  readily  convinced 
that  the  required  trait  — as  a rule  a matter  of  imcer- 
tain  and  variable  judgment  — was  conspicuous.  As 
illustrating  the  temptation  of  allegiance  to  theory  to  en- 
list self-deception  in  the  determination  of  fact,  the  retro- 
spective view  of  the  subject  has  permanent  value.  Pre- 
possession, though  unrecognized  by  the  phrenologists, 
is  likewise  a quality  of  human  nature,  with  an  interest- 
ing psychology  of  its  own.’^ 

* It  is  characteristic  of  the  wavelike  oscillations  of  movements  of 
this  kind  that  in  periods  after  the  desertion  of  the  position  by  the 
scientific  world,  an  occasional  reaction  appears  and  gains  a consid- 
erable adherence.  An  Ethological  Society,  which  publishes  the 
Ethological  Journal,  was  founded  in  1903  and  attempts  to  rein- 
state the  phrenological  position,  though  in  a wholly  modified  form 


160  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


VII 

At  this  juncture  we  turn  from  the  antecedents  to 
the  more  direct  line  of  descent  of  modern  psychology. 
The  successive  claimants  to  the  domain  of  “charac- 
ter and  temperament”  may  be  said  to  have  momen- 
tarily triumphed  and  passed  away,  without  accredited 
issue.  The  new  sovereignty  represents  a very  differ- 
ent allegiance.  It  shares  in  the  common  heritage  of 
modern  science.  The  notable  extension  of  knowledge 
through  experiment  is  ever  paralleled  by  a develop- 
ment of  logical  method  and  critical  interpretation,  as 
well  as  by  an  extension  of  technical  resources.  To  this 
general  movement  psychology  owes  its  present  status, 
and  shares  in  its  benefits.  It  finds  a concrete  expres- 
sion in  the  psychological  laboratory,  and  a yet  more 
comprehensive  one  in  the  transformation  of  the  entire 

and  with  an  attempt  at  reconciliation  with  the  established  localiza- 
tion of  function  in  the  brain;  the  latter  is  in  a legitimate  sense  the 
new  and  true  phrenology.  There  is  no  reason,  except  the  historical 
one  (which,  however,  is  adequate),  for  giving  the  term  “phrenology” 
any  less  respectable  status  than  that  of  “psychology”  itself.  It  is 
clear  that  the  doctrine  of  the  localization  of  function  in  the  cortex  of 
the  brain  represents  a chapter  in  the  development  of  physiology  which 
replaces  the  series  of  conjectural  and  extravagant  views  that  belong 
to  the  antecedents  of  our  subject.  It  should  not  be  inferred  that 
the  Ethological  Society  is  wholly  devoted  to  this  reinstatement  of 
phrenology;  it  considers  the  entire  range  of  topics  bearing  upon 
character  and  temperament,  but  presents  a leaning  toward  the  im- 
pressionistic and  obscure  interpretations.  It  may  be  added  that  so 
distinguished  a contributor  to  the  principles  of  modern  evolution  as 
Alfred  Russel  Wallace  believed  that  the  neglect  of  phrenology  was  one 
of  the  intellectual  crimes  of  the  nineteenth  century,  and  maintained 
that  this  aspect  of  physiological  and  psychological  research  is  cen- 
tral in  its  promise  for  the  regulation  of  mental  affairs  in  the  future. 
The  attempts  to  restate  certain  aspects  of  the  phrenological  position 
in  modern  form  should  be  mentioned.  They  undertake  a “Revival 
of  Phrenology  ” and  are  represented  by  Hollander:  The  Mental  Func- 
tions of  the  Brain  (1901). 


CHAEACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT 


161 


range  of  accredited  problems,  and  the  introduction  of 
new  realms  of  inquiry.  The  technical  advance  in  the 
knowledge  and  control  of  physical,  biological,  and 
psychological  forces  characterizes  the  modern  world 
of  science.  These  divisions  of  intellectual  enterprise, 
though  differently  directed,  are  mutually  corrobora- 
tive. They  progress  by  the  application  of  a common 
logic.  Standards  of  evidence,  extension  of  data,  and  the 
basis  of  interpretation  develop  together.  Jointly  they 
determine  the  spirit  of  modern  science,  from  which 
psychology,  along  with  the  rest  of  the  sciences,  receives 
its  directive  bent  and  the  temper  of  its  pursuit.  A 
coordinate  factor  is  the  dominance  of  an  expanding 
practical  philosophy  — a worldly  wisdom  born  of  a 
larger  experience  in  social,  political,  and  economic  rela- 
tions. It  is  expressed  in  the  standards  of  intercourse 
and  living,  and  more  particularly  in  the  cosmopolitan 
outlook,  reflecting  the  insight  into  the  determination 
of  events  and  careers  as  of  the  qualities  of  men  shaped 
by  and  shaping  them.  This  influence  extends  to  litera- 
ture, philosophy,  and  the  arts  of  life;  it  provides  the 
background  against  which  the  technical  pursuits  are 
projected,  from  which  they  emerge. 

The  establishment  of  the  principles  and  the  body  of 
knowledge  determining  the  present  study  of  charac- 
ter and  temperament  is  the  convergent  product  of  a 
complex  development;  it  forms  an  integral  part  of 
the  general  advance  for  which  the  nineteenth  century 
is  notable.  Our  purpose  will  be  served  by  considering 
broadly  the  contributory  branches  of  investigation  to 
which  psychology  is  particularly  indebted.  Among 
these  the  establishment  of  the  relation  between  body 


162  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


and  mind  is  clearly  central.  Equally  fimdamental  is 
the  interpretation  of  the  vital  processes  and  provi- 
sions through  a unifying  and  illuminating  principle. 
This  was  supplied  by  the  master-key  of  evolution,  and 
at  once  rationalized  and  vitalized  the  conception  of 
origins  and  transformations  of  natmal  processes  and 
products  — including  the  manifestations  and  endow- 
ments of  the  mental  nature.  Interpretation  became 
possible  in  a convincing  language  — quieting  the  Babel 
of  tongues.  Both  of  these  guiding  principles  — the 
latter  particularly  — were  revolutionary  in  their  in- 
fluence, not  primarily  by  the  new  extension  of  knowl- 
edge and  interest  (which  was  in  the  main  a consequence 
of  the  new  insight),  but  by  the  introduction  of  a new 
interpretation.  Familiar  facts  were  given  a distinc- 
tive and  a richer  meaning.  The  perspective  of  signifi- 
cance was  notably  altered.  This  momentous  recon- 
struction of  the  biological  reahn  indicates  in  a few 
words  the  decisive  factors  that  made  modern  psychol- 
ogy possible.  The  brevity  of  the  record  should  not 
diminish  the  appreciation  of  its  vital  importance. 

The  development  of  the  knowledge  of  nervous  func- 
tion has  a venerable  history.  The  recognition  of  sen- 
sation and  movement  in  relation  to  the  nerves  occurs 
sporadically  and  irregularly  in  Greek,  Roman,  and 
mediseval  medicine,  at  times  with  a shrewd  interpre- 
tation of  symptoms.  It  seems  never  to  have  been  made 
a leading  principle,  but  was  held  in  detachment  from 
the  general  notions  in  terms  of  which  conclusions 
were  stated.  Hippocrates,  Galen,  and  their  followers 
occasionally  record  observations  in  which  a limited  loss 
of  movement  (paralysis)  and  loss  of  sensation  (anges- 


CHARACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT 


163 


thesia)  were  referred  to  interference  with  the  action 
of  certain  nerve-trunks.  Such  observations  remained 
casual  and  incidental.  The  usual  explanation  of  the 
bodily  accompaniments  of  mental  action  were  given 
in  terms  of  the  flow  of  the  “vital”  spirits,  with  the 
veins  (supposed  to  contain  air)  as  the  true  channels 
of  the  flow  that  determined  sensation;  while  the  ven- 
tricles (literally  breathing-spaces  — actually  the  chan- 
nels for  the  cerebro-spinal  fluid)  were  assigned  the 
central  part  in  the  vital  service.  Vesalius,  founder  of 
modern  anatomy,  knew  by  experiment  apparently,  as 
well  as  through  inference  from  observation,  that  sec- 
tion of  the  nerves  abolished  muscular  control  and  that 
the  loss  of  the  medulla  deprived  an  animal  of  sensation 
and  movement.  He  contested  the  notion  that  facul- 
ties like  memory  could  reside  in  such  spaces  as  the 
ventricles  of  the  brain.  But  such  views  were  heretical 
to  the  scriptural  authority  of  Galen  and  Hippocrates, 
and  were  timidly  expressed  and  pmsued.  As  a type  of 
conception  matured  under  philosophical  pursuits  cri- 
tically maintained  and  in  relation  to  the  science  of  the 
day,  may  be  cited  the  view  of  Descartes.  He  looked 
upon  the  nervous  system  as  a mechanical  automaton 
— somewhat  after  the  manner  of  an  elaborate  and 
fantastic  “playing”  fountain,  whose  ingenious  streams 
turned  windmills  and  started  miniature  water-spouts. 
The  nerves  were  conceived  as  tubes  for  the  flow  of 
“animal  spirits,”  or  of  some  similar  agency,  with  the 
pineal  gland  in  the  center  of  the  system  as  a controll- 
ing valve  directing  the  flow  — the  flow  according  to 
the  course  resulting  in  one  kind  or  another  of  mental 
process.  Even  WiUis,  despite  his  insight  into  the  struc- 


164  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


ture  and  function  of  the  brain  and  the  complex  provi- 
sions for  its  circulatory  system,  could  speak  of  it  as  an 
instrument  which  the  “soul  inhabits  and  adorns  with 
its  presence.”  He  conceived  the  blood  as  a vital  flame, 
through  which  products  of  combustion  arose  and  in 
turn  gave  rise  to  mental  processes.  Each  variety  of 
physical  change  which  the  physiologists  and  chemists 
discovered  in  the  laboratory  of  the  body  — such  as 
distillation  and  absorption,  or  fermentation  and  evap- 
oration, along  with  the  older  conception  of  animal 
spirits  (the  latter  term  used  confusedly  at  once  in  a 
psychological  and  a chemical  sense;  hence  “spirits”  of 
ammonia,  turpentine,  etc.)  — were  in  turn  called  upon 
to  account  for  the  transformations  responsible  for  the 
elementary  mental  processes. 

There  is  nothing  notably  distinctive  in  the  succes- 
sive formulations  of  “nervous”  function  from  the  days 
of  Harvey,  who  gave  the  directive  impetus  to  physio- 
logical conceptions,  to  those  of  Haller,  who  first  applied 
them  with  marked  success  to  develop  the  conception 
of  nervous  responsiveness  (irritability)  through  spe- 
cific adaptation  of  the  organism  of  the  stimulus.  Haller 
was  not  free  from  the  speculative  vagaries  of  his  pred- 
ecessors; yet  he  thought  of  the  problem  of  the  phys- 
iological basis  of  mental  processes  consistently  and 
clearly.  His  contributions  so  decidedly  advanced  the 
conception  of  nervous  function  that  it  was  relatively 
easy  to  make  the  transition  to  the  true  interpretation 
given  first  by  a group  of  physiologists  in  the  early  nine- 
teenth century  (Marshall  Hall,  Charles  Bell,  Majendi) 
and  culminating  in  the  actual  measurement  of  the  rate 
of  nervous  impulse  by  Helmholtz  in  1850.  The  posi- 


CHARACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT 


165 


tion  of  Haller  is  notable  not  only  for  the  general  cor- 
rectness of  his  conclusions  and  the  experimental  evi- 
dence upon  which  they  were  based,  but  equally  because 
he  separated  so  clearly  what  was  conjectural  from  what 
was  established.  In  a number  of  cases  the  task  of  his 
successors  was  merely  to  follow  his  lead  and  transform 
conjecture  into  proof.  ^ 

This  account  of  one  strand  in  the  network  of  data 
indispensable  to  the  establishment  of  a psychological 
point  of  view  is  presumably  typical  of  parallel  move- 
ments. It  indicates  how  recent  are  the  steps  of  direct 
bearing  upon  present-day  problems,  and  in  so  far  jus- 
tifies the  slight  consideration  (in  the  present  connec- 
tion) of  the  remoter  and  more  fragmentary  historical 
antecedents.  1 The  history  makes  it  easy  to  understand 
how  readily,  in  the  absence  of  an  accredited  and  es- 

^ An  admirable  statement  of  the  development  of  knowledge  of  the 
nervous  system  is  found  in  Sir  Michael  Foster’s  Lectures  on  the  His- 
tory of  Physiology  (1901),  chap.  X.  G.  Stanley  Hall’s  “ History  of 
Reflex  Action”  {American  Journal  of  Psychology,  January,  1896) 
should  also  be  consulted.  Andrew  D.  White’s  History  on  the  Warfare 
of  Science  and  Theology  (1896)  provides  an  illuminating  commentary 
upon  the  movement  of  thought  through  which  the  present  subject 
reached  its  modern  stage.  Of  the  histories  of  psychology  that  of 
Dessoir  (1912)  contains  the  most  distinctive  appreciation  of  the 
“character  and  temperament”  movement.  Of  the  more  recent 
studies  the  most  noteworthy  are:  A.  Levy,  Psychologie  du  Caract^re 
(1896);  Malapert,  Temperament  et  Caractere  (1902),  Les  EUments  du 
Caractere  (1896) ; Alfred  Fouille,  Temperament  et  Caractere,  etc.;  Paul- 
han,  Les  Caracteres  (1894);  Th.  Ribery,  Essai  de  Classification  Nat- 
urel  des  Caracteres  (1902);  L.  Klages,  Prinzipien  der  Charalderologie 
(1911);  Sternberg,  Charalcterologie  als  Wissenschaft  (1907);  C.  J. 
Whitby,  The  Logic  of  Human  Character.  Of  books  of  other  purpose 
with  important  bearing  upon  the  subject  may  be  mentioned  Mac- 
Dougall,  Social  Psychology  (1908),  and  Wallas,  The  Great  Society 
(1914).  A notable  volume  is  A.  F.  Shand,  The  Foundations  of  Char- 
acter (1914).  My  own  volume.  Character  and.  Temperament  (1916), 
attempts  a comprehensive  statement  in  terms  of  modern  psychology. 


166  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


tablished  view  of  the  bodily  correlates  of  mental  action, 
the  ambitious  innovations  as  well  as  the  traditional 
survivals  of  beliefs  could  gain  a foothold.  This  is  true 
in  part  of  even  so  late  a propaganda  as  that  of  Lava- 
ter  — which  in  large  measure  was  operative  before  the 
day  of  the  most  decisive  discoveries  — and  to  the  careers 
of  Gall  and  Spurzheim,  whoso  contributions  in  part 
came  after  them.  The  spirit  of  nineteenth-centiary 
science  was  not  then  sufficiently  disseminated  to  make 
obvious  the  irrelevancy  of  such  pretensions  as  phre- 
nology, nor  indeed  to  offer  a satisfactory  considera- 
tion of  the  problems  which  that  system  professed  to 
solve. 

VIII 

In  the  collateral  ancestry  of  “character  and  tempera- 
ment” the  anthropological  attitude  occupies  an  im- 
portant place,  in  a new  sense  making  mankind  the 
proper  study  of  man.  It  forms  part  of  the  broadening 
outlook  upon  the  constitution  of  nature  in  general  and 
human  nature  in  particular,  that  characterizes  mod- 
ern thinking.  It  doubtless  has  a relation  to  the  closer 
study  of  the  political  struggles  of  nations  and  to  eco- 
nomic expansion,  though  the  relation  is  not  intimate. 
It  aims  at  a philosophical  interpretation  of  the  struc- 
ture and  motive  sources  of  hiunan  society  and  insti- 
tutions. The  anthropological  interest  extends  to  the 
characteristics  of  the  social  groups,  particularly  of  races 
and  peoples  in  different  stages  of  development  and 
imder  the  sway  of  distinctive  cultures.  The  enlarge- 
ment of  outlook  is  a result  of  the  spirit  of  exploration 
and  inquiry,  which  brought  knowledge  of  peoples  and 


CHARACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT 


167 


habitations  and  other  systems  of  culture,  and  in  an- 
other direction  extended  the  reconstruction  of  the  past 
of  man.  A similar  enterprise  resurveyed  the  story  of 
the  intellectual  past  and  traced  the  slow  control  of  the 
forces  of  nature  through  invention,  and  the  equally 
laborious  attainment  of  a social  control  through  the 
organizations  of  men.  The  larger  intercourse  with 
varieties  of  mankind;  the  broader  interpretation  of  the 
forces  responsible  for  human  development;  the  techni- 
cal scientific  advances:  these  resulted  from  the  spirit 
of  exploration  and  inquiry,  and  brought  with  them  a 
more  thorough  knowledge  of  the  diversity  of  men  and 
civilizations,  and  in  the  process  traced  the  issues  of 
the  interplay  of  desires,  capacities,  and  beliefs,  by 
which  to  interpret  one’s  own  and  (with  allowance)  for- 
eign natures.  Culture  acquired  a more  real  and  a 
richer  meaning  as  a psychological  product,  and  there- 
with conferred  a new  insight  and  a new  obligation 
upon  the  psychologist.  The  diversity  of  men  was 
thus  related  to  their  divergent  solutions  of  the  prob- 
lem of  shaping  their  lives  to  satisfy  needs,  impulses, 
and  desires;  and  the  environment,  so  largely  a psycho- 
logical one,  acquired  its  full  significance.  The  study  of 
human  natiire  embraced  more  than  that  of  one  time 
and  region  and  status.  The  still  more  recent  and  in- 
dependent emphasis  of  the  sociological  aspects  of  life 
is  in  the  larger  view  an  issue  of  the  anthropological 
interpretation,  but  is  yet  more  characteristic  of  the 
attitude  now  dominant,  and  properly  called  modern. 
The  psychology  of  the  social  relations  is  thereby  made 
an  integral  part  of  the  study  of  human  character. 

Two  further  aspects  of  the  qualities  of  which  charac- 


168  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


ter  and  temperament  form  the  realistic  composite,  are 
the  genetic  aspect,  and  the  abnormal  — the  patholog- 
ical aspect.  The  growth  of  traits  is  an  essential  part 
of  their  nature.  It  implies  a reference  to  the  setting  in 
which  they  operate,  to  which  they  are  adapted,  by 
which  they  have  been  shaped.  It  implies  equally  the 
reference  to  the  vital  course,  the  maturing  unfoldment 
of  native  endowment,  which  makes  the  biological 
aspect  of  human  nature  the  most  comprehensive  and 
the  most  elemental.  Within  this  compass  the  deter- 
mination of  hereditary  forces  and  their  mode  of  opera- 
tion assumes  a special  importance.  The  traits  forming 
the  composite  of  “ character  and  temperament  ” are  part 
of  the  biological  inheritance,  are  the  issues  of  forces 
whose  fundamental  significance  is  the  biological  one. 
Accordingly  (despite  or  in  addition  to  our  more  de- 
tailed interests  in  other  aspects)  they  must  reflect  and 
conserve  the  allegiance  to  this  underlying  relation. 
More  specifically,  the  genetic  aspect  differentiates  the 
outlines  of  the  stages  of  growth;  in  its  terms  are  de- 
scribed the  orbit  of  the  psychological  cycle.  It  yields 
the  psychology  of  infancy,  of  adolescence,  of  matm-ity, 
of  senescence,  and  presents  the  course  of  the  included 
qualities  in  mutual  illumination.  The  genetic  argu- 
ment emphasizes  a progressive  environment  and  a pro- 
gressive purpose;  it  enlarges  the  scope  of  adaptation, 
and  it  interprets  the  impetus  and  goal  of  varying  in- 
terests and  endeavors.  It  was  never  absent  from  the 
accredited  psychology  of  human  nature,  but  in  the 
modern  view  it  assumes  an  explicitness  and  a direc- 
tive position  that  constitutes  it  a notable  factor  among 
the  available  resources.  It  has  powerfully  affected  our 


CHARACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT 


169 


entire  view  of  human  qualities,  has  extended  our  data, 
and  enriched  their  interpretation. 

A parallel  statement  may  be  made  of  the  argument 
from  the  decay,  the  faulty  development,  the  inherent 
liability  to  perversion  of  natural  qualities,  which  are 
responsible  for  the  pathological,  the  abnormal,  the 
divergent  aspects  thereof.  Useful  adaptation,  due  pro- 
portion, tempered  blending,  related  emphasis  of  traits 
stand  as  the  normal  issue;  the  divergence  or  failure 
thereof  becomes  the  abnormal.  The  abnormal  in  ex- 
cess or  defect  takes  its  place  as  an  instrument  of  analy- 
sis and  an  enlargement  of  data.  It  is  a distinctively 
modern  resomce,  particxilarly  in  the  refinement  of  its 
application.^ 

It  remains  to  touch  upon  the  collateral  streams  of 
interest  which  in  modern  times  maintain  the  study  in 
one  or  another  aspect,  thus  bridging  the  gap  between 
the  old  and  the  new  learning.  Among  these  is  the  at- 
tempt, never  wholly  absent  in  practical  ages,  to  guide 
training,  to  indicate  on  the  basis  of  an  analysis  of  char- 

^ It  is  in  such  general  terms  that  the  line  of  descent  of  the  present 
psychological  interpretation  of  human  endowment  proceeds.  The 
more  specific  history  of  the  attempts  to  formulate  the  resultant  posi- 
tions is  brief.  The  classic  chapter  (book  vn,  chap,  v)  “Of  Ethology, 
or  the  Seience  of  the  Formation  of  Character,”  in  John  Stuart 
Mill’s  System  of  Logic  (1843),  though  a programme  rather  than  a con- 
tribution, still  has  significance.  The  project  was  imdertaken  by 
Alexander  Bain  in  a volume  bearing  the  title  On  the  Study  of  Charac- 
ter (1861).  Though  Bain  wrote  at  a time  when  psychology  had  made 
rapid  advances  and  the  vagaries  of  phrenology  had  been  retired  to 
their  proper  place,  he  devoted  a considerable  portion  of  his  book  to  a 
refutation  of  the  phrenological  position.  He  thus  conferred  an  un- 
deserved dignity  upon  these  findings  and  gave  his  constructive  views 
an  unfortunate  setting.  The  subject  was  independently  pursued  by 
a group  of  writers  (mainly  in  France  and  Italy),  whose  contributions 
in  part  belong  to  the  living  literature  of  the  subject. 


170  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


acter  the  promise  of  youth,  and  the  direction  of  voca- 
tion — all  in  the  spirit  of  a worldly  wisdom.  As  an 
example  of  the  earlier  period,  the  work  of  the  Spaniard, 
Huarte  (1530-92),  “The  Trial  of  Wits,”  may  be  cited, 
since  it  seems  to  have  attained  a large  circulation,  was 
translated  into  several  languages  (the  English  edi- 
tion appearing  in  1689),  and  the  German  by  the  great 
Lessing  (1729-81)  so  late  as  1752.  There  were  other 
writings  of  similar  import  both  before  and  after  Huarte. 
It  is  difficult  to  estimate  their  precise  influence  in 
the  current  of  thought  destined  to  be  redirected  in  a 
more  scientific  analytic  interest.  There  is  no  hesita- 
tion, however,  in  recognizing  in  the  works  of  Kant 
(1724-1804)  a dominant  influence  in  the  rehabilita- 
tion of  the  subject.  This  appears  not  alone  in  his  rec- 
ognition of  the  claims  of  the  practical  reason,  but  not- 
ably in  his  “Anthropology”  (1798).  Indeed,  Kant’s 
use  of  this  term  corresponds  more  closely  to  a study 
of  the  individual  differences  of  men  — which  the  prob- 
lems of  character  and  temperament  consider  — than 
to  the  content  of  the  science  which  now  bears  that 
name.  Special  attention  should  also  be  directed  to  his 
“Observations  on  the  Sense  of  the  Beautiful  and  Sub- 
lime,” in  which  is  given  in  a modern  vein  a detailed 
analysis  in  the  field  of  the  emotions,  with  excursions 
into  the  comparative  psychology  of  the  sexes  and  of 
nations.  It  shows  the  shrewd  analyst  in  an  engaging 
light.  Of  the  writers  affected  by  the  Kantian  position, 
who  realized  that  the  study  of  character  offered  a great 
field  for  the  applications  at  once  of  philosophy,  of  an- 
thropology, and  of  education,  Julius  Bahnsen  is  the 
most  representative.  His  work  on  “Charakterologie” 


CHARACTER  AND  TEMPERAMENT 


171 


(1867)  both  in  method  and  scope  represents  the  attempt 
to  reach  general  and  practical  conclusions  in  the  spirit 
of  the  early  nineteenth  century.  It  does  not  incorpor- 
ate the  views  of  the  bases  or  sources  of  character  which 
were  even  then  available  and  which  were  represented 
by  a group  of  German  physiologists,  such  as  Johannes 
Muller  (1801-58),  K.  F.  Burdach  (1776-1847),  and  in 
a different  temper  Lotze  and  K.  G.  Cams.  These,  sym- 
pathetic with  the  life  of  the  practitioner,  brought  to 
their  philosophical  generalizations  the  spirit  of  exact 
knowledge. 

The  establishment  of  modern  psychology  is  the  cul- 
mination of  many  interests;  in  no  aspect  is  this  histori- 
cal development  more  significant  than  in  regard  to  the 
sources  of  the  view  of  the  qualities  of  men  as  applied 
in  modem  life.  The  attempt  to  short-circuit  the  route 
from  theory  to  practice,  from  understanding  to  appli- 
cation, has  always  ended  disastrously.  The  correct- 
ness of  the  foundations  determines  the  strength  of 
the  edifice.  The  study  of  the  nervous  system  and  the 
recognition  of  the  subjection  of  all  human  traits  to 
an  evolutionary  process  laid  the  foundations.  The  so- 
ciological expressions  of  human  qualities  were  related 
to  their  biological  significance.  The  competition  of 
human  qualities  received  a psychological  interpreta- 
tion. Narrow  views  were  avoided  by  considering  the 
varieties  of  human  culture  and  expression.  Institu- 
tions, though  dominantly  an  environmental  product, 
became  significant  as  embodiments  of  psychological 
needs  and  their  satisfaction.  Vocations  became  direc- 
tions of  special  endowments.  National  characteris- 
tics were  similarly  interpreted.  Education  was  seen 


172  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


to  be  a transformation  of  original  trends  as  well  as  a 
direct  preparation  for  the  situations  of  an  artificial  life. 
Human  nature  was  at  once  the  material  upon  which 
all  desired  ends  had  to  build,  while  yet  to  be  remodeled 
for  such  cherished  purposes.  A closer  knowledge  of 
the  mode  of  working  of  the  human  endowment  re- 
sulted from  the  experimental  study  of  the  underlying 
processes  of  the  mind.  Language,  art,  science,  customs, 
social  institutions,  political  relations,  reflected  the 
spirit  of  a collective  mind,  though  often  articulate 
through  the  original  contributions  of  favored  individ- 
uals. With  this  combined  equipment  the  psychologist 
of  to-day  proceeds  to  the  interpretation  of  the  traits 
of  men  summarized  in  the  study  of  character  and  tem- 
perament. The  antecedents  of  this  view  form  a not- 
able chapter  in  the  development  of  the  human  mind, 
in  the  story  of  the  control  of  the  psychic  forces  of  which 
culture  is  a record. 


VI 


FACT  AND  FABLE  IN  ANIMAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 

As  an  instance  of  a simple  and  clear-cut  “case”  in  the 
study  of  conviction,  the  contrast  of  the  facts  and  the 
fables  in  the  intellectual  powers  ascribed  to  pet  ani- 
mals leaves  nothing  to  be  desired.  The  question  at 
issue  is  direct  and  distinct.  Can  a dog  or  a horse  rea- 
son in  the  sense  of  calculating,  reading,  and  making 
similar  logical  distinctions?  When  an  alleged  educated 
dog  or  an  equine  genius  is  exhibited  with  elaborate 
demonstrations  on  the  public  stage,  what  shall  be  our 
attitude  of  belief?  Once  again  we  have  to  draw  the  line 
between  the  probable  and  improbable,  the  possible 
and  impossible  in  terms  of  a psychological  issue,  ' Yet, 
so  preposterous  is  the  assumption  involved  in  the  claim, 
that  even  an  elementary  analysis  of  the  psychological 
contradictions  which  it  tolerates,  is  adequate  to  dispel 
the  delusion.  The  will  to  believe  in  the  supernormal 
animal  may  have  affiliations  with  other  “survivals” 
that  continue  to  influence  popular  thinking  through 
the  imperfect  consistency  of  the  easy-going  popular 
mind.  Yet  even  fairly  critical  persons  “take  stock 
in”  animal  geniuses.  In  such  cases,  as  well  as  in  the 
case  of  the  exhibitors  of  such  animals,  there  may  be  a 
measure  of  self-deception  in  the  process.  Simple  and 
brief  though  the  case  is,  it  stands  clearly  as  a contri- 
bution to  the  logical  conditions  to  which  a psychologi- 
cal inquiry  is  subject. 


174  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


I 

Man  has  ever  been  ready  to  show  his  esteem  of  animal 
ways,  even  to  the  veneration  that  in  early  times  took 
the  form  of  animal  worship.  The  cunning  and  courage 
of  animals,  their  passions  and  endmance,  their  keen- 
ness of  sense  and  mastery  of  instinct,  appealed  to  the 
man  of  nature  as  enviable  qualities.  The  wolf  that  he 
feared,  or  the  horse  that  he  subdued,  was  equally  to 
him  a fellow-being.  He  was  aware  that  the  animal  scent 
was  truer,  the  animal  sense  of  direction  surer,  than  his 
own.  Matching  his  wits  against  theirs,  he  knew  that 
he  might  be  outwitted  by  animal  wile,  might  be  over- 
come by  animal  daring.  In  his  mythology  he  con- 
structed beings  endowed  with  superhuman  qualities 
by  fantastic  combinations  of  the  animal  and  the  hu- 
man form;  and  in  his  fables,  from  ^Esop  to  Br’er  Rab- 
bit, he  gave  to  his  favorite  animal  the  hero’s  part  in 
his  simple  plots.  He  placed  himself  under  the  protec- 
tion of  some  sacred  animal  as  a totem,  and  held  it  as 
likely  that  the  soul  of  an  animal  could  be  made  to  in- 
habit the  body  of  a man,  or  that  by  some  magic  he 
could  be  transformed  into  their  semblance. 

It  is  quite  possible  that  some  obscure  and  disguised 
variety  of  this  same  instinctive  feeling  may  still  afiect 
our  estimates  of  what  animals  do,  and  of  how  they  feel 
and  think.  We  know  so  intimately  how  our  domestic 
pets  enter  into  the  routine  of  our  lives,  share  our  moods 
and  occupations,  that  it  seems  plausible  to  suppose 
that  only  a lack  of  speech  prevents  them  from  ex- 
pressing a knowledge  of  our  thoughts  and  sympathy 
with  our  feelings.  But  when  we  reflect  upon  the  mat- 
ter more  soberly,  we  realize  that  we  must  not  allow  our 


FACT  AND  FABLE  IN  ANIMAL  PSYCHOLOGY  175 


prejudices  to  affect  our  judgment  of  what  their  beha- 
vior justifies  us  in  concluding  in  regard  to  their  intelli- 
gence. In  considering  what  kinds  of  minds  they  have 
and  how  they  use  them,  we  must  never  forget  how  dif- 
ferent are  their  needs  from  ours,  how  readily  an  action 
on  their  part  may  seem  to  be  full  of  meaning  to  us  (be- 
cause if  performed  by  us  it  would  be  done  for  definite 
reasons  and  purposes),  and  yet  may  be  for  them  a rather 
simple  trick  to  gain  our  favor.  This,  indeed,  is  the  diffi- 
culty of  the  whole  problem.  We  can  judge  what  ani- 
mals think  only  from  what  they  do;  yet  what  they 
really  do  may  be  wholly  different  from  what  they 
apparently  do.  It  is  we  who  unintentionally  read  into 
the  action  the  meaning  that  it  has  for  us.  The  way  out 
of  this  difficulty  is  not  very  simple  nor  very  direct; 
and  it  is  the  psychologist’s  business  to  determine  by 
all  the  various  kinds  of  evidence  and  reasoning  that 
he  can  bring  to  bear  upon  the  data,  just  what  kinds  of 
thinking  the  most  favored  animal  can  and  cannot  mas- 
ter. The  latter  limitation,  particularly,  must  be  care- 
fully considered;  yet,  both  for  animal  capacities  and 
animal  limitations,  is  it  of  prime  importance  to  note 
that,  like  ourselves,  animals  learn  only  such  things  as 
enter  profitably  into  the  scheme  of  their  lives.  They 
will  under  ordinary  natural  circumstances  acquire  an 
intelligent  appreciation  of  such  of  the  goings-on  in  the 
world  about  them  as  they  can  put  to  use.  Though  we 
furnish  our  pets  with  decidedly  different  conditions  of 
life  and  teach  them  much  that  they  would  have  no 
occasion  to  learn  for  themselves,  yet  the  manner  of 
their  learning  stiU  remains  of  the  same  order  and  re- 
quires the  same  combination  of  powers  as  governs  their 


176  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


natural  behavior.  So,  in  the  end,  the  question  of  how 
animals  think  is  one  that  psychology  may  hopefully 
consider.  The  answer  may  not  be  complete;  but  there 
is  no  reason,  so  far  as  it  goes,  why  it  should  not  be 
sound  and  convincing  — setting  forth  clearly  and  pre- 
cisely what  types  of  intelligent  action  animals  share 
with  us,  and  how  much  greater  a range  of  even  our 
simple  thinking  and  doing  lies  wholly  outside  of  their 
interests  and  their  capacities. 

Such  reflections  are  brought  home  to  the  psycholo- 
gist whenever  he  observes  how  willing  people  are  to 
be  convinced  that  the  multiplication-table  and  read- 
ing and  spelling  fall  as  readily  within  the  powers  of  the 
exceptional  animal  as  they  do  within  those  of  an  ordi- 
nary child.  Let  us  consider  a group  of  performances 
that  within  recent  years  have  been  triumphantly  her- 
alded as  proving  the  vast  possibilities  of  animal  edu- 
cation, and  have  been  accepted  by  the  vast  majority 
of  people  for  what  they  pretend  to  be.  A wise  horse, 
“Kluge  Hans,”  has  mystified  Berlin  audiences;  and 
“Jim  Key,”  another  equine  sage,  has  done  the  same 
for  the  American  public,  by  going  through  a pro- 
gramme that  includes  adding  and  subtracting,  and 
multiplying  and  dividing,  reading  and  spelling,  telling 
time  and  the  days  of  the  week,  indicating  people’s  ages, 
or  sorting  their  letters,  revealing  their  professions  and 
their  peculiarities,  knowing  the  value  of  coins  and 
bills,  or  reasoning  that  a circle  has  no  corners,  and 
even  pointing  out  passages  from  the  Bible!  In  analyz- 
ing such  performances,  it  is  indispensable  to  remain 
undistracted  by  what  the  exhibitor  asserts  or  pretends 
that  the  animal  does,  and  calmly  to  observe  what 


FACT  AND  FABLE  IN  ANIMAL  PSYCHOLOGY  177 


really  takes  place;  to  decide  not  necessarily  how  the 
trick  is  done,  but  what  kind  of  thinking  is  concerned 
in  the  steps  that  the  animal  goes  through.  Such  an 
exhibition  may  offer  as  interesting  a study  of  the  psy- 
chology of  the  audience  as  of  the  performer  — a study 
of  what  people  are  ready  to  believe  and  why  they  are 
so  disposed. 


n 

It  requires  no  deep  psychological  insight  to  reach  the 
conviction  that  the  calculating  and  spelling,  time-tell- 
ing and  letter-sorting  horse  would  be  as  much  of  a mir- 
acle as  a centaur,  or  a Pegasus,  or  a imicorn.  All  these 
creatures  belong,  and  with  equal  obviousness,  to  the 
world^of  fable;  and  the  one  falls  as  far  outside  the  realm 
of  actual  psychology  as  the  other  escapes  the  ken  of 
the  zoologist.  If  one  is  inclined  to  regard  that  so  obvi- 
ous a proposition  would  at  once  command  assent,  he 
need  only  overhear  the  talk  of  those  who  come  away 
from  these  “marvelous”  performances  to  become  con- 
vinced that  in  popular  estimation  the  calculating  horse 
and  the  imicorn  are  horses  of  very  different  colors.  The 
latter  is  at  once  relegated  to  the  world  of  myth;  but 
the  former,  though  not  to  be  met  with  in  every  stable, 
is  regarded  as  falling  within  the  occasional  possibilities 
of  mundane  horsedom. 

If  we  neglect  for  the  moment  that  there  is  absolutely 
nothing  in  a horse’s  life  that  would  supply  the  least 
occasion  for  developing  so  remarkable  a talent  as  is 
needed  for  counting  or  spelling,  we  may  bring  ourselves 
to  consider  what  kind  of  a miracle  the  calculating  horse 
would  really  be.  An  extravagant  admirer  of  the  Berlin 


178  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


horse,  in  maintaining  that  “ Hans’s  ” education  is  about 
on  a par  with  that  of  a boy  (even  a Berlin  boy)  of 
twelve  years,  has  at  least  the  courage  of  his  convic- 
tions; nothing  less  would  suflSce  to  fit  such  a genius 
of  a horse  to  handle  numbers  and  words  and  the  ab- 
stract relation  of  things,  as  his  friends  allege.  And  if  a 
Zulu  or  an  Eskimo  were,  after  an  equally  brief  school- 
ing, to  tmn  out  a Newton  or  a Darwin,  it  would  be 
rather  less  of  a marvel. 

To  gain  a common-sense  view  of  the  matter,  observe 
a bright  child  of  three  years  of  age:  note  how  it  gives 
a hundred  evidences  for  every  hour  of  its  waking  exis- 
tence, of  a ceaselessly  busy  occupation  with  all  sorts 
of  ideas  and  little  mental  problems;  how  it  sets  up  in 
its  play  one  situation  after  another,  sees  new  relations, 
devises  a new  use  for  an  old  toy,  and  creates  a little 
world  of  its  own  imagining,  for  which  it  makes  rules 
and  breaks  them,  pretends  that  things  are  happening 
and  gives  reasons  for  their  doing  so;  and  so  hour  after 
hour  proves  itself  possessed  of  a very  acute  little  mind 
to  which  ideas  and  relations  and  situations  are  very 
interesting  and  familiarly  handled  mental  tools  or  play- 
things. It  is  very  true  that  much  of  this  we  know  only 
because  the  child  keeps  up  a constant  chatter  in  its 
play,  and  speaks  for  itself  as  well  as  its  toys  or  dolls, 
reveals  its  intentions  in  words,  and  thus  tells  the  story, 
which  without  such  explanation  we,  in  our  grown- 
up remoteness  from  such  occupation,  could  but  feebly 
understand.  But  the  very  possibility  of  learning  all 
this  language  and  of  using  it  is  itself  a direct  tribute 
to  the  intelligence  that  animates  the  little  brain  and 
reveals  its  finer  quality,  its  greater  possibilities.  Lan- 


FACT  AND  FABLE  IN  ANIMAL  PSYCHOLOGY  179 


guage  helps,  most  decidedly  helps  the  mind  to  grow 
in  scope  and  power;  but  it  does  not  create  the  capacity 
which  its  use  requires.  We  have,  moreover,  some  very 
interesting  accounts  of  the  cleverness  of  yormg  chil- 
dren, who  from  early  infancy  were  both  deaf  and  blind, 
and  who  from  their  dark  and  silent  world  into  which 
language  could  but  sparsely  enter,  gave  equally  con- 
vincing proof  of  how  busy  their  brains  were  with  much 
the  same  kind  of  thoughts  and  purposes  and  interests 
as  make  up  the  mental  lives  of  their  more  fortu- 
nate playmates.  Natmally  their  doings  were  decidedly 
hampered,  and  their  thinkings  decidedly  limited,  by 
the  slightness  of  the  bond. — the  single  highway  of 
touch  — that  connected  them  with  their  fellow-beings. 
Such  children,  in  almost  as  languageless  a condition  as 
a dog,  and  with  far  less  chance  of  finding  out  what  was 
going  on  in  the  world  and  of  participating  therein, 
develop  into  rational  creatures  of  just  that  special 
kind  of  rationality  that,  even  in  its  simplest  terms, 
the  brightest  dog  never  achieves  or  approaches. 

And  now  consider  what  a slow  and  weary  path  a 
bright  child,  equipped  with  all  its  sense  and  senses,  and 
at  the  expense  of  much  patient  teaching,  must  tread 
before  it  comprehends  the  message  of  the  letters,  and 
gets  to  look  upon  “twice  two  is  four”  as  something 
more  than  a rather  stupid  bit  of  memory  exercise,  that, 
like  virtue,  if  persisted  in,  brings  its  own  reward.  With 
an  inconceivably  greater  start  beyond  the  dog  or  the 
horse,  with  a tremendously  greater  aptitude  for  just 
this  sort  of  mental  acrobatics,  the  human  child  must 
await  some  years  of  ripening  of  its  powers,  and  upon 
that  favorable  foundation  expend  some  further  years 


180  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


of  initiation  and  schooling  to  exhibit  a simple  profi- 
ciency in  getting  meaning  out  of  those  crooked  black 
marks  on  white  paper,  and  in  putting  two  and  two 
together  so  as  to  comprehend  the  manner  of  its  strange 
transformation  into  four.  Surely,  the  accomplishment 
merits  our  profound  admiration.  To  this  imderstand- 
ing  of  how  much  is  involved  in  bringing  an  apt  mind 
to  the  point  at  which  reading  and  calculating  becomes 
a bare  possibility,  of  how  great  a world  is  already  con- 
quered when  the  three  R’s  begin  to  play  even  the  most 
modest  of  parts,  let  us  add  one  point  more:  When  the 
child  begins  to  show  (and  not  wholly  by  language) 
that  the  letters  and  numbers  have  some  meaning,  it 
shows  the  fact  so  variously,  while  yet  imperfectly,  that 
we  have  constant  means  of  testing  how  real  its  knowl- 
edge may  be.  We  gain  a pretty  fair  idea,  in  each  case, 
how  far  the  accomplishment  is  a mere  mechanical 
trick,  or  a really  comprehended  operation.  Everywhere 
the  limitations  are  conspicuously  obvious;  and  we 
know  how  gradually  we  must  add  to  the  complexity 
of  the  business,  how  readily,  by  only  a slight  change 
in  the  setting  of  the  problem,  we  sink  the  struggling 
mind  beyond  its  depth.  All  this  is  a very  sound  lesson 
in  psychology  to  take  with  us,  when  we  attend  a 
“show”  in  which  a horse  or  a dog  is  put  through  some 
steps,  which  are  supposed  to  prove  for  the  “ star  ” per- 
former a real  comprehension  of  the  message  of  the  let- 
ters and  the  operations  of  the  multiplication-table. 

Ill 

With  so  mueh  of  preamble,  let  us  look  at  the  actual 
performance,  first  as  it  is  presented  on  the  show-bills. 


FACT  AND  FABLE  IN  ANIMAL  PSYCHOLOGY  181 


and  then  as  it  appears  from  behind  the  scenes.  The 
programme  advertising  the  learned  performances  of 
“Jim  Key”  includes  among  its  dozen  numbers  such 
items  as  these:  “Jim  shows  his  proficiency  in  figuring, 
adding,  multiplication,  division,  and  subtraction  for 
any  number  below  thirty.”  “He  spells  any  ordinary 
name  asked  him.”  “He  reads  and  writes.”  “Gives 
quotations  from  the  Bible  where  the  horse  is  men- 
tioned, giving  chapter  and  verse”;  and  in  addition  acts 
as  a post-office  clerk  or  handles  a cash-register.  When 
these  problems  are  reduced  to  equine  terms,  they  prove 
to  be  simple  variations  of  a single  theme.  To  aid  the 
figuring,  the  numbers  are  placed  in  natural  order  on 
large  frames,  five  in  a row,  and  five  rows;  and  the  let- 
ters, in  alphabetical  order,  are  similarly  displayed.  The 
munbers  to  be  added  or  subtracted  are  proposed  by 
some  one  in  the  audience,  and  repeated  by  the  show- 
man. The  horse  then  proceeds  to  the  card  bearing  the 
number  that  indicates  the  result,  takes  that  card  be- 
tween his  teeth,  and  gives  it  to  his  master.  The  same 
is  done  for  words  composed  of  letters,  each  letter  being 
selected  in  turn. 

This  is  absolutely  the  whole  performance;  and  even 
when  most  generously  interpreted  bears  a decidedly 
remote  resemblance  to  what  the  posters  describe.  The 
interesting  part  of  it  all  is  that  so  many  who  witness 
this  simple  exhibition  are  quite  ready  to  conclude  that 
before  “Jim  Key”  chooses  his  card,  he  goes  through 
those  mental  processes  which  each  one  of  the  audience 
performs  when  he  works  out  the  answer  to  the  problem 
as  announced.  This  assumption  is  not  alone  wholly 
uncalled-for;  it  is  actually  preposterous.  One  of  the 


182  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


elementary  facts  that  students  of  mind  — whether 
of  human  or  of  animal  minds  — clearly  grasp,  is  that 
there  are  vastly  different  ways,  in  this  complex  world 
of  ours,  of  doing  the  same  thing.  The  same  result  is 
reached  by  wholly  different  means.  To  neglect  this 
distinction  would  be  to  conclude  that  because  a man 
— or,  if  you  like,  a horse  or  a squirrel  — avoids  a cer- 
tain mushroom  on  account  of  its  unpleasant  odor, 
while  the  botanist  does  so  by  recognizing  it  as  a speci- 
men of  Amanita  muscaria,  all  have  displayed  the  same 
kind  of  intelligence,  have  used  the  same  reasoning, 
because  in  the  end  they  reach  the  same  result,  the 
avoidance  of  the  fungus.  To  the  simple  but  compre- 
hensive statement  that  the  horse  gives  not  the  slight- 
est indication  of  going  through  any  of  these  processes 
in  order  to  select  his  card,  it  need  only  be  added  that 
he  gives  decided  indication  of  going  through  a very 
different  kind  of  process.  It  is  not  at  all  necessary  to 
know  precisely  what  special  sign  the  horse  observes 
in  guiding  his  selections,  in  order  to  determine  (which 
is  the  important  thing)  that  it  is  some  kind  of  simple 
sign,  an  operation  that  falls  within  this  general  type. 
The  type  of  “Jim  Key’s”  operation  is  simply  that  of 
learning  to  go  first  to  a certain  one  of  five  rows,  that  is 
either  the  middle,  or  the  top,  or  the  bottom,  or  the  one 
between  middle  and  top,  or  the  one  between  middle 
and  bottom;  and  then  in  turn  to  select  one  of  five  cards 
arranged  horizontally  offering  a similar  choice.  Whether 
the  cards  bear  numbers  or  letters  or  Chinese  charac- 
ters or  the  Weather  Bureau  signals  or  any  other  mark- 
ings, and  whether  these  markings  have  any  meaning, 
is  as  wholly  indifferent  to  the  horse  as  it  is  unneces- 


FACT  AND  FABLE  IN  ANIMAL  PSYCHOLOGY  183 


sary  for  him  to  go  through  any  reasoning  process  in 
order  to  select  the  card  that  he  is  to  present  as  his  an- 
swer. As  to  the  precise  association  that  an  animal  comes 
to  establish  between  a certain  sign  and  a certain  ac- 
tion, and  the  number  and  complexity  of  such  associa- 
tions that  he  can  master,  there  is  doubtless  some  varia- 
tion among  animals,  though  again  hardly  as  much  as 
among  men.  It  is  also  interesting  to  determine  the 
nature  of  the  signs,  whether  noted  by  the  ear  or  the 
eye,  that  a dog  or  a horse  most  readily  learns;  but  all 
these  details  do  not  at  aU  modify  the  general  nature 
of  the  operation,  which  mainly  needs  be  considered. 
The  actual  indication  or  clue  that  “Jim  Key”  follows 
to  reach  first  the  right  frame,  and  then  the  right  row, 
and  then  the  right  letter,  seems  to  be  given  by  differ- 
ent positions  of  the  master’s  whip.  The  ability  to  learn 
even  this  simple  association  is  probably  very  limited, 
and  in  this  case  seems  never  to  exceed  five  distinc- 
tions. Upon  this  slender  basis  of  actual  achievement 
does  “Jim  Key”  attain  his  reputation  as  a learned 
thinker. 

The  performances  of  “Kluge  Hans,”  so  far  as  they 
may  be  gathered  from  the  printed  descriptions,  are  of 
no  more  complex  character.  The  method  of  response 
is  simpler,  and  consists  of  nothing  more  than  in  pawing 
continuously  one  stroke  after  another,  and  of  stopping 
when  the  number  of  strokes  corresponds  to  the  answer 
of  the  arithmetical  problem  that  has  been  set.  Alpha- 
bets and  “yes”  and  “no”  must  also  be  reduced  to  num- 
bers before  they  fall  within  “Hans’s”  repertory.  Here 
again,  as  announced,  the  programme  is  most  versatile 
and  startling.  There  is  the  same  proficiency  in  mul- 


184  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


tiplying  and  dividing  and  adding  and  spelling;  and  by 
an  ingenious  variation  of  the  question,  “Hans”  will 
tell  how  many  of  the  admiring  company  are  over  fifty 
years  of  age,  or  are  members  of  a certain  profession, 
and  will  paw  “yes”  or  “no”  in  answer  to  any  ques- 
tion to  which  his  master  knows  the  answer.  The  claims 
put  forth  on  behalf  of  the  Berlin  horse  — and  that  on 
the  part  of  men  otherwise  versed  in  scientifie  matters 
— is  indeed  remarkable,  positively  astounding;  for 
one  of  these  attributes  to  “Hans”  a perfect  acquain- 
tance with  fractions,  the  ability  to  distinguish  colors 
as  well  as  playing-cards,  to  tell  the  coins  of  the  realm, 
to  differentiate  geometrical  figures,  to  give  the  time 
upon  any  watch-face,  to  name  musical  tones  and  tell 
which  are  discords.  The  method  by  which  these  an- 
swers are  indicated  is  never  more  nor  less  than  that  of 
pawing  until  the  correct  number  is  reached.  The  more 
complicated  replies  are  in  the  form  of  words;  for  this 
purpose  the  elementary  sounds  are  reduced  to  forty- 
two  — allowing  for  combinations  of  vowels  and  con- 
sonants. Accordingly,  any  one  of  these  sounds  is  indi- 
cated by  its  position  in  seven  places  on  one  of  six  rows; 
thus  for  j,  “Hans”  stamps  first  three  times  and  then 
four ; and  for  St,  first  five,  then  six.  Under  this  system 
the  horse  is  actually  supposed  to  distinguish  between 
the  ordinary  s and  the  long  s at  the  end  of  the  word, 
between  du  (with  the  Umlaut)  and  au  without  it,  and 
so  on.  Such,  at  all  events,  is  the  claim  set  forth  for 
“Hans’s”  miraculous  intelligence.  As  a fact  it  is,  of 
course,  completely  a matter  of  indifference  to  “Hans” 
what  the  questions  may  be;  they  could  with  equal  suc- 
cess be  put  in  Greek  or  Sanskrit,  so  long  as  he  can 


FACT  AND  FABLE  IN  ANIMAL  PSYCHOLOGY  185 


catch  the  right  signal  and  stop  pawing  at  the  right  time. 
And  so  again  the  gap  between  fact  and  fable  is  world- 
wide; and  the  assumption  is  equally  groimdless  that 
any  measure  of  the  human  type  of  reasoning  inter- 
venes to  make  possible  the  horse’s  replies. 

Surely  there  is  nothing  in  either  of  these  perform- 
ances, except  the  pretenses  of  the  showman,  that  in 
the  least  suggests  the  use  of  any  of  the  powers  that  the 
developing  child  must  first  acquire  to  gain  an  actual 
knowledge  of  numbers  and  letters.  And,  if  we  look, 
we  shall  find  many  indications  of  the  quite  different 
processes  that  are  really  concerned.  The  best  of  these 
lies  in  the  nature  of  the  mistakes  that  are  likely  to 
occur.  For  “Jim  Key,”  these  take  the  form  of  select- 
ing a neighboring  letter  — an  a;  for  a ?/  — a kind  of 
mistake  which  no  mind  that  really  was  doing  any  spell- 
ing would  be  in  the  least  tempted  to  commit;  while 
“Hans’s”  mistake  consists  in  not  seeing  the  signal 
quickly  enough,  and  in  pawing  once  too  often  or  in 
anticipating  through  noting  the  preparation  for  the 
signal,  and  stopping  too  soon  — again  a type  of  mis- 
take that  has  no  relation  to  the  actual  operation  of 
those  who  calculate  and  read.  So  also  the  scope  of  the 
questions  that  these  marvelous  animals  at  once  attack 
without  preliminary  training  shows  how  imrelated  is 
the  finding  of  the  answer  to  the  consideration  of  the 
problem.  If  we  add  considerably  to  the  difficulty  of 
the  problem  that  we  set  to  a calculating  child,  we  must 
be  prepared  to  accustom  its  powers  gradually  to  the 
increased  difficulty  and  to  take  small  steps  repeatedly, 
with  much  chance  for  mistake,  in  the  newer  processes. 
But  these  calculating  horses  jump  at  once  into  frac- 


186  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


lions  and  square  roots,  into  propositions  in  geometry, 
and  equations  in  algebra,  when  some  enterprising  ques- 
tioner proposes  them.  This,  at  all  events,  is  true  for 
“Hans’s”  master,  who  easily  prepares  the  result;  though 
in  “Jim  Key’s”  case,  one  sometimes  suspects  that  the 
calculating  possibilities  of  the  master  are  not  immeas- 
urably in  advance  of  those  of  the  horse. 

And  once  more  — it  certainly  seems  strange  that  so 
exceptionally  educated  an  animal  should  find  no  other 
occasion  to  exercise  his  remarkable  powers,  should  not 
spontaneously  exhibit  some  original  evidences  of  his 
genius,  which  would  distinguish  him  from  the  ordinary 
horse.  We  are  even  tempted  to  pity  so  talented  an 
animal  with  no  outlet  for  its  vigorous  mind,  condenmed 
to  the  monotonous  round  of  oats  and  hay,  varied  only 
by  the  tit-bits  of  carrot  and  sugar;  these,  however, 
seem  to  be  appreciated  as  rewards  of  learning  by  such 
educated  animals  quite  as  keenly  as  by  their  untu- 
tored kind.  It  is  also  pertinent,  though  possibly  un- 
necessary, to  point  out  the  inherent  contradiction  be- 
tween the  operations  that  a successful  reply  is  supposed 
to  involve  and  the  absurdity  of  the  failures  or  wrong 
answers  that  occasionally  occur.  Thus,  this  most  in- 
telligent Berlin  horse,  who  is  supposed  to  be  acquainted 
with  diflBcult  mathematical  relations,  occasionally 
makes  mistakes.  Now,  when  a child  makes  a mistake, 
it  is  in  regard  to  some  operation  just  beyond  its  capac- 
ity, while  the  simpler  additions  and  subtractions  are 
readily  accomplished.  On  the  other  hand,  “Hans,” 
immediately  after  giving  an  answer  in  square-root,  fails 
to  coimt  the  buttons  on  an  officer’s  coat,  and  insists, 
until  repeatedly  corrected,  that  a man  has  three  ears 


FACT  AND  FABLE  IN  ANIMAL  PSYCHOLOGY  187 


and  not  two;  or  again,  after  making  the  minute  dis- 
tinctions of  German  orthography,  puts  Ic  for  j;  and 
further,  if  this  miraculoiis  horse  really  distinguished 
the  sounds  and  converted  them  into  letters,  why  should 
he  not  be  phonetically  misled  and  occasionally  sub- 
stitute, let  us  say,  a ck  for  a k,  which  would  mean  aU 
the  difference  between  two  pawings  followed  by  one, 
and  three  followed  by  five.  Yet  such  objections  are, 
indeed,  superfluous,  or  would  be  were  they  not  so 
commonly  disregarded  by  the  prejudice  in  favor  of 
taking  such  absurd  pretenses  at  their  face  value.  In 
brief,  it  is  diBBcult  seriously  to  investigate  these  limi- 
tations in  any  other  spirit  than  that  of  pointing  out 
how  unmistakably  they  indicate  on  the  part  of  the 
horse  an  unreasoning,  unrelated  method  of  reaching 
the  answer  through  some  system  of  signs. 

This  statement  of  the  facts  of  the  case  does  not  at 
all  imply  that  in  this  performance  we  have  reached 
the  limits  of  the  horse’s  education.  Very  likely  the 
intelligent  horse  may  be  taught  to  go  very  much  farther 
than  this  in  the  direction  of  his  natural  ability  to  as- 
sociate signs  with  actions.  It  would,  for  example,  be 
very  interesting  to  know  whether  “Jim  Key”  could 
be  taught,  in  selecting  one  after  the  other  the  letters 
that  spell  his  name,  to  proceed  of  his  own  accord  to 
the  I after  he  has  been  led  to  the  J,  and  then  to  the  M, 
and  so  on;  that  is,  whether  he  could  learn  to  perform 
a series  of  selections  by  associating  each  with  the  one 
following.  This  would  still  be  a task  of  the  same  order, 
but  a more  complicated  one;  and  in  investigations  of 
this  kind,  earnest  students  of  animal  intelligence  have 
obtained  important  evidence  as  to  the  capacities  and 


188  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


limitations  of  animal  thinking.  Such  psychological 
questions  are  asked  in  a different  temper  from  that 
which  prompts  the  stage  performances,  and  they  lead 
to  far  more  useful  results. 


IV 

And  so  we  reach  the  other  side  of  our  inquiry:  why 
this  kind  of  a performance  is  so  generally  accepted  at 
its  face  value,  why  educated  persons  attribute  to  the 
horse  (as  they  do  to  the  Berlin  horse),  the  insight 
to  recognize  that  twenty-seven  divided  by  seven  gives 
three  with  a remainder  of  six,  that  one  fourth  must 
be  added  to  make  a unit  out  of  three  fourths,  or  that 
at  12.17  one  must  wait  forty-three  minutes  for  one 
o’clock!  Indeed,  so  widespread  were  the  misleading  ac- 
counts of  this  learned  animal,  that  a commission  of 
inquiry  was  appointed  to  investigate  the  whole  affair; 
and  upon  this  commission  sat  a professor  of  psychol- 
ogy of  the  University  of  Berlin.  Though  the  foregone 
conclusion  was  reached  that  the  performance  did  not 
exhibit  “a  scintilla  of  anything  that  may  be  regarded 
as  thought,”  it  certainly  seems  incongruous  that  so 
serious  an  inquiry  should  have  become  desirable.  Only 
one  point  of  interest  seems  to  have  been  elicited,  namely, 
that  the  horse’s  master  or  the  bystanders  may  have 
frequently  been  honestly  unaware  of  giving  the  sign 
which  the  keen  senses  of  the  horse  caught  as  the  indi- 
cation to  stop  pawing.  Perhaps  we  need  not  too  point- 
edly raise  the  question  as  to  how  far  these  exhibitions 
intentionally  deceive  their  audiences.  Wherever  sys- 
tematic training  enters,  it  follows  that  the  trainer  must 
realize  how  wide  is  the  gap  between  what  is  done  and 


FACT  AND  FABLE  IN  ANIMAL  PSYCHOLOGY  189 


what  is  pretended.  Self-deception  on  the  part  of  the 
showman  cannot  be  held  accountable  for  more  than 
a slight  portion  of  this  discrepancy.  Yet  still  truer  is 
it  that  if  people  were  not  ready  to  credit  such  remark- 
able powers  to  the  horse  or  the  dog,  such  exhibitions 
would  find  no  favor.  It  is  partly  because  animals  can 
really  do  many  things  that  are  wonderful  in  themselves 
and,  if  performed  by  men,  would  require  considerable 
rational  powers,  that  we  are  inclined  to  credit  them 
with  capacities  for  learning  similar  to  our  own.  This 
tendency  can  be  held  in  check  only  by  an  appreciation 
of  the  complexity  of  even  a simple  piece  of  true  rea- 
soning, of  how  essential  it  is  to  appraise  an  action  in 
terms  of  the  process  that  led  to  it,  and  how  indirect 
is  the  revelation  of  process  that  comes  from  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  result  alone.  When  this  simple  lesson  in 
psychology  is  clearly  recognized  as  furnishing  a soimd 
basis  for  judgment,  there  will  be  less  tendency  to  be- 
lieve that  horses  can  take  unto  themselves  brains  with 
a capacity  to  multiply  and  read,  as  to  believe  that  a 
horse  can  suddenly  sprout  wings,  even  though  such 
a Pegasus  is  pictured  on  the  posters  displayed  in  front 
of  the  exhibition  hall. 

People  would  also  less  easily  succumb  to  such  de- 
ception if  they  stopped  to  consider  that  in  regard  to 
these  animal  performances  they  must  earn  the  right  to 
an  opinion  by  some  simple  measure  of  initiation  into 
the  arrangements  of  what  impresses  the  uninitiated 
as^a  remarkable  exhibition.  The  first  attitude  is  natu- 
rally that  of  wonder,  and  in  lack  of  any  detailed  knowl- 
edge of  what  the  trick  may  be,  the  tendency  is  strong 
to  credit,  at  least  in  part,  the  explanations  that  are 


190  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


advanced.  Once  this  attitude  is  overcome,  and  the 
kind  of  training  that  prepares  for  the  performance  is 
understood,  the  whole  affair  loses  its  marvelous  aspect 
and  becomes  a mildly  interesting  demonstration  of 
animal  training.  A brief  glimpse  of  the  mechanism  be- 
hind the  scenes  is  quite  suflScient  to  balance  the  glare 
of  the  footlights  and  leave  the  spectator  in  possession 
of  his  usual  measure  of  human  intelligence  that  enables 
him  to  appraise  sympathetically  but  sanely  the  intelli- 
gent powers  of  animals. 


VII 

“MALICIOUS  ANIMAL  MAGNETISM” 

This  study  of  an  individual  case  of  delusion  is  justi- 
fied as  a contribution  to  the  psychology  of  conviction 
for  the  reason  that  it  plays  a part,  and  a strange  one, 
in  a modern  cult  numbering  its  adherents  by  the  hun- 
dred thousands;  for  the  further  reason  that  the  con- 
tent of  the  delusion  and  the  mode  of  its  manifestation 
reflect  older  beliefs,  in  part  through  common  tradition, 
in  part  through  personal  channels;  and  for  the  yet 
additional  reason  that  a delusional  conviction  is  also 
a conviction  in  terms  of  a psychology  broad  enough 
to  include  normal  and  abnormal  expressions.  The 
course  of  the  delusion  furnishes  an  interesting  narra- 
tive, however  one  may  view  the  personality  of  its 
martyr  and  the  restricted  incorporation  of  the  belief 
in  a movement,  that  in  some  respects  is  the  most  re- 
markable religious  innovation  of  modern  days. 

I 

The  story  proceeds  in  terms  of  three  distinct  strands 
of  fact  and  argument.  It  may  be  helpful  to  summa- 
rize them  at  the  outset.  The  first  is  the  history  of  the 
delusion  as  a personal  belief  of  Mrs.  Eddy,  the  founder 
of  Christian  Science.  The  second  is  the  historical 
source  of  the  notions  embodied  in  the  belief.  The  third 
is  the  statement  of  the  belief  as  transformed  in  Chris- 


192  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


tian  Science  phraseology,  with  reference  to  the  sup- 
porting theory.  The  strands  intertwine  in  a compos- 
ite product  that  is  certainly  unique  in  the  annals  of 
the  closing  nineteenth  century. 

“Malicious  animal  magnetism”  — at  times  referred 
to  in  the  literature  of  Christian  Science  as  “M.A.M.” 
— is  a modern  variety  of  witchcraft.  It  assumes  a 
mysterious  mental  influence  which  one  mind  may 
exercise  upon  another  to  the  latter’s  undoing.  In  the 
extreme,  it  is  the  wishing  of  another’s  death  by  intense 
and  evilly  disposed  mental  concentration. 

In  its  anthropological  kinship  the  belief  is  affiliated 
to  the  widespread  superstition  (particularly  prevalent 
in  the  Orient  and  southern  Europe)  of  the  evil  eye, 
by  which  is  cast  a spell  on  those  upon  whom  it  falls, 
when  accompanied  by  malicious  intent.  “M.A.M.” 
is  a mental  form  of  evil  eye.  Still  earlier  is  the  belief 
that  the  same  influence  may  be  exercised  by  pronounc- 
ing incantations  upon  any  personal  belonging  of  the 
intended  victim.  By  securing  a lock  of  his  hair  or  the 
parings  of  his  nails  or  anything  intimately  connected 
with  his  person,  the  spell  is  made  more  certain  and 
deadly.  Hence  the  care  taken  that  no  such  parts  of 
one’s  person  or  belongings  shall  fall  into  the  enemy’s 
hands,  and  the  custom  of  burning  these  to  avoid  this 
possibility.  Connected  with  this  notion  is  the  special 
practice  of  choosing  an  object  which  shall  represent 
the  victim,  and  by  piercing,  burning,  or  otherwise  in- 
juring the  proxy,  cause  the  same  fate  to  befall  the 
victim  himself.  Hanging  in  effigy  may  be  interpreted 
as  a remote  application  of  the  same  underlying  notions. 
In  Hawaii  the  death-prayer  is  similarly  pronounced, 


MALICIOUS  ANIMAL  MAGNETISM 


193 


and  the  doomed  one  succumbs  to  the  dire  influence.^ 
These  instances,  which  may  be  readily  extended,  show 
the  relations  of  the  belief  in  to  widespread 

notions  and  practices  of  older  and  cruder  cultures. 

In  mediaeval  belief  there  was  recognized  a white  and 
a black  magic.  The  necromancer  used  the  latter  to 
wreak  revenge  upon  his  enemies,  and  offered  his  serv- 
ices to  others  for  this  end.  In  Christian  tradition  the 
power  was  gained  by  compact  with  the  Devil,  always 
regarded  as  the  source  of  illicit  influence.  The  methods 
of  acquiring  the  power  for  evil  varies  with  the  cult 
in  which  it  is  incorporated.  Its  most  general  formula- 
tion is  in  the  belief  in  witchcraft,  which  has  an  event- 
ful history,  spreading  sporadically  in  successive  epi- 
demics over  several  centuries.  Thus,  one  phase  of 
“M.A.M.”  and  its  central  doctrine,  reflects  the  hold 
of  a world-wide  superstition  natural  to  primitive  reli- 
gions, with  interesting  survivals  among  less  enlightened 
communities  of  modern  times. 

The  term  “animal  magnetism”  comes  to  Mrs.  Eddy 
directly  from  Mesmer  (1734-1815).  The  notion  is 
much  older  than  Mesmer  and  is  derived  by  analogy 
from  the  mysterious  attraction  by  which  a magnet 
draws  particles  of  iron  to  itself.  To  the  speculations 
of  older  times  it  did  not  seem  remote  to  assume  a simi- 
lar magnetism  acting  among  the  celestial  bodies,  and 
an  allied  force  affecting  animal  and  human  creation. 
These  realms  are  connected  in  systems  of  astrology 
and  occult  magic.  Building  upon  a confused  mixture 

^ The  theme  is  used  in  the  modern  drama  of  The  Bird  of  Paradise. 
Here  the  forsaking  of  the  ancient  tribal  gods  is  avenged  by  causing 
the  apostate  — • a native  maiden  married  to  a foreigner  — to  offer 
herself  as  a sacrifice  to  the  burning  volcano  to  appease  its  anger. 


104  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


of  such  notions,  Mesmer  reached  the  conclusion  that 
diseases  could  be  cured  by  applying  actual  magnets 
to  the  bodies  of  patients,  thereby  evoking  symptoms 
(after  the  manner  of  crises)  and  through  this  proce- 
dure inducing  a cure.  In  a later  stage  of  his  career,  he 
built  a large  tub  or  baquet  after  the  manner  of  a great 
battery.  The  tub  was  filled  with  iron  filings  and 
other  paraphernalia;  from  it  emerged  bent  iron  rods 
which  the  patients  seized.  The  usual  symptoms,  sug- 
gestive of  hysterical  attacks,  ensued.  Still  later  Mes- 
mer claimed  the  power  to  magnetize  water,  or  a tree; 
he  claimed  that  the  magnetic  fiuid  flowed  freely  from 
his  person,  and  thus  introduced  the  notion  of  a pecu- 
liar force  exercised  by  specially  endowed  persons,  and 
capable  of  influencing  others,  particularly  in  the  cure 
of  disease.  Still  adhering  to  the  older  notions,  he  in- 
duced the  “crisis”  by  making  passes  and  strokings 
with  his  hands,  from  which  the  personal  magnetism 
was  supposed  to  flow.  Even  in  Mesmer’s  day  it  was 
demonstrated  that  the  “crises”  and  symptoms  and 
cures  proceeded  as  well  without  the  “magnetic”  appa- 
ratus as  with  it;  for  they  were  due  to  suggestion  and 
mental  susceptibility.  At  first  by  a few  advanced  stu- 
dents, and  then  more  generally,  the  source  of  the  phe- 
nomena was  correctly  referred  to  the  nervous  suscepti- 
bility of  the  subject;  the  state  was  called  “artificial 
somnambulism,”  in  view  of  its  close  relation  to  the 
state  of  a sleep-walker.  StlU  later  (1840)  James  Braid 
correctly  recognized  the  physiological  basis  of  the  con- 
dition and  called  it  “hypnosis”  — an  induced  sleep-fike 
state.  The  older  notions  survived  and  were  continued 
by  the  popularity  of  hypnotism  as  a stage  perform- 


MALICIOUS  ANIMAL  MAGNETISM 


195 


ance.  The  “hypnotizers”  kept  alive  the  pseudo-scien- 
tific belief  in  the  personal  power  (or  magnetism)  of  the 
performer;  they  demonstrated  dramatically  how  com- 
pletely the  subject’s  senses,  movements,  and  ideas  were 
controlled  by  the  fiat  of  the  hypnotist’s  word. 

The  further  history  or  analysis  of  hypnotism  would 
lead  too  far  afield.^  With  the  aid  of  this  outline  the 
place  of  “animal  magnetism”  in  the  history  of  Mrs. 
Eddy’s  delusion  will  be  intelligible. 

II 

Next  to  be  considered  is  the  personal  aspect  of  the 
delusion  in  relation  to  Mjs.  Eddy’s  mental  develop- 
ment and  the  incidents  of  her  decidedly  bourgeois  life. 
Her  early  history  is  that  of  a nervous  invalid.  In  search 
for  health  she  came  under  the  treatment  of  “Dr.”  P. 
P.  Quimby,  who  may  be  said  to  have  been  the  earliest 
American  mental  healer.  In  an  original  way  he  ab- 
sorbed the  principles  of  treatment  by  mental  sugges- 
tion, to  which  the  successors  of  Mesmer  were  turning, 
and  introduced  into  it  a little  philosophy  and  a good 
deal  of  religious  faith.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the 
basis  of  the  Christian  Science  healing  practices  and  of 
most  of  its  theory  is  Quimbyism. 

In  his  earlier  days  Quimby  hypnotized  by  passes 
after  the  Paris  fashion,  prescribed  drugs,  and  at  the 
same  time  gave  suggestions,  consolation,  and  advice. 
His  mature  system  was  one  of  pure  mental  healing, 
directed  to  the  removal  of  symptoms  and  anxiety.  It 
was  in  contact  with  this  changing  atmosphere  — from 

* It  is  considered  in  “Hypnotism  and  its  Antecedents”  in  my  Fact 
and  Fable  in  Psychology.  (1900.) 


196  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


mesmerism  to  suggestion  — thet  Mrs.  Eddy  grew  to 
a late  maturity.  By  it  her  ideas  were  shaped. 

It  was  also  at  this  time  that  hypnotism  came  to 
America  from  France.  In  part  the  older  “mesmeric” 
notions  were  adhered  to,  but  the  newer  ideas  of  an  arti- 
ficial somnambulism  and  a directly  mental  influence 
were  gaining  ground.  The  passes  and  strokings,  that 
were  thought  at  first  to  convey  the  magnetic  fluid,  were 
retained,  but  only  to  render  the  subject  attentive  and 
passive.  M.  Charles  Poyen  was  the  intermediary  be- 
tween Mesmer  and  Mrs.  Eddy,  and  may  actually  have 
looked  upon  the  faces  of  both.  He  lectured  in  New 
England  and  gave  stage  exhibitions  with  hypnotized 
subjects  at  the  time  when  Mrs.  Eddy,  in  her  search 
for  health,  was  inclining  to  mind-cure.  She  must  have 
seen  these  passes  and  strokings  and  rubbings,  which 
put  the  subjects  at  the  mercy  of  the  mesmerizer.  She 
must  have  seen  the  “mesmerized”  subjects  helplessly 
go  through  strange  antics  at  the  behest  of  the  opera- 
tor, and  may  have  been  impressed  with  the  possible 
abuse  of  such  power.  At  all  events,  these  manipula- 
tions remained  with  her  as  the  embodiment  of  animal 
magnetism.  As  she  grew  away  from  everything  mate- 
rial and  held  mind  to  be  all,  this  earlier  system  be- 
came to  her  the  symbol  of  error,  of  everything  awful 
and  malicious. 

Thus  it  came  about,  when  Mrs.  Eddy  developed 
as  the  cardinal  principle  of  Christian  Science  the 
denial  of  everything  material,  that  the  last  survival 
of  anything  visible  or  tangible  in  the  system  which 
most  had  helj>ed  her,  became  the  basis  of  her  delu- 
sions of  suspicion  and  persecution.  Her  published 


MALICIOUS  ANIMAL  MAGNETISM 


197 


writings  refer  to  the  subject  frequently.  The  following 
paragraphs  express  her  attitude:  — 

As  named  in  Christian  Science,  animal  magnetism  or  hyp- 
notism is  specifically  a term  for  error  or  mortal  mind.  . . . 
This  belief  has  not  one  quality  of  Truth  or  Good.  It  is  either 
ignorant  or  malicious.  The  malicious  form  of  hypnotism 
ultimates  in  moral  idiocy. 

When  Christian  Science  and  animal  magnetism  are  both 
comprehended,  as  they  will  be  at  no  distant  date,  it  will  be 
seen  why  the  author ^of  this  book  has  been  so  unjustly  per- 
secuted and  belied  by  wolves  in  sheep’s  clothing. 

The  author’s  own  observations  of  the  workings  of  animal 
magnetism  convince  her  that  it  is  not  a remedial  agent,  and 
that  its  effects  upon  those  who  practice  it  and  upon  their  sub- 
jects who  do  resist  it,  lead  to  moral  and  to  physical  death. 

The  likely  forms  of  animal  magnetism  are  disappearing 
and  its  aggressive  features  are  coming  to  the  front.  The  looms 
of  crime,  hidden  in  the  dark  recesses  of  mortal  thought,  are 
every  hour  weaving  webs  more  complicated  and  subtle.  So 
secret  are  the  present  methods  of  animal  magnetism  that  they 
ensnare  the  age  into  indolence  and  produce  the  very  apathy 
on  the  subject  which  the  criminal  desires. 

Whatever  may  be  the  obscure  meaning  of  these  pas- 
sages, they  indicate  a strong  desire  to  establish  the  com- 
plete originality  of  the  Christian  Science  doctrine.  They 
make  animal  magnetism  the  dangerous  counterfeit  and 
denoimce  the  material  aids  in  its  practice  not  alone  as 
useless,  but  as  resorted  to  only  with  vicious  intent. 

From  here  on,  the  story  of  “M.A.M.”  is  the  story 
of  Mrs.  Eddy’s  personal  relations  to  the  belief.  It  is 
closely  bound  up  with  the  early  history  of  Christian 
Science.  It  grew  by  deeds  and  doctrines,  at  first  most 
slowly,  and  later  with  astonishing  rapidity.  The  fame  of 
the  cures  kept  the  movement  alive;  classes  were  formed 
and  disciples  trained;  a religious  doctrine  was  developed. 


198  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


Mrs.  Eddy’s  strength  as  a leader  lay  in  teaching  and 
expounding.  She  was  much  too  nervous,  too  ill  at  ease, 
too  self-centered,  to  minister  to  others.  For  the  sym- 
pathetic treatment  that  should  remove  doubt,  inspire 
hope,  and  counsel  wisely,  she  depended  upon  more 
confident,  better-poised  natures.  In  her  early,  diflS- 
cult  days,  she  found  a young,  able,  and  willing  part- 
ner in  Richard  Kennedy.  Kennedy  was  a practitioner 
interested  in  results  and  not  over-impressed  with  the 
verbal  statements  of  Mrs.  Eddy.  In  his  treatment  he 
used  rubbings  of  the  head  as  well  as  suggestion  and 
denial,  as  he  was  taught  by  Mrs.  Eddy  and  through 
her  by  Quimby.  Mrs.  Eddy  was  a trying  companion 
and  leader,  and  a bad  loser.  The  rupture  came  when 
she  accused  Kennedy  of  cheating  at  cards.  He  left  her, 
established  an  independent  practice,  and  became  the 
first  Christian  Scientist  accused  of  practicing  “M.A.M.” 
Mrs.  Eddy  promptly  laid  the  falling-off  of  her  success, 
due  to  Kennedy’s  withdrawal,  to  his  sending  out  ad- 
verse mental  influences  both  against  her  and  to  pre- 
vent others  from  joining  the  movement.  She  accused 
him  of  using  his  powers  on  patients,  not  to  cure,  but 
to  aggravate  their  sufferings.  This  she  called  “mental 
malpractice.”  It  was  all  rather  confused  in  her  mind 
and  in  her  language.  One  notion  persisted:  that  this 
evil  mental  influence  causes  suffering  to  its  victim. 
The  mental  thought,  being  the  sole  reality,  causes  the 
disease  and  disaster  which  mortal  mind  is  somehow 
compelled  to  recognize.  That  is  precisely  the  primi- 
tive notion  that  keeps  superstitions  alive,  manufac- 
tures evil  charms,  and  places  them  in  the  enemy’s  house. 
Mrs.  Eddy’s  language  is  interesting:  — 


MALICIOUS  ANIMAL  MAGNETISM 


199 


Among  our  very  first  students  was  the  mesmerist  aforesaid, 
who  has  followed  the  cause  of  metaphysical  healing  as  a 
hound  follows  his  prey.  . . . This  malpractitioner  tried  his 
best  to  break  down  our  health  before  we  learned  the  cause 
of  our  sufferings. 

His  mental  malpractice  has  made  him  a moral  leper  that 
would  be  shunned  as  the  most  prolific  cause  of  sickness  and 
sin,  did  the  sick  understand  the  cause  of  their  relapses  and 
protracted  treatment,  the  husband  the  loss  of  the  wife,  and 
the  mother  the  death  of  her  child. 

Filled  with  revenge  and  evil  passions,  the  malpractitioner 
can  only  depend  on  manipulation,  and  rubs  the  heads  of 
patients  years  together,  first  incorporating  their  minds 
through  this  process.  . . . Through  the  control  this  gives  the 
practitioner  over  patients,  he  readily  reaches  the  mind  of  the 
community  to  injure  another  or  promote  himself,  but  none 
can  track  his  foul  course. 

Sooner  suffer  a doctor  infected  with  smallpox  ^ to  be  about 
you  than  come  under  the  treatment  of  one  who  manipulates 
his  patients’  heads. 

The  distance  from  ordinary  medical  practice  to  Christian 
Science  is  full  many  a league  in  the  line  of  light;  but  to  go  in 
healing  from  the  use  of  inanimate  drugs  to  the  misuse  of 
human  will  power  is  to  drop  from  the  platform  of  common 
manhood  into  the  very  mire  of  iniquity. 

Thus  early  in  her  career  “M.A.M.”  became  to  Mrs. 
Eddy  her  “black  beast,”  as  the  French  say,  her  “hoo- 
doo” in  popular  superstitious  phrase.  To  her  it  was 
dead  earnest  and  a real  beast.  It  made  her  an  invalid 
and  crossed  her  moods.  It  made  her  affairs  go  wrong 
and  kept  her  poor.  It  set  people  against  her  and 
thwarted  her  plans.  Most  of  all,  it  was  used  by  traitors 
and  enemies  — by  those  who  deserted  her  and  took 
to  successful  mental  healing  on  their  own  account. 

* The  admission  that  there  is  such  a thing  as  smallpox  infection  is, 
of  course,  inconsistent  with  Mrs.  Eddy’s  precepts,  as  with  her  many 
denials  of  its  reality. 


200  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


As  one  leading  disciple  after  another  tired  of  her  tyr- 
anny and  her  nerves,  he  was  turned  against  and 
accused  of  “M.A.M.”  The  delusion  grew,  fed  by  per- 
sonal grudge.  It  took  on  definite  shape  as  she  shaped 
her  system,  and  was  made  part  of  it. 

Kennedy’s  successor  was  Daniel  SpOfford.  The  new 
form  of  treatment  was  now  called  “metaphysical  heal- 
ing.” Spofford  did  not  manipulate,  but  practiced  suc- 
cessfully by  mental  suggestion.  In  1877  he,  in  turn, 
came  under  the  ban.  He  left  Mrs.  Eddy,  who  thus 
referred  to  him  in  the  hurriedly  prepared  second  edi- 
tion of  “Science  and  Health”:  — 

Since  “Science  and  Health”  first  went  to  press,  we  have 
observed  the  crimes  of  another  mesmeric  outlaw,  in  a variety 
of  ways,  who  does  not  as  a common  thing  manipulate,  in 
cases  where  he  suddenly  attempted  to  avenge  himself  of  cer- 
tain individuals,  . . . 

In  1878  Mrs.  Eddy,  or  her  supporters,  so  worked 
upon  the  mind  of  one  of  their  patients  — Miss  Lucre- 
tia  L.  S.  Brown  — as  to  gain  her  consent  to  bring  suit 
against  Spofford  as  a mesmerist.  In  the  case  of  Miss 
Brown,  he  was  charged  with  causing  “by  said  power 
and  art  great  suffering  of  body  and  mind  and  severe 
spinal  pains  and  neuralgia  and  a temporary  suspen- 
sion of  mind,  and  still  continues  to  cause  the  plaintiff  the 
same.” 

Mr.  Spofford,  so  far  as  known,  is  the  last  person 
tried  for  witchcraft  in  a comt  of  law.  With  strange 
dramatic  justice  the  court  sat  in  Salem,  the  seat  of 
the  only  American  epidemic  of  witchcraft.  The  attorney 
for  Miss  Brown  was  Edward  J.  Arens,  Spofford’s  suc- 
cessor, and  himself  the  next  to  be  accused  of  “M.A.M.” 


MALICIOUS  ANIMAL  MAGNETISM 


201 


Witnesses  testified  to  the  reality  of  the  malicious 
influence  mentally  administered;  but  the  ridiculous 
charge  was  ruled  out  of  coiut. 

It  is  said  that  Mrs.  Eddy,  at  successive  phases  of 
her  career,  kept  pictures  of  Kennedy  and  Spofford  and 
a third  foe,  Arens,  in  her  room,  the  two  former  marked 
with  a black  cross,  the  latter  with  a red  cross,  to  aid 
her  mental  resistance. 

No  less  remarkable  an  incident  is  the  controversy 
surrounding  the  death  of  Mr.  Eddy.  On  June  5,  1882, 
Mrs.  Eddy  gave  out  this  interview:  — 

My  husband’s  death  was  caused  by  malicious  mesmerism. 
Dr.  Rufus  K.  Noyes,  late  of  the  City  Hospital,  who  held  an 
autopsy  over  the  body  to-day,  affirms  that  the  corpse  is  free 
from  all  material  poison  although  Dr.  Eastman^  still  holds 
to  his  original  belief.  I know  that  it  was  poison  that  killed 
him,  not  material  poison,  but  mesmeric  poison. 

Mrs.  Eddy  was  confident  that  she  could  have  saved 
her  husband  by  cormter-thought,  if  only  she  had  not 
been  so  occupied  with  her  work,  and  had  realized  the 
power  of  the  mesmerists.  She  says:  — 

Oh,  is  n’t  it  terrible  that  this  fiend  of  malpractice  is  in  the 
land!  After  a certain  amount  of  mesmeric  poison  has  been 
administered,  it  cannot  be  averted.  No  power  of  mind  can 
resist  it.  It  must  be  met  with  resistive  action  of  the  mind  at 
the  start,  which  will  counteract  it. 

“The  atmosphere  of  Mrs.  Eddy’s  house  derived  its 
peculiar  character  from  her  belief  in  malicious  mes- 

^ The  Dr.  Eastman  in  question  was  a quack.  Mr.  Eddy  fell  com- 
pletely under  the  sway  of  Mrs.  Eddy’s  delusions.  He  shared  in  the 
suspicion  of  constant  danger,  and  often  ran  to  the  shelter  of  a friendly 
door  to  avoid  the  mesmeric  miasma.  The  notion  of  thus  mentally 
absorbing  poison  seems  to  have  been  his  contribution. 


202  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


merism,  which  exerted  a sinister  influence  over  every- 
one under  her  roof.  Her  students  could  never  get  away 
from  it.  Morning,  noon,  and  night  the  thing  had  to 
be  reckoned  with,  and  the  very  domestic  arrangements 
were  ordered  to  elude  or  counteract  the  demoniacal 
power.  If  Mrs.  Eddy  had  kept  in  her  house  a danger- 
ous maniac  or  some  horrible  physical  monstrosity,”  ‘ 
the  situation  could  not  have  been  worse.  If  the  water- 
pipe  froze,  or  the  wash-boiler  leaked,  or  her  servants 
were  negligent,  or  her  dressmaker  was  awkward  in  fit- 
ting, it  was  aU  the  work  of  her  enemies,  accomplished 
by  mental  projections.  Her  mail,  certain  letter-boxes, 
certain  streets,  became  infected  with  mesmerism.  At 
one  time  she  was  convinced  that  the  telegraph  oflBce 
at  Boston  was  in  the  hands  of  her  enemies,  and  sent  a 
message  to  Chicago  from  West  Newton  via  Worcester. 
She  wanted  her  students  to  remain  in  Boston  on  the 
Fomth  of  July,  a day  when  “mortal  mind  was  in  ebul- 
lition,” to  help  her  oppose  the  evil.  She  believed  in 
a real  “printer’s  devil,”  and  attributed  the  delays  in 
printing  her  “Science  and  Health”  to  mesmerism.  She 
set  her  students  to  treating  mentally  the  pressmen 
against  delays,  and  when  the  sheets  were  ready,  asked 
them  to  turn  their  thoughts  from  the  press-room  to 
the  bindery.  Her  letters  are  full  of  it;  and  nothing 
seems  to  irritate  her  more  than  a slighting  of  this  essen- 
tial dogma  of  her  creed. 


Ill 

To  consider  the  case  of  Mrs.  Eddy  scientifically  is 
to  consider  it  objectively.  The  details  are  naturally 
1 Milmine,  The  Life  of  Mary  Baker  G.  Eddy,  p.  301. 


MALICIOUS  ANIMAL  MAGNETISM 


203 


personal,  but  the  interpretation  proceeds  by  accred- 
ited psychological  principles,  as  objectively  applicable 
to  this  case  as  to  any  other.  The  fact  that  the  patient 
was  the  foimder  of  a prosperous  sect,  and  the  reverence 
of  her  followers  for  “Mother  Eddy,”  are  incidents  with 
no  special  bearing  upon  the  central  interpretation.  In 
the  actual  development  of  Christian  Science  the  part 
to  be  assigned  to  Mrs.  Eddy  is  also  readily  over-esti- 
mated; dependence  upon  others,  passive  acceptance 
of  fate,  fortunate  circumstances  in  the  management 
of  her  campaign,  and  the  public  state  of  mind,  were 
also  decisive  in  the  movement,  which  after  years  of 
struggle  brought  her  notoriety,  wealth,  and  an  amaz- 
ing following.^ 

The  case  of  Mrs.  Eddy  is  the  case  of  a nervous  in- 
valid with  a highly  irritable  constitution  becoming  a 
chronic  victim  to  delusions  of  persecution.  The  text- 
books on  insanity  give  many  cases  of  the  remarkable 
persecutions,  to  which  such  victims  have  regarded  them- 
selves as  subjected.  They  believe  themselves  poi- 
soned, drugged,  threatened  by  voices  through  the  walls 
or  the  telephone;  they  see  secret  enemies  in  visitors, 
and  find  hidden  meanings  in  letters.  A common  form 

^ One  phase  of  Mrs.  Eddy’s  mentality  suggests  a Freudian  inter- 
pretation. She  was  very  aggressive  on  the  matter  of  the  originality 
of  Christian  Science  as  her  creation  or  special  revelation.  In  conse- 
quence she  denied  any  obligation  to  Quimby  and  concealed  the  evi- 
dence of  her  dependence.  She  quarreled  with  those  who  had  helped 
her  and  denounced  them.  This  attitude  implies  the  subconscious 
sense  of  her  dependence,  even  of  her  inferiority;  the  insistence  be- 
comes a form  of  compensation  for  her  incapacity.  It  may  be  traced 
in  her  writings,  in  her  relations  to  the  Mother  Church,  in  the  inci- 
dents of  her  life.  The  delusion  of  “M.A.M.”  is  clearly  related  to  this 
cluster  of  beliefs;  it  expresses  the  “fear”  aspect  accompanying  the 
self-assertion  by  way  of  consolation. 


204  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


of  the  delusion  makes  its  source  mystic.  The  evil  comes 
by  thought-waves,  by  telepathy,  by  brain-vibrations, 
and  by  magnetism.  The  evil  designs  are  ascribed  to 
definite  personal  enemies.  The  form  of  the  persecu- 
tion and  the  selection  of  the  enemies  are  shaped  by 
circumstances.  The  personal  history  of  Mrs.  Eddy 
places  her  delusion  of  “M.A.M.”  plainly  in  the  same 
order  of  cases. 

How  the  delusion  might  have  developed  had  it  re- 
mained purely  personal  and  not  attached  to  a system 
of  belief,  it  is  impossible  to  determine.  It  is  clear  that 
her  system  was  shaped  to  admit  and  express  the  delu- 
sional symptoms.  It  is  clearer  still  that  the  tyranny 
of  the  delusions  affected  the  doctrines,  yet  affected 
still  more  Mrs.  Eddy’s  attitude  to  her  followers  and  all 
the  personal  details  of  her  administration.  Her  feeling 
of  helplessness  and  her  dependence  upon  others  were 
directed  by  this  delusional  fear.  She  always  needed 
a buffer  against  “M.A.M.”  When  she  wished  to  write 
and  found  the  writing  slow  and  unprogressive,  she 
appealed  to  her  students:  “Direct  your  thoughts  and 
everybody  else’s  that  you  can  away  from  me;  don’t 
talk  of  me.”  “Those  who  call  on  me  mentally  in  suffer- 
ing are  in  belief  killing  me.” 

It  is  related  that  at  the  time  of  her  indignation  against 
Spofford,  Mrs.  Eddy  induced  twelve  of  her  disciples  to 
arrange  a continuous  mental  session  of  twenty-four 
hours,  each  student  holding  his  thought  for  two  hours, 
willing  the  downfall  of  Spofford.  Her  son.  Dr.  Foster 
(whom  she  adopted  when  the  latter  was  forty-one 
years  old),  served  as  a shield  to  offset  the  adverse 
treatment  of  the  enemy;  when  he  was  dismissed,  others 


MALICIOUS  ANIMAL  MAGNETISM 


205 


served  to  conduct  the  evil  forces  away  from  Mrs. 
Eddy  by  vigorous  counter-statements.^ 

It  is  plain  that  such  actions  and  beliefs  as  were  ex- 
hibited by  Mrs.  Eddy  would  be  set  down  as  those  of 
an  abnormal,  neurotic,  unbalanced  person.  The  no- 
toriety of  the  patient  should  not  in  the  least  affect  the 
diagnosis;  though  so  conspicuous  a career  necessarily 
and  deeply  modified  the  evolution  of  the  case  as  a whole. 
The  reactions  to  a personal  experience,  as  vitiated  by 
an  unfortimate  temperament,  constitute  the  most  sig- 
nificant exhibit  in  the  origin  and  status  of  “malicious 
animal  magnetism.”  The  “animal  magnetism”  is  an 
accidental  reference  due  to  circumstance,  and  as  a 
name  is  almost  meaningless.  It  represents  the  formu- 
lation of  her  delusion.  The  “maliciousness”  is  a per- 
sonal reference,  and  is  an  essential  trait  in  delusions 
of  persecution. 

Just  how  far  Mrs.  Eddy’s  case  can  be  more  minutely 
diagnosed  or  classified  is  not  altogether  clear.  The 
medical  details  are  lacking;  her  early  obscurity  and 
the  attempts  to  shroud  her  personality  in  mystery  in- 
crease the  difficulty  of  arriving  at  a clear  decision. 
There  is,  however,  no  hesitation  in  reaching  a diagnosis 
of  a mentally  abnormal  condition  — an  inherited  neu- 
rasthenic diathesis,  in  its  later  development  tending 
toward  a paranoiac  state.  Mrs.  Eddy’s  case  has  been 
diagnosed  as  paranoia  on  the  basis  of  the  documents 
of  the  case.  Paranoia  is  a polite  Greek  term  for  a 

* In  1908,  when  Mrs.  Leonard,  living  with  Mrs.  Eddy,  died,  it  was 
said  that  her  death  was  due  to  “M.A.M.”  as  exercised  by  a faction 
opposed  to  Mrs.  Eddy,  who  willed  her  death  by  “statements.”  Thus, 
saving  her  patron  by  acting  as  a shield  to  receive  the  “M.A.M.,”  she 
lost  her  life. 


206  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


marked  and  limited  or  one-sided  eccentricity  and  ir- 
responsibility. In  slang  phrase  its  equivalent  may  be 
rendered  as  “being  a little  off”  or  “cranky.”  Many 
paranoiacs  are  markedly  and  dangerously  insane;  quite 
as  many  suffer  from  harmless  delusions.  Still  others 
are  in  the  borderland,  and  except  in  certain  relations 
may  lead  outwardly  responsible  lives.  The  paranoiacs 
form  the  most  elusive,  the  most  individual,  the  true 
Uite  of  the  great  borderland  where  dwell  the  eccentric 
and  the  ill-balanced.  Mrs.  Eddy’s  is  the  rare  but  not 
unique  case  of  a religious  paranoiac  with  a following. 
“Paranoiacs,”  writes  one  authority,  “form  the  aristoc- 
racy of  asylums;  indeed,  the  majority  of  them  have 
little  difficulty  in  avoiding  confinement  in  them.”  Mrs. 
Eddy  deserves  a high  place  in  this  aristocracy.^ 

IV 

The  fact  that  the  doctrine  of  “M.A.M.”  is  so  largely 
a personal  contribution  appears  in  the  trouble  it  has 
caused  in  the  camp  of  the  faithful.  Many  of  the  de- 
fections from  the  faith  have  been  due  to  the  resistance 
to  Mrs.  Eddy’s  pet  doctrine.  When,  in  1888,  she  gave 
a course  of  six  lectures  on  “obstetrics,”  five  of  which 
were  taken  up  with  “M.A.M.,”  the  students,  who  had 
paid  high  fees  for  the  privilege  of  attending  them,  nat- 
urally rebelled.  It  is  known  that  the  revisers  of  her 

^ For  the  details  of  Mrs.  Eddy’s  life  and  personality  the  reader 
must  consult  the  Life  of  Mary  Baker  G.  Eddy,  by  Miss  Milmine. 

As  contributory  to  the  medical  side  of  the  case,  the  following  detail 
may  be  cited:  A significant  paranoiac  s3rmptom  is  the  use  of  words  in 
strange  and  forced  meanings,  with  a marked  verbal  obsession.  A 
certain  simple  verbosity  goes  with  it.  In  this  case  the  medical  analo- 
gies prevail.  The  use  of  such  terms  as  “obstetrics,”  “malpractice,” 
“mental  poison,”  “metaphysical  healing,”  illustrate  the  result. 


MALICIOUS  ANIMAL  MAGNETISM 


207 


works  have  stricken  much  of  the  record  of  her  pecu- 
liarities from  Mrs.  Eddy’s  official  writings,  and  have 
been  strenuous  in  withdrawing  the  rare  earlier  editions 
of  “Science  and  Health,”  that  disclose  the  personal 
hold  of  this  strange  doctrine;  this  applies  particu- 
larly to  the  third  edition,  which  contains  a remark- 
able chapter  on  “Demonology,”  in  itself  a conclusive 
document  proving  her  delusional  state.  The  earlier 
issues  of  the  “Christian  Science  Jovunal”  mention 
cases  of  successful  treatment  against  the  invasion  of 
“M.A.M.”  In  the  daily  press  of  the  period  the  dili- 
gent student  may  find  mention  of  occasional  protests, 
when  patients  die  of  recognizable  diseases,  while  the 
family  insist  upon  a diagnosis  of  “M.A.M.”^ — quite 
in  the  manner  of  primitive  times  or  the  darker  ages. 
It  is,  however,  difficult  to  say  that  the  doctrine  was 
generally  accepted  by  Christian  Scientists;  a tendency 
to  ignore  the  matter  as  a regrettable  incident  was  the 
more  common  attitude. 

Yet  so  late  as  1909  a renewed  outburst  of  the  delu- 
sion appeared  in  sensational  form.  By  this  time  fac- 
tions and  dissensions  had  arisen,  as  is  not  imusual  in 
a personally  controlled  church.  Mrs.  Eddy  was  an 
old  and  very  feeble  woman;  and  the  question  of  the 
bestowal  of  the  mantle  of  the  prophet  was  variously 
discussed.  The  most  influential  and  independent  can- 
didate was  Mrs.  Augusta  E.  Stetson,  leader  of  the 
movement  in  New  York  City,  who  was  bitterly  de- 
nounced by  Mrs.  Eddy.  It  was  against  Mrs.  Stetson 
that  a member  of  her  church  raised  the  accusation  of 
“M.A.M.”  Here  is  a part  of  the  victim’s  story:  — 


208  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


At  midnight,  I was  awakened  by  an  icy  blast  sweeping 
through  the  open  window  from  the  direction  of  New  York. 
My  teeth  chattered.  My  heart  fluttered.  Luminous  waves 
rolled  toward  me,  covered  with  the  faces  of  the  dead.  I felt 
just  like  a man  being  electrocuted.  It  seemed,  indeed,  that 
my  soul  went  from  my  body,  that  I saw  through  the  walls  of 
my  house.  And  in  the  hour  of  agony  I saw  Mrs.  Stetson’s 
blue  eyes  all  around  the  room. 

Like  the  afflicted  of  old,  she  took  to  her  Bible  to 
overcome  the  unseen  foe,  but  to  no  purpose.  The  chill 
continued;  in  despair  she  turned  on  the  steaming  water 
in  the  bathtub,  but  could  feel  no  heat.  The  contest 
went  on. 

Impersonal,  Ever-present,  Omnipotent  Love  bore  me  up 
beyond  the  reach  of  the  would-be  midnight  assassin,  the 
human  hatred  of  truth,  the  mad  ambition  for  the  personal 
place  and  power.  . . . Still  shivering  from  that  boiling  bath, 
I groped  about  for  the  most  elaborate  piece  of  darning  I could 
find,  and  sitting  up  in  bed,  pushed  the  needle  to  and  fro  while 
my  parched  lips  muttered,  “God  is  all;  God  is  good;  nothing 
can  harm  me.”  As  I sat  there,  my  husband  staggered  up  the 
stairs  and  into  my  room. 

“My  God!”  he  exclaimed,  “what  has  happened  to  me? 
Coming  out  on  the  train  I felt  as  if  I were  going  to  die.  I am 
suffocating.” 

This  is  clearly  the  hysterical  tale  of  a badly  fright- 
ened woman,  under  the  spell  of  a set  of  ideas  imposed 
by  her  religious  faith.  But  hot  baths,  darning,  and 
prayers  would  not  have  been  called  upon  if  the  victim 
had  not  seriously  believed  that  Mrs.  Stetson,  by  fix- 
ing her  thoughts  with  malicious  intent,  was  causing 
this  midnight  agony  many  miles  away. 

The  story,  of  which  this  incident  is  a part,  is  set  in 
the  usual  commonplace  conflict  of  money  and  ambi- 
tion and  influence.  Step  by  step  Mrs.  Stetson  induced 


MALICIOUS  ANIMAL  MAGNETISM 


209 


the  convinced  disciple  to  give  far  more  largely  to  the 
support  of  the  church  than  her  means  allowed.  When 
a gift  of  fifteen  thousand  dollars  for  an  organ  was  ar- 
ranged, the  husband  protested;  the  gift  was  withdrawn, 
and  the  money  used  to  build  two  country  houses.  The 
withdrawal  from  her  vows  preyed  upon  the  mind  of 
the  disciple,  and  then  came  the  blighting  of  her  ven- 
tures and  the  “death-thought.”  “My  baby  was  born 
soon  after,  but  only  lived  several  days.  Every  pet  I 
had  died.  Every  flower  I touched  withered.  Ill-luck 
attended  the  building  of  my  houses.”  In  the  end,  the 
power  of  fear  prevailed;  one  of  the  houses  was  sold, 
and  the  church  shared  in  the  proceeds. 

And  this,  so  far  as  can  readily  be  determined,  is  the 
last  incident  in  the  drama  of  “M.A.M.”  With  Mrs. 
Eddy’s  death  in  1910  the  delusion  lost  its  personal 
vitality.  Never  eagerly  accepted  by  the  disciples,  it 
naturally  faded  from  view. 


V 

The  belief  in  “malicious  animal  magnetism”  can 
readily  be  derived  from  the  theory  and  practice  of 
Christian  Science  by  carrying  them  to  the  further  con- 
clusion that  what  cures  may  kill.  If  denying  ills  anni- 
hilates them,  why  should  not  asserting  iUs  create  them? 
The  existence  of  the  force  and  its  use  for  good  or  ill  are 
distinct.  If  the  doctrine  that  all  reality  is  mind  ac- 
coimts  for  the  benefits  which  the  practices  of  Chris- 
tian Science  confer  when  beneficently  used,  it  equally 
supports  the  possibility  of  “malpractice”  or  the 
“death-thought.”  Both  practices,  benevolent  and  ma- 
levolent, are  forms  of  “absent  treatment”;  the  one  is 


210  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


as  consistent  with  the  underlying  prineiple  as  the  other. 
In  the  Christian  Science  ritual  the  healer  and  his  com- 
pany are  thoroughly  convinced  that  the  deluded  pa- 
tient has  no  disease.  They  deny  the  reality  of  disease; 
they  intently  wish  that  the  patient  should  not  believe 
in  it.  They  make  “statements”  that  pneumonia  or 
rheumatism  or  typhoid  fever  or  smallpox  does  not 
exist;  that  the  patient  will  presently  be  released  from 
the  belief  that  he  has  it.  They  state  the  beneficence  of 
God,  the  healing  power  of  Christian  Seience,  and  by 
repeated  and  insistent  declaration  they  demonstrate 
away  the  belief  in  disease.  Change  all  this  procedure 
from  a blessing  to  a eurse,  but  retain  the  faith  in  the 
power  of  wishing  and  believing,  of  stating  and  aflSrm- 
ing,  and  of  other  verbal  substitutes  for  reality,  and 
you  can  inflict  injury  and  make  things  go  wrong,  just 
as  the  reverse  process  makes  them  go  right.  That  is 
all  that  is  necessary  to  reach  the  notion  of  mental 
“malpractice.”  Intensify  it  all  as  you  would  in  treat- 
ing a mortal  enemy,  and  you  have  the  “death-thought.” 
The  fact  that  “M.A.M.”  remained  so  largely  a per- 
sonal conviction  of  Mrs.  Eddy  without  ready  accept- 
ance by  her  followers  shows  that  irrationality  in  a 
modern  environment  has  its  set  limitations.  Mental 
epidemics  find  resistances  in  the  educational  accom- 
plishments of  the  American  democracy.  The  spirit 
of  the  age,  though  demonstrably  tolerant  of  sueh  start- 
ling logical  performances  as  the  success  of  Christian 
Science  attests,  none  the  less  sets  up  restraining  influ- 
ences upon  the  extent  to  which  that  process  may  go, 
even  in  a system  of  thinking  that  in  so  many  ways 
deserts  the  logic  that  makes  the  spirit  possible,  Irra- 


MALICIOUS  ANIMAL  MAGNETISM 


211 


tionality  as  well  as  rationality  has  its  limitations;  and 
thus  is  the  psychology  of  conviction  complicated.  It 
is  hardly  conceivable  that  such  a delusion  as  a mali- 
cious mental  influence  would  develop  to  a general  men- 
tal contagion,  however  strongly  incorporated  in  the 
doctrines  of  a sect,  and  however  strongly  these  doc- 
trines repudiate  the  claims  of  reality  and  the  logic  of 
daily  life.  The  loyal  Christian  Scientist  may  tolerate 
or  cherish  large  reserved  areas  of  belief  in  which  an 
alien  logic  rules;  he  is,  however,  careful  to  draw  the 
boundaries  between  these  areas  and  the  practical  field 
of  operation  of  his  business  affairs.  He  is  hardly  likely 
to  treat  in  the  same  manner  a Christian  Science  state- 
ment and  a bank  statement;  nor  will  he  assemble  a 
company  and  ask  their  aid  toward  increasing  his 
balance  in  the  bank  by  throwing  forth  intense  mental 
vibrations,  or  have  a fear  that  his  balance  will  be 
endangered  by  the  malicious  mental  concentration  of 
his  rivals;  he  is  not  likely  to  believe  that  fluctuations 
of  stocks  can  be  brought  about  by  “absent  treat- 
ment” on  the  part  of  “metaphysical”  bulls  and  bears. 
It  is  interesting  to  observe  that  the  integrity  of  a 
practical  reason  resists  the  encroachment  of  inconsis- 
tency, even  when  reinforced  by  religious  faith;  and  it 
is  equally  interesting  to  observe  that  in  the  actual 
experience  a saving  moral  integrity  does  the  same. 

The  easy-going  public  is  content  to  concede  that  if 
the  conviction  of  the  reality  of  mental  waves,  even 
if  it  implies  the  imreality  of  microbes,  helps  some  per- 
sons in  the  recovery  from  ills  that  the  denied  flesh  is 
yet  somehow  heir  to,  and  if  there  is  some  real  satisfac- 
tion in  considering  the  troubles  so  treated  not  as  dis- 


212  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


eases  but  as  mental  “errors  of  mortal  mind,”  so  let  it 
be;  democraey  is  tolerant  intellectually  as  well  as  polit- 
ically. But  if  this  force  is  used  to  inflict  injury,  even 
those  convinced  of  the  underlying  doctrine  hesitate  or 
refuse  to  accept  the  conclusion  consistent  with  their 
inconsistent  logic,  and  certainly  refuse  to  apply  it. 
The  psychology  of  conviction  in  such  issues  develops 
a logic  of  its  own.  When  hard-pressed,  consistency 
yields  to  morality;  ethical  notions  and  habits  exercise 
their  restraints  upon  thought  as  upon  action;  for  this, 
too,  is  part  of  the  general  psychology  under  which 
convictions  alike  develop  and  become  practically 
operative  in  conduct.  Principles  and  practice  are  most 
complexly  and  flexibly  connected  and  construed,  and 
the  influence  of  reserved  areas  of  thinking  makes  itself 
felt.  Moreover,  the  principle  of  satisfaction  prevails. 
The  converts  to  Christian  Science  are  attracted  to  it 
not  by  its  logic,  but  by  the  solace  it  offers;  they  find  this 
solace  in  the  one  aspect  of  its  doctrines  — the  denial  of 
ills  and  the  cme  of  so-called  disease  — and  not  in  the 
other  — the  belief  in  a malicious  use  of  the  same  order 
of  agency. 

In  so  far  as  the  psychologist  may  undertake  the 
guardianship  of  mental  health,  he  is  bound  to  regard 
the  menace  of  unreason  with  comparable  concern,  alike 
when  the  false  beliefs  which  it  fosters  are  apparently 
innocuous  and  when  they  are  palpably  dangerous.  For 
the  difference  in  no  small  measure  lies  in  the  limita- 
tions placed  by  the  restraints  of  sanity  upon  the  de- 
gree to  which  the  invasion  of  reason  is  carried  in  the 
direction  of  influencing  conduct.  The  type  of  think- 
ing that  leads  to  the  acceptance  of  such  Christian 


MALICIOUS  ANIMAL  MAGNETISM 


213 


Science  doctrines  as  that  there  is  no  difference  in  the 
manner  in  which  smallpox  spreads  and  that  in  which 
fear  or  the  blush  of  shame  spreads,  is  logically  in  line 
with  such  beliefs  as  the  deadly  power  of  a malicious 
mental  force.  A critical  reviewer  of  recent  “mental 
healing”  movements  charges  Mrs.  Eddy  with  “doing 
all  she  could  to  revive  in  om*  generation  the  panic  fear 
which  oppressed  all  Europe  for  centuries,”  and  finds 
the  temper  of  believers  in  “M.A.M.”  comparable  to 
that  which  “tortured  and  put  to  fiame  thousands  of 
friendless  old  women.”  The  temper  is  unquestionably 
malignant,  but  is  itself  tempered  by  a saving  common 
sense.  Large  collective  delusions  would  have  to  make 
their  way  against  all  the  bulwarks  that  science  and 
humanity,  experience  and  common  sense,  have  built 
about  sanity  and  sound  judgment.  Twentieth-centuiy 
minds  are  too  busy  with  realities,  too  saturated  with 
wholesome  and  profitable  ways  of  thinking,  too  grate- 
ful for  the  benefits  derived  from  science  and  a sturdy 
practical  sense,  to  desert  approved  standards,  tried 
and  true,  at  the  call  of  any  belief,  however  deep  the 
loyalty  that  it  claims.  Yet  outside  its  familiar  inter- 
ests, the  average  mind  is  open  to  the  lure  of  doctrines 
whose  very  obscmity  silences  reason  and  induces  a 
feeling  of  plausibility,  dulling  the  sense  of  incompati- 
bility with  the  logical  standards  of  daily  life  and  soimd 
science.  The  great  procession  of  Mrs.  Eddy’s  follow- 
ers does  not  mean  that  those  who  subscribe  to  her 
pseudo-philosophy  are  going  to  regulate  their  behavior 
or  their  business  on  the  theory  that  nothing  exists  but 
mind.  It  means  that  on  one  side  of  their  natures  they 
are  willing  to  yield  to  the  persuasiveness  of  doctrines 


214  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


that  would  make  the  rest  of  their  thinking  and  doing 
utterly  nonsensical.  In  that  kind  of  tolerance  there  is 
a real  menace  to  rationality.  The  whole  purpose  of 
education  is  to  make  men  reasonable,  so  that  when 
necessary  one  may  reason  with  them.  Any  tendency 
that  promotes  irrationality  is  a serious  menace  to  men- 
tal health,  even  though  it  affects  directly  only  a small 
part  of  the  community,  and  affects  them  in  but  a de- 
tached portion  of  their  attitudes  and  actions. 

If  a movement  can  give  shelter  to  so  pernicious  a 
doctrine  as  “malicious  animal  magnetism”  and  even 
in  isolated  cases  lead  to  such  procedures  as  those 
cited,  it  shows  the  menace  to  rationality  inherent  in 
a departure  from  straight  thinking;  for  this  type  of 
departure  is  a reversion  to  the  swaddling  stages  of  in- 
telligence, favorable  to  superstition  and  the  vain  pseudo- 
sciences of  an  outgrown  past.  In  this  sense  there  really 
are  malignant  mental  germs;  and  one  can  never  tell 
where,  despite  modern  precautions  in  mental  hygiene, 
such  germs  may  find  a culture-bed  suitable  to  their 
propagation.  Even  a limited  contagion  deserves  the 
serious  attention  of  the  guardians  of  mental  health. 

The  type  of  argument  concerned  in  this  study  suf- 
fers from  the  psychological  influence  that  the  belief 
affects  the  result;  an  apparent  verification  is  in  real- 
ity a prepossession.  Unquestionably  the  successes  of 
treatment  by  the  ritual  of  Christian  Science  demon- 
strate the  power  of  belief  to  aid  and  abet  the  recov- 
ery of  patients,  particularly  those  of  marked  nervous 
susceptibility.  Judicious  neglect  is  often  the  best 
prescription  for  troublesome  symptoms  aggravated  by 
worry  and  morbid  habits,  and  thus  deprived  of  nature’s 


MALICIOUS  ANIMA.L  MAGNETISM 


215 


healing  powers.  Over-attention  to  ailments,  fear,  anx- 
iety, distrust,  hopelessness,  react  unfavorably  upon  the 
prospects  for  recovery.  Poise  and  confidence,  however 
acquired,  relieve  these  obstacles  to  progress.  The 
Christian  Science  attitude  shares  in  these  benefits; 
but  to  ascribe  the  benefits  to  the  doctrine,  or  to  see  in 
them  a proof  of  the  doctrine,  is  an  obvious  or  a subtle 
fallacy  according  to  its  setting  in  the  minds  of  those 
misled  by  the  argument.  That  similar  benefits  may  be 
reached  along  the  highways  of  reason  quite  as  smely 
as  along  the  byways  of  unreason,  is  equally  true.  If 
so  reached  there  will  be  no  tendency  to  extend  the 
principle  beyond  its  warrant;  such  extension  is  the 
supreme  danger.  The  failure  to  distinguish  between 
organic  and  functional  disorders,  the  willingness  to 
expose  others  to  violently  contagious  diseases,  the 
refusal  to  employ  approved  precautions  and  remedies, 
are  all  most  rmreasonable  convictions.  The  fact  that 
they  may  be  derived  from  the  fundamental  proposition 
that  there  is  no  reality  except  mind,  and  once  thus 
derived  are  put  in  practice,  is  far  more  menacing  than 
a weak  and  imapplied  belief  in  “malicious  animal  mag- 
netism.” This  statement  is  pertinent  only  in  that  it 
calls  attention  to  the  menace  of  reason  inherent  in 
the  principles  of  “Eddy ism”;  the  examination  of  this 
strange  doctrine,  or  of  the  truths  regarding  mental 
healing  which  it  uses  and  abuses,  is  not  germane  to 
the  present  excursion  into  abnormal  logic  and  abnor- 
mal psychology. 

A false  and  shallow  view  of  the  principles  of  mental 
action  operates  in  the  preparation  of  the  soil  for  the 
spread  of  delusion;  for  this  reason  both  aspects,  true 


216  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


and  false,  must  be  eonsidered.  The  principle  itself  is 
well  recognized.  It  operates  in  crude  as  well  as  in  re- 
fined settings.  Travelers  among  primitive  peoples 
relate  that  the  warriors  ordinarily  recover  promptly 
from  spear-wounds,  but  not  if  they  believe  the  spear- 
heads to  be  poisoned.  But  to  regard  the  mode  of  ac- 
tion of  the  belief  the  same  as  that  of  the  poison  is  to 
ignore  the  distinction  between  the  subjective  and  the 
objective,  which  is  the  criterion  of  sanity.  Voltaire 
satirically  remarked  that  he  was  fully  persuaded  that 
incantations  together  with  a sufficient  dose  of  arsenic 
would  kill  your  neighbor’s  sheep.  As  a practical  mat- 
ter, we  live  in  a dual  world.  If  we  lived  only  in  the  world 
of  matter,  we  might  come  upon  arsenic  and  not  upon 
incantations;  and  if  we  lived  only  in  the  world  of  mind, 
we  might  come  upon  incantations,  but  not  upon  arse- 
nic. But  to  conclude  that  because  there  are  incanta- 
tions, therefore  there  is  no  arsenic  — to  say  nothing  of 
announcing  this  absm-dity  as  a great  discovery  — is 
the  height  of  unreason;  and  the  attempt  to  apply  it, 
either  by  reviving  a fear  of  incantations  or  by  remov- 
ing the  poison-labels  from  bottles  of  arsenic  is  equally 
though  differently  dangerous.  It  is  such  an  attitude 
favorable  to  unreason  that  the  confusions  fostered  by 
Christian  Science  doctrines  make  possible;  only  on  the 
basis  of  such  a departure  from  a sound  logic  would  it 
be  possible  to  graft  the  delusion  of  “M.A.M.”  Such 
a conviction,  despite  its  personal  aspects  as  an  indi- 
vidual delusion  of  suspicion  and  persecution,  has  a 
more  general  significance  in  the  setting  and  develop- 
ment that  accompany  it,  and  thus  contributes  to  its 
psychology.  It  takes  the  modern  mind  back  vio- 


MALICIOUS  ANIMAL  MAGNETISM 


217 


lently  to  the  cruder  thinking  of  an  outgrown  past,  and 
indicates  that  the  same  mind,  in  spite  of  educational 
opportimities,  may  succumb  to  the  same  disturbing 
forces  that  make  the  history  of  conviction  so  in- 
structive, while  yet  at  times  so  discouraging  a psy- 
chological record.  It  illustrates  also  how  gradual  and 
uncertain  is  the  transition  from  weak  to  perverse  think- 
ing; that  with  the  restraints  and  guidance  of  logic 
overturned,  the  issue  readily  turns  from  the  illogical 
to  the  pathological.  For  the  temptation  to  delusion 
proceeds  upon  the  attraction  of  a conclusion  to  a dis- 
ordered mind.  The  psychology  of  conviction  must  be 
conceived  broadly  enough  to  include  a study  of  devia- 
tions as  well  as  of  conformities;  for  both  are  of  one 
genius.  Sanity  lies  in  the  adjustment  of  psychological 
tendencies  to  logical  restraints.  The  study  of  convic- 
tion derives  its  value  jointly  from  both  sources,  often 
with  unexpected  illumination  from  the  more  irregular 
aspects,  as  shadows  bring  out  the  high  lights  and  the 
entire  picture  in  more  vivid  perspective. 


VIII 


THE  DEMOCRATIC  SUSPICION  OF 
EDUCATION 

In  the  survey  of  “cases”  of  conviction  the  transition 
is  now  to  be  made  to  the  active  arena  of  controversial 
questions.  As  a part  of  their  history  all  important 
beliefs  have  passed  through  controversial  stages.  In 
the  process  of  establishment  the  newer  candidate  en- 
counters the  accredited  prestige  of  the  older  claimant. 
Dispossession  in  intellectual  sovereignty  is  difficult; 
for  it  must  overcome  the  conservative  forces  of  adjust- 
ment and  the  adherence  to  systems  and  causes  that 
have  grown  into  the  intellectual  and  emotional  fiber 
of  both  popular  and  influential  conservative  minds. 
The  raising  of  doubts  disturbs  an  adjusted  attitude; 
this  is  naturally  an  unwelcome  procedure.  When  it 
meets  the  entrenched  positions  that  have  been  long 
occupied  and  have  developed  cherished  associations 
and  warmly  espoused  loyalties,  its  reception  is  still 
more  aggressively  resisted.  Heresy  is  the  familiar 
charge  that  brings  the  issue  to  trial;  persecutions  for 
radical,  dissenting,  subversive  convictions  are  fre- 
quent' and  far  from  creditable  incidents  in  the  his- 
tory of  thought.  Wdien  excommunication  and  social 
ostracism  are  superseded  as  incompatible  with  the 
accredited  standards  of  tolerance,  ridicule  and  sus- 
picion may  take  their  place.  The  controversy  that  dis- 
placed the  earth  from  its  central  position  in  the  cosmic 


DEMOCRATIC  SUSPICION  OF  EDUCATION  219 


system,  the  displacement  of  miracles  by  the  rigid  uni- 
formity of  natural  law,  the  displacement  of  “special 
creation  ” by  evolution,  — aU  furnish  examples  of  the 
opposition  which  great  convictions  encounter,  of  the 
bitter  controversies  through  which  they  emerge  to 
their  rightful  place.  Prestige,  prejudice,  convention, 
and  the  entire  array  of  conservative  social  forces  enter 
into  the  psychology  of  the  conflict.  This  field,  how- 
ever dominant  its  importance  in  the  general  history 
of  science,  is  not  the  one  to  be  selected  for  illustration 
of  the  psychology  of  controversial  issues;  for  these,  to 
be  typical,  must  deal  with  living,  shifting,  present-day 
problems.  The  older  controversies,  though  their  les- 
sons are  not  remote,  have  no  decisive  bearing  upon  the 
attitudes  that  affect  our  convictions  or  with  which 
we  sympathize.  The  weapons  employed  in  the  intel- 
lectual campaigns  of  the  past  are  obsolete  in  our 
twentieth-century  equipment.  In  the  progressive  war- 
fares of  the  mind  the  armament  changes  as  radically 
as  in  military  operations.  In  both  fields  war  motives 
are  more  enduring  than  the  settings  and  the  instru- 
ments of  the  conflicts. 

Displacements  and  replacements,  reformations  and 
renaissances,  are  inevitably  gradual  in  their  progress, 
however  sharp  and  critical  the  attack  and  defense  at 
the  moment  of  the  conflict.  Certain  orders  of  con- 
victions are  markedly  fluid  in  their  establishment,  are 
much  like  dissolving  views  in  the  manner  of  the  wane 
of  the  old  and  the  yielding  to  the  new.  The  emphasis 
and  the  rendering  change,  rather  than  the  theme.  An 
altered  manner  and  method  of  procedure,  more  con- 
genial to  the  spirit  of  the  incoming  age,  characterize 


220  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


such  movements;  the  waves  of  their  progression  form 
in  contours  of  a gentle  sweep.  Such  plastic  convictions 
are  determined  less  by  newer  orders  of  knowledge  than 
by  newer  insights  and  interpretations.  The  contro- 
versy is  real  but  never  critical;  gradually,  without 
convulsion,  the  old  order  passes.  Peace  ensues  with- 
out aggressive  victory;  an  altered  attitude,  like  the 
calm  after  a storm,  settles  upon  the  same  scene,  yet 
transforms  its  complexion.  The  changed  status  of 
women,  the  attitude  toward  war,  the  place  yielded  to 
indulgence  in  the  social  code,  are  but  a few  of  the 
many  examples.  In  their  discussion  the  shift  of  em- 
phasis and  of  point  of  view  bring  other  orders  of 
consideration  to  the  foreground,  and  retire  the  promi- 
nent features  of  yesterdays.  A change  of  interest  be- 
comes as  significant  as  a change  of  conclusion. 

By  a proper  selection  of  “cases,”  controversial  psy- 
chology may  be  portrayed  in  the  making,  with  the 
intent  to  interpret  its  nature  and  to  render  its  spirit. 
In  such  an  essay  a unifying  interpretation  is  decisive; 
the  features  are  given,  but  the  expression  must  be 
brought  out.  Such  portrayal  is  entirely  compatible 
with  an  intent  to  incline  conviction  toward  one  posi- 
tion and  away  from  others;  there  should  be  no  prop- 
aganda, but  there  may  properly  be  an  array  of  the 
evidence  toward  a consistent  exposition,  by  which  the 
mind  is  won  to  a satisfying  conclusion.  The  argument 
proceeds  upon  a psychological  understanding  of  the 
complex  forces  that  shape  conviction  as  affected  by 
temperaments  and  circumstances.  Selected  surveys  of 
living  controversial  issues  may  prove  rich  in  illustra- 
tive value  and  profitable  in  consideration. 


DEMOCRATIC  SUSPICION  OF  EDUCATION  221 


The  theme  introducing  the  controversial  group  — 
by  way  of  overture,  as  it  were  — is  of  somewhat  differ- 
ent status.  The  position  of  education  in  the  system  of 
acquiring  social  control  is  apparently  imcontro verted; 
the  opposition  is  apparently  non-existent.  But  it  is 
possible  to  summon  the  plaintiff  and  obtain  a state- 
ment of  the  charge.  Despite  appearances,  education  is 
really  placed  upon  the  defensive,  and  in  varied  forms 
of  expression  has  always  been  so.  The  suspicion  of 
education  is  of  ancient  lineage,  though  no  more  ven- 
erable than  the  respect,  even  the  awe  or  fear  of  learn- 
ing. In  the  history  of  the  intellectual  classes  there  is 
some  justification  for  the  distrust.  In  the  beginnings 
of  culture  the  priest  medicine-man  was  the  sole  repre- 
sentative of  the  savant.  Learning  conferred  a some- 
what mysterious  power  to  influence  fate;  the  possi- 
bility of  using  the  knowledge-control  to  work  fil,  as 
well  as  the  intangible  nature  of  the  gift,  gave  rise  to 
awe  and  fear.  Soothsayer,  interpreter  of  omens  and 
the  signs  of  nature,  magician  and  depositary  of  lore, 
the  proof  of  his  art  was  a practical  test  — the  power, 
like  that  of  Aaron,  to  do  something  beyond  the  ordi- 
nary capacity,  to  transcend  common  experience.  When 
miracles  were  demanded,  the  temptation  to  resort  to 
trickery  was  strong;  and  the  play  upon  ignorance  would 
readily  convert  even  a modest  accomplishment  into  a 
marvelous  power.  Thus  set  apart,  the  wise  man  may 
put  his  prestige  to  too  severe  a strain,  or  he  may  exercise 
his  ealling  in  an  unpopular  cause;  also  his  pretenses 
may  have  been  disclosed  sufficiently  to  arouse  suspi- 
cion of  his  office.  Under  a possible  twofold  application 
of  the  power  conferred  by  knowledge  — so  long  as  the 


222  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


methods  of  securing  intellectual  control  were  feebly 
understood  — there  arose  in  mediaeval  times  the  dis- 
tinction between  white  magic,  exercised  in  approved 
ways,  and  black  magic,  which  was  evil  and  presum- 
ably conferred  by  compact  with  the  Devil.  The  em- 
ployment of  this  Satanic  aid  was  the  theme  of  the 
drama  of  “Friar  Bacon”  and  of  the  “Faust”  legend; 
and  through  these  this  aspect  of  the  exhibition  and  the 
suspicion  of  learning  was  made  familiar.  In  a measure 
the  suspicion  under  which  the  wielders  of  the  black  art 
labored,  extended  vaguely  and  moderately  to  learning 
in  general. 

In  any  modern  setting  the  suspicion  is  differently 
exercised;  its  center  is  shifted.  A vast  amount  of  con- 
trol has  come  directly  out  of  practical  experience,  quite 
detached  apparently  from  the  scholar’s  professional 
activity.  Technical  skill  arising  from  direct  doing  and 
from  a rigidly  practical  learning,  acquires  a standing 
in  rivalry  to  the  form  of  control  conferred  by  the  study 
of  principles,  which  we  know  as  science;  for  science  is 
the  accredited  form  of  control  succeeding  the  ambi- 
tious search  for  the  essence  of  things,  which  captivated 
the  mediaeval  mind  and  gave  its  arts  their  magical 
aspect.^  Thus  theory  and  practice,  which  in  reality 
are  inseparable  and  mutually  dependent,  came  into 
a sharp  and  unfortunate  rivalry.  What  really  hap- 
pened was  that  principles  once  arduously  gained  by 
progressive  and  original  scholars  became  so  familiar 
that  they  were  absorbed  in  common  knowledge.  Prac- 

* An  aspect  of  the  old-time  search  is  considered  in  the  “Modern 
Occult”  in  my  Fact  and  Fable  in  Psychology  (1900);  see  also  pp.  238- 
275. 


DEMOCRATIC  SUSPICION  OF  EDUCATION  223 


tice  seemed  able  to  dispense  with  them,  but  really 
assumed  them.  Thus  fortified,  but  ignoring  the  source 
of  its  equipment,  practice  proceeded,  as  well  it  might, 
to  extend  its  domain  and  to  claim  its  mighty  conquests 
as  exclusively  its  own.  It  grew  proud  of  its  power  and 
naturally  attracted  the  larger  following.  Practice  is, 
indeed,  quite  capable  of  self-direction  so  long  as  it 
remains  fairly  close  to  a well-trodden  domain;  but  at 
the  frontier,  where  the  next  step  is  uncertain  and 
ventures  into  the  unknown,  theory  holds  the  larger 
vision  and  the  more  capable  direction. 

Once  education  has  become  a democratic  birthright, 
it  is  inevitably  limited  for  the  vast  majority  to  the 
point  at  which  it  fits  one  for  performance  of  the  sim- 
pler parts  in  the  social  economy.  A livelihood  must  be 
gained,  and  learning  comes  to  be  appraised  by  the 
“paying”  quality  of  its  gifts.  Such  pragmatic  test 
may  be  as  rigidly  applied  to  theory  as  to  practice,  but 
when  applied  to  the  study  of  principles  has  a more 
catholic  criterion.  The  man  of  science  appreciates  how 
indirect  may  be  the  road  from  theory  to  practice  and 
how  vain  are  short-cuts  as  well  as  royal  roads  to  learn- 
ing. The  democratic  temper  is  apt  to  be  impatient  of 
such  precautions,  and  to  ignore  what  is  not  patent  on 
the  surface,  apt  to  insist  upon  immediate  results  and 
to  become  suspicious  of  broad  foimdations,  when  the 
details  and  specifications  of  the  structure  to  be  erected 
upon  them  cannot  be  supplied. 

But  the  peculiarly  ominous  feature  of  the  democra- 
tic rule  is  that,  with  its  freer  distribution  of  opportuni- 
ties, “practical”  men  come  into  influential  positions, 
and  establish  alike  the  standards  of  approved  success 


224  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


and  the  power  to  enforce  them.  Political  control  and 
economic  control  set  the  patterns  for  control  in  gen- 
eral; and  any  claim  for  exemption  on  the  part  of  edu- 
cation from  the  tests  thus  established  is  cavalierly 
dismissed  as  a specious  mask  for  incompetence.  While 
still  regarded  as  indispensable,  education  finds  its 
hands  tied  by  an  alien  rule,  which  may  be  kindly  but 
undiscriminating,  but  is  quite  as  likely  to  be  self-con- 
fident and  intolerant.  Thus  transfigured,  the  demo- 
cratic suspicion  of  education  is  the  strangely  habited 
successor  of  the  distrust  of  the  learned  arts.  In  some 
quarters  disavowing  the  role,  in  others  proud  of  it, 
the  champions  of  the  practical  life  become  diflBcult 
opponents  because  of  their  entrenched  positions  and 
their  dislike  or  disdain  for  argument  when  conclu- 
sions can  be  more  simply  determined  by  force.  Stated 
with  the  pardonable  brusqueness  that  results  from  a 
rough  sketch,  such  is  the  controversial  contention  that 
is  selected  for  consideration,  because  its  very  existence 
is  so  commonly  ignored,  either  in  complacent  satis- 
faction with  the  status  quo,  or  resignation  to  it,  or  in 
an  imwillingness  to  agitate  with  imcertain  profit,  and 
face  the  possibility  of  arousing  a more  aggressive  dis- 
trust. 


I 

Among  the  professed  convictions  of  democracy  none 
is  more  readily  urged  than  the  belief  in  education.  All 
adherents,  whatever  their  partisan  political  affiliations, 
eagerly  espouse  its  cause,  as  similarly  all  nations 
profess  the  cause  of  peace.  But  the  type  of  education 
and  the  conditions  under  which  it  shall  proceed,  like 


DEMOCRATIC  SUSPICION  OF  EDUCATION  225 

the  conditions  under  which  nations  will  keep  the  peace, 
are  matters  of  serious  contention.  For  education  as 
for  peace  the  critical  issue  is  the  placing  of  that  con- 
trol; for  education  the  actual  conflict  is  between  the 
several  orders  of  interest  contending  for  a share  in  the 
social  control. 

Education  is  at  once  respected  and  suspected;  for 
education  protects  the  past,  even  as  it  secmes  or  mort- 
gages the  future.  It  faces  the  task  of  reconciling  the 
older  and  the  newer  order,  of  making  the  transition 
from  one  to  the  other.  In  a brisk  democratic  climate, 
education,  if  it  takes  its  clue  too  largely  from  prece- 
dent, becomes  dull  and  forbidding  to  the  stirndy  pro- 
gressives; if  it  caters  too  eagerly  to  the  ambitious  haste 
of  the  yoimg  and  untried,  it  loses  poise  and  prestige. 
The  situation,  however,  is  not  so  simple,  either  in  fact 
or  in  statement. 

The  parties  to  the  suspicion  of  education  are  not 
readily  summoned.  It  is  only  occasionally,  when  the 
freedom  of  speech  and  action  is  at  stake,  that  the  issue 
comes  to  trial.  The  ancient  form  of  the  conflict  was 
direct  and  militant,  and  promptly  raised  the  cry  of 
heresy.  From  charges  of  heresy  to  modern  indulgent 
tolerance,  the  change  of  front  is  decided.  In  the  old- 
time  regime  the  professor  was  assumed  to  be  safely 
orthodox.  Any  deviations  from  the  prescribed  path 
were  sharply  checked  by  a superior  of  his  own  guild. 
In  the  present  order  his  calling  approaches  that  of  an 
accredited  pathfinder;  if  his  right  of  dispensation  is 
questioned,  it  is  he  who  reads  the  law  of  trespass  upon 
academic  freedom.  Yet  the  two  expressions  are  one 
in  motive  and  akin  in  circumstance.  The  professor  in 


226  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


the  land  of  the  free  — if  he  remembers  that  it  is  also 
the  home  of  the  brave  — may  attain  a democratic 
variety  of  liberty.  If  he  is  moderately  vertebrate,  de- 
cently considerate,  and  properly  practical,  he  enjoys 
the  freedom  of  the  forum  as  well  as  of  the  academy, 
But  restrictions,  however  themselves  restrained,  are 
at  work;  they  may  not  gall,  but  they  chafe.  The  man 
of  ideas  is  not  gagged  or  muzzled,  but  tethered.  The 
stake  is  shifted  to  pastures  new  when  the  powers  that 
be  decide  to  extend  the  boundaries  of  what  it  is  safe 
for  the  public  to  know.  The  restraint  handicaps  the 
profession  as  it  limits  its  public  service.  It  is  not 
austere,  dogmatic,  or  ceremonial,  because  these  forms 
of  expression  are  uncongenial  to  a modern  platform. 
Yet  the  suspicion  of  education  remains;  the  voice  is 
Jacob’s  voice,  but  the  hands  are  the  hands  of  Esau. 

In  our  up-to-date  democracy  it  is  not  the  dead  hand 
of  the  past  that  stills  the  voice  of  the  scholar  or  saps 
the  vitality  of  his  utterance,  but  the  mailed  fist  of  the 
present.  The  fear  or  the  complaint  is  not  that  the 
learned  tribe  are  going  too  fast  in  tearing  up  the  old, 
but  that  they  are  presumptuously  interfering  with  the 
new.  The  distrust  is  a pragmatic  tribute  to  learning,  in 
that  it  assumes  that  what  is  taught  in  the  academy  has 
its  effect  in  the  market-place.  Suspicion  is  aroused  only 
when  real  or  cherished  values  are  threatened;  these  vary 
with  the  changing  rallying-points  of  worldly  interests. 

The  shifting  lines  of  conservative  protest  are  sug- 
gestive. The  sciences  and  philosophies  that  deal  with 
man  — his  origin,  his  nature,  his  obligations,  his  des- 
tiny — invite  the  suspicion  of  learning.  What  the  peo- 
ple believe  on  these  matters  profoundly  affects  their 


DEMOCRATIC  SUSPICION  OF  EDUCATION  227 


conduct,  and  may  disturb  the  established  institutions 
that  assert  a control  of  such  conduct.  Beyond  this 
range,  feeling  does  not  rim  high  because  interest  is  re- 
mote. We  must  go  back  a generation  or  two  in  time 
and  a longer  span  in  ideas,  to  find  an  heretical  suspi- 
cion of  geology,  for  example.  To  our  retrospect  it  seems 
a crude  loyalty  to  the  Biblical  prestige  and  an  insen- 
sitiveness to  the  ethnological  quality  of  the  story  of 
creation,  that  looked  upon  the  geological  accoimt  as 
a rival.  The  attitude  toward  inquiry  that  entertained 
the  suspicion  is  substantially  obsolete.  In  the  ab- 
sence of  any  sanctified  chemistry  or  physics  — apart 
from  certain  aspects  of  miracles  — these  sciences  es- 
caped the  heretical  implication;  but  they  did  not 
escape  the  oppressive,  inhospitable,  ghetto-like  atmos- 
phere of  suspicion  in  which  all  science  had  so  long  to 
live.  Astronomy  was  less  fortunate  in  that  the  earth 
was  the  human  habitat,  and  the  cosmic  system  the 
center  of  all  speculation.  Such  considerations  are  sig- 
nificant. As  a fact,  it  made  no  difference  to  the  or- 
dinary citizen  whether  he  believed  in  the  Ptolemaic 
or  the  Copernican  system,  except  as  authority  stepped 
in  and  saw  to  it  that  he  should  be  let  alone  in  the  one 
case  and  suitably  harassed  in  the  other.  But  what 
always  made  a difference  was  whether  the  citizen  was 
acquiescent  and  conforming  or  not,  and  from  whom  he 
took  his  orders  — the  crucial  issue  of  the  social  control. 
To  tolerate  indiscriminate  inquiry  or  condone  skepti- 
cism is  an  invitation  to  anarchy;  no  one  can  tell  where 
it  will  stop. 

It  becomes  apparent  that  the  suspicion  of  education 
centers  about  the  knowledge-sources  of  hiunan  control 


228  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


and  moves  with  the  shifting  center  of  the  established 
institutional  interests.  In  long  cultural  sweeps  it  shifts 
from  Church  to  State;  within  the  State  from  absolute 
authority  to  mobilized  partisanship,  from  politics  to 
commerce,  from  one  system  of  fused  and  composite 
interests  to  another.  The  democratic  suspicion  of  edu- 
cation is  the  dominant  one  in  American  affairs.  It 
grows  out  of  the  complications  of  theory  and  practice 
in  a highly  organized,  industrialized  community.  The 
constructive  instincts  are  bigger  and  older  than  the 
intellectual  ones.  The  native  human  fitness  is  for  do- 
ing things;  changing  the  face  of  nature  is  the  human 
specialty.  The  cult  of  the  hand  is  more  universal  than 
the  cult  of  the  head.  The  practically  occupied  part  of 
humanity  is  always  the  vast  majority;  the  intelligence 
of  the  practical  understanding  sets  the  standards  of 
intelligence  in  all  respects  and  the  perspective  of  in- 
terests yet  more  conclusively. 

Biologically,  it  may  be  noted,  man’s  only  formidable 
weapons  are  his  wits.  In  his  early  career  he  outwitted 
his  animal  competitors;  and  the  game  of  life  persists 
as  a complicated  endeavor  to  outwit  one’s  human 
competitors.  It  is  natural  that  beyond  the  point  of 
immediate  guidance  of  action,  the  pursuit  of  knowledge 
should  seem  a vanity  or  a luxury.  To  the  many  it  is 
such;  to  the  few,  not.  That  ridge  forms  the  great  di- 
vide, and  eventually  estranges  the  few  who  live  by 
thinking,  in  a world  of  ideas,  from  the  many  who  live 
by  doing,  in  a world  of  action.  The  public  function 
of  education  is  to  reconcile  the  estrangement,  to  bring 
the  two  camps  together. 

It  is  a sobering  consideration  that  the  carrying  of 


DEMOCRATIC  SUSPICION  OF  EDUCATION  229 


thinking  beyond  the  stress  of  the  urgent  or  the  immi- 
nent situation  is  in  truth  an  unnatural  process;  but 
also  that  such  is  the  inexorable  demand  of  the  artifi- 
cial life.  The  complimentary  designation  homo  sapiens 
applies  feebly  to  the  race  at  large.  To  the  unsophisti- 
cated mind,  getting  results  by  thinking  seems  a weird, 
uncanny  process.  Letters  and  formulse  are  charms, 
and  the  laboratory  a witches’  caldron.  Necessity  is  the 
only  accredited  mother  of  invention;  and,  by  the  same 
token,  laziness  must  be  its  father,  since  labor-saving 
devices  are  the  common  features  of  the  progeny. 
Yet  that  incidental  by-product  of  the  problem-solv- 
ing impulse  through  which  was  distributed  irregu- 
larly among  men  a liking  of  the  thought-adventme 
and  a joy  in  the  mental  quest,  has  proved  to  be  the 
most  momentous  factor  in  human  evolution.  Little 
wonder  that  genius  stands  aloof  and  anomalous,  com- 
manding awe  and  suspicion,  and  that  a like  suspicion 
attaches  to  all  practitioners  of  the  thinking  arts,  black 
and  white,  ancient  and  modern. 

With  such  an  heredity  the  present-day  suspicion 
of  education  becomes  more  intelligible.  But  present- 
day  conditions  seem  peculiarly  fitted  to  dispose  of  the 
suspicion  finally.  There  is  so  much  intermingled,  com- 
plicated knowing  and  doing  for  so  many  of  us,  that 
the  intercourse  between  them  is  busy  and  regulated. 
The  portals  of  learning  are  thrown  wide  open.  A di- 
versity is  democratically  defined  as  an  opportunity  for 
anybody  to  learn  anything.  The  cult  of  learning  has 
no  longer  any  hallowed  secrets  or  mystic  rites.  The 
democratic  shift  of  affairs,  reflecting  the  widespread 
organization  of  industry  and  the  bigness  of  it  in  the 


230  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


perspective  of  life,  has  swept  the  center  of  social  con- 
trol into  the  stream  of  the  industrial  traffic,  and  es- 
tablished the  stock-exchange  as  the  solar  plexus  of 
communal  sensibility. 


II 

When  the  universities,  both  leading  and  following 
the  political  and  industrial  movement,  incorporated 
the  newer  humanities  into  the  curriculum,  the  demo- 
cratic suspicion  was  inevitably  concentrated  upon  these 
studies,  as  soon  as  they  grew  formidable  enough  to 
assert  a direction  of  affairs.  The  big  business  of  gov- 
ernment rapidly  became  hugely  complex,  and  had  to 
be  organized  as  much  after  the  manner  of  studies 
as  of  office  routine  or  industrial  management.  The 
methods  of  investigation  and  research  were  alone  ade- 
quate to  confer  insight.  The  man  trained  in  the  school 
of  experience  occupied  one  side  of  the  desk,  and  the 
man  trained  in  the  school  of  organized  learning,  the 
other.  The  suspicion  of  education  still  hovered  near 
and  erected  an  intangible  barrier.  The  question  of 
directive  control  was  certain  to  become  a critical  issue. 

The  effect  within  the  universities  was  marked.  It 
weakened  the  waning  hold  of  the  older  humanities,  and 
in  so  far  removed  them  from  the  zone  of  contention 
toward  the  neutral  territory  of  the  harmless  and  the 
useless;  it  also  altered  the  trend  and  temper  of  inquiry 
throughout  the  institution.  This  movement  proceeded 
with  safety  and  sanity  in  the  European  universities 
by  reason  of  the  firm  establishment  of  the  rights  and 
dignities  of  learning  and  the  accredited  share  of  trained 
thinking  in  the  equipment  for  leadership.  In  the 


DEMOCRATIC  SUSPICION  OF  EDUCATION  231 


American  universities  the  parallel  conservative  ten- 
dencies were  negligibly  weak  or  had  a different  setting. 
In  the  older  institutions  of  the  Atlantic  seaboard,  en- 
dowed by  the  loyalties  of  private  patrons  and  serving 
the  interests  of  the  spirit,  somewhat  locally  interpreted, 
for  several  generations  of  homogeneous  communities, 
the  adjustment  was  gradual.  In  the  receding  frontiers 
where  territorial  and  industrial  expansion  was  rapid, 
governmental  regulations  provisional,  situations  urgent, 
different  solutions  of  public  interests  had  to  be  found. 
In  that  environment  any  desirable  citizen,  and  many 
an  undesirable  one,  could  be  elected  or  appointed 
upon  qualifications  moderately  imrelated  to  the  fimc- 
tion  to  be  served,  and  proceed  in  office  after  the  man- 
ner of  a man  of  action.  The  tradition  of  the  respecta- 
bility and  the  steadying  power  of  learning  was  not 
lost;  each  new  State  established  its  university  almost 
as  soon  as  its  capital.  The  educational  institutions 
accepted  the  conditions  and  such  limited  support  as 
they  made  possible,  and  prospered  in  varying  measure. 
The  rest  is  a matter  of  rapid  history.  The  distinctive 
and  comprehensive  fact  is  that  the  establishment 
after  their  manner  — in  itself  quite  unprecedented  — 
of  the  American  State  Universities  presented  to  the 
interested,  and  at  times  amazed  world,  the  reaction 
of  thorough-going  and  untraditional  democracy  to  the 
perplexing  claims  of  learning. 

The  primary  effect  of  the  contact  was  obvious.  De- 
mocracy raised  the  criterion  of  utility,  which  was  legiti- 
mate, and  insisted  upon  prescribing  the  instruments 
of  its  attainment,  which  was  questionable.  The  ban- 
ishment of  the  classical  inutilities  was  simple;  the  Greeks 


232  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


had  little  to  offer  on  facilities  of  transportation.  The 
contentious  question  of  the  value  of  studies  may  h«> 
side-stepped;  but  the  question  of  the  value  of  trained 
thinking  is  vital.  To  the  loyal  steward  of  learning, 
whatever  contributes  to  that  end  is  precious.  The 
democratic  steam-roller  is  not  a delicate  or  a con- 
siderate leveling  instrument.  Education  emerges  from 
the  operation  maimed  rather  than  rectified.  The  prac- 
tical criterion  is  derived  too  narrowly  from  a limited 
and  insistent  world  of  experience;  its  harsh  and  un- 
discriminating intrusion  distorts  the  pursuits  of  learn- 
ing and  disturbs  its  temper.  Feebly  supported  by 
tradition,  coerced  into  immediate  responsiveness  to 
local  pressure,  controlled  by  external  and  inevitably 
imintelligent  authority,  the  State  University  is  bound 
to  compromise  such  aspirations  and  ideals  as  sur- 
vive. Toward  the  activities  of  the  University  the 
practical  control  dispensed  with  irregular  bounty 
three  policies:  encoimagement,  indifference,  suspicion. 
The  immediately  and  aggressively  practical  was  en- 
couraged; the  traditional  and  well-established  main- 
stays of  learning  were  tolerated,  possibly  damned  with 
faint  praise,  possibly  permitted  to  decline  by  inani- 
tion; the  newer  studies,  with  close  bearing  upon  poli- 
tics and  business,  were  pastured  and  watched.  But 
back  of  all  and  most  vital  was  the  manner  of  regula- 
tion. Meanwhile  the  Universities  grew,  the  catalogue 
swelled,  the  students  flocked,  the  budget  waxed  apace. 

Ill 

The  phenomenal  and  triumphant  march  of  the 
higher  education  in  the  United  States  during  the  last 


DEMOCRATIC  SUSPICION  OF  EDUCATION  233 


half-century  may  be  viewed  as  the  visible  embodiment 
of  the  demoeratic  faith  in  education  as  the  only 
adequate  preparation  for  the  modern  life.  The  scale 
of  the  demonstration,  and  the  measure  and  manner  of 
conviction  which  it  embodies,  are  apt  to  escape  the 
attention  of  those  to  whom  the  phenomenon  is  famil- 
iar. It  may  appear  if  one  eonsiders  that  presumably 
for  the  first  time  in  history  has  the  control  of  the  vital 
concerns  of  education  fallen  to  the  direction  of  the 
people  at  large.  This  is  the  result  of  the  spread  of 
democracy,  which  is  one  with  the  spread  of  education, 
and  of  the  consequent  interest  in  the  educational  pro- 
visions and  the  equally  consequent  desire  (considering 
the  dominant  democratic  political  temper)  to  exer- 
cise control  over  it.  Only  when  the  mass  of  the  peo- 
ple were  in  creditable  measure  educated  — or  at  least 
the  possibility  of  such  education  stood  close  to  every- 
body’s horizon  — could  such  a situation  develop.  It 
has  developed  most  typically  in  the  United  States  by 
reason  of  the  extensive  opportunity  and  intensive 
assertion  of  the  democratic  regime;  and  it  appears  in 
the  fullness  of  its  implications  in  the  growth  and  ex- 
pansion, as  likewise  in  the  manner  of  control,  of  the 
State  University.  The  consideration  applies  to  the  en- 
tire educational  system,  but  to  the  University  pecu- 
liarly. For  the  student  of  the  convictions  underlying 
education  as  a great  social  institution,  the  manner  in 
which  the  democratic  genius  has  disposed  of  the  distri- 
bution of  control  is  of  commanding  interest.  It  is  not  a 
matter  of  limited  professional  concern,  least  of  all  is  it 
an  academic  question  in  the  uncomplimentary  barren 
sense  of  discussion  without  issue;  it  is  a vital  issue  in 


234 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


public  policy.  Though  a democracy  may  treat  edueation 
niggardly,  and  ignore  the  appalling  fact  that  the  cost  of 
one  battleship  will  pay  for  the  building  and  equipment 
of  a great  university  or  endow  a small  college,  the  edu- 
cational budget  and  the  educational  activities  form  a 
conspicuous  feature  even  in  an  ungenerous  provision. 

Turning  to  this  most  practical  aspect,  we  note  that 
in  regard  to  the  State  University,  the  voting  of  the 
sinews  of  war  is  a legislative  function,  and  thus  def- 
initely places  the  control  of  education  with  the  lay- 
man. On  this  matter  there  must  be  no  illusion;  the 
result  is  not  inevitable,  but  merely  actual;  for  the 
democratic  position  is  decided.  The  notion  that  those 
who  dance  must  pay  the  piper  is  universal;  the  notion 
that  those  who  pay  the  piper  shall  say  what  and  how 
he  shall  play  is  democratic.  In  such  measure  the  box- 
receipts  control  the  career  of  the  drama  and  the  ad- 
vertising columns  the  editorial  pages,  — all  crude  state- 
ments, but  in  this  application  not  libelous.  Next  must 
be  discarded  the  academic  delusion  that  by  adoption 
of  policy  one  may  put  asunder  what  by  institutional 
bond  goes  together.  Boards  of  Trustees  or  Regents 
may  solemnly  record  that  educational  questions  rest 
with  the  Faculty  and  financial  ones  with  the  Board; 
but  both  are  parties  to  self-deception  if  they  believe 
that  the  resolution  affects  the  facts.  Under  the  actual 
government  the  real  situation  is  that  questions  which 
the  Board  is  willing  to  leave  to  the  Faculty  define  the 
latter’s  province;  and  such  decisions  as  the  Legislature 
is  willing  to  leave  to  the  Board  determine  the  orbit  of 
its  powers.  The  determination  of  control,  within  the 
college  walls  and  without,  is  of  one  complexion. 


DEMOCRATIC  SUSPICION  OF  EDUCATION  235 


In  the  machinery  for  the  regulation  of  the  State 
Universities,  the  democratic  suspicion  of  education 
has  an  imprecedented  opportunity  to  reveal  its  exis- 
tence and  its  quality.  Here  the  student  of  education, 
with  a taste  for  diagnosis,  finds  the  tale-telling  symp- 
toms. Of  the  first  order  of  significance  is  the  transfer 
of  the  policy  and  spirit  of  the  practical  life  to  the  aca- 
demic economy.  The  germ  responsible  for  the  most 
acute  symptom  is  that  insidious  bacterial  agency  known 
as  “efficiency.”  The  expansion  of  business,  including 
the  business  of  government,  has  developed  a technique 
of  its  own;  through  its  mastery  was  to  be  secured  the 
largest  share  of  social  control.  The  business  technique, 
and  still  more  disastrously  the  business  attitude,  comes 
into  sharp  and  direct  conflict  with  the  scholarly  tem- 
per and  disinterested  habit  of  mind  of  the  inquirer. 
The  one  criterion  is  tangible  and  intelligible;  the  other, 
intangible,  vmcertain,  and  difficult.  The  practical  man’s 
control  advances  or  implies  or  imposes  the  view  that 
the  same  methods  that  bring  success  in  business  must 
apply  and  have  like  value  in  education.  The  Univer- 
sity “plant”  must  be  weighed  and  surveyed,  and  if 
foimd  wanting.  Dr.  Efficiency  will  prescribe.  The  rat- 
ing of  the  student-factory  is  to  be  judged  by  its  out- 
put. Time-slips  and  unit-costs  tell  all  the  story  that  a 
busy  man  has  time  to  consider.  The  professor  fills  out 
a tediously  complete  question-sheet,  and  a clerk  tabu- 
lates just  what  he  is  worth.  Those  who  have  followed 
the  situation  know  that  this  is  not  an  exaggeration  or 
a travesty,  but  in  at  least  one  instance  an  imder-state- 
ment  of  the  crude  attempt  under  legislative  warrant 
to  apply  an  irrelevant  appraisal  to  a great  University’s 


236  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION  j 

activity.  This  may  be  paralleled  in  another  instance  by 
tlie  wanton  disregard  of  intellectual  interests  through  the 
autocratic  withholding  of  the  University’s  appropria- 
tions by  the  Governor  of  the  State,  In  the  latter  case 
the  danger  of  power  in  unintelligent  hands,  as  of  the  pos- 
sible fate  of  learning  under  political  handling,  is  drasti- 
cally illustrated;  in  the  former  case,  the  danger  of  car- 
rying a totally  unsuitable  method  of  appraisal  to  the 
extreme  of  an  obsession.  In  both  instances  the  motive 
force  is  the  insistence  upon  a practical  standard,  with 
the  consequent  suspicion  of  sound  learning  not  immedi- 
ately translatable  into  commercially  negotiable  terms. 
In  both  instances  the  most  obvious  and  essential  of 
practical  policies,  that  of  providing  every  worthy  en- 
terprise with  the  conditions  favorable  to  its  finest 
possibilities,  is  grossly  disregarded.  When  education 
is  appraised  by  irrelevant  standards,  its  cause,  however 
attentively  listened  to,  fails  to  get  a hearing.  The 
pleading  and  the  defense  come  to  assume  the  argu- 
ments acceptable  to  the  business  mind.  The  triumphs 
of  science  are  quoted  as  increasing  dividends  obtained 
by  conversion  of  the  baser  metal  of  inquiry  into  the 
gold  of  application.  Under  cover  of  such  benefit,  char- 
ity is  solicited  for  the  poor  relations  of  the  educa- 
tional household.  Morganatic  alliances  of  culture  and 
agriculture  are  entered  into  to  secure  the  interests  of 
the  future.  Defend,  excuse,  condone,  regret,  bewail  or 
censure  the  situation  as  one’s  conscience  or  one’s  tem- 
perament decides;  but  let  it  not  be  ignored.  Such  are 
the  controlling  factors  of  the  interests  of  education 
under  democratic  control. 

Perhaps  the  strangest  manifestation  of  the  demo- 


DEMOCRATIC  SUSPICION  OF  EDUCATION  237 


cratic  suspicion  of  education  is  the  complaint  that  the 
educational  interests  do  not  remain  free  from  the  taint 
of  political  influence  which  democracy  has  itsefl  im- 
posed. Common  and  loud  is  the  cry  that  the  State 
University  is  “in  politics.”  Forced  by  its  constitution 
to  be  a political  dependency,  pricked  into  an  alert  re- 
sponsiveness to  public  pressure,  improtected  by  an 
adequate  bill  of  rights  or  permanence  of  policy,  ex- 
posed to  inquisitive  periodical  digging-up  of  such  roots 
as  get  a start  in  the  meager  soil,  how  shall  it  be  other- 
wise? The  educational  present  is  no  sooner  liberated 
by  favorable  or  complacent  measures  than  the  future 
becomes  uncertain  by  a turn  of  political  fortune.  Poli- 
tics makes  strange  bedfellows,  and  the  State  Univer- 
sity is  called  to  account  for  the  character  of  its  involun- 
tary associates.  It  is  not  only  possible,  but  supremely 
easy,  to  free  the  State  University  of  all  undesirable 
political  affiliations.  A single  measure  properly  framed 
would  sectu’e  adequate  financial  support  and  legal 
security.  But  that  would  diminish  the  external  con- 
trol and  give  the  directive  policy  to  those  profes- 
sionally qualified  to  exercise  it;  and  there’s  the  rub, 
for  the  democratic  suspicion  of  education  will  not  have 
it  so. 

To  acquit  the  Universities  of  all  accountability  for 
the  imfortunate  situation  would  disclose  an  academic 
bias.  For  the  most  part  the  Universities  have  played 
the  game  with  little  or  no  protest  at  all.  They  have 
consented  to  make  it  a game.  Many  a worthy  Uni- 
versity president  has  entered  the  office  as  a scholar  and 
left  it  as  a politician.  Some  have  not  the  original 
handicap  to  overcome.  Some  entertain  the  imperial 


208  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


ambition  to  leave  in  marble  what  they  found  in  brick. 
Others  give  due  consideration  to  the  principle  that  a 
university  is  composed  of  men.  And  thus  we  reach 
the  indiscreet  question:  Who  is  (or  who  are)  the  Uni- 
versity? On  this  issue  one  may  be  as  neutral  as  the 
Sphinx  and  as  politic  as  the  University  president,  and 
yet  recognize  that  for  the  suspicion  of  education,  the 
University  is  the  Faculty.  No  legal  disfranchisement 
conceals  the  true  relation.  The  professor  in  his  im- 
protesting  timidity  may  be  dubbed  the  “third  sex”; 
but  the  unerring  test,  with  the  truth  of  psychological 
revelation,  leads  to  the  actual  source  of  influence.  By 
following  the  trail  of  suspicion  one  reaches  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  scholar  and  discloses  the  fear  of  trained 
thinking. 


IV 

It  is  well  to  carry  diagnosis  a little  farther  and  ob- 
serve how  the  men  of  knowledge  and  the  men  of  action 
come  to  clash.  Application  needs  no  defense,  and  specu- 
lation to  be  profitable  must  be  kept  within  bounds. 
The  divorce  of  thinking  from  the  vitality  of  fact  and 
the  experienced  habit  of  mind  leads  to  refined  but 
inconsequential  rumination.  The  scholastic  sterility  is 
the  historical  justification  of  the  suspicion  of  educa- 
tion; but  for  the  American  situation  it  is  as  remote  as 
the  accusation  of  witchcraft.  The  lines  of  conflict  are 
assembled  about  the  standards  by  which  utility  is  to 
be  judged.  The  practical  mind  in  this  aspect  of  its 
operation  is  strangely  blind  or  inconsistent.  The  charge 
may  be  made  respectfully,  for  it  is  recognized  that  all 
men  except  fools  have  their  irrational  sides.  The  prac- 


DEMOCRATIC  SUSPICION  OF  EDUCATION  239 


tical  mind  appreciates  the  benefits  of  science,  its  re- 
cent gifts  especially.  The  telegraph,  telephone,  elec- 
tric light,  motors,  and  automobiles  are  indispensable 
to  business.  A vote  of  thanks  is  in  order;  but  there  the 
matter  ends.  Of  the  intellectual  supports  of  science, 
the  depths  of  its  foundations,  the  immensity  of  its 
scope,  of  the  world  and  the  life  which  it  expresses  and 
the  consecration  which  it  imposes,  there  are  but  vague 
notions.  The  notion  approaches  definiteness  in  the 
suspicion  that  a demand  for  a favorable  scientific  at- 
mosphere is  a clever  but  specious  plea,  whose  real 
purpose  is  to  extract  uncontrolled  appropriations 
and  secure  immunity  from  investigation.  Deliver  the 
goods,  and  to  those  who  have  shall  be  given. 

The  practical  emphasis  is  legitimate  just  so  far  as 
it  is  intelligent.  But  the  source  of  insight  is  the  hidden 
spring  from  which  all  blessings  flow,  and  which,  like 
aH  springs,  will  run  dry  unless  constantly  replenished. 
The  effect  of  tmintelligent  democratic  practicality  is 
composite.  It  encourages  the  equalizing  education,  and 
makes  a pet  of  imiversity  extension  and  all  that  may 
be  spread  widely  and  thinly.  The  recognition  or  cul- 
tivation of  superior  fitness  is  viewed  with  suspicion. 
Learning  is  necessary,  even  admirable,  so  long  as  it 
serves.  Learn  all  there  is  to  know,  but  bring  the  learn- 
ing to  the  practical  man,  and  let  him  direct  its  employ- 
ment. Those  who  come  with  unprofitable  accumu- 
lations or  with  empty  hands  have  only  themselves  or 
the  system  of  education  to  blame.  The  expert,  like  the 
laborer,  is  worthy  of  his  hire  and  no  more;  and  to  be 
thus  worthy,  he  must  perform  a desired  and  a pre- 
scribed service.  The  twentieth-century  expansion  of 


240  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


industry  and  government  requires  the  services  of 
trained  thinking  in  systems  of  taxation  and  transpor- 
tation, in  regulation  of  natural  resources  and  public 
utilities.  The  employment  of  the  trained  thinker  is 
one  matter;  his  in  vesture  with  authority  quite  an- 
other. As  a clerk  to  a business-minded  commissioner 
he  is  acceptable,  but  as  a commissioner,  questionable. 
The  brunt  of  the  suspicion  goes  back  to  the  Univer- 
sity of  which  he  is  a product,  and  which  sets  his  affilia- 
tions. To  the  politically  minded,  affiliation  is  always 
of  a political  cast.  The  scholar  in  public  service  be- 
longs to  the  University  Party;  and  party  politics  is  a 
ruthless  struggle  for  social  control.  The  State  Uni- 
versity is  urged  by  the  practical  turn  of  the  democra- 
tic institution  to  apply  its  resources  to  the  problems  of 
the  day  and  the  hour,  and  by  the  very  thoroughness 
with  which  it  accepts  the  obligation,  it  arouses  the 
suspicion  of  its  service.  “Serve,  but  do  not  aspire  to 
control,”  would  be  a suitable  motto  for  its  portals,  if 
peace  at  any  price  were  its  policy.  “Let  thy  knowl- 
edge be  another’s  power,”  is  a proper  text  for  a bacca- 
laureate sermon  that  seeks  democratic  approval. 

V 

The  suspicion  of  education  has  another  and  a most 
significant  aspect.  Regulation  and  control  are  means; 
the  satisfaction  of  needs  is  an  end.  Between  the  two, 
morality  steps  in  and  justifies  or  denounces  means  and 
ends.  Conflict  of  policy  is  serious;  conflict  of  motive 
even  more  so.  The  regulation  of  public  good  and  pri- 
vate advantage  is  the  oldest  political  problem,  but  not 
older  than  the  moral  principles  by  which  it  alone  can 


DEMOCRATIC  SUSPICION  OF  EDUCATION  241 


be  safely  and  sanely  solved.  The  enduring  tempta- 
tion is  to  use  the  political  machinery  for  private  in- 
terests. Lobbyists  range  from  philanthropists  to  scoun- 
drels. The  back-door  channels  of  influence,  secret 
understandings,  bartering  of  measure  for  measure,  ex- 
tend the  mechanism  of  control  deviously  and  dubi- 
ously. Despite  distressful  exceptions,  the  party  of  the 
larger  knowledge  has  been  the  party  of  the  firmer  right- 
eousness. A sensitiveness  to  the  intellectual  values,  if 
education  is  permitted  to  express  its  inherent  quality, 
sensitizes  to  moral  values  as  well.  Times  alter  expres- 
sion; but  the  custody  of  learning  does  not  lose  its 
priestly  function.  Were  this  not  so,  a university  might 
degenerate  to  a training-school  for  “crooks.*^’  The 
atmosphere  of  ideas  and  ideals  is  one.  In  it  must  flour- 
ish such  measure  of  disinterested  endeavor  as  is  com- 
patible with  a rigorous  democratic  climate. 

The  political  suspicion  of  education  thus  acquires 
an  added  motive.  To  interpret  the  implication  crudely 
would  be  imjust;  to  ignore  it  is  misleading.  The  sins 
of  society  grow  with  its  complexity  and  rise  with  its 
level.  The  standards  of  propriety  that  divide  men  are 
delicate  and  involved.  Compromises  which  one  man 
sanctions  and  another  condemns  are  not  black  but 
variously  shaded.  It  is  altogether  too  true  that  the 
standards  congenial  to  the  political  habit  of  mind, 
with  its  short-sighted  vision  focused  upon  immediate 
advantage,  leave  convictions  forlorn  and  principles 
“all  tattered  and  torn.”  To  make  the  worse  appear 
the  better  cause  is  the  ancient  temptation  of  the  battle 
of  wits.  Hypocrites,  demagogues,  “confidence  men,” 
artful  dodgers  and  copious  shufilers,  all  shades  and 


242  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


grades  of  frauds,  persist  among  men  and  prove  the 
moral  neutrality  of  heredity.  These  engaging  quali- 
ties in  their  modern  guise  appear  less  as  vices  than  as 
failings;  they  are  toned  down  to  the  manners  of  re- 
spectability, but  the  disguise  is  often  as  crude  as  the 
underlying  quality.  You  cannot  wholly  avoid  them  by 
joining  University  Clubs;  and  to  their  shame,  the  Uni- 
versity’s graduates  have  not  always  proved  its  truest 
knight-defenders  in  the  political  jousts.  An  insensi- 
bility to  intellectual  values  and  to  moral  distinctions 
alike  contribute  to  a suspicion  of  education.  The  up- 
holders of  the  broader  learning,  as  of  the  finer  integ- 
rity, will  continue  to  love  the  cause  of  education  for  the 
enemies  she  makes. 

It  should  not  be  overlooked  that  in  developing  its 
position,  the  democratic  suspicion  of  learning  has  im- 
provised an  educational  platform.  The  democratic 
view  sets  forth  that  as  one  man  is  as  good  as  another, 
or  at  least  no  better,  so  is  one  study  as  fit  as  another. 
Education  has  no  center  and  an  accommodating  pe- 
riphery. This  convenient  theory  finds  defenders  within 
the  University,  possibly  as  a comforting  echo  of  the 
sentiment  without.  If  students  find  diflSiculties  in  en- 
trance requirements,  whittle  away  the  requirements, 
and  graduate  candidates  upon  terms  which  they  can 
conveniently  meet.  The  increasing  number  of  college 
graduates  may  always  be  pointed  to  to  prove  the  grow- 
ing enlightenment  of  the  State.  If  a man  is  not  equal 
to  his  task,  adjust  the  task  to  the  man,  or  accept  what 
he  can  do.  By  eliminating  quality  the  world  is  won- 
derfully simplified,  the  academic  world  especially. 
Consequences  multiply.  Those  within  the  University 


DEMOCRATIC  SUSPICION  OF  EDUCATION  243 


who  yield  to  the  popular  clamor  attract  the  elective 
affinities  of  the  student,  and  more  and  more  set  the 
standard  of  presentation  and  performance.  Injection  ' 
of  the  practical  motive  doubles  the  attendance  of 
the  complacent  professor’s  courses;  and,  however  re- 
sisted by  the  professors  more  loyal  to  ideals,  by  such 
returns  is  their  academic  status  affected.  Foimdations 
are  slighted,  engaging  but  imcritical  interpretations 
sponsored,  half-baked  theories  advanced,  and  equally 
indigestible  conclusions  swallowed.  The  process  has 
gone  on  long  enough  to  affect  the  quality  of  the  recruits 
to  the  learned  career.  The  rewards  of  practice  attract, 
and  the  disqualifications  of  the  learned  profession  re- 
pel. The  selection  is  lowered,  and  enough  of  the  weaker 
sort  enter  the  Faculties  to  give  unwelcome  support  to 
the  contention  of  the  practical  men  that  the  profes- 
sional man  is  no  better  equipped  for  responsibility  than 
any  one  else.  Too  frequently  insecure  in  professional 
virility,  the  practical  aspirant  for  preferment  finds  it 
easier  to  impress  the  layman  than  the  judgment  of  his 
peers.  The  suspicion  of  education  lowers  the  profes- 
sional standard  alike  of  learning  and  of  learners. 

Such  is  the  true  if  impopular  story  of  the  educational 
situation.  The  text  and  its  elaboration  may  not  be 
suitable  for  a congratulatory  Commencement  address. 
To  the  serious  and  sincere  it  induces  reflection,  per- 
haps dejection;  but  despondency  is  largely  tempera- 
mental; hope  and  despair  commonly  enjoy  the  same 
outlook.  There  is  no  question  that  theory  and  prac- 
tice will  continue  in  business  together.  The  warrant 
for  the  decline  of  the  fear  of  trained  thinking  lies  in 
the  fact  that  the  poUtical  and  the  industrial  expansion 


244  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


demand  it;  the  larger  experience  will  restore  the  truer 
perspective  and  the  broader  sympathy.  The  move- 
ment in  that  direction,  by  the  inertia  of  the  masses 
concerned,  is  slow  and  irregular.  Under  the  banner 
of  Efficiency  men  may  proceed  jauntily  to  brief  and 
startling  reform;  under  the  same  misleading  ensign  the 
reaction  from  its  disappointments,  sincere  or  feigned, 
will  proceed  to  a stronger  entrenchment  of  the  practi- 
cal man  and  a withdrawal  of  such  favor  to  the  cause  of 
new  learning  as  new  movements  dispense.  The  efieet 
seems  to  be  the  substitution  of  an  indiscriminate  for 
a partial  suspicion  of  learning. 

Yet  it  would  be  neither  fair  nor  wise  to  conclude  with 
this  despairing  note.  It  is  well  to  consider  that  matters 
might  be  worse.  There  are  more  menacing  dangers  to 
the  cause  of  education  than  a democratic  suspicion, 
there  is  an  autocratic  control.  Of  this  the  saddest  ex- 
ample that  the  modern  world  has  discovered  to  its 
dismay,  is  furnished  by  the  educational  system  that 
American  institutions  have  copied  with  greatest  re- 
spect. The  world  war  has  revealed  the  extent  to 
which  the  positions  and  preferments  of  professors  in 
German  Universities  is  determined  by  complacent 
agreement  with  governmental  policies.  Such  conform- 
ity has  gone  to  the  extent  of  shaping  doctrine  to  sup- 
port the  policies  of  those  in  power  and  supplying  them 
with  the  prostituted  sanction  of  learning.  Such  a con- 
dition subjects  the  freedom  of  teaching,  not  to  sus- 
picion or  limitation,  but  to  a perversion  worse  than 
any  possible  encroachment  by  unwise  distribution  of 
control.  Under  this  startling  revelation  the  cause  of 
academic  freedom  has  assumed  an  international  im- 


DEMOCRATIC  SUSPICION  OF  EDUCATION  245 


portance.  It  makes  clearer  to  democratic  institutions 
the  sanctity  of  educational  ideals  and  gives  the  intel- 
lectual interests  a clearer  share  in  the  safeguarding  of 
democracy.  Learning  must  be  free,  not  alone  to  di- 
rect practice  wisely,  but  to  perform  its  service  for  the 
commonwealth;  such  service  consists  in  the  command 
of  scientific  principles  which  is  the  warrant  of  the  ex- 
pert, and  the  loyalty  to  moral  principles  which  in 
considerable  measure  are  likewise  under  the  priestly 
custody  of  the  disciples  of  learning.  With  the  danger 
of  an  imwise  control  of  educational  interests  thus  dis- 
mally revealed,  the  truly  practical  man,  the  broadly 
practical  man,  wiU  more  readily  appreciate  the  impor- 
tance of  abandoning  his  suspicion  and  yielding  to  the 
professional  guardians  of  learning  a far  larger  and  more 
authoritative  control  than  is  now  exercised.  No  pro- 
fession can  maintain  itself  or  its  ideals,  can  attract  to 
its  calling  the  finest  minds,  that  does  not  control  the 
standards  of  its  guild  and  command  the  confidence  of 
the  public.  The  indispensable  step  toward  such  an 
issue  in  a democratic  nation  is  to  dismiss  the  suspicion 
of  education  as  an  obsolete  heritage  from  an  imenlight- 
ened  past.  Conviction  must  precede  reform;  a survey 
of  the  forces  shaping  such  conviction  may  serve  as  an 
approach  to  a more  fortunate  understanding. 


IX 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCE: 
ALCOHOL  AND  TOBACCO 

For  presenting  a controversial  issue  in  which  the  voice 
of  psychology  may  be  heard,  the  question  of  indulgence, 
more  particularly  the  “case”  of  alcohol  and  tobacco, 
presents  many  advantages  as  well  as  perplexities.  It 
is  a question  upon  which  persons  of  comparable  intel- 
lectual and  social  status,  of  like  concern  for  matters 
of  morality  and  of  health,  of  similar  outlook  and  edu- 
cation, hold  divergent  and  even  strenuously  opposed 
convictions.  The  problem  presents  widely  varying 
aspects  in  different  countries,  under  different  tradi- 
tions, which  in  turn  are  reflected  in  the  mode  of  regu- 
lation of  these  indulgences,  in  the  social  customs  sur- 
roimding  their  use,  and  particularly  in  the  attitude 
assumed  toward  them  by  the  prevalent  public  opin- 
ion. These  varieties  and  contrasts  are  the  issue  of  the 
cumulative  historical  forces  that  always  shape  modes 
and  standards  of  living.  Other  days,  other  ways;  from 
one  generation  to  another,  xmder  special  stress  of  cir- 
cumstance and  in  response  to  an  alert  social  conscience, 
views  change  moderately  or  decidedly.  In  addition,  the 
scientific  decision  in  regard  to  the  effect  of  alcohol 
and  tobacco  turns  upon  technical  investigations  in 
physiology  and  medicine,  involving  difficult  and  in- 
tricate interpretation.  Moreover,  a definite  stand  in 
the  matter  is  not  easily  avoided,  alike  in  theory  and 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCE  247 


in  practice.  The  situation  invites  if  it  does  not  compel 
a positive  attitude  and  decision.  The  question  of  the 
regulation  of  such  indulgences  is  certain  to  become  a 
public  concern,  and  may  become  an  acute  political 
issue.  Public  sentiment  and  public  opinion  determine 
personal  attitudes  narrowly  or  liberally;  very  differ- 
ent atmospheres  surroimd  the  indulgences,  leaning  to- 
ward approval,  or  tolerance,  or  indifference,  or  con- 
demnation, or  uncompromising  animosity.  Politically 
these  may  assume  a local,  or  a provincial,  or  a national 
importance.  Such  movements  at  times  gain  a favor- 
able and  rapid  headway,  and  again  are  treated  com- 
placently or  with  slight  concern.  In  a disinterested 
view  the  attempt  in  the  United  States  to  establish  a 
political  party  on  the  question  of  regulating  by  pro- 
hibiting the  traffic  in  alcohol,  is  an  amazing  anomaly. 
If  party  organizations  were  generally  carried  on  in 
this  spirit,  there  would  arise  as  many  parties  as  there 
are  planks  in  a platform;  and  the  problem  of  seeming 
a democratic  expression  of  opinion  would  become  even 
more  hopelessly  complicated  than  it  now  is.  Though 
it  may  be  formulated  politically,  the  liquor  question 
is  considered  morally.  It  inspires  violent  harangue  as 
well  as  sober  condemnation.  In  some  quarters  it  is 
presented  as  the  most  serious  menace  to  civilization; 
and  the  thousands  of  wrecked  lives  and  unhappy  homes 
traceable  to  the  liquor  habit  form  the  tragic  and  indis- 
putable evidence  of  the  gravity  of  the  problem.  Though 
so  nearly  equally  controlled  by  moral,  hygienic,  social, 
and  practical  considerations,  it  is  in  the  main  the  moral 
aspects  that  shape  the  contours  of  the  issue;  in  this 
respect  legislation  follows  public  sentiment  or  yields  to 


248  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


it.  The  practical  side  is  represented  by  the  question 
of  extravagance  and  the  obstacle  to  thrift,  and  by  the 
economic  effect  upon  the  efficiency  and  reliability  of 
labor.  Irregular  living,  diminished  returns,  enfeebled 
energies,  stand  as  the  charge  when  the  “case”  of  alco- 
hol is  called. 

For  all  these  reasons  the  attitude  toward  the  use  of 
alcohol,  and  in  lesser  measure  — thus  serving  as  a 
helpful  comparison  — toward  the  use  of  tobacco,  may 
profitably  be  considered  as  types  of  complex  convic- 
tions. The  larger  bearings  of  the  regulation  of  these 
indulgences  are  not  here  to  be  considered;  our  concern 
is  only  with  the  forces  that  shape  convictions  and  atti- 
tudes. In  this  view  alcohol  and  tobacco  become  “cases” 
of  indulgence;  for  psychologically  that  is  the  larger 
aspect  — not  necessarily  the  more  important  aspect 
■ — that  includes  them.  Under  these  limitations  the 
manner  of  formation,  and  in  some  measure  the  jus- 
tification of  convictions,  is  made  central  and  deter- 
mines what  shall  be  included  in  and  what  omitted  from 
the  present  survey.  Obviously  the  pros  and  cons  of 
statistical  data,  of  technical  investigation,  and  of  politi- 
cal situations  belong  to  other  domains;  as  do  also  the 
policies  to  be  reached  and  made  effective  after  due 
consideration  of  all  sides  and  interests.  Of  large  bear- 
ing upon  such  decision,  however  reached  or  whatever 
its  complexion,  is  the  general  principle  that  the  prac- 
tical setting  of  the  indulgence  — which  is  a matter 
of  the  attitude  toward  it,  and  thus  fundamentally 
psychological  — itself  determines  the  moral  and  man- 
nerly side  of  it,  and  through  these  the  measure  and 
nature  of  the  abuse  and  the  consequent  evils.  As  un- 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCE  249 


questionably  established  as  the  evils  of  intemperance 
and  the  menace  of  imwise  indulgence  (all  with  refer- 
ence to  one’s  temperament  and  surroundings)  is  the 
psychological  fact  that  the  influences  attaching  to  such 
indulgence  can  go  far  to  reduce  or  to  aggravate  the 
dangers,  to  give  the  indulgence  a favorable  or  unfav- 
orable setting.  The  American  saloon  and  the  manner 
in  which  liquor  is  used,  and  the  occasions  and  associa- 
tions of  the  drink-habit,  may  have  more  to  do  with 
the  evils  of  alcohol  than  its  intrinsic  and  inherent  men- 
ace. The  environment  of  the  potation  may  be  more 
decisive  than  the  alcoholic  ingredient.  And  this  means 
that  the  problem  must  be  considered  discriminatingly; 
the  discrimination  must  extend  to  details  and  circum- 
stances, alike  physiological,  psychological,  and  more 
generally  social.  Even  the  percentage  of  alcohol,  which 
represents  the  strength  of  the  craving,  — whether  for 
brief,  strong,  violent  stimulation,  or  for  leisurely,  con- 
vivial, moderate  easement,  — may  be  the  determin- 
ing factor  that  directs  the  indulgence  to  restraint  and 
an  innocent  sociability,  or  degrades  it  to  abandon  and 
irresponsibility.  For  tobacco  the  parallel  alternative 
may  be  between  using  the  weed  for  solace  and  the  sym- 
bol of  leisure,  or  for  excitation  and  relief  of  tension 
during  intensive  work.  In  aU  this  apparent  detach- 
ment there  is  no  intention  to  ignore  other  and  practi- 
cally more  important  aspects  of  the  “case”  of  alcohol 
and  tobacco.  The  set  limitations  of  the  essay  imply  a 
familiarity  with  such  other  bearings,  in  order  to  make 
way  for  a treatment  on  a larger  scale,  of  the  special 
psychological  considerations  that  are  so  easily  over- 
looked. The  psychologist,  hke  every  other  specialist. 


250  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


finds  in  a common  problem  the  material  for  his  special 
interests  and  interpretation.  In  so  far  as  he  sets  him- 
self the  troubled  task  of  illustrating  in  terms  of  the 
psychology  of  indulgence,  the  general  manner  in  which 
controversial  attitudes  are  shaped,  he  must  face  the 
consequences  of  his  venture.  He  may  be  content  if  he 
carries  the  conviction  of  the  pertinence  of  his  approach, 
whether  there  is  acceptance  or  rejection  of  his  conclu- 
sions. 


I 

It  is  conceded  that,  by  and  large,  the  affairs  of  the 
body  affect  the  business  of  the  mind,  that  substan- 
tially every  physiological  adjustment  involves  a psy- 
chological one.  When  the  effect  is  carried  primarily 
through  the  nervous  system,  the  relation  may  be  af- 
firmed unreservedly.  Such  direction  of  the  joint  affairs 
of  body  and  mind  regularly  assumes  a moral  aspect, 
readily  makes  demand  for  economic  regulation,  and 
may  appear  militantly  in  political  policies,  or  give  rise 
to  a complex  social  problem  in  a problem-conscious 
age.  In  the  hue  and  cry  against  the  use  of  tobacco  and 
alcohol  — in  excess  a serious  social  evil  — are  raised 
many  voices  of  denunciation.  The  clamor  is  loud  but 
confused;  for  the  cause,  like  other  causes,  makes  strange 
bedfellows.  Extravagant  tirade,  a noisy  campaign  cry 
of  extermination,  high-pitched  moral  concern,  lusty 
prejudice,  sanctimonious  preachment,  sober  judg- 
ment, political  hubbub,  contribute  to  the  Babel  of 
tongues.  In  such  an  issue  where  passions,  though  of 
milder  partisan  temper,  are  engaged,  a broad  rea- 
sonableness of  view  makes  for  poise  and  sanity  and 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCE  251 


tolerance  alike.  The  present  essay  presents  the  con- 
viction that  a consideration  of  the  psychology  of  in- 
dulgence may  promote  a helpful  attitude  toward  an 
admittedly  controversial  issue. 

A college  student,  after  a patient  trial  of  the  some- 
what strange  menu  of  a “health”  restaurant,  came  to 
the  reasonable  conclusion  that  there  was  no  substitute 
for  food.  To  this  we  may  agree,  and  agree  as  well  that 
it  behooves  us  to  exercise  discretion  in  regard  to  what 
shall  pass  the  lips  and  sustain  our  being.  Such  is  the 
dispensation  of  natme  that  links  in  close  sympathy 
digestion  and  disposition.  It  is,  however,  not  alto- 
gether a simple  matter  to  distinguish  between  foods 
and  stimulants,  and  aids  to  digestion;  for  these  are 
of  many  varieties  and  in  their  effect  encounter  a 
complex  physiology,  are  subject  to  the  individual 
susceptibility  that  proverbially  makes  one  man’s  meat 
another’s  poison.  When  the  chemistry  of  nutrition 
and  the  physiology  of  digestion  have  had  their  say 
and  have  been  duly  heeded,  the  food  problem  is  not 
disposed  of,  at  least  not  in  the  case  of  the  more  com- 
plexly organized  members  of  the  species,  to  whom 
consideration  may  be  directed.  It  begins  as  the 
relatively  simple  problem  of  feeding,  and  presently 
assumes  the  composite  complexion  of  dining;  and  the 
diner,  with  no  exemption  from  the  primitive  satisfac- 
tion of  tmiversal  needs,  is  none  the  less  a social,  aesthe- 
tic, moral,  and  intellectual  being  capable  and  desirous 
of  a generous  roxmd  of  as  worthy  (or,  at  least,  as  inno- 
cent) gratifications  as  his  endowments,  tastes,  and  cir- 
cumstances may  afford.  He  wishes  to  participate  in 
the  enjoyments  of  good,  and  likewise  of  sound  living. 


252  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


That  the  pleasures  of  the  table  play  some  proper  part 
in  the  art  of  living,  and  contribute  effectively  if  mod- 
estly to  the  formation  of  standards  and  levels  of  cul- 
ture, is  abundantly  attested  by  the  tried  and  approved 
customs  of  many  sorts  and  conditions  of  society.  Hos- 
pitality is  an  ancient  virtue  and  an  abiding  one.  Good- 
fellowship,  the  widening  of  sympathies  and  outlooks, 
the  stimulations  of  intercourse  and  temperate  dis- 
cussion of  the  affairs  of  state  or  philosophy  are  pro- 
moted by  the  companionship  of  the  table.  A German 
saying,  by  a play  of  words,  sets  forth  that  a man  is  what 
he  eats  ; it  would  be  truer  to  say  that  how  a man  eats 
is  a clue  to  his  nature.  At  all  events,  the  ceremonies 
of  the  repast  and  table-manners  come  to  serve  as  a 
critical  index  of  refinement.  Psychologically,  the  trans- 
formation from  feeding  to  dining  is  a convincing  ex- 
ample of  the  evolution  by  which  the  exercise  of  a 
natural  function  acquires  a worthy  social  status  by 
surrounding  it  with  the  several  embellishments  avail- 
able to  an  aesthetic  nature.  Released  from  the  grosser 
claims  of  urgent  hunger  and  absorption  in  the  cruder 
sensory  stimulations,  we  add  to  physiological  appe- 
tite — ever  the  best  because  the  natural  sauce  — sup- 
plementary allurements  of  spice,  garnishing,  flavor, 
setting,  and  such  arts  of  gastronomy  as  we  command. 
In  thus  elevating  a necessity  to  a function,  we  are  ever 
appealing  to  the  more  delicate,  and  are  subordinating 
the  grosser  satisfactions.  Nor  need  we  become  heed- 
less of  the  superior  injunction  of  plain  living  and  high 
thinking  enjoined  by  our  moral  nature,  that  in  turn 
subordinates  the  dinner  to  the  diners.  The  quality  of 
the  former  can  never  atone  for  any  notable  defections 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCE  253 


in  the  qualities  of  the  latter.  Yet  to  attain  the  repu- 
tation of  a welcome  dinner  guest  and  to  participate 
worthily  in  the  communion  that  ministers  to  daily 
needs  is  an  attainment  not  to  be  slighted.  The  culti- 
vation of  the  zests  of  life,  of  the  alleviations  of  the 
day’s  sterner  occupations,  presents  a claim  that  cannot 
be  denied  without  losing  something  of  the  fullness  of 
living.  It  is  true  with  more  than  one  reference  that 
man  does  not  live  by  bread  alone. 

The  appreciation  thus  defended,  itself  makes  for 
moderation.  It  sets  forth  the  service  of  the  seasonings 
and  garnishings,  and  by  that  token  does  not  mistake 
them  for  the  solid  ingredients  of  the  courses  them- 
selves. It  allies  itself  with  the  amenities,  the  luxuries, 
the  leisure,  and  the  surplusage  of  life,  from  which  many 
choice  blossoms  emanate;  it  contributes  the  order  of 
gratification  that  tends  to  advance  the  standards  of 
living.  It  does  not  depreciate  abuse  nor  become  im- 
mindful  of  temptation;  the  very  presence  of  tempered 
restraint  is  part  of  the  flavor.  Such  appreciation  may 
properly  point  with  disfavor  to  the  neglect  of  that 
which  it  cherishes,  to  bemoan  the  scant  place  accorded 
to  its  interests  in  a recklessly  busy  occupation,  snatch- 
ing hasty  bites  at  “quick-limch”  counters,  tolerant 
of  bad  cooking,  insensible  to  the  unsavoriness  of  a 
rushing  or  a mussy  existence.  If  the  cultivation  of 
standards  of  good  living  be  our  aim,  it  seems  reason- 
able to  enlist  in  the  cause  all  the  various  aids  of  high 
and  low  degree,  that  may  contribute  to  the  common 
end;  nor  need  we  fear,  if  we  have  any  confidence  in 
the  stability  of  our  individual,  social,  or  national 
character,  that  the  presence  of  restrained  indulgence 


254  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


will  mar  the  perspective  and  detract  from  the  higher, 
by  attention  to  the  lower  satisfactions,  or  by  exposure 
to  temptation  endanger  the  power  of  resistance.  Man- 
liness is  to  be  and  often  must  be  trusted  as  well  as 
sheltered;  and  by  the  very  confidence  that  we  express 
in  self-control,  we  pay  tribute  to  its  worth.  Ideals 
need  not  suffer  in  their  pragmatic  contact  with  the 
convincing  realities  of  our  many-sided  nature,  respon- 
sive to  the  versatile  appeals  of  a many-sided  world. 
It  is  rather  in  our  skill  in  making  the  conventions  of 
society  the  instruments  of  worthy  purposes  that  we 
show  our  quality  and  attain  the  full  stature  of  a privi- 
leged humanity. 

II 

All  this  may  seem  an  ambitious,  even  an  irrelevant 
prelude  to  quite  too  slight  a theme  to  sustain  it.  Yet 
the  argument  is  of  one  nature;  the  keynote  is  that 
of  the  psychology  of  indulgence.  Men  will  look  very 
differently  upon  the  place  that  may  properly  be  pro- 
vided or  sanctioned  for  such  indulgences  as  alcohol 
and  tobacco,  according  to  their  views  of  indulgence 
in  general,  of  the  legitimate  demand  to  be  conceded  to 
cravings  that  stand  close  to  vital  needs,  and  by  .such  in- 
timacy incur  the  danger  of  disturbing  the  general  econ- 
omy. Men  will  be  judged  by  the  direction  of  choice 
and  desire  — guided  by  morals,  manners,  and  ideals 
— among  the  varieties  of  indulgence  afforded  by  the 
democracy  of  common  opportimity  or  the  aristocracy 
of  special  privilege.  That  the  glass  of  wine  at  the  table 
and  the  cigar  after  it  have  come  to  take  their  part  in 
the  scheme  of  indulgent  gratification  that  promotes 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCE  255 


fellowship,  and  in  such  social  service,  under  the  usual 
sanctions  and  restrictions  of  convention,  have  served 
their  purpose  well,  may  be  advanced  with  quite  as 
much  warmth  and  pertinence  as  has  inspired  the  fierce 
and  undiscriminating  denunciations  that  recognize 
only  the  serious  evils  of  intoxication  and  an  intem- 
perate tobacco  habit.  It  will  ever  remain  the  case  that 
for  this  or  that  individual  or  group,  in  consideration 
of  the  dangers  to  which  the  use  of  alcohol  and  tobacco 
is  undeniably  open,  the  only  safe  and  the  only  wise 
policy  is  that  of  abstinence;  but  if  we  are  prepared  to 
guide  policy  by  knowledge  and  reason,  it  is  but  fair 
that  the  several  aspects  of  the  problem,  alike  for  prin- 
ciple and  for  practice,  be  considered  together  and  with- 
out prejudice. 

A comprehensive  antipathy  to  alcohol  and  tobacco 
is  expressed  in  the  verdict  that  places  them  in  the  in- 
dex expurgatorium  of  drugs,  and  speaks  of  the  indul- 
gence in  their  use,  however  moderate  or  occasional, 
as  a drug-habit.  It  allies  them  with  cocaine,  morphine, 
opium,  and  similar  psychic  poisons,  and  once  reach- 
ing the  term  “poison”  has  seemingly  proved  its  case. 
This  is  certainly  a striking  example  of  the  danger  in- 
herent in  assuming  an  intolerant  attitude  toward  a 
practice  admittedly  open  to  serious  danger  in  its 
abuse;  it  also  illustrates  that  such  danger  is  not  theo- 
retical but  woefully  real  in  the  American  situation  and 
temperament.  In  this  aspect  it  is  akin  to  the  similarly 
expressed  extreme  antagonism  to  the  use  of  drugs  in 
any  form,  for  any  purpose.  The  exponents  of  drug- 
less healing  illustrate  the  menace  of  conviction  when 
it  is  undiscriminating  in  its  premises  and  uncomprom- 


256  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


ising  in  its  conclusions.  It  is  wrong  — the  argument 
goes  — to  administer  drugs;  for  drugs  are  unnatural, 
and  many  of  them  are  poisons.  Cults,  such  as  Chris- 
tian Science  and  Dowie’s  Zionism,  are  inspired  by  such 
argument;  and  the  appeal  is  ever  to  the  obvious  ex- 
amples of  excess,  the  victims  of  drug-habits  that  ob- 
sess and  possess  them  to  their  undoing.  Let  children 
die  through  neglect  of  available  treatment;  let  the 
pangs  of  disease  and  the  tortures  of  injured  tissues 
bring  suffering  to  the  full;  let  pestilence  spread;  but 
let  us  abjure  drugs  at  whatever  cost!  It  is  entirely 
fair  to  adduce  this  amazing  example  of  inhuman- 
ity fostered  and  advocated  on  the  basis  of  just  such 
type  of  undiscriminating  prejudice  as  is  often  directed 
against  other  practices  — admittedly,  as  in  the  case 
of  tobacco  or  alcohol,  with  very  different  charges  and 
quite  different  defense.  It  is  fair,  because  only  thus 
can  one  make  plain  the  danger  inherent  in  such  atti- 
tudes, however  worthy  the  motives  or  the  causes  in 
which  they  are  enlisted.  They  make  directly  for  un- 
reason that  is  ever  potentially  vicious  and  dangerous. 
Whenever  a campaign  is  inspired  by  the  spirit  of  prej- 
udice and  imreason,  the  interests  of  sanity  and  sane 
regulation  are  jeopardized;  every  movement  that  con- 
ducts its  enterprises  by  means  of  such  appeals  assails 
the  rationality  of  the  commimity  and  paves  the  way 
for  fanaticism.  It  is  reasonableness  in  all  crises,  as  in 
lesser  occasions  of  moment,  that  is  the  fundamental 
resource  of  wholesome  judgment  and  policy,  alike  in 
hygiene,  in  morals,  in  politics,  and  the  many  con- 
troversial issues  of  public  welfare. 

One  is  tempted  to  go  farther  afield  to  illustrate  the 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCE  257 


menace  of  unreason  as  applied  to  problems  concern- 
ing hygienic  and  moral  measures  that  affect  the  rights 
of  the  individual  and  of  society.  Upon  the  basis  of  a 
similarly  inspired  opposition  — and  one  quite  as  un- 
intelligent— we  have  the  anti- vaccinationists;  and 
reaching  to  higher  circles  where  prejudices,  like  other 
beliefs,  acquire  a more  moralized  statement,  the  anti- 
vivisectionists.  It  is  gratifying  to  record  that  Ameri- 
can conditions  up  to  the  present  have  not  been  as  fav- 
orably disposed  toward  this  propaganda  of  imreason 
as  to  others;  ^ yet  it  is  possible  to  cite  the  well-known 
fact  that  a popular  periodical,  which  ministers  to  the 
relaxations  of  life  and  stands  for  that  sanity  of  view 
which  a sense  of  humor  so  notably  confers,  which  cir- 
culates among  the  more  cultivated  classes  of  society, 
incessantly  preaches  an  ignorant  and  false  crusade, 

^ Since  these  words  were  written,  the  occasion  for  recalling  them 
has  arisen.  The  “Red  Cross”  has  been  sued  by  the  anti-vivisection- 
ists  to  prevent  the  use  of  one  hundred  thousand  dollars  appropriated 
by  the  War  Council  for  medical  research  to  relieve  suffering  and 
dimmish  the  death-rate  among  war  casualties  of  our  own  soldiers. 
A more  amazing  instance  of  the  menace  of  intentional  ignorance  and 
obstinate  prejudice  is  hardly  imaginable.  To  insist  upon  a senti- 
mental objection  against  experiments  upon  animals  at  such  a critical 
time  in  the  history  of  the  nation,  in  brutal  disregard  of  the  facts  and 
in  impertinent  opposition  to  the  expert  conviction  of  medical  proof, 
is  as  preposterous  as  it  is  inhumane.  To  state  that  vivisection  has 
brought  no  benefit  to  mankind  in  face  of  the  overpowering  evidence 
to  the  contrary,  shows  the  utter  blindness  to  evidence  of  a convinced 
sentimental  prejudice;  to  urge  that  prejudice  at  this  time  and  thus 
to  cripple  the  humanitarian  efforts  that  redeem  the  awful  calamities 
of  war,  shows  the  complete  disregard  of  humane  considerations  to 
which  unreason  may  lead.  In  the  face  of  this  instance  of  bigoted 
opinion,  the  strictures  above  applied  to  it  seem  criminally  lenient. 
Like  the  delusions  of  the  insane  — to  which  such  fanaticism  is  allied 
— the  distinction  between  innocent  and  dangerous  beliefs  is  most 
treacherous.  Society  cannot  afford  an  attitude  of  tolerance;  the  men- 
ace of  extreme  conviction  is  too  serious. 


258  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


brutally  misrepresents  the  noble  army  of  experts  who 
are  carrying  the  triumphs  of  science  into  the  field  of 
deepest  concern  to  humane  interests,  criticizes  with- 
out authority  and  ignores  the  open  records  of  achieve- 
ment; while  in  the  main  stultifying  its  own  position, 
it  unquestionably  fosters  the  cause  of  prejudice.  With 
such  a flagrant  example  of  a campaign  of  unreason 
circulating  among  those  most  favored  in  condition 
and  education,  it  is  well  to  proceed  cautiously  in  all 
issues  prone  to  arouse  prejudice.  It  is,  indeed,  pertinent 
to  observe  that  vivisection,  vaccination,  and  the  use 
of  stimulants  are  essentially  medical  questions.  This 
does  not  mean  that  physicians  alone  have  the  right 
to  an  opinion  on  the  matter;  it  does  mean  that  the  same 
methods  of  scientific  study  must  be  applied  to  them  as 
to  all  other  problems  in  which  the  popular  judgment 
must  defer  to  the  expert.  Of  the  three,  the  vaccina- 
tion question  is  clearly  the  most  technical,  the  one  in 
which  a positive  lay  conviction  in  opposition  to  an 
established  medical  conclusion  is  most  impertinent. 
Yet  in  this  issue  the  method  of  prejudice  loses  none 
of  its  violence,  is  no  more  considerate  of  fact,  than  in 
more  legitimately  controversial  matters,  in  which  the 
nice  adjustment  of  individual  liberty  and  social  wel- 
fare require  a fair  hearing  of  all  interests. 

All  such  issues  revolve  about  the  claims  of  senti- 
ment as  against  reason.  The  proper  appraisal  of  sen- 
timent must  be  tactfully  as  well  as  charitably  reached. 
The  opposition  to  vivisection  is  more  intelligible  than 
that  which  inspires  the  anti- vaccinationists.  It  rests 

* It  is  familiar  that  the  sentiment  against  dissection  of  the  human 
body,  reinforced  by  the  authority  of  the  Church,  delayed  for  cen- 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCE  259 


upon  a sentiment  that  is  cordially  approved,  but  not 
as  a principle  to  be  followed  at  any  price.  In  the  view 
of  humane  men  of  science,  vivisection  is  amply  jus- 
tified by  the  benefits  which  it  confers  upon  the  human 
race;  to  abandon  it  or  even  unduly  restrict  it  would 
be  a costly  sacrifice  to  sentiment.  The  use  of  alcohol 
is  obviously  a more  debatable  matter,  essentially  a 
different  order  of  issue,  and  reaches  to  the  field  of  per- 
sonal and  social  even  more  than  of  medical  regulation. 
It  is  well,  however,  to  consider  related  issues  in  order 
to  appreciate  the  common  psychology  of  their  setting; 
to  appreciate  that  the  formation  of  conviction  upon 
such  issues  is  in  each  case  affected  by  a decidedly  simi- 
lar play  of  forces.  The  perspective  of  consideration  in 
all  of  them  shows  comparable  factors;  the  wise  deci- 
sion of  each  proceeds  by  the  same  methods.  In  all, 
tolerance  of  divergent  attitudes  and  the  avoidance  of 
fanatic  convictions  are  indispensable.  No  one  of  these 
questions  can  be  solved  wisely,  viewed  sanely,  regu- 
lated wholesomely,  unless  it  is  brought  and  kept  well 
within  the  sphere  of  discussion  dominated  by  a judicial 
temper,  and  subject,  when  pertinent,  to  expert,  scien- 
tific judgment.  That  the  same  danger  threatens  the 
attitude  toward  the  use  of  alcohol  and  tobacco  appears 
in  the  legislation  that  requires  textbooks  for  boys  and 
girls  to  recite  — often  with  a misleading  emphasis  and 
always  with  an  unwholesome  one  — the  shocking 
physiological  consequences  of  over-indulgence  in  alco- 

turies  the  advance  of  the  basal  medical  sciences,  even  after  these 
interests  had  been  scientifically  established.  Although  the  force  of 
proscription  was  more  powerfully  exercised  in  those  days,  and  the  ob- 
jectors had  a different  sentimental  background,  it  is  clearly  akin  to 
that  now  operative  in  more  restricted  measure. 


260  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


hoi  and  tobacco,  as  a part  of  an  elementary  introduc- 
tion to  the  principles  of  physiology.  Such  legislation 
is  inspired  by  a propaganda  conducted  with  mistaken 
zeal  and  persisted  in  despite  the  emphatic  protest  of 
experts  in  physiology  and  hygiene,  as  well  as  of  the 
lay  sponsors  of  sound  teaching  and  sane  views. 

Ill 

In  the  present  survey  it  is  not  possible  to  consider 
in  any  adequate  manner  the  findings  of  those  who 
have  calmly  and  scientifically  investigated  the  effects 
of  alcohol  or  tobacco,  or  to  interpret  their  sober  con- 
clusions upon  which  alone  a wise  decision  as  to  their 
mode  of  use  or  regulation  can  be  based;  or,  again,  to 
consider  the  economic  regulation  that  the  extensive 
trafl&c  in  these  commodities  demands.  On  these  issues 
let  those  speak  who  speak  with  authority;  and  may 
they  find  a reasonable  public  to  listen  to  their  verdicts. 
The  present  concern  is  with  the  psychological  influ- 
ences that  affect  convictions  in  regard  to  the  use  of 
these  indulgences,  and  determine  the  attitudes  toward 
them,  including  the  attitude  of  unremitting  antago- 
nism and  tmcompromising  opposition. 

It  may  be  well  to  refer  briefly  to  the  judicial  type 
of  opposition,  which  is  more  likely  to  be  met  in  the 
case  of  tobacco,  because  its  use  is  looked  upon  more 
indulgently.  Yet  in  sober  statements  we  may  read 
that  the  use  of  tobacco  roughens  or  toughens  the  moral 
fiber,  that  smokers  disregard  the  rights  of  others,  that 
the  habit  is  disgusting  and  will  appear  so  if  one  thinks 
about  it  in  the  right  way.  The  first  type  of  statement 
will  carry  only  when  it  is  conceded  that  only  the 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCE  261 


wrong  kind  of  people  smoke;  for  it  stands,  not  by  proof 
of  observation,  but  of  prejudice  quite  as  justifiable, 
doubtless  as  a predilection  in  favor  of  smoking  and  a 
preference  for  the  custom  and  its  associations.  The 
aesthetic  argument  is  soimd;  but  it  is  interesting  to 
observe  to  what  uses  it  may  be  put.  The  same  order 
of  reflection  that  might  induce  one  to  give  up  smok- 
ing may  also  direct  one’s  contemplation  to  the  inher- 
ent unaesthetic  character,  the  slimy  nastiness,  of  a 
soft-boiled  egg,  so  that  ever  after  it  will  be  a loathsome 
object.  One  might  also  bring  to  bear  humanitarian 
considerations,  and  decide  that  it  is  wrong  to  inter- 
fere with  natural  embryological  development  and 
destroy  life  at  its  tenderest  stage.  It  is  perhaps  easier 
to  attain  a yet  more  energetic  sentiment  against  swal- 
lowing a raw  oyster;  but  by  thus  breaking  one’s  self 
of  the  habit  of  eating  eggs  or  oysters  by  conjuring  up 
an  sesthetic  prejudice  against  them,  one  has  not  dem- 
onstrated that  the  purpose  was  worthy  or  that  eggs 
or  oysters  are  imfit  for  food.  The  aesthetic  argument 
is  too  imcertain;  other  people  of  respectable  standing 
eat  and  relish  such  queer  things.  “Food”  tabooes,  as 
we  know  familiarly  from  the  Mosaic  dispensation,  ac- 
quire a sanctity  which  in  turn  creates  a violent  disgust 
in  presence  of  their  violation.  The  same  parent  dis- 
pensation, the  same  historical  stream  of  custom  in 
which  our  attitudes  have  been  developed,  is  quite  as 
direct  and  strong  in  praise  of  the  blessings  of  wine, 
though  not  silent  in  admonishing  against  its  abuse. 
Through  the  ages  an  abundant  sentiment  has  played 
about  the  service  of  wine,  given  it  a place  in  the  sacra- 
ment, and  an  earlier  function  in  the  ceremonial  liba- 


262  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


tion,  has  made  it  the  symbol  of  tribute  and  good  feel- 
ing. It  seems  likely  that  healths  will  continue  to  be 
drunk  as  of  old;  and  toasts  celebrated  in  cold  water, 
however  crystal  pure,  fail  to  carry  the  flavor  of  the 
hallowed  rite. 

Moral  denunciation  and  sesthetic  objection  are  legit- 
imate arguments,  but  uncertain  ones.  They  revolve 
in  part  about  sensibilities,  and  these  go  back  to  the 
personal  and  the  temperamental  basis.  If  it  be  true 
that  those  who  look  indulgently  upon  a glass  of  wine 
and  a cigar,  or  a mug  of  ale  and  a pipe,  in  the  average 
run  belong  to  the  less  sensitive  and  considerate  mem- 
bers of  the  community,  as  compared  with  others  of 
like  social  status  who  have  not  succumbed  to  these 
temptations,  the  argument  would  begin  to  assume 
moderate  weight.  Similarly  on  the  side  of  health:  if 
physicians,  whatever  they  prescribe  for  others,  in  their 
own  practice  for  themselves  are  as  likely  as  not  to 
take  an  indulgent  attitude  toward  alcohol  and  tobacco, 
they  express  as  pertinent  a verdict  by  example  as  by 
precept.  The  same  applies  to  editors  who  present  one 
attitude  for  their  readers  and  another  for  themselves; 
while  the  reference  to  ministers  in  this  respect  may  be 
discreetly  avoided. 

The  other  aspect  of  the  matter  is  more  definitely 
.sentimental.  Such  sentiment,  in  assuming  an  indul- 
gent attitude  toward  the  indulgence,  is  admittedly  a 
favoring  predilection;  but  the  fact  that  it  has  become 
attached  to  this  form  of  indulgence  is  not  without  sig- 
nificance. It  argues  for  the  congeniality  of  the  indul- 
gence to  the  ensemble  of  the  traits  that  make  for  an 
appreciation  of  the  values  of  life.  In  view  thereof,  the 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCE  263 


intolerance  displayed  by  those  to  whom  all  this  type 
of  sentiment  makes  no  appeal,  seems  sadly  out  of  per- 
spective. The  story  of  a famous  writer  who  pictmed 
the  hero  as  partaking  of  the  cup  that  cheers,  and  was 
advised  by  the  editor  that  in  deference  to  the  pub- 
lic the  incident  might  acceptably  be  deprived  of  its 
alcoholic  flavor,  is  not  too  improbable  to  be  true,  and 
is  in  a line  with  the  protest  upon  the  part  of  ardent 
prohibitionists  against  the  ceremonial  breaking  of  a 
bottle  of  champagne  at  the  launching  of  a government 
vessel.  All  this  is  indicative  of  the  temper  of  convic- 
tions that  claim  a superior  sanction  and  glory  in  un- 
yielding tenacity  — an  unwilhngness  amounting  to  a 
horror  of  adjusting  attitude  or  conduct  to  the  judicial 
perspective. 

The  spirit  of  Puritanism  may  be  viewed  sympa- 
thetically in  its  historical  setting.  If  followed  too  hter- 
ally,  it  would  banish  the  drama,  and  because  of  the 
allurements  and  immoral  temptations  of  the  stage  — 
all  real  enough  and  a constant  menace  — offer  no  other 
solution  than  their  abolition.  Cards  become  the  Devil’s 
counters  and  dancing  his  enticement;  both  are  to  be 
shunned.  Gambhng  may  readily  become  a serious  evil 
demanding  vigilant  regulation,  and  dance-halls  are  the 
undoing  of  many.  Even  “bridge  whist  ” may  lose  its 
legitimate  service  as  relaxation  and  destroy  the  sane 
perspective  of  the  values  of  life.  The  moral  argument 
is  thus  set  off  against  the  sentimental  one.  This  is 
legitimate  within  judicial  limits,  but  in  any  liberal  dem- 
ocratic regime  must  be  referred  to  the  field  in  which 
each  must  exercise  those  virtues  of  judgment  and  re- 
straint that  neither  paternalism  nor  prohibition  nor 


2C4  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


intolerant  prejudice  can  or  should  regulate.  One  will 
hardly  go  far  in  reasonable  adjustment  by  setting  up 
false  antagonisms  of  this  type.  Let  each  draw  his 
distinctions  of  licet  and  non  licet  according  to  his  lights, 
and  respect  all  others  who  draw  them  differently,  with 
no  less  integrity  of  conscience. 

No  claim  is  made  for  indulgence  in  its  own  right,  nor 
for  any  relaxation  of  the  eternal  vigilance  that  alone  is 
the  price  of  moral  safety.  It  is  urged  that  the  moral 
aspects  of  the  issues  be  not  too  obtrusive;  for,  though 
legitimate,  they  are  subject  to  a large  plasticity  of  in- 
fluence. Reason,  usage,  propriety,  breeding,  circum- 
stance, all  play  upon  them  and  make  their  truer  ad- 
justment a matter  of  a sense  of  value  — a fine  art  and 
not  a crude  proscription.  Other  moralized  sentiments 
show  the  same  relations.  Even  so  commonplace  a 
sentiment  as  shame  may  serve  as  an  example.  Mo- 
rality requires  a sensitive  sense  of  shame;  but  the  situa- 
tions to  which  it  shall  be  applied  are  most  variable  and 
complex.  Just  what  we  shall  and  shall  not  be  ashamed 
of  cannot  be  scheduled  in  however  liberal  a system 
of  commandments.  Honi  soit  qui  mol  y pense.  It  may 
even  be  the  case  that  the  same  qualities  or  actions  of 
which  one  man  is  ashamed,  another  is  proud.  A weak 
sense  of  shame  is  certainly  a fault,  and  shamelessness 
a vice;  but  the  like  is  true  of  prudery,  in  that  both  in- 
terfere with  a more  desirable  disposition  of  the  play 
of  modesty  in  thought  and  deed.  The  reference  is  also 
pertinent  because  shame  enters  into  the  attitude  to- 
ward indulgence  in  alcohol  and  even  tobacco.  If  the 
community  sentiment  is  such  that  these  indulgences 
cannot  be  freely  acknowledged,  they  acquire  a little  of 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCE  265 


the  tarnish  of  a secret  vice.  In  view  of  this  psycholo- 
gical factor,  it  has  been  wisely  urged  that  if  the  screens 
and  opaque  doors  were  removed  from  saloons,  the 
American  bar  would  lose  some  of  its  unfortunate  fea- 
tures; though  it  would  take  far  more  than  this  to  re- 
deem it  wholly.  We  are  all  aware  how  diflferent  is  the 
attitude  toward  these  indulgences,  how  completely 
different  is  their  use  and  regulation  in  other  communi- 
ties, which  may  lay  claim  to  as  proper  consideration 
for  morals  and  manners  and  health  as  those  that  look 
with  suspicion  or  horror  upon  these  practices.  The 
individual  is  inevitably  controlled  by  public  opinion. 
It  is  because  such  opinion  is  readily  thrown  out  of  its 
judicial  perspective  by  a violent  sentiment,  that  its 
care  is  a proper  charge  upon  the  leaders  of  opinion. 
In  this  service  the  psychologist  may  properly  ask  to 
be  recognized.  He  participates  in  the  shaping  of  stand- 
ards and  attitudes;  and  these  make  the  controversial 
situations  — make  them  or  mar  them. 

It  is  to  the  congenial  and  sympathetic  court  of  in- 
dulgence that  the  “case”  of  alcohol  and  the  “case” 
of  tobacco  may  safely  be  referred  for  trial.  Nor  is  the 
plea  that  of  “guilty  with  mitigating  circumstances 
the  point  is  rather  that  the  entire  procedure  of  crimi- 
nal or  even  of  civil  hearing  is  unsuited  to  the  case.  May 
it  not  be  that  Justice  is  represented  blindfolded  not 
merely  to  confine  attention  to  the  cause,  with  no  fav- 
oritism to  the  suitors,  but  as  well  to  symbofize  that 
there  are  other  jurisdictions  remote  or  excluded  from 
her  austere  domain? 


266  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


IV 

The  psychology  of  indulgence,  to  whatever  field 
applied,  is  subject  to  a common  interpretation.  It  may 
be  developed  positively  with  reference  to  the  principle 
of  the  urgent  expression  of  impulses  and  needs,  of  low 
and  high  degree.  Specifically,  the  human  machine  is 
so  complex  in  construction  that  it  seeks  moments  of 
expansion,  vents  of  emotion,  releases  of  tension,  and 
quite  as  distinctively  yearns  for  enhancements  of 
experience  that  come  to  the  fore  in  the  minor  charms 
and  greater  thrills  of  the  emotional  life.  It  may  be 
developed  negatively  with  reference  to  the  principle 
of  unwise  suppression;  for  there  is  a set  normal  limit 
to  salutary  discipline  and  reserve  as  ministrants  to 
self-culture.  Carried  beyond  such  limit,  undue  re- 
straint may  lead  to  insidious  invasion  of  efficiency. 
Insistent  denial  of  impulse,  tolerance  of  secretive  aver- 
sion, may  in  abnormal  cases  induce  an  undermining  of 
stability,  the  cause  of  which  is  commonly  unsuspected. 
Speaking  to  these  aspects,  the  statement  of  principle 
may  be  brief  and  confident.  The  art  of  application, 
like  all  art,  is  long,  and  not  teachable  by  any  less  ex- 
perience than  that  of  life  itself.  The  primitive  stress 
of  impulse  is  urgent;  the  exercise  of  function  in  the 
simpler  orders  of  expression  is  amply  provided  for  by 
natural  outlet  and  common  occasion.  The  optimistic 
joy  of  action  and  expression  as  a satisfaction  of  needs 
is  duly  recognized  as  the  cry  of  red-blooded  life:  Let 
life  be  lived  to  the  full! 

To  complex  adults  the  simple  life  is  a delusion;  so- 
phistication makes  it  so;  cultivation  strives  to  make 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCE  267 


it  more  so.  The  satisfaetion  of  needs  moves  upward 
with  the  levels  of  their  attainment.  Hence,  the  sug- 
gestion that  milk  is  for  babes  and  stronger  potations 
for  men.  Let  it  be  conceded  that  richness  and  expan- 
sion of  life  involves  a fullness  of  expression  as  of  appre- 
ciation; quite  as  it  involves  an  acquired  restraint,  a 
poised  self-control.  Maturity  is  achieved  by  successive 
and  cumulative  exercise  of  restraints,  reserves,  repres- 
sions, and  denials,  by  which  the  primitive  cast  of  our 
nature  gives  way  to  the  disciplined  ideals  of  our 
nurture;  the  most  comprehensive  of  these  are  imposed 
by  social  relations.  The  more  complex  social  regula- 
tions require  more  complex  types  and  occasions  of 
relaxation. 

To  provide  for  the  psychology  of  indulgence  under 
the  conditions  of  twentieth-century  life  cannot  be  a 
simple  matter.  Racial  and  national  preferences, 
strengths  and  weaknesses  alike,  are  shown  in  these 
provisions  and  their  sanction  in  sentiment  and  cus- 
tom. The  contrast  of  North  and  South,  of  Anglo- 
Saxon  and  Latin,  of  sunny  and  gray  skies,  reappears 
in  the  psychological  contrast  of  stoUd  reserve  of  the 
one,  and  freedom  of  gestural  and  facial  expression  of 
the  other;  in  staid  or  ready  sympathies,  and  also  no 
less  in  the  effects  sought  and  found  in  beer  or  wine: 
likewise  in  the  mode  of  succumbing  to  intemperance. 
But  all  this  is  complex;  the  prevalence  of  intoxication 
is  not  revealed  in  the  statistics  of  the  consumption  of 
alcoholic  beverages.  Manner  and  measure  and  occasion 
and  the  kinds  of  beverages  all  participate  in  the  result. 
In  so  far  as  these  are  unconsidered,  statistics  ignore 
psychology.  Different  peoples  require  different  types 


268  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OP  CONVICTION 


of  relaxation  and  indulgence;  moreover,  the  social 
“case  ” of  alcohol  must  not  be  considered  by  itself.  It 
stands  along  with  other  indulgences,  and  with  them 
frames  a scheme  of  life,  involving  profit  and  loss.  If  it 
be  decided  deliberately  and  reasonably  that  the  dan- 
ger exceeds  the  zest,  let  the  use  of  alcohol  be  abandoned 
by  those  thus  convinced,  but  without  animus  against 
those  who  reach  the  opposite  conclusion  in  the  exer- 
cise of  the  same  reasonable  judgment  and  reasonable 
temper.  Also  let  those  voting  “no”  stop  a moment 
to  count  the  cost,  for  there  is  a cost  — an  equally  legit- 
imate cost  as  that  recognized  by  those  voting  “aye 
both  relate  to  the  cost  of  excess.  Excessive  restraint, 
or  even  too  constant  frowning  upon  indulgence,  may 
lead  to  a narrow,  austere,  sunless  perspective  of  life, 
or  yet  more  mildly  throw  a shadow  where  indulgence 
sheds  a beam  of  sunlight.  Blue  laws  are  archaic,  but 
their  temper  survives  and  in  no  application  more 
characteristically  than  in  the  singling  out  of  alcohol 
as  the  special  offender,  with  tobacco  as  the  minor  ac- 
complice. It  is  because  these  indulgences  have  had  to 
bear  the  brunt  of  the  charge  that  it  is  worth  while  to 
plead  the  case  of  indulgence  in  their  behalf. 

Let  us  face  the  question  of  excess.  As  war  indicates 
the  momentary  failure  of  the  peaceful  adjustments  of 
conflict,  so  intoxication  indicates  a serious  fault  in  the 
normal  adjustments  of  relaxation.  A temperate  peo- 
ple stands  higher  than  an  intemperate  one.  A peace- 
ful nation  is  not  by  virtue  of  that  fact  in  any  measure 
cowardly,  weak,  or  soft.  Its  unwarlike  spirit  may  be 
thus  determined,  but  even  more  probably  it  may  not. 
It  may  have  found  vents  and  occasions  in  other  enter- 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCE  269 


prises  for  the  exercise  of  the  virile  qualities  which  war 
unquestionably  develops.  A temperate  people,  made 
so  by  imposed  abstinence,  reaches  the  end  by  less 
worthy  means.  It  does  not  solve  its  problems,  but 
abandons  the  solution  by  substituting  for  it  a proscrip- 
tion. It  may  well  be  that  under  certain  situations 
the  dangers  involved  are  too  serious  to  take  the  risk 
of  any  other  type  of  regulation.  The  regulations  ac- 
cepted thus  become  a clue  to  the  collective  psychology 
of  the  community.  Stated  the  other  way  about,  the 
yielding  to  drunkenness  becomes  an  index  of  racial  or 
national  weakness.  The  fact  that  so  large  a portion 
of  alcohohc  indulgence  in  the  United  States  takes  place 
in  coarse  and  even  degrading  surroundings  is  a legiti- 
mate arraignment,  either  of  our  people  or  of  our  social 
regulations,  or  of  both.  If  we  cannot  take  our  alcohol 
and  our  tobacco  soberly,  we  must  assume  a large  part 
of  the  blame  and  place  it  where  it  belongs,  and  not 
invidiously  upon  alcohol  and  tobacco.  These  minis- 
ter to  the  satisfaction  of  certain  cravings,  admittedly 
in  the  field  of  indulgence;  if  we  cannot  take  our  indul- 
gences wisely,  the  unwisdom  is  ours.  And  if  we  reach 
the  conclusion  that  our  social  psychology  is  so  unfor- 
tunately established  that  we  cannot  change  it,  or  can- 
not take  the  risks  incidental  to  such  a reform,  let  us 
face  that  situation  frankly  and  penitently.  To  this  end 
we  may  find  aid  by  contemplating  the  happier  solu- 
tion of  other  peoples  in  other  lands.  To  array  ourselves 
as  plaintiffs  and  make  alcohol  the  defendant,  is  to 
falsify  the  true  relation.  With  this  attitude  of  social 
responsibihty  we  have  become  familiar  in  other  rela- 
tions. We  ask  ourselves  how  far  our  treatment  of  crimi- 


270  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


nals  and  crime  is  responsible  for  the  prevalence  of  crime 
and  delinquency.  Yet  we  know  that  however  wisely 
we  regulate  such  tendencies,  we  shall  always  have 
crime  and  drunkenness,  just  as  we  shall  always  have 
poverty.  All  these  we  constantly  try  to  reduce  to  a 
minimum,  and  are  constantly  examining  how  far  we 
can  exercise  a salutary  social  control.  It  is  the  same 
type  of  endeavor,  exercised  in  the  same  temper,  that 
is  demanded  for  the  case  of  alcohol. 

Viewed  more  individually,  the  psychology  of  indul- 
gence takes  account  of  the  holiday  mood,  the  constant 
small  and  occasional  large  enhancements  and  high 
lights  of  experience;  it  sets  store  by  the  breaks  in  rou- 
tine and  by  the  minor  easements  of  existence,  and  con- 
siders a life  bare  and  cold  that  lacks  the  generous  econ- 
omy which  indulgences  serve  to  relieve,  as  well  as  a 
life  dissipated  that  by  excess  disturbs  or  wrecks  it.  It 
finds  a place  for  indulgence  in  the  habits  that  make  up 
the  stream  of  daily  occupation,  and  by  their  more 
common  presence  — as  against  the  occasional  holiday 
— are  cumulatively  more  important.  It  emphasizes  as 
well  that  it  is  the  mental  attitude  that  makes  the  zest 
and  forms  the  tonic,  while  yet  it  realizes  that  zest  must 
be  affiliated  with  and  developed  from  needs  set  in  the 
heritage  of  a common  appetite.  Good  cheer  aids  di- 
gestion; but  digestion  may  crave  and  in  like  spirit  wel- 
come a physiological  stimulant.  If  body  and  mind  are 
closely  allied,  the  recognition  of  the  kinship  should  be 
mutual.  Feeding,  like  working  or  thinking,  or  any 
aspect  of  routine  living,  must  find  its  relief  in  indul- 
gence. We  indulge  in  idling  and  playing,  in  vaudeville 
and  dime-novels,  in  amusement-parks  and  motion-pic- 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCE  271 


lures  — all  more  or  less  wisely  and  more  or  less  riskily. 
But  we  have  no  intention  of  doing  away  with  all  these 
types  of  indulgences.  There  is  indulgence  in  eating, 
but  this,  hke  drinking,  in  addition  to  moral  and  hy- 
gienic consequences,  raises  the  issue  of  extravagance, 
which  for  the  moment  should  not  be  emphasized.  The 
fact  remains  that  releases  from  routine  are  thus  de- 
manded and  enjoyed;  and  life  takes  its  stamp  from 
the  manner  and  measure  of  their  recognition.  Wisdom 
lies  in  temperance  in  all  these  types  of  indulgence;  ex- 
cess everywhere  lurks  as  a danger.  A motion-picture 
jag,  or  a dime-novel  jag,  or  a bridge-whist  jag,  is  in 
principle  as  open  to  danger  as  an  alcohol  jag;  its  con- 
sequences are  different,  but  that  does  not  entail  a dif- 
ferent psychological  appraisal  of  their  legitimacy. 

Eating  furnishes  the  nearest  analogy  for  drinking; 
and  there  we  find  the  same  variation  in  terms  of  nec- 
essity and  luxury,  of  food-value  and  zest-value,  from 
solid  nutriment  to  fruits  and  flavors  and  condiments 
and  relishes  and  desserts,  and  no  differently  in  the  sol- 
vent and  mood  of  wine.  Variety  of  food  and  a mixed 
diet  confer  a psychological  benefit;  occasional  banquets 
maintain  the  zest.  Roast  beef  is  a feast  to  the  peasant 
indulging  in  meat  on  Sundays  only;  it  loses  that  qual- 
ity in  a monotonous  hotel  diet.  One  may  accept  or 
prefer  the  same  breakfast  day  by  day,  but  by  that  very 
token  demand  a different  dinner.  In  the  composition 
of  the  meal  as  of  the  courses,  the  same  variety  that 
is  the  spice  of  life  is  insisted  upon,  the  same  demand 
made  that  some  of  the  ingredients  shall  stand  for  the 
zest  and  flavoring,  that  some  shall  be  valued  more  as 
stimulants  than  as  food.  The  principle  holds  for  the 


272  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


larger  features  as  for  the  details  of  life,  and  of  its  phys- 
iological as  of  its  psychological  ordering. 

Selection  and  regulation  is  ever  an  art,  and  as  such, 
of  however  lowly  a degree,  may  ask  the  same  freedom 
from  hampering  restrictions  or  prejudicial  tabooes  that 
are  approvingly  granted  to  arts  of  loftier  concern. 
Moreover,  there  is  a sanctioned  scale  of  indulgence; 
and  it  is  but  a question  of  drawing  lines  according  to 
our  preferences,  ideals,  or  customs,  which  differ  no 
more  than  the  views  and  diversities  of  our  philosophies. 
Tea  and  coffee  are  indulgences;  a rating  of  their  value 
or  injury  cannot  be  obtained  from  the  admonishing 
advertisements  of  substitutes  for  them,  or  of  the  opin- 
ions of  those  who  find  them  unnecessary,  unsuited,  or 
harmful.  If  some  prefer  on  occasion  a dash  of  brandy 
in  coffee  or  of  rum  in  tea,  the  indulgence  has  not  wholly 
changed  its  status.  The  laborious  proofs  that  alcohol 
and  tobacco  are,  strictly  considered,  unnecessary,  are 
likewise  themselves  unnecessary.  There  is  no  conten- 
tion that  these  represent  the  only  indulgences  of  their 
kind;  merely  that  when  viewed  with  the  spirit  of  in- 
dulgence, they  have  found  a place  in  societies  that  are 
mindful  of  the  sterner  duties  of  life,  as  of  the  dangers 
of  excess  in  what  in  temperate  measure  relieves  voca- 
tional strain. 

Leisure,  luxury,  relief,  indulgence  partake  in  this 
respect  something  of  the  parallel  excitements  of  sport. 
The  shooting  of  corralled  game  comes  near  to  butchery; 
and  if  one  is  so  worried  by  the  sense  of  danger  that  the 
chase  is  a torture,  the  enjoyment  is  gone;  between  the 
two  lies  the  zest  of  good  sport,  of  the  enhancement  of 
experience  through  the  thrill  of  uncertainty,  or  even 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCE  273 


of  danger.  Here,  too,  humanitarian  and  other  con- 
siderations enter;  and  we  cannot  expect  agreement  as 
to  the  legitimacy  of  shooting  and  hunting,  though  we 
may  rather  envy  the  exhilaration  and  enthusiasm  that 
a devotee  gets  from  gun  or  rod.  We  realize  that  all  this 
is  debatable  ground  and  a controversial  issue.  If  we 
observe  that  individuals  and  societies,  respectful  of 
the  serious  duties  of  life  and  considerate  in  the  regu- 
lation of  their  relaxations  as  well  as  mindful  of  the 
dangers  attaching  to  indulgences,  find  a proper  and  re- 
strained place  for  alcohol  and  tobacco,  we  must  be  pre- 
pared to  accord  them  the  right  and  privilege  attaching 
to  such  sanction;  for  that  is  the  type  of  adjustment 
that  prevails  in  controversial  issues. 

V 

The  psychology  of  suppression  is  equally  to  be  con- 
sidered. The  adherents  of  the  Freudian  school  of  psy- 
chology look  upon  saving  rather  than  spending  as  the 
root  of  mental  evil.  The  miser  rather  than  the  spend- 
thrift becomes  the  shocking  example;  the  sour-faced 
ascetic  and  disappointed  spinster,  rather  than  the 
cheery  epicure  and  the  contented  mater  or  paterfamilias, 
happy  despite  the  high  cost  of  living.  Certainly  the 
most  charitable  view  of  the  miser  is  to  regard  him  as 
abnormal,  as  lacking,  by  inherent  defect  or  acquired 
perversion,  wholesome  impulses  and  channels  of  ex- 
pression of  desires  and  their  satisfaction.  However 
conditioned  and  however  exercised,  miserliness,  like 
all  greeds,  makes  a vice  of  repression  out  of  the  virtue 
of  moderation;  it  makes  of  thrift  an  obsession.  The 
abnormal  — as  is  true  of  so  many  phases  of  conduct. 


274  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


so  also  of  indulgence  — has  a lesson  for  normal  psy- 
chology. Suppression  is  not  so  innocent  as  it  appears, 
though  unrestraint,  which  stands  so  close  to  indul- 
gence, loses  none  of  its  dangers.  Both  sides  of  the  case 
offer  warnings.  There  are  cases  in  which  despondency 
of  mood,  paralysis  of  desire,  hesitations,  broodings, 
obstacles  — all  thwarting  action  and  throwing  the 
mental  equilibrium  seriously  out  of  balance  — are 
traceable  to  persistent  and  long-standing  suppressions 
and  repressions  of  impulses  and  desires  which  nature 
has  implanted  deeply  in  the  fiber  of  our  being.  To  find 
the  source  of  the  emotional  obstruction  that  dams  the 
freedom  of  flow,  often  by  the  very  release  of  conscious 
confession,  restores  tranquillity.  The  mental  abscess  has 
been  lanced,  and  relief  follows.  Preventively  at  earlier 
stages,  the  provision  and  enjoyment  of  slighter  normal 
indulgences  might  have  averted  catastrophe,  by  in- 
ducing a freer  habit  of  expression.  The  mechanism  of 
suppression  is  subconscious  and  by  that  token  is  insi- 
dious in  its  invasion,  unsuspected  in  its  onset.  Such 
is  the  reinforcement  of  the  principle  of  indulgence  de- 
rived from  the  lessons  of  mental  disaster  inherent  in 
over-suppression.  So,  on  the  one  hand,  over-indul- 
gence — which  includes  constant  indulgence  of  trivial 
degree,  even  more  than  occasional  debauches  — leads 
to  a mental  habit  of  willfulness  and  unrestraint,  quite 
apart  from  the  actual  injury  of  the  indulgence;  and  on 
the  other  hand,  constant  suppression  and  denial  dams 
the  emotional  current  with  quite  comparable  dis- 
aster. The  choice  and  mode  of  indulgence  is  a separate 
matter,  but  like  the  degree  and  manner  of  indulgence, 
is  largely  a temperamental  reaction,  an  individual 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCE  275 


adjustment.  Such  adjustment,  like  all  economy,  be- 
comes a matter  of  a budget;  and  the  legitimacy  of. ex- 
penditures is  determined  by  the  same  complexity  of 
judgment  that  must  ever  be  called  upon  in  making  up 
the  accounts  of  living.  Economies  may  be  wise  or  fool- 
ish; far-sighted  or  near-sighted.  Indulgence,  the  policy 
of  generosity,  seems  to  find  support  in  the  psychology 
of  our  emotional  nature  — the  emotions  themselves, 
as  in  the  play  of  the  imagination,  supplying  the  in- 
dispensable relaxations  as  well  as  inspirations  for  the 
rigors  of  duty  and  the  obligations  of  reason.  To  ex- 
clude alcohol  and  tobacco  from  the  privileges  of  such 
consideration  is  psychologically  unwarranted. 

There  is  no  intention  in  the  application  of  this  argu- 
ment to  imply  that  the  authority  of  psychology  may 
be  cited  in  behalf  of  smoking  or  drinking.  The  path 
from  principle  to  policy  may  be  clear;  but  the  inter- 
pretation of  policy  as  applied  to  specific  practices  must 
be  imcertain.  It  is  possible  to  state  conclusions  in  the 
indicative  and  the  conditional  moods;  but  the  cate- 
gorical statement  must  be  cautiously  appealed  to. 
Ideals,  however  well  established,  are  ever  in  the  mak- 
ing; and  the  psychologist,  like  any  other  specialist  or 
layman,  brings  to  the  transition  from  theory  to  prac- 
tice the  trend  of  his  personal  bias.  He  may  do  this 
quite  frankly,  while  presenting  the  bearing  of  his  find- 
ings as  his  professional  insight  sees  them.  The  message 
of  the  psychology  of  indulgence  is  authentic  and  vital; 
whether  the  interpretation  is  soimd  and  the  applica- 
tion wise  must  be  left  to  the  same  sanity  of  judgment 
to  which  the  regulation  of  the  physiological  and  psy- 
chological economy  is  approvingly  referred. 


276  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


As  to  the  special  psychology  of  the  alcoholic  indul- 
gence, a slighter  consideration  will  suffice.  There  are 
some  who  claim  that  the  moments  of  exaltation  are 
in  miniature  moments  of  ecstasy,  of  getting  out  of 
ourselves  — in  lesser  measure  and  more  commonly  — 
of  dropping  the  handicaps  of  repression,  the  thralls 
of  convention,  and  thus  attaining  geniality  if  not  in- 
spiration. Alcohol  unbends,  releases  by  banishing  re- 
straint, sets  free  the  truer  self.  By  all  means  a steady 
fire  for  the  heat  of  the  work  of  the  day,  but  the  occa- 
sional spark  for  the  illumination  of  insight.  Moreover, 
it  is  urged,  the  general  habit  of  susceptibility  to  such 
appeal  raises  the  quality  of  endeavor,  supports  the 
mechanism  of  elaboration,  makes  for  originality  and 
the  higher  gifts  of  service  of  the  mental  life.  Clearly 
alcohol  confers  no  gifts,  educates  no  facility;  “Der 
Wein  erfindet  nichts;  er  schiodtzt  nur  aus."  The  admis- 
sion gives  the  clue  to  the  opposition:  inspiration  thus 
induced  is  often  babbling;  the  exhilaration  an  illusion, 
the  stimulation  artificial,  the  dependence  upon  it  an 
uncertain  crutch;  the  plight  of  the  lame  and  the  halt 
who  counted  upon  its  support,  an  adequate  sermon. 
The  alternative  does  not  exclude  the  middle  ground 
of  temperate  indulgence. 

Such  tolerance  is  more  readily  gained  for  tobacco, 
in  that  its  effects  present  no  such  drastic  issues.  The 
evil  effects  of  tobacco  are  less  comprehensive;  the  in- 
temperate habit  is  less  easily  formed,  and  in  formation 
more  readily  restrained.  But,  more  importantly,  the 
associations  of  the  indulgence  are  more  easily  assimi- 
lated in  the  prevalent  social  customs.  All  this  is  ad- 
mittedly a matter  of  convention,  and  the  present  plea 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCE  277 


urges  that  it  may  wisely  be  left  to  the  forces  that, 
under  discriminating  oversight,  build  convention  into 
a sanction.  An  apt  illustration  is  furnished  by  the  ob- 
jection to  women’s  smoking.  The  fact  that  the  stand- 
ards of  indulgence  as  well  as  the  forms  of  indulgence 
are  different  for  the  sexes,  is  again  a complicated  issue 
of  the  many  composite  forces  that  have  been  passed  in 
review.  That  women  have  the  same  right  as  men  to 
claim  the  privileges  of  the  psychology  of  indulgence, 
can  hardly  be  questioned;  that  the  status  of  the  in- 
dulgence in  their  hands  will  be  determined  by  the  per- 
sonalities of  those  who  practice  it  and  the  setting  which 
they  give  it,  is  equally  clear.  For  the  attitude  toward 
a habit  and  its  setting  go  far  to  determine  its  status. 
The  important  consideration  in  the  use  of  alcohol 
and  tobacco,  as  of  any  other  indulgence,  is  to  surround 
them  with  those  influences  and  associations  that  make 
their  use,  as  far  as  may  be,  a fine  habit  and  not  a coarse 
one. 

I How  far  the  problem  of  alcohol  is  the  problem  of  the 
craving  for  stimulant,  or  the  convivial  drink-habit,  or 
the  low  saloon,  is  the  decisive  issue  that  determines 
the  remedy  to  be  sought.  The  problem  will  yield  to 
solution  under  unprejudiced  scientific  investigation 
at  the  hands  of  physicians,  social  workers,  physiolo- 
gists, psychologists,  and  practical  moralists.  Let  these 
interests  study,  consider,  and  recommend.  None  the 
less,  indulgence  brings  a legitimate  if  minor  plea.  Pub- 
lic hygiene,  moral  health,  and  economics  may  well  ac- 
knowledge the  plea  of  the  psychology  of  indulgence, 
while  yet  they  maintain  the  supremacy  of  their  own 
interests.  Condition  and  circumstance  must  be  dis- 


278  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OP  CONVICTION 


criminatingly  considered.  Sweeping  regulations  are 
always  simpler  to  propose  and  enact  than  discriminat- 
ing ones.  If  the  American  temperament  and  American 
conditions  are  so  unsuited  to  the  favorable  assimila- 
tion of  this  type  of  indulgence,  so  disposed  to  exhibit 
its  dangers  in  the  most  extreme  form;  if  experience 
proves  the  hopelessness  of  any  reforms  which  shall 
surround  indulgence  with  respectability,  it  may  be 
wise  to  admit  defeat  and  surrender.  To  repeat:  Pro- 
hibition is  not  a solution,  but  the  abandonment  of  a 
solution.  While  the  regulation  by  statute  of  the  use 
of  tobacco  has  hardly  been  attempted,  one  phase  of  it 
has  brought  about  the  same  undiscriminating  legisla- 
tion that  is  to  be  feared.  To  find  a group  of  States  in 
which  a cigarette  is  contraband  seems  a strange  anom- 
aly in  a democracy  that  balks  at  so  many  wise  forms 
of  paternalism.  That  some  of  these  States  have 
repealed  such  drastic  laws  shows  that  reason  may  be 
reinstated.  The  complete  prohibition  of  cigarettes  is 
a double  confession  of  failure;  an  admission  that  laws 
regulating  the  sale  of  cigarettes  to  minors  will  not  be 
enforced,  and  an  admission  that  legislatures  can  be 
influenced  to  abandon  principles  and  enact  paternal- 
istic laws  which  they  would  not  tolerate  in  other  fields, 
and  do  so  under  the  influence  of  prejudice  which  has 
not  even  the  merit  of  sincerity. 

It  is  as  yet  an  open  question  whether,  if  aU  the  in- 
terests in  favor  of  respectability  were  to  direct  their 
energies  to  the  elevation  of  the  conditions  surrounding 
the  use  of  alcohol,  more  could  not  be  accomplished. 
It  still  remains  true  that  the  wholesale  denunciation 
and  the  exaggerated  emphasis  of  one  phase  of  the  evil 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCE  279 


disturbs  the  diagnosis  and  makes  for  unreason.  It  is 
but  necessary  to  transfer  the  situation  to  other  coun- 
tries with  other  customs  to  justify  the  plea  for  discrimi- 
nation in  diagnosis,  treatment,  and  prevention  alike. 
Amelioration  of  social  evils  has  usually  yielded  to  judi- 
cious treatment  rather  than  to  narrow-minded  or  un- 
discriminating propaganda.  It  is  with  such  a policy 
that  the  psychology  of  indulgence  establishes  a ready 
sympathy  and  support. 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


“ We  can  bring  no  more  to  living 
Than  the  powers  we  bring  to  life.” 

Kipling. 

Among  issues  characteristically  modern,  the  contro- 
versy as  to  the  true  nature  of  woman  and  her  place  in 
the  social  order  is  peculiarly  rich  in  complexity  of  ar- 
gument and  variability  of  conclusion.  With  the  varied 
status  of  women  in  different  lands,  with  their  achieve- 
ments in  older  days  and  in  the  near  and  nearest  gen- 
erations fairly  familiar,  with  the  intimate  knowledge 
of  womanly  ways  and  doings  which  is  the  common 
experience  and  the  common  tradition,  the  data  for 
judgment  as  to  the  psychological  endowment  respon- 
sible for  these  products  seem  adequate  and  accessible. 
And  yet  the  fact  that  the  problem  exists  in  a sense  in 
which  there  is  no  man  question  is  often  accepted  with 
no  curiosity  and  little  concern.  Much  of  this  is  due 
to  the  adjustment  of  tradition.  In  every  situation  the 
woman  question  is  practically  solved,  yet  resists  an 
enduring  solution.  The  restless  dissatisfaction  with 
the  status  quo  leads  to  question  and  reform.  The  con- 
trasts of  national  solutions  remain  interesting,  and  no 
less  so  when  shifted  to  the  narrower  contrasts  with- 
in an  accepted  range.  Modern  technique  brings  to 
the  question  a diflFerent  approach,  generally  biological 
and  specifically  psychological.  In  an  analytic  spirit 


THE  FEMININE  MIND  281 

it  detaches  circumstance  from  nature,  and  measures  as 
it  explores. 

The  present  survey  attempts  to  bring  to  bear  upon 
the  psychological  phase  of  the  problem  the  combined 
evidence  of  theory  and  practice,  of  science  and  tradi- 
tion, of  experience  and  test.  The  question  at  issue  is 
whether  and  how  the  feminine  differs  from  the  mas- 
culine mind;  how  far  the  observable  differences  of 
achievement  and  response  are  the  result  of  tradition 
and  education,  or  of  original  nature  doubtless  rein- 
forced by  artificial  direction.  Application  stands  close 
to  interpretation  and  demands  a hearing.  The  issue 
comes  forward  in  questions  of  the  day:  whether  women 
should  vote,  should  enter  this  or  that  profession,  should 
enjoy  this  or  that  privilege  or  right.  Decisions  are 
difficult  and  discussion  constant.  Prejudice  and  con- 
vention exert  a powerful  infiuence  on  conclusions,  and 
logic  is  often  ignored  or  retired  to  a subsidiary  issue. 
Facts  and  their  interpretation  are  confused,  or  more 
commonly  their  significance  distorted.  The  issue  ex- 
tends to  all  spheres  of  living  and  the  spiritual  supports 
of  life;  to  industry  and  commerce,  to  education  and 
profession,  to  art  and  science,  to  family  life  and  public 
concerns,  to  rehgion,  to  ethics,  to  all  the  massed  in- 
fluences that  constitute  the  social  ideals  and  the  social 
control.  Institutions  embody  the  prevalent  views  and 
customs  reflect  them.  Psychology  claims  a special 
place  in  the  hearing;  for  it  is  predominantly  the  nature 
of  the  mental  endowment  of  woman  that  is  decisive. 
Her  fitness  and  capacity  determine,  under  the  admitted 
deviations  of  opportunity  and  custom,  the  types  of 
her  career. 


282  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


A survey  of  such  broad  scope  should  not  be  hurried 
in  procedure,  as  it  should  not  be  hasty  in  conclusion. 
Its  purpwDse  is  at  once  to  throw  light  upon  the  com- 
posite forces  affecting  the  actual  decisions  reached  by 
all  sorts  and  conditions  of  men  and  women,  and  yet 
more  particularly  upon  the  significance  to  be  at- 
tached to  the  several  orders  of  evidence  and  consid- 
eration. This  double  purpose  affords  the  clue  to  the 
presentation.  Such  a judicial  survey  is  consistent 
with  a definite  view  of  the  favored  conclusions,  once 
the  principles  of  interpretation  are  reached.  The  issue 
is  one  of  a considerable  group  in  which  a scientific- 
minded  approach  is  possible,  though  a rigid  scientific 
procedure  is  not.  The  common  bias  and  prejudice  of 
convention  and  usage  may  be  overcome;  yet  the  di- 
vergence of  opinion  remains,  by  reason  of  the  variable 
emphasis  attached  to  one  or  other  order  of  evidence. 
The  rapprochement  of  method  is  important,  even 
though  the  differences  of  opinion  remain;  for  a modus 
vivendi  and  a practical  cooperation  in  the  actual  issues 
of  the  day,  in  so  far  as  they  depend  upon  an  enlightened 
view  of  the  feminine  mind,  are  thus  rendered  possible. 
The  same  forces  are  responsible  for  the  changing  status 
of  woman  that  is  recognizably  moving  in  a definite 
direction  to  the  great  benefit  of  social  progress. 

I 

The  nature  of  the  feminine  endowment  is  primarily 
an  affair  of  biology;  biology  divides  the  responsibility 
by  referring  the  question  to  physiology,  to  psychology, 
and  to  sociology.  These  speak  with  the  voice  of  au- 
thority; and  to  them  the  public  listens  with  its  custom- 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


283 


ary  deference,  tinged  with  suspicion.  For  every  man 
presumes  to  know  and  every  woman  knows  feminine 
behavior  and  character  intimately;  so  the  personal 
verdict  dominates,  undistm-bed  by  what  science  has  to 
say.  Moreover,  on  so  engaging  a topic  the  average 
mind  is  as  little  disposed  to  be  critical  as  it  is  to  be 
objective.  Hence,  the  popular  and  the  scientific  ver- 
sions of  the  “eternal  feminine”  diverge;  likewise  the 
ancient  and  modem  ones,  and  those  of  class  and  mass. 

From  the  academy  and  the  laboratory  come  learned 
treatises  and  essays,  some  ambitious  and  comprehen- 
sive, others  modest  and  restrained.  In  its  view  of  the 
“eternal  feminine”  the  public  follows  a tradition  that 
reflects  the  experiences  as  well  as  the  prejudices  and 
impressions  of  a preoccupied,  slightly  reflective,  largely 
sentimental,  and  frequently  confused,  democratic  order 
of  wisdom.  The  men  of  science  report:  “Here  is  our 
analysis,  and  such  is  the  nature  of  woman.”  History, 
the  formal  spokesman  of  experience,  replies:  “Here  is 
the  career  of  woman;  in  the  story  read  the  nature  of 
her  parts.”  More  informally  the  idea  and  ideal  of 
the  feminine  appear  in  the  drama,  the  novel,  the  story 
of  the  day.  These  several  renderings  offer  contrasts 
rather  than  conflicts;  they  present  varieties  of  per- 
spective. Throughout  the  question  appears  and  re- 
appears: Which  is  the  truly,  intrinsically  feminine,  and 
which  the  favored  or  enforced  manner  of  feminine  ex- 
pression? Society  changes  its  forms;  evolution  proceeds, 
and  takes  the  feminine  with  it;  what  in  all  this  change 
is  the  inherent,  eternal  feminine?  “Thus  natured, 
woman  could  not  be  other  than  she  is,”  says  the  posi- 
tive scientist.  “Responsive  to  condition,  the  woman 


284  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


of  each  age  and  stage  of  culture  becomes  what  her 
world  makes  of  her,”  concludes  the  cautious  historian, 
remembering  his  varium  et  mutabile  semper.  The  ver- 
satile past,  the  responsible  present,  and  the  glorious 
future  of  womanhood  each  finds  its  special  pleaders 
in  the  variegated  literature  of  the  feminist  movement. 
To  rescue  the  problem  from  confusion  and  sentimen- 
tal distortion  is  in  these  tolerant  days  a possible  if  not 
a grateful  task.  Despite  an  occasional  editor  or  legis- 
lator or  other  worldly  cloistered  soul,  men  are  about 
ready  to  admit  that  women  are  people;  also  that  the 
nature  of  femininity  may  become  a definite  and  dis- 
interested inquiry,  as  well  as  a worthy  one.  “We  have 
comprehensive  monographs  on  silkworms,  beetles,  and 
cats,  but  none  on  women,”  says  an  Italian  anthropolo- 
gist, who  attempts  gallantly  to  supply  the  lack. 

II 

Such  a monograph  might  well  begin  with  the  ob- 
vious but  significant  statement  that  men  and  women 
are  obviously  and  overwhelmingly  alike.  They  are 
alike  by  reason  of  a common  nature,  which  means  a 
like  evolution  through  the  remoter  ages;  and  yet  more 
alike  by  reason  of  the  common  schooling  of  experience 
through  the  nearer  generations.  They  are  still  more 
conspicuously  alike  in  that  the  social  tradition  moulds 
them  to  a common  pattern.  Yet  to  all  these  influences 
the  sexes  react  differently.  The  actual  status  and 
achievement  of  any  section  of  the  human  race  is  in- 
telligible only  as  a vast  transformation  of  original 
nature,  which  affects  similarly  the  present  nature  of 
both  sexes.  The  racial  heredity  and  the  racial  history 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


285 


prevail.  What  the  sexes  have  in  common  still  domi- 
nates even  in  the  present  complexities  and  artificialities 
of  human  nature.  Under  one  interest  or  another  we 
may  push  this  community  into  the  background;  with- 
out it  the  foreground  would  be  unintelligible. 

And  so  we  return  to  first  principles:  the  significance 
of  sex  remains.  Nature’s  intention  is  as  plain  as  her 
execution.  “The  powers  that  we  bring  to  life”  are 
already  specialized  by  decree  of  nature.  “Male  and 
female  created  He  them.”  If  the  principle  of  a phys- 
iological psychology  is  sound,  like  minds  in  unlike 
bodies  are  a contradiction.  Along  with  their  commu- 
nity men  and  women  differ  broadly  and  deeply. 

There  is  no  need  to  review  the  established  differences 
in  structure  and  function,  in  skeleton  and  organs,  in 
metabolism,  in  development,  in  liability  to  disease,  in 
every  minute  detail  of  bodily  economy;  it  is  necessary 
only  to  observe  the  pattern  of  closely  woven  connec- 
tion thus  set  by  nature.  Such  differences  of  bodily 
structure  and  function  obtain  over  and  above  the 
direct  functions  of  sex;  they  constitute  an  array  of 
secondary  or  associated  traits.  Some  stand  close  to 
and  support  the  complex  interests  of  sex;  others  are 
derivative  and  remote,  radiating  to  the  minutest  bio- 
logical details.  Such  differences  express  specialization 
and  the  issues  of  specialization.  “A  man  is  a man  even 
to  his  thumbs,  and  a woman  is  a woman  down  to  her 
little  toes.”  Anatomy,  physiology,  and  pathology  tell 
a concordant  story.  What  reason  is  there  to  expect 
psychology  to  enter  a dissenting  opinion? 

Nature  makes  differentiation  significant  to  the  drama 
of  sex.  In  human  psychology  each  sex  becomes  addi- 


286  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


tionally  attractive  to  the  other  by  a variegated 
unlikeness  in  appearance  and  expression.  Sex  is  a bi- 
ological emphasis.  It  carries  with  it  a diminishing  per- 
spective of  derivative  traits.  Some  of  these  traits  are 
of  major  and  others  of  minor  import;  some  stand  close 
to  the  center  of  the  powers  that  we  bring  to  life,  and 
others  are  more  or  less  remote.  Heredity  carries  for- 
ward the  entire  composite  of  ancestral  traits.  In  the 
long  run  fathers  and  mothers  contribute  equally  though 
differently  to  the  endowment  of  men  as  well  as  of 
women,  and  both  are  more  interesting  and  richer  in 
possibility  by  virtue  of  their  dual  heredity.  Yet  every 
heredity  is  subject  to  the  supreme  emphasis  of  one 
sex  alone,  which  brings  it  about  that  there  are  no 
human  beings  — only  men  and  women.  Sex  remains 
the  eternal  motive  of  Nature’s  organic  design. 

The  differentiation  of  men  and  women  is  thorough, 
comprehensive,  and  established;  its  existence  is  beyond 
question;  its  limitations  and  consequences  offer  a 
meaty  bone  of  contention.  Woman,  whether  by  nature 
controversial  or  not,  is  to-day  a controversy.  Conclu- 
sions, though  they  differ  widely,  are  held  confidently. 
Like  many  another  opinion,  that  concerning  the  nature 
of  woman  is  formed  by  precipitating  an  interpretation 
in  the  solution  of  facts.  The  interpretations  are  more 
largely  responsible  for  the  divergent  opinions  than  any 
disagreement  upon  the  facts.  The  facts  are  gathered 
by  observation,  extensive  or  limited,  crude  or  refined, 
and  presumably  objective  and  unprejudiced;  interpre- 
tation enters  and  proceeds  upon  a system  of  values. 
In  terms  of  fact,  no  one  is  tempted  to  question  that 
when  Nature  has  her  way,  men  have  beards  and  women 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


287 


have  none.  But  by  way  of  interpretation,  to  deter- 
mine what  use  or  advantage  a beard  is  to  a man  re- 
quires a standard  of  values.  To  consider  a bearded  sex 
as  superior  or  inferior  to  an  unbearded  one  is  a vain 
assumption.  For,  once  more;  sex-traits  are  more  or 
less  central,  or  more  or  less  peripheral,  fairly  vital  or 
fairly  trivial;  or  they  are  significant  in  one  aspect, 
and  differently  so  in  another.  In  Nature’s  scheme  — 
which  must  be  accepted,  though  decidedly  modified 
by  human  purposes  — beardedness  is  an  incorporated 
masculine  trait.  For  adequate  reasons,  however  ob- 
scure or  to  our  thinking  irrelevant  or  perverse.  Nature 
conserves  the  beard.  The  Mohammedan  may  accept 
it  and  swear  by  the  beard  of  his  prophet;  the  twen- 
tieth-century American  citizen  may  accept  it  more  pro- 
fanely by  an  irksome  obligation  of  a daily  shave;  but 
even  a Christian  Scientist  cannot  successfully  deny 
its  stubbly  reality. 

Human  interests  lie  in  values  rather  than  in  facts. 
Civilizations  have  arisen  and  have  assumed  their  vari- 
ous complexions  by  virtue  of  this  preference  and  the 
manner  of  its  expression.  The  important  type  of  value 
is  social  value  — value  for  human  living  as  it  is  or- 
ganized in  the  environment  of  the  age  and  the  com- 
munity, as  it  is  shaped  by  the  traditions  and  in- 
stitutions in  which  the  individual  is  embedded.  The 
individual’s  habits  are  saturated  with  the  mental  inheri- 
tance and  the  imposed  schooling  of  his  tribe.  Great 
streams  of  influence,  ancient  and  recent,  general  and 
local,  massive  and  delicate,  pour  down  upon  him,  de- 
termining the  set  of  his  beliefs  and  attitudes,  for  bet- 
ter or  for  worse,  for  richer,  for  poorer,  in  his  lifelong 


288  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


alliance  with  the  social  conditions  of  his  habitat.  All 
this  makes  him  or  her  the  particular  kind  of  a human 
being  that  he  or  she  is. 

What  is  true  of  conditions  is  also  true  of  opinions. 
Opinions,  scientific  as  well  as  impressionistic,  expert 
and  popular,  proceed  upon  an  accepted  set  of  values. 
Facts  in  the  abstract  are  naked  and  neutral;  their  very 
selection  clothes  them  with  a partisan  tint.  Thus 
clothed,  they  are  fashioned  into  opinions.  The  busi- 
ness of  natural  science  is  to  interpret  the  facts  in  terms 
of  natural  values,  yet  human  values  enter.  For  many 
purposes  that  is  legitimate,  as  it  is  inevitable.  Science 
aims,  however,  to  render  unto  Caesar  the  things  that 
are  Caesar’s.  At  best,  science  is  a bold  restoration  of 
the  torso  of  our  partial  knowledge.  As  such  it  is  the 
work  of  the  critical  and  skilled  imagination.  Leg  and 
arm,  trunk  and  head,  are  alike  indispensable,  but  not 
equally  a clue  to  the  meaning  of  the  whole,  and  to  the 
spirit  of  the  composition.  Proportion  and  perspective 
determine  the  impression  even  more  completely  than 
content.  Facts  in  themselves  are  mute;  they  await 
a unified  interpretation.  Hence,  the  difficulties  in 
reaching  a right  conception  of  the  feminine  as  differ- 
entiated from  the  masculine  nature;  hence,  also,  the 
justification  of  this  logical  approach. 

Ill 

Sex  is  as  ancient  as  it  is  significant.  The  human  dis- 
position of  sex  forms  part  of  the  interesting  record. 
In  the  natural  environment,  before  the  disturbing 
intervention  of  historical  change,  the  powers  of  life 
adequately  determined  the  powers  of  living,  for  men 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


289 


and  women  in  common  and  distinctively.  Primitive 
living  was  a foray  and  a combat  for  food  and  wives, 
and  for  the  protection  of  a cave  or  shelter  for  the  cubs. 
The  powers  brought  to  hfe  and  matured  by  hving  were 
directly  concerned  with  food  and  family.  These  con- 
cerns and  the  qualities  to  meet  them  remain  primal, 
elemental,  inexorable.  They  shape  existence  for  the 
twentieth-century  tenants  in  steam-heated  sky-scrap- 
ers no  differently  than  for  the  original  cliff-dwellers. 
The  powers  that  we  bring  to  life  are  essentially  un- 
changed — so  the  anthropologists  assure  us  — and 
only  the  hving  profoundly  altered.  What  this  means 
is  that  the  powers  of  the  human  brain  — the  hmiting 
instrument  of  all  power  — were  fixed  by  and  adapted 
to  the  needs  of  primitive  living.  The  oldest,  deepest 
instincts  in  human  psychology  are  those  of  the  cave- 
man and  the  cave-woman.  Living  was  for  long  cen- 
turies of  this  simple  order,  and  in  comparison  has  been 
of  the  civilized  order  only  for  brief  years.  What  saved 
and  expanded  the  powers  of  hfe  were  the  large  play- 
fulness and  long  helplessness  of  the  human  cub.  Ma- 
turing is  gradual,  and  is  in  process  an  instinctive  and 
irregular  trial  and  error,  joy  and  sorrow,  in  attempt 
and  growing  success  and  enlarging  enterprise.  Play 
is  deep-rooted,  and  once  tasted  is  never  absent  from 
the  game  of  hving,  and  becomes  its  redemption  from 
ferocity.  Play  enters  into  occupation  as  weU  as  re- 
laxation; the  satisfactions  that  make  doing  things  fun 
take  their  place  beside  food  and  family  to  make  hfe 
hvable.  The  powers  that  we  bring  to  hfe  may  be 
measured  in  relation  to  their  ministry  to  the  con- 
cerns of  food,  family,  and  fun;  such  is  their  service 


290  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


in  their  near-to-nature  perspective,  and  such  they  re- 
main. 

The  original  woman  question  is  accordingly  this: 
How  far  do  the  specialized  functions  assigned  by  Na- 
ture carry  with  them  other  ranges  of  power,  of  fit- 
ness and  limitation,  of  advantage  and  handicap?  In 
quite  the  same  spirit  of  neutrality,  the  assets  and  lia- 
bilities of  the  masculine  economy  require  examination. 
To  over-tailored  minds  there  is  something  derogatory 
in  the  notion  that  qualities  of  high  esteem  and  remote 
employment  should  acknowledge  so  lowly  an  ances- 
try. Such  prejudices  are  irrelevant  and  disturbing.  It  is 
the  attempt  to  rise  above  them  that  characterizes  the 
scientific  temper. 

In  the  achievements  written  in  the  conquest  of  Na- 
ture and  of  human  nature,  lie  the  honor  and  the  glory. 
The  ancient  traits  remain,  but  are  transmuted  in  the 
crucible  of  civilization.  It  is  a long  road  from  mar- 
riage by  capture  or  by  purchase  to  chivalry,  romance, 
devotion,  sacrifice,  and  the  art-embellished  enhance- 
ments of  courtship;  yet  they  all  belong  to  the  same 
psychological  tale,  saturated  and  thrilled  with  the 
love-song  of  sex-attraction.  Without  these  life  seems 
almost  unthinkable  and  living  impoverished  and  bare. 
Strong  virtues  and  strong  vices  are  rooted  here  — the 
strength  derived  from  a common  source  of  the  powers 
of  life.  The  roles  of  men  and  those  of  women  in  this 
drama  are  different;  the  difference  runs  the  gamut  of 
human  nature  and  in  no  rendering  is  more  sustained 
than  in  the  psychic  one.  The  part  played  by  food  in 
the  drama  of  living  may  be  no  less  comprehensive  than 
that  of  sex,  and  no  less  momentous;  its  moments  may 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


291 


be  less  tense,  but  are  more  constant,  differently  for- 
mative. Both  pursuits  with  their  associated  energies 
go  forward  to  the  extended,  transformed  struggle  for 
richer  living,  in  the  complex  will  to  prevail,  that  im- 
poses its  urgency  — though  with  difference  of  empha- 
sis — upon  both  sexes. 

In  the  beginning  and  continuously  the  sex-ardor  and 
food-aggressiveness  of  the  male  sets  his  qualities  in 
the  mould  of  mastery.  Might  was  and  is  the  theme  of 
his  being;  it  vibrates  in  his  mind  as  in  his  muscles.  The 
bully  shows  it  crudely  in  a small  setting;  the  despot 
wields  it  grandly  in  a larger  one.  To  judge  by  sleeping- 
car  etiquette  the  propitious  address  for  the  American 
male  is  “boss,”  as  it  is  likewise  the  less  complimentary 
title  of  political  influence.  Muscular  prowess  was  first 
in  the  field  and  remains  in  possession.  In  institutions 
ostensibly  devoted  to  learning,  brass  bands  greet  the 
returning  football  heroes;  but  the  initiates  of  Phi 
Beta  Kappa  remain  unserenaded.  The  discovery  of  the 
North  Pole  is  more  thrilling  than  the  discovery  of 
evolution.  It  is  aggressive  exploration  on  a popular 
plane,  nearer  to  Nature’s  patterns,  and  thus  intelli- 
gible and  appealing.  It  establishes  a record  which  the 
grand-stand  can  appreciate  and  applaud. 

Mental  aggressiveness  combines  with  physical  aggres- 
siveness or  replaces  it.  Initiative  and  enterprise  wait 
upon  strength,  as  mind  no  less  than  muscle  demands 
exercise.  To  explore  and  venture  and  possess  — and  in 
the  first  instance  by  direct  physical  prowess  — confers 
the  satisfaction  craved  by  the  masterful  temperament. 
It  orders  the  coming  and  the  seeing  and  the  conquer- 
ing of  the  Csesar  in  every  man.  The  mad  ambition  of 


292  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


the  male,  if  unchecked,  becomes  the  serious  menace 
to  humanity,  a threat  to  other  cherished  values,  un- 
less restrained  by  other  potent  forces  of  living,  rooted 
and  made  strong  in  other  powers  of  life.  Masculine 
performance  and  interest  tend  to  a high-tension  ac- 
tivity; in  so  far  they  follow  the  primitive  pattern  of 
the  chase,  involving  active  endurance,  keen  pursuit, 
hot  rivalry,  stirring  climax,  and  the  quarry  or  foe  over- 
come. Big  game  and  big  business  and  the  “big  stick” 
appeal  to  the  eternal  masculine.  Properly  combined 
with  a lion  rampant  and  a fox  couchant,  these  trophies 
would  compose  an  appropriate  male  escutcheon.  The 
strengths  and  the  weaknesses  of  masculine  psychology, 
no  less  than  the  fitness  of  the  masculine  powers  of  life 
to  the  forms  of  living  at  present  cherished  and  estab- 
lished, or  to  the  life  and  ideals  of  other  days  and  ways, 
are  to  be  considered  with  reference  to  one  origin,  as 
rooted  in  a common  quality  of  the  male.  The  problem 
of  civilization  — if  we  are  prepared  to  interpret  its 
mission  pacifically  — is  to  let  the  ape  and  the  tiger 
die,  without  killing  the  man,  without  maiming  the 
potential  superman. 

There  is  a further  psychological  principle  that  nur- 
ture reinforces  nature  and  finds  its  motives  there. 
Thus  encouraged,  masculinity  becomes  increasingly 
masculine.  Primitive  social  organization  shows  the 
simple  life  at  its  simplest,  and  the  strenuous  life  with- 
out complication.  Those  hold  who  have  the  power  and 
those  take  who  can.  When,  however,  a man  commands 
other  men,  however  despotically,  personal  strength 
is  replaced  by  social  authority.  The  transformation  is 
possible  only  by  a psychological  process;  it  endures 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


293 


only  as  the  psychic  bond  holds.  The  captain  remains 
a captain  so  long  as  his  crew  does  not  mutiny.  Organi- 
zation follows  the  clue  of  individual  rule.  Its  early 
form  is  military;  for  manly  men  soldiering  is  the  oldest 
of  professions.  But  the  qualities  of  the  soldier’s  profes- 
sion, like  every  other,  change  as  ideals  and  conditions 
change.  What  a man  fights  for,  and  with,  and  how,  and 
the  restraints  he  exercises,  come  to  be  far  more  signifi- 
cant than  his  original  pugnacity.  The  soldier  may  be 
enlisted  as  a crusader,  or  as  a member  of  the  Salvation 
Army,  or  as  an  individualistic  soldier  of  fortune,  or  as  a 
philanthropic  knight-errant  of  reform.  The  “ conduct  ” 
and  “ satisfaction  ” pattern  of  fighting,  like  most  of 
nature’s  patterns,  is  complex,  woven  of  many  strands. 
The  psychological  satisfactions  of  fighting  may  depart 
slightly  or  widely  from  the  original  type;  they  reap- 
pear in  the  employments  of  vocation  and  relaxation. 
Venture,  pursuit,  overcoming,  rivalry,  possession, 
authority,  the  rewards  of  shrewdness,  and  the  plau- 
dits of  the  crowd  are  all  satisfying.  They  were  in  part 
established  through  fighting;  they  continue  in  the  psy- 
chology of  all  manners  of  mastery.  Sport  enlists  them 
so  thoroughly  that  it  remains  typically  a masculine  out- 
let. But  sport  may  enlist  other  patterns  of  satisfaction 
that  encroach  upon  the  “food”  or  livelihood  interests. 
When  the  interests  in  the  stake  exceed  that  in  the 
game,  the  player  becomes  a gambler  or  a pot-himter. 
Our  approval  is  for  the  authentic  amateur,  for  sport 
for  sport’s  sake.  The  word  “amateur”  (literally, 
“lover  ”)  implies  another  fundamental  pursuit.  A lover 
fights  and  hkes  to  win,  though  marriage  by  capture  is 
fairly  obsolete.  In  all  its  expressions  masculine  ardor 


294  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


is  of  one  source,  however  variously  expressed,  variously 
composed.  We  deny  as  we  cite  that  all  is  fair  in  love 
and  war;  but  the  association  remains. 

Such  is  masculine  nature;  and  by  consequence  the 
imposed  nurture  insists  upon  injecting  into  all  man- 
controlled  pursuits  a fair  measure  of  the  same  qual- 
ities. Men  so  organize  their  enterprises  as  to  make 
business  a game,  a competition,  a fight,  often  a ruth- 
less one;  also  they  speculate  and  take  chances.  But  as 
they  gamble  they  use  their  wits;  they  plan  the  cam- 
paign, they  measure  and  circumvent  opposition,  they 
seek  the  thrill  of  success.  Not  indifferent  to  other 
values,  they  yet  excuse  evasions  or  sharp  practices 
by  the  dictum  that  business  is  business,  which  means 
that  men  will  be  men.  The  same  intelligence  has  dis- 
covered that  war  is  war,  and  that  love  is  love.  Yet 
thanks  to  the  like  penetration  of  the  feminine  mind, 
a warlike  or  businesslike  lover  is  rarely  acceptable; 
so  the^masculine  endowment  escapes  too  rigid  limita- 
tions. To  repeat:  The  masculine  tendency  is  to  make 
a fighting  game  of  all  pursuits,  to  bring  to  them  the 
flavor  of  the  typical  male  satisfactions.  If  permitted, 
men  make  politics  a game,  not  too  clean  a one,  and 
having  stained  it,  advise  sensitive  souls  — women  and 
scholars  — to  keep  out. 

Equally  important  is  the  transformation  of  the  mas- 
culine satisfaction  as  it  extends  its  range,  transfers  its 
allegiance.  The  foray  and  chase  stimulate  the  zest  of 
experience,  the  spread  of  curiosity,  the  experimental 
inclination.  The  hunter  becomes  the  trapper,  the  fighter 
becomes  the  strategist.  Invention  is  started  on  its 
momentous  career,  and  with  it  as  the  social  counter- 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


295 


part,  the  organization  of  man-power  as  well  as  of  ox- 
power  and  horse-power.  Power  and  conquest  still  en- 
thrall men;  but  the  instrument  is  no  longer  a simple 
pugnacity  or  blood-thirst,  but  conquest  of  nature, 
extension  of  mental  dominion,  forearming  by  fore- 
thinking, controlling  by  understanding.  The  mental 
quest  brings  its  minor  satisfactions  as  weU  as  its  tan- 
gible results;  it  brings  them  most  generally  in  some 
form  near  to  the  primitive  pattern;  nor  in  complex 
undertakings  are  the  earlier  types  forsaken.  In  such 
manner  the  whole  man  is  transformed,  but  not  wholly. 
Once  society  has  incorporated  and  organized  these 
derivative  activities,  boys  turn  as  natiually  into  me- 
chanics and  engineers,  or  captains  of  industry  and 
business  men,  as  into  soldiers.  At  an  unsophisticated 
age  they  are  enthralled  by  railway  trains  as  readily  as 
by  fisticuff  encounters.  Girls  are  not  debarred  from 
these  indulgences  by  a tyrannical  male  ukase,  but  by 
a decree  of  their  nature;  they  are  not  devoid  of  either 
pugnacity,  curiosity,  inventiveness,  or  a love  of  sen- 
sation; but  the  formulae  of  satisfaction  which  they  nat- 
urally follow  is  sufficiently  different  to  make  the  segre- 
gation that  occurs  in  the  College  of  Engineering  as 
expressive  of  what  women  dishke  as  of  what  men  hke. 

There  is  more  than  one  lesson  in  the  illustration:  In 
the  first  instance,  that  the  derivative  and  remote  con- 
trasts in  what  men  and  women  do  better  than  the 
other,  differently  than  the  other,  with  more  decided 
preference  than  the  other,  follows  consistently,  though 
not  rigidly,  from  consistent  and  rigid  original  endow- 
ment, indissolubly  associated  with  sex.  These  differ- 
ences may  be  man-encouraged,  man-exaggerated,  but 


296  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


they  are  not  man-made.  A second  consequence  is  that 
these  very  differences  are  not  only  of  degree,  but  of 
limited  degree;  what  the  social  system  does  is  either 
decidedly  to  increase  the  divergence,  or  decidedly  to 
diminish  it,  to  encourage  it,  or  to  discourage  it. 
In  times  of  war  women  engage  and  acquit  themselves 
acceptably  in  occupations  which  for  a variety  of  rea- 
sons they  avoid  in  times  of  peace.  The  peace  stand- 
ard, though  not  infallible,  is  presumably  more  legit- 
imate than  the  war  standard.  A further  consequence 
is  that  types  of  modem  employments  may  be  so  remote 
from  these  original  differences  that  the  fitness  of  men 
and  of  women  for  them  may  be  substantially  equal, 
though  this  equality  may  conceal  the  fact  that  the 
male  superiorities  and  inferiorities  are  of  one  order, 
and  the  female  of  another.  Still  further:  It  should 
never  be  forgotten  that  there  are  some  sorts  of  em- 
ployments in  which  small  differences  are  highly  signifi- 
cant, and  others  in  which  they  are  not  so.  One  may  as 
readily  be  deceived  as  enlightened  by  statistics  and  the 
bare  outlines  of  facts;  for,  like  words,  they  may  con- 
ceal as  much  as  they  reveal. 

rv 

Leaving  the  masculine  psychology  with  its  forbid- 
ding logical  flavor,  we  turn  to  an  equally  sketchy  out- 
line of  the  feminine  nature  as  Nature  has  ordained  it. 
The  evidence  is  strong  that  the  feminine  endowment 
is  even  more  heavily  sex-determined  than  the  mascu- 
line. Reducing  pages  to  phrases,  one  may  read,  with 
abundant  citation  of  chapter  and  verse,  that  women 
are  truer  to  type  than  men,  nearer  to  the  race-norm 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


297 


and  the  child-nature,  more  conservative  and  less  vari- 
able. Prominent  is  the  larger  affectability  of  woman, 
which  in  turn  is  the  nearer-to-nature  reaction,  and  is 
indispensable  to  the  race-preserving,  mothering  minis- 
trations. The  potential  mother  in  every  woman  com- 
mands a larger  range  of  her  endowment,  penetrates 
deeper  into  the  roots  of  her  being,  radiates  more  inti- 
mately to  the  finer  modes  of  her  expressions,  than  is 
true  of  any  sex-determined  section  of  masculine  psy- 
chology. The  race-preserving  qualities  are  in  their 
feminine  expression  more  absorbing,  more  sustained, 
more  vital.  The  female  of  the  species  is  more  deadly 
in  earnest  for  the  species;  her  marginal  activities  re- 
fiect  more  warmly,  more  pervasively  the  focal  con- 
cerns. She  bears  the  sterling  hall-mark  of  her  na- 
ture more  conspicuously  and  more  responsibly.  It  has 
been  well  said  that  the  Romans  appropriated  everything 
from  the  Greeks  except  their  background;  a fortunate 
son  might  inherit  as  largely  his  mother’s  qualities,  but 
would  always  lack  her  background. 

In  her  secondary  trait  a woman  follows  a double 
allegiance:  the  one  set  by  courtship,  the  other  by  the 
care  of  the  young.  This  duality  — which  imder  stress 
may  approach  duplicity  — enlarges  and  complicates 
a woman’s  qualities;  it  gives  her  a versatility  more  ex- 
acting than  is  needed  to  make  a man  at  once  a good 
lover  and  a good  provider.  The  belle  and  the  matron 
are  both  present  in  the  woman’s  dower;  and  those  by 
dower  competent  to  judge  detect  in  some  women  the 
dominance  of  the  belle  inadequately  under-studied 
by  the  matron,  and  in  others  the  matron  rather  negli- 
gent of  the  other  half.  If  the  interests  of  the  one,  in 


298  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


Hausfrau  parlance,  are  children,  church,  and  chim- 
ney-corner, the  interests  of  the  other  may  be  disre- 
spectfully rendered  as  charms,  chaps,  and  chiffons, 
with  chatter  as  a frivolous,  and  charity  as  a sobering 
ballast.  The  eternal  feminine  is  as  truly  the  belle  as 
the  matron.  Historically,  the  r6le  accorded  to  women 
has  varied  from  slave  to  siren,  to  solace.  At  all  times 
women  have  had  to  charm  for  their  station,  even  for 
their  living;  and  the  technique  of  charm  and  its  asso- 
ciated arts,  which  are  many  and  of  good  standing,  — 
and  of  not  so  good,  — are  hers  by  bent  of  nature  and 
the  inclination  of  nurture. 

In  both  pursuits  there  is  a large  demand  upon  emo- 
tional endowment,  upon  sympathy  and  a tempera- 
mental insight  into  the  play  of  intimate  motives,  of 
affective  give  and  take  — all  intensely  personalized. 
“Man  has  been  compelled  to  face  external  Nature. 
Woman  must  face  humanity.”  The  personal  passion- 
ateness of  the  mother  standardizes  much  of  feminine 
emotion;  and  in  so  far  as  the  mental  life  is  supported 
and  colored  by  the  emotional  nature,  — and  that,  like 
beauty  or  the  love  of  it,  is  not  skin-deep,  but  goes  to 
the  bone,  — the  feminine  mind  is  bound  to  reflect 
originally,  and  in  all  its  moods  and  tenses,  the  abound- 
ing sources  of  its  inspiration.  The  larger  possibilities 
lie  here,  the  truer  devotion  to  causes  espoused,  the  more 
righteous  appraisal  of  what  things  are  vital  and  worth 
while,  and  an  abundant  following  of  minor  qualifica- 
tions, slighter  superiorities,  more  congenial  fitnesses 
for  types  of  occupation,  which  shape  female  (and  also 
feminist)  psychology. 

The  larger  limitations  are  of  the  same  conditioning. 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


299 


Certain  profound  transformations  of  the  human  mind 
must  be  accomphshed  before  civilization  can  proceed 
completely,  consonantly,  successfully,  and  happily. 
Some  of  the  qualifications  for  entering  into  the  prom- 
ised land  — the  promise  that  of  inspired  vision  and 
the  fulfillment  directed  by  cherished  ideals  of  the  larger 
minds  of  both  sexes  — will  be  more  difficult  for  women, 
and  others  for  men.  In  so  far  as  the  transformation 
runs  coxmter  to  deeply  ingrained  masculine  traits,  — 
strengths  and  weaknesses  alike — men  will  have  a longer 
and  a harder  road  to  travel  to  incorporate  them  into 
their  being.  In  so  far  as  the  transformation  opposes 
the  feminine  bent,  — its  frailties  and  foibles  as  well 
as  its  potencies,  — the  greater  trial  will  fall  to  the  lot 
of  women.  The  civilizing  process  requires  a reorgani- 
zation of  the  psychic  nature;  if  one  sex  has  a readier 
facility  for  such  readjustment,  that  facility  will  be- 
come a general  advantage.  For  civilization,  education, 
domestication,  — call  the  process  by  whatever  name, 
— is  nothing  else  than  the  expression  of  the  self -trans- 
forming power  of  the  human  mind,  aided  or  hindered 
by  the  institutional  establishments  which  that  same 
intelligence  establishes  for  the  process.  A dominantly 
masculine  civilization  will  differ  from  a dominantly 
feminine  one;  either  implies  the  capacity  to  control 
above  the  other.  Every  civiUzation  reflects  the  parts 
assumed  by  the  two. 

The  psychic  changes  that  civihzation  demands  of 
human  nature,  and  the  masculine  and  feminine  way 
of  meeting  that  demand,  are  decisive.  They  shape  the 
conditions  of  living,  and  they  determine  the  field  of 
operation  of  the  feminine  along  with  and  as  contrasted 


300  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


with  the  masculine  mind.  The  generally  human  way 
of  meeting  that  demand  — as  likewise,  the  way  of  this 
nation  and  of  that  — comes  forward  in  the  differences 
of  ideals  that  make  the  large  issues  of  our  living.  Na- 
tions go  to  war  for  such  ideals;  people  travel  and  study 
to  understand  them  and  absorb  them;  missionaries 
devote  their  lives  to  extend  them;  commerce  brings 
them  with  her  cargoes.  And  always  these  ideals  are 
differently  absorbed  and  refracted  as  they  pass  through 
a psychic  prism  that  behaves  after  the  manner  of  a 
masculine  or  of  a feminine  medium  of  transmission. 
That  complex  refractive  and  reflective  aspect  of  the 
feminine  mind  is  the  consideration  eventually  to  be 
reached,  but  is  present  in  our  minds  from  the  outset; 
it  is,  indeed,  largely  responsible  for  our  entire  under- 
taking. For  the  moment  the  important  thing  is  to 
note  that  the  transformations,  large  and  small,  come 
into  being  by  a grafting  process;  the  success  of  the 
graft  depends  upon  the  nearness  of  kin  of  the  trans- 
formed to  the  original  trait.  Such  transformations  as 
stand  close  to  feminine  qualities  will  be  better  and  more 
readily  accomplished  by  women;  those  that  sprout 
more  congenially  upon  a masculine  stem  will  blossom 
more  abimdantly  in  the  transformed  psychology  of 
the  male;  still  others  may  flourish  as  richly  under  the 
one  culture  as  under  the  other,  and  yet  show  differ- 
ences of  growth. 

That  phase  of  the  conclusion  has  been  reached.  The 
other  side  of  the  same  conclusion  requires  statement. 
It  is  that  the  mode  of  the  response  reveals  sex  as  char- 
acteristically as  the  success  of  the  response.  Mode, 
method,  manner,  technique  carry  the_stamp  of  sex  as 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


301 


strongly,  possibly  more  revealingly  than  the  action  or 
the  interest.  In  so  far  as  women  qualify  for  the  trans- 
formations demanded  by  this  or  that  order  of  living, 
they  qualify  not  only  by  virtue  of  womanly  traits,  but 
in  a womanly  manner.  Sacrifice  is  inherent  in  a moth- 
er’s nature;  by  virtue  thereof  the  womanly  nature  is 
emotionally  more  richly  responsive;  that  trait  will 
spread  itself  over  the  entire  range  of  feminine  respon- 
siveness. Women  will  share  the  profit  and  the  loss  of 
such  generous  affectability  in  all  their  reactions  to 
life’s  situations,  alike  where  it  proves  to  be  a benefit 
and  where  it  does  not.  They  may  be  disposed  to 
approach  and  to  solve  problems  emotionally  by  the 
technique  of  sacrifice  (or  it  may  be  by  the  technique  of 
charm),  which  require  for  their  adequate  solution,  the 
technique  of  invention  and  mastery.  They  may  be  in- 
clined to  substitute  feeling  for  initiative.  By  the  same 
token  they  may  have  a tendency  to  over  personalize 
situations,  which  is  another  consequence  of  a more 
susceptible  and  generous  affectability.  And  a weak 
sense  for  the  objective  (which  is  a characteristic  atti- 
tude demanded  by  science  and  made  strong  in  its 
practice)  may  handicap  them  seriously  in  playing  this 
part  or  thal,  for  which,  so  far  as  all  the  other  essential 
or  supporting  qualities  go,  they  may  be  as  well  fitted 
as  men.  They  may  not  take  ideas  so  seriously  as  feel- 
ings, and  may  prefer  good  will  to  good  sense.  Grafted 
upon  one  and  the  same  stem  are  the  qualities  that  make 
women  more  sacrificing,  more  conscientious,  more 
patient  alike  of  drudgery  and  disaster,  more  senti- 
mental, and  less  tolerant  of  personal  differences,  less 
impressed  by  far-flung  systems  of  control,  and  more 


302  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


inclined  to  yield  devotion  than  to  supply  the  direction 
of  its  energy.  More  bluntly  put:  the  following  of  her 
natural  bent  may  lead  a representative  woman  to 
martyrdom,  more  or  less  futile,  or  more  or  less  noble 
(witness  the  hunger  strikes  of  imprisoned  suffragettes), 
or  to  nagging  more  or  less  venial  (witness  Xantippe 
and  her  clan).  Let  the  concluding  emphasis  fall  upon 
this  principle  that  maimer  maketh  the  man  and  the 
woman  also. 

V 

But  what  is  the  bearing  of  all  this  upon  the  feminine 
mind?  The  mind  is  the  instrument  of  reasoning,  and 
logic  does  not  deal  with  gender.  In  Mme.  de  Stael’s 
words:  “Les  dmes  n*ont  pas  de  sexes.”  The  explana- 
tion of  this  gifted  feminist’s  view  that  minds  are  with- 
out sex,  is  astonishingly  simple:  she  was  simply  wrong. 
And  there  are  psychologists  differently  mistaken  by 
way  of  the  other  extreme,  who  hold  that  minds  reflect 
little  else  than  sex.  A truer  mean  is  expressed  by  Mr. 
Havelock  Ellis:  “A  man  is  a man  throughout,  a woman 
is  a woman  throughout,  and  that  difference  is  mani- 
fest in  all  the  energies  of  body  and  soul.”  The  truth 
is  that  the  rational  element  in  the  mind’s  procedures 
dominates  only  in  the  few,  and  reaches  so  far  as  a 
moderately  responsible  control  of  conduct  in  the  many, 
yet  by  no  means  in  the  vast  majority  of  the  average 
run  of  men  and  women.  Of  thinking  pure  and  simple 
there  is  much  that  is  simple  enough,  but  not  so  much 
that  is  pure.  Thinking  colored  by  emotional  inclina- 
tion is  the  rule,  even  among  the  more  intellectually 
inclined;  and  thinking  warped  by  desire  and  emotional 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


303 


bias  is  the  even  more  common  rule  for  the  far  more 
numerous  non-intellectual  classes.  Considered  more 
practically;  if  conclusions  affecting  human  relations 
could  be  expressed  in  logarithms,  minds  would  truly 
have  no  more  sex  than  adding-machines;  and  diaries 
would  be  no  more  interesting  than  time-tables  or  bank- 
books. Thinking  would  stand  free  of  emotional,  and 
consequently  also  of  sex-bias.  Thinking,  as  it  actually 
goes  on  (when  charitably  interpreted),  includes  the 
gross  aggregate  of  mental  processes  that  intervene 
between  the  appearance  of  a problem  and  the  line  of 
action  decided  upon  for  its  solution  — between  vague 
impressions  and  definite  convictions.  Making  up  one’s 
mind,  like  oiu’  display  of  an  American  flag  when  we 
travel  abroad,  is  in  many  instances  a superfluous  pro- 
cedure. The  average  mind  is  already  in  a state  of  pre- 
paredness; it  may  be  caught  in  deshabille,  but  promptly 
assumes  its  formal  and  conventional  habit.  To  un- 
welcome calls  it  is  conveniently  as  well  as  convention- 
ally not  at  home. 

One  must  not  be  misled  or  cajoled  by  a word.  The 
mind  is  the  logical  phase  of  the  psychological  natme. 
The  mind  as  the  instrument  of  perception  and  judg- 
ment must  on  occasion  be  distinguished  from  the  com- 
posite personality  that  also  attends  to  feeling  and 
willing  — the  character.  But  neither  minds  nor  charac- 
ters exist  in  detachment.  The  only  reality  is  the  indi- 
vidual, at  once  mind  and  character,  both  set  in  a com- 
mon nature.  Young  men  and  young  women  go  to  col- 
lege to  develop  their  minds,  but  in  no  sense  leave  their 
charaeters  — or  however  they  designate  their  none  too 
logical  selves  — at  home.  They  bring  their  total  per- 


304,  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


sonalities,  sex  and  all,  to  learning  as  to  all  other  call- 
ings. And  so  distinct  are  the  problems  arising  from 
this  circumstance  (which  many  even  officially  con- 
cerned with  it  take  pleasure  or  pride  in  ignoring)  that 
coeducational  colleges  appoint  women  Deans  of  Women 
to  direct  women  students,  despite  the  presence  of 
fairly  competent  men  on  the  Faculty.  Recognizing 
this  practical  condition,  psychology  studies  the  femi- 
nine nature,  mental  nature,  emotional  nature,  willing 
nature,  conduct  nature,  — all  in  one,  and  one  in  all, 
— composite  and  sexed. 

This  consideration  is  important  in  its  own  right,  and 
is  additionally  so  because  the  perceiving  and  judging 
functions,  which  are  favored  in  the  ordinary  meaning 
of  mind,  are  likewise  not  detached.  The  mind  as  the 
logical  instrument  depends  upon  supporting  qualities. 
These  supporting  qualities  lie  partly  in  the  same  field 
as  the  logical  operations;  such  are  keenness  of  percep- 
tion, capacity  for  detail,  sustained  attention,  ready 
imagination,  range  of  association,  a sense  of  perti- 
nence, value,  propriety,  effectiveness.  Quite  as  largely 
they  are  in  the  field  of  feeling  and  will,  or  encroach 
upon  them;  such  are  conscience,  persistence,  endur- 
ance, self-control,  and  that  composite  attitude  that 
makes  the  professional  temper.  When  these  supports 
are  considered  in  their  actual  relations  to  success  and 
manner  of  undertaking,  to  the  capacities,  preferences, 
strengths  of  interest,  inclinations  to  occupations,  and 
all  manner  of  fitnesses  that  make  up  the  quality  of  the 
work  of  the  mind  in  its  daily  rounds,  it  becomes  clear 
how  arbitrary  it  would  be  to  view  them  as  merely  in- 
tellectual facilities,  as  detached  in  any  manner  from 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


305 


the  man  or  woman  — body,  mind'  and  character  — 
who  directs  them.  The  pragmatic  diflFerences  in  the 
feminine  mind  and  the  masculine  mind,  when  both  are 
set  to  work  upon  the  same  order  of  task,  result  from 
the  infusion  of  the  feeling  and  willing  factor,  quite  as 
much  as  from  any  difference  in  logical  power  or  method. 
The  difference  makes  manner  and  quality  as  well  as 
efficiency.  The  range,  degree,  and  manner  of  one’s 
interests  are  as  much  a part  of  one’s  feeling  as  of 
one’s  thinking;  the  complex  play  of  interests  as  sup- 
ports to  mind  are  intelligible  only  when  considered  in 
terms  of  the  total  psychological  natme. 

In  summary:  The  minds  of  men  and  the  minds  of 
women  may  differ  less  (both  in  general  and  in  particu- 
lar cases)  than  their  supporting  qualities.  What  men 
and  women  choose  to  attempt  and  manage  to  accom- 
plish with  their  minds  may  depend  more  upon  the 
supporting  qualities  they  bring  to  bear  upon  the  effort 
than  upon  any  strong  differences  in  mental  capacity. 
Psychology  recognizes  such  original  and  decisive  dif- 
ferences, while  yet  it  emphasizes  that  they  are  of  de- 
gree only;  but  it  considers  them  in  their  practical  em- 
ployment as  aided  by  their  supporting  qualities.  If 
this  interpretation  is  sound,  it  is  natural  that  isolated 
tests  designed  with  slight  reference  to  the  supporting 
qualities  (which  play  such  a large  part  in  the  actual 
relations  of  a real  world)  should  show  slight  contrast 
of  the  masculine  and  the  feminine  performance.  Tests 
like  facts,  which  they  are,  require  the  illumination  of 
their  place  in  the  setting  that  gives  them  meaning. 


306  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


VI 

It  is  only  in  a limited  sense  that  the  mental  aptitudes 
of  men  and  women  are  subject  to  test.  The  test  of  the 
schoolroom  is  pertinent  so  far  as  it  goes;  the  psycho- 
logical laboratory  contributes  similar  and  more  meas- 
urable comparisons.  The  experiences  of  trades  and 
occupations  add  to  the  impression.  The  combined  edu- 
cational, psychological,  and  industrial  records  show,  on 
the  whole,  a small  range  of  differences  — some  favor- 
able to  men,  others  to  women.  This  conclusion  applies 
to  tests  involving  the  working  of  the  senses,  the  direc- 
tion of  skilled  movements,  as  well  as  tests  in  the  field 
of  memory,  imagination,  and  the  associative  and  judg- 
ing processes.  The  most  marked  superiority  is  that  of 
men  in  muscular  strength  and  qualities  of  action  re- 
lated to  this  factor.  A consistent  feminine  superiority 
is  in  the  field  of  memory  and  the  allied  supporting, 
somewhat  detailed  and  minute,  secretarial  or  hand- 
maid qualities  that  keep  the  mental  affairs  in  order. 
Yet  equally  convincing  of  fair  equality  are  the  records 
of  Phi  Beta  Kappa  in  coeducational  institutions.  These 
summarize  the  most  complex  array  of  mental  apti- 
tudes that  may  readily  be  compared  in  parallel  columns 
of  figures.  Speaking  broadly,  and  thus  shallowly,  so 
far  as  aptitude  for  study  goes,  the  academic  record 
divides  the  prizes  — for  there  is  more  than  one  — and 
some  go  to  boys  and  some  to  girls,  though  often  with 
conspicuous  exceptions  and  uncertain  distribution. 
When  projected  in  averages,  the  curves  of  such  men- 
tal aptitudes  decidedly  overlap  and  present  similar 
outlines. 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


307 


When  it  comes  to  interpretation,  the  trouble  begins. 
The  pertinent  question,  if  our  principles  are  sound,  re- 
lates to  the  place  of  the  aptitudes  tested  in  college,  in 
a biological  scale.  Thus  considered,  they  are  obviously 
highly  special  applications  of  highly  derivative  powers 
to  the  third  and  fourth  degree.  The  bare  fact  that 
young  men  and  yoimg  women  do  so  nearly  equally 
well  (by  the  tests  of  rank  in  studies)  may  have  so  un- 
expected a meaning  as  that  they  do  equally  badly.  And 
this  is  not  a slur,  but  the  recognition  of  a fact;  namely, 
that  the  specialization  of  the  mental  powers  demanded 
by  college  courses,  though  not  very  rigid,  is  rigid  enough 
to  make  the  test  limited  and  uncertain.  It  would  be 
more  so  if  one  proposed  to  test  the  intelligence  of  the 
sexes  by  their  skill  at  chess,  — in  which,  from  a profes- 
sional point  of  view,  most  men  and  most  women  would 
do  equally  badly.  The  test  is  good  so  far  as  it  goes; 
and  clearly  it  does  not  go  nearly  so  far  as  a “college 
course  ” test.  Both  tests  would  show  that  the  stand- 
ards of  proficiency  (in  chess  or  in  studies)  set  by  a 
democratic  requirement,  or  the  modest  qualifications 
necessary  to  keep  one  in  college,  represent  but  a part 
and  a tangential  part  of  the  individual’s  total  qualifi- 
cation for  living.  Men  and  women  do  equally  well  (or 
equally  badly)  in  college,  because  their  doing  well  or 
not  depends  on  qualities  too  irregularly  related  with 
their  most  significant  strengths  and  weaknesses.  The 
records  of  what  intellectually  specialized  men  and  in- 
tellectually specialized  women  do  with  their  minds, 
when  released  from  academic  discipline,  is  a far  more 
significant  criterion.  In  professional  pursuits,  the  sup- 
porting, congenially  masculine  qualities,  combining  with 


308  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


the  special  intellectual  grasp,  may  account  largely  for 
the  overwhelming  prominence  of  men’s  names  in  gen- 
eral biographical  dictionaries  and  in  those  of  the  spe- 
cialties. 

It  should  be  noted  that  in  such  comparisons  the 
standards  are  shifting.  In  the  selection  of  those  fit  for 
college  from  the  total  candidates  (neglecting  the  large 
and  disturbing  factor  of  opportunity)  the  intellectual 
facility  may  prove  to  be  about  equal  in  the  sexes.  In 
the  early  days  when  few  women  went  to  college,  those 
who  went  were  doubtless  of  higher  intellectual  status 
than  the  average  of  men,  or  the  average  of  women  in 
college  to-day;  selection  must  be  considered.  The  pro- 
portion fit  for  encouragement  for  the  doctor’s  degree 
may  show  a decided  contrast  of  sex;  and  successful 
candidates  for  important  professorships  may  reveal  still 
more  pronounced  differentiation  of  sex  (after  due  allow- 
ance for  artificial  sex-disqualification  is  made).  This 
specialized  order  of  intellectual  test,  though  in  part 
legitimate,  is  indeed  remote  from  the  central  function 
of  the  intellect  to  direct  conduct  rationally  under  the 
ordinary  conditions  of  life.  It  may  be  gliding  over 
rather  than  resting  upon  the  significant  sex-differences; 
it  may  be  concealing  rather  than  revealing  the  sex- 
differences  on  which  a comparable  amateur  score  is 
made.  The  professional  standard  may  be  needed  to 
show  sex-differenees  of  so  highly  specialized  a type. 

High-grade  intellectual  logical  quality  lies  so  remote 
from  the  central  and  common  utilities  of  a decently 
rational  control  of  conduct,  that  it  is  almost  the  last 
place  where  one  should  look  for  pronounced  and  au- 
thentic sex-differences.  And  if  it  should  be  the  fact 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


309 


that  some  one  quality  in  this  domain  dominates,  and 
if  that  quality  happens  to  have  a stronger  and  more 
congenial  hold  on  the  psychology  of  one  sex  than  on 
that  of  the  other,  such  superiority  may  have  a tremen- 
dous influence  upon  the  achievements  and  occupa- 
tions of  the  sexes.  The  tests,  be  it  noted,  are  set  by 
complex  careers  under  highly  civilized  and  specialized 
social  conditions.  Such  a quality  is  originality;  not 
originality  alone,  but  supported  by  an  aggressive  per- 
sistence, an  exploring  curiosity,  a directive  manage- 
ment, and  much  else  of  like  nature. 

For  no  lifelong  pursuit  flourishes  upon  one  quality 
alone;  the  combination  which  it  demands  widens  the 
chance  for  finding  a greater  fitness  in  masculine  or  in 
feminine  psychology.  When  a similar  achievement  is 
fairly  equally  accomplished  by  men  and  by  women, 
it  may  still  be  that  the  qualities  contributing  to  the 
comparable  success  themselves  vary  moderately  or 
decidedly  in  the  two  sexes.  And  quite  as  significantly, 
men  and  women  will  not  only  carry  to  the  same  occu- 
pation differently  contributing  factors,  but  show  a like 
difference  of  manner  in  expression.  Even  when  no  such 
complexity  exists,  the  sex-difference  may  be  signifi- 
cant. In  general,  women  are  doubtless  as  musically 
gifted  as  men,  probably  more  so;  the  proportion  of 
musical  composers  among  men-musicians  remains  a 
significant  fact,  and  the  contrast  of  a masculine  and 
feminine  musical  rendition  equally  so.  Though  such 
statements  must  be  made  with  proper  reservations, 
their  significance  remains.  They  direct  the  interpre- 
tation without  which  the  bare  facts  are  as  likely  to 
mislead  as  to  enlighten.  Once  the  right  clue  to  inter- 


310  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


pretation  is  found,  the  controversial  issues  may  be  led 
to  a surer  understanding  and  a more  profitable  appli- 
cation. The  indispensable  condition  to  following  the 
right  scent  is  the  avoidance  of  the  false  ones.  Among 
these  the  statistical  fallacy  is  especially  to  be  avoided; 
this  claims  for  facts  because  they  accurately  represent 
what  they  represent,  an  authority  over  conclusions 
which  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  facts  entirely  fails  to 
justify. 

Statistics  tell  the  truth,  but  not  the  whole  truth; 
they  are  false  only  when  falsely  interpreted.  There 
are  professional  psychologists  who  conclude,  on  the 
basis  of  the  experimental  and  similar  data,  that  women 
have  proved  themselves  as  well  fitted  as  men  for  all 
vocations,  that  their  intellectual  equipment  is  com- 
parable, that  the  exclusion  of  women  from  any  calling 
is  mere  prejudice.  That  conclusion  involves  a double 
fallacy:  it  assumes  that  the  intellectual  test  is  ade- 
quate and  is  adequately  tested  by  the  given  tests;  and 
also  that  all  kinds  of  differences  are  equally  significant. 
It  likewise  ignores  an  important  fact:  that  speciahzed 
qualities  mature  by  the  support  which  they  find  in  the 
generic,  more  primary,  more  vital  qualities,  nearer  to 
Natme’s  perspective.  In  addition,  it  overlooks  that 
small  differences  may  count,  and  count  heavily,  just 
in  that  proportion  in  which  society  finds  a use  (an  un- 
natural use,  it  may  be)  for  highly  specialized  qualities. 
If  one  will  reflect  upon  the  small  place  provided  for 
a mathematical  gift  (that  is,  for  that  general  type  of 
aptitude  upon  which  a proficiency  in  mathematics  may 
be  built)  in  a fairly  primitive  and  natural  condition  of 
society,  and  will  reflect  upon  the  extremely  modest 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


311 


mathematical  capacity  found  in  the  average  person  in 
school  or  behind  the  counter,  — all  of  whom  make 
desirable  voting  or  should-be  voting  citizens,  de- 
cently competent  in  all  the  complex  relations  of  mod- 
ern life,  — one  begins  to  realize  how  remote  a part  in 
a natural  distribution  of  general  and  special  aptitudes 
this  mathematical  proficiency  plays.  The  fact  that 
we  honor  one  who  has  such  unusual  powers  by  making 
a professor  of  mathematics  of  him,  and  by  supporting 
him  in  such  affluence  that  it  requires  all  his  mathemat- 
ical ingenuity  to  make  both  ends  meet,  demonstrates 
that  our  complex  needs  require  in  a highly  selected  few 
an  extreme  development  of  powers  fairly  remote  from 
the  ordinary  range  upon  which  a livelihood  is  gained 
and  a life  lived.  So  far  may  the  powers  that  we  bring 
to  living  travel  from  the  powers  that  we  bring  to  life. 

The  general  relation  of  women  to  learning  should 
not  be  dismissed  without  recognizing,  indeed,  empha- 
sizing, that  by  sheer  force  of  tradition  society  may 
impose  a disqualification  upon  a sex,  which,  if  not  least 
aptly,  at  least  inaptly,  expresses  a significant  differ- 
ence. In  days  well  within  the  modern  perspective, 
an  educated  woman  was  regarded  as  an  unwomanly 
one;  and  a taste  for  blue  in  stockings  (though  in  long- 
skirted  days  more  readily  concealed)  ostracized  the 
feminine  precursor  of  the  “high-brow  ” from  the  privi- 
leges of  her  sex.  Books  are  no  more  formidable  weap- 
ons for  women  than  for  men;  and  the  pen  which  some 
men  have  found  mightier  than  the  sword  may  also  by 
some  women  be  found  mightier  than  the  broom.  The 
ignorance  of  women  in  many  lands  must  not  be  cited 
to  indicate  an  aptitude  or  a taste  for  that  form  of  bliss. 


312  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


Similarly  the  fact  that  the  group  who  hold  that  a 
college  education  unfits  for  the  activities  of  life  is 
composed  of  impenetrable  men,  may  give  that  senti- 
ment a masculine  air  without  making  it  typical  of  the 
male. 

The  restrictions  which  a masculine  rule  have  placed 
upon  feminine  expression  and  the  extent  to  which  such 
limitations  have  fettered  or  effectively  discouraged 
the  development  of  womanly  capacities,  can  be  judged 
only  by  the  result  of  emancipation.  For  it  is  not 
merely  the  feet  of  women  — as  in  China  — but  the 
minds  of  women  that  have  been  bound,  by  both  proc- 
esses limiting  their  excursions.  The  effect  of  restric- 
tion appears  in  social,  political,  and  vocational  fields 
and  spreads  over  the  entire  career  of  women;  histori- 
cally it  is  doubtless  the  largest  single  influence  that 
determines  what  women  have  done,  even  when  the 
largest  allowance  is  made  for  the  extent  to  which  their 
occupations  express  their  nature.  This  applied  field 
will  presently  be  considered;  for  the  moment  we  note 
that  the  intellectual  qualities  of  women  are  of  intens- 
ive interest  because  minds  count  in  modern  life  and 
are  going  to  count  more  and  more.  Without  inclina- 
tion to  the  educating  process  and  capacity  for  it,  the 
competence  necessary  for  the  civilized  life  cannot  be 
attained.  The  world  is  going  to  be  more  and  more  in- 
terested in  the  feminine  mind,  as  the  tendency  spreads 
to  give  minds  (and  feminine  minds)  a fairer  and  a 
larger  field.  The  world  will  not  thereby  lose  its  interest 
in  feminine  personalities. 

In  brief:  the  intellectual  test  is  valuable,  but  does 
not  stand  alone;  deeper  and  more  comprehensive  are 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


313 


the  allied  and  supporting  processes  which  give  the 
cutting  edge  to  the  instrument,  and  determine  the 
temper  of  the  mind,  the  manner  and  spirit  of  its  use. 
Women  possess  a distinctive  type  of  mentality  and 
express  the  mentality  which  they  share  with  men  with 
distinctive  differences  of  manner  and  composition  and 
effect;  and  all  this,  by  reason  of  the  different  composite 
of  their  supporting  qualities  and  their  setting  in  the 
total  feminine  nature.  To  neglect  these  differences, 
and  rely  for  one’s  convictions  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
feminine  mind  upon  the  detached  mental  tests,  is  un- 
warranted. It  over-emphasizes  the  tendency  to  look 
upon  intellectual  sex-differences  as  the  results  of  im- 
posed restraints;  its  leads  to  the  hasty  conclusion  of 
a comparable  equality  in  all  capacities  from  a demon- 
strated comparability  in  a limited  and  selected  group 
of  speciahzed  proficiencies.  The  generic  tests  of  life 
are  more  authentic  than  the  selected  tests  of  the  lab- 
oratory; they  alone  supply  a field  of  operation  broad 
enough  and  natural  enough  to  be  adequate,  however 
themselves  artificial.  Specific  tests  of  isolated  psychic 
capacities  are  valuable;  but  their  true  value  appears 
only  when  they  are  appraised  in  relation  to  the  total 
psychology  in  which  they  live  and  move.  On  the  one 
hand,  the  results  supplied  by  the  artificial  reaction  of 
women  under  the  attitude  of  a test  are  readily  stated; 
their  meaning  is  seriously  in  dispute.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  evidence  of  what  women  can  do  is  uncertainly 
reflected  in  the  history  of  what  women  have  done, 
because  of  generations  of  traditional  restrictions  of 
women’s  careers  and  expressions.  For  these  reasons, 
though  not  for  these  alone,  the  measures  of  the  powers 


314  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


of  women  as  recorded  upon  a masculine  or  a neutral 
yardstick  leave  the  powers  of  women  a problem,  and 
the  desirable  status  of  woman  a controversy. 

VII 

Once  again  a long  bit  of  rough  logical  road  has  had 
to  be  traveled  to  gain  the  easier  highway  upon  which 
one  may  proceed  more  smoothly  the  rest  of  the  way. 
The  concerns  of  life  in  which  men  hold  the  common 
stock  and  women  the  preferred,  and  those  in  which 
the  reverse  distribution  holds,  must  be  sought  in  those 
close,  intimate,  social,  democratic  relations  that  affect 
directly  the  modes  of  living  that  count  in  convictions 
as  well  as  in  occupations  and  satisfactions.  This  is 
the  habitat  of  deep  psychology,  where  traits  are  at 
once  subtle  and  profound.  Here  the  feminine  mind, 
as  all  minds  in  their  specialized  aspects,  becomes  most 
revealing,  most  characteristic  in  the  actual  and  com- 
plex encounter  with  the  play  of  general  cultural  and 
special  social  forces,  with  life  in  all  its  complexity  of 
tradition  and  circumstance,  as  it  is  warmly  and  richly 
lived.  Under  such  complications,  the  relative  simplic- 
ity of  the  “woman  question  ” assumes  the  sophisti- 
cated intricacy  of  the  “feminist  movement.”  Here 
the  psychological  forces  shaping  the  attitude  toward 
women  and  of  women  meet  the  practical  forces  that 
shape  the  common  situation,  the  common  world,  in 
which  all  sorts  of  people  and  all  sorts  of  men  and  women 
must  find  a way  of  adjusting  their  differences  of  opin- 
ion and  of  nature  in  a psychological  as  well  as  a prac- 
tical modus  vivendi. 

Feminism  is  itself  a telltale  manifestation  of  the 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


315 


feminine  mind.  But  the  tale  that  it  tells  is  not  merely 
of  the  aggressive  sex-consciousness  with  which  men 
can  afford  to  dispense  or  express  without  need  of  de- 
fense, but  of  the  reasons  why  there  is  Httle  occasion 
for  a masculinism.  The  world  has  for  many  ages  been 
a man-made  world.  It  may  be  a crude  affair,  but 
there  are  some  provisions  in  it  for  a masculine  type  of 
interest  and  happiness,  some  cozy  corners  of  reckless 
abandon,  some  invitations  to  masculine  zest.  Here  and 
there  are  a few  sheltered  tables  labeled:  “Reserved  for 
women  and  children.”  One  of  the  overlooked  reasons 
why  the  woman’s  place  is  in  the  home  is  that  man  has 
decided  that  his  place  is  outside  of  it  — in  the  great 
man-made  world  without.  In  a more  systematic  sur- 
vey there  would  be  much  to  say,  in  the  past  tense  and 
in  the  present,  of  the  subjection  of  women,  of  the  un- 
suitability of  any  established  forms  of  social  regula- 
tion, as  of  education,  to  the  inherent  psychology  of  the 
feminine  mind.  It  is  the  undefined  status  of  women 
and  the  inner  attitude  toward  the  accredited  sphere 
of  womanly  expression,  rather  than  the  approved  or 
tolerated  treatment  of  women,  that  teUs  the  tale.  So 
far  as  respect  and  privilege  go,  we  of  the  New  World 
— in  which  we  have  retained  a sense  of  its  making  — 
readily  accept  the  judgment  of  a people  and  its  in- 
stitutions by  the  position  accorded  to  women.  Indeed, 
our  visitors  from  beyond  the  sea  comment  upon  our 
attitudes  sometimes  with  intelligent  amazement,  and 
sometimes  with  unintelligent  despair.^ 

^ It  remained  for  a scholar  of  the  Teutonic  persuasion  to  recog- 
nize in  the  “ Cult  of  Womanhood”  the  supreme  American  danger.  His 
explanation  exposes  the  trap  which  knowledge  sets  for  learned  minds: 
the  cult  is  traceable,  he  thinks,  to  the  matriarchal  system  of  the  Amer- 


316  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


Feminism  is  the  expression  of  a growing  conscious- 
ness of  the  unsuitability  of  traditional  restrictions  to 
modern  conditions.  Like  many  a movement  it  is  sub- 
ject to  extreme  expressions,  and,  more  unfortunately, 
is  apt  to  be  judged  by  them.  Its  progress  has  been 
hampered  and  its  motives  distorted  by  a sort  of  radi- 
cal iconoclasm  which  selects  as  the  idol  to  be  shattered 
the  presumption  of  the  male.  Nothing  is  to  be  gained 
and  much  of  great  value  is  to  be  lost  by  fostering 
in  any  measure  a sex-antagonism.  Sex-diflEerences  may 
be  interpreted  by  way  of  compensation  for  specializa- 
tion; and  the  assumption  or  discussion  of  superiority 
is  futile.  No  sex  can  show  the  other  its  place  and  keep 
its  own.  What  the  world  is  interested  in  are  the  dis- 
tinctively masculine  qualities  and  the  distinctively 
feminine  ones,  and  the  values  attaching  to  these  in  the 
perspective  of  ideas  and  ideals  of  the  day. 

Sex-differences,  like  all  authentic  differences,  are  val- 
uable. Such  differences  prevent  a Sahara-like  stand- 
ardization from  sweeping  over  the  world.  Feminism 
and  masculinism  should  be  encouraged  to  their  fullest 
and  freest  expression.  A neuter  mind  is  not  desirable, 
if  possible;  and  a denatured  mind  of  either  sex  would, 
like  some  of  the  artificially  grafted  fruits,  sacrifice 
flavor  for  something  less  choice.  What  the  world  owes 
to  the  feminine  mind  is  a native  and  authentic  em- 
phasis among  the  common  human  traits,  which  is  re- 
sponsible for  some  of  the  deepest  trends  in  civilization. 

lean  Indians,  combined  with  the  practice  of  co-education.  By  the 
same  logic  one  may  conclude  that  as  women  in  cruder  times  were 
accustomed  to  accept  dictation  at  the  hands  of  men,  they  now  nat- 
urally become  stenographers;  this  conclusion,  however,  appeared  in 
its  proper  place,  not  in  a professedly  learned  volume,  but  in  a frivo- 
lous column  of  jokes.  . 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


317 


The  compensations  which  it  has  made  strong  enough 
to  offset  the  perils  of  a too  aggressive  masculinity  have 
established  sympathy,  esteem,  affection,  charm,  grace, 
and  the  amenities  and  gentilities  that  enrich  the  art 
of  living.  They  compensate  for  the  insistent  utilities 
and  the  coarser  brutalities  of  an  unredeemed  nature. 
By  reason  of  the  investiture  of  the  dominant  social 
control  in  the  hands  of  men,  the  manner  of  incorpora- 
tion of  feminine  quahties  in  the  cultural  products,  and 
the  value  set  upon  them,  becomes  a test  of  the  cultural 
level  of  attainment.  In  so  far  as  civilization  is  domesti- 
cation, the  domestic  inclination  of  women  is  an  asset. 
Its  scope  is  broad,  but  its  focus  hes  in  the  intimate 
personal  relations  and  constant  social  contacts  of  the 
daily  round.  In  so  far  as  civilization  is  transformation 
under  exploration,  invention,  inquiry,  and  mastery, 
the  constructive  inclination  of  men  is  an  asset.  The 
bypaths  of  invitation  associated  with  these  divergent, 
though  not  exclusive  traits  lead  to  minor  contrasts  and 
remoter  consequences.  Social  institutions  and  regu- 
lations, and  the  prizes  and  approvals  which  they  estab- 
lish, provide  congenial  avenues  of  expression  for  such 
traits,  and  likewise  set  up  limitations  and  restrictions. 
Such  cultural  products  are  normally  cherished  and 
embraced,  and  only  with  an  awakening  consciousness 
of  their  hmitations  are  they  endured,  then  tolerated 
in  rebellion,  and  finally  displaced  by  more  congenial 
forms.  The  attitudes  shift  imperceptibly  imder  the 
slower  processes  of  adjustment;  they  alter  rapidly 
under  the  deliberate  stimulation  of  a growing  mal- 
adjustment. In  such  a setting,  feminism  has  an  intel- 
ligent origin,  while  the  form  that  it  assumes  reflects 


318  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


the  temperamental  reactions  of  racial  and  national  as 
well  as  of  individual  temperaments. 

To  sense  the  spirit  of  such  reactions  and  to  gain  an 
insight  into  their  justification,  one  may  observe  se- 
lected areas  of  human  interest.  The  occupational  field 
contributes  a suggestive  illumination;  and  a glimpse 
backward  to  primitive  conditions  is  interesting.  “A 
man  hunts,  spears  fish,  fights,  and  sits  about,”  said  a 
primitive  Australian,  with  the  plain  implication  that 
the  rest  is  woman’s  work.  Apart  from  the  sitting 
about  — which  is  a perennial  masculine  proficiency  — 
the  work  of  men  has  decidedly  changed,  far  more  so 
than  that  of  women.  The  larger  reorganization  has 
fallen  to  men,  and  in  that  lies  some  excuse  for  their 
failures  and  lapses.  Viewed  occupationally,  there  is 
in  these  and  the  nearer  generations  so  little  distinctively 
masculine  work  available  — that  is,  for  the  vast  ma- 
jority of  men  — that  men  have  been  compelled  to  take 
the  more  interesting  portions  of  women’s  work  away 
from  them;  for  the  industries  were  originally  predomi- 
nantly feminine.  Out  of  them  men  have  made  manu- 
facture and  commerce  and  trade  and  business,  and 
have  injected  into  these  pursuits  masculine  orders  of 
satisfaction.  Without  this  masculinization  of  indus- 
try, the  modern  world  could  not  have  arisen.  It  is  not 
to  be  inferred  that  all  business  activities  are  pecul- 
iarly masculine.  What  has  happened  in  recent  days 
is  only  that  the  business  man  has  come  to  be  regarded 
as  the  typical  male,  to  whose  interests  and  habits  of 
mind  all  others  must  give  way.  In  the  confidence  of 
his  self-approval  and  the  consciousness  of  his  economic 
power,  he  may  presume  to  regard  a University  as  a 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


319 


knowledge-plant,  of  which  the  significant  side  is  the 
time-table  and  the  cost  per  student-hour.  For  his 
tired  (though  not  overstrained)  mind,  the  drama  in 
the  hands  of  business-minded  managers  must  be  re- 
duced to  vapidity,  horse-play,  and  the  display  of  the 
feminine  without  suggestion  of  mind  or  eternity.  The 
glamour  of  business  hangs  over  every  masculine  ac- 
tivity, however  questionable  in  service  or  practice, 
that  is  accredited  to  this  absorbing  pursuit.  Most  of 
it  is  admittedly  necessary,  though  its  necessity  is  un- 
intelligently  considered;  yet  much  of  it  is  by  no  war- 
rant a manly  calling.  To  select  an  unimportant  in- 
stance: the  stately  personality  that  bears  so  unworthy 
a title  as  “floor- walker”  or  “hotel-clerk”  fails  to  im- 
press the  reflective  mind  with  the  inherent  virility  of 
that  calling.  Appearances  are  deceptive;  we  must  look 
below  the  surface  to  determine  how  far  what  men 
do  and  what  women  do  is  theirs  by  inherent  fitness, 
or  by  tradition  and  convention.  This  consideration  is 
pertinent  because  so  many  attitudes  toward  the  fem- 
inist question  are  rendered  superficial  and  irrelevant  by 
lack  of  psychological  discrimination. 

In  further  illustration  both  of  convictions  and  of 
human  relations,  one  turns  naturally  and  without 
apology  to  the  business  of  politics.  The  reasons  as- 
signed privately  and  publicly  why  women  should  not 
vote,  make  a self-respecting  psychologist  hesitate  to  ex- 
ercise that  uncertain  privilege.  The  hypothetical  dan- 
ger of  entrusting  the  ballot  to  many  women  is  the  same 
as  the  demonstrated  danger  of  entrusting  it  to  quite 
as  many  men.  We  rejoice  in  the  removal  of  the  me- 
diaeval disability  of  women  in  regard  to  education. 


320  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


having  found  them  unexpectedly  educable.  True  it  is 
that  most  women  and  most  men  have  an  effective  and 
a different  resistance  to  the  process;  yet  it  remains  to 
show  any  distinction  in  gender  between  one  unedu- 
cated vote  and  another.  What  is  really  feared  is  not 
quite  clear:  Is  it  the  effect  of  women  on  politics,  or  the 
effect  of  politics  on  women?  Replying  to  the  former: 
It  is  true  that  men  have  made  politics  a game  and  a 
fight.  If  we  wish  to  keep  it  so,  it  is  well  to  leave  mat- 
ters as  they  are.  If  we  believe  in  municipal  housekeep- 
ing, it  might  be  well  to  recognize  the  housekeeping  part 
of  the  community.  And  more  seriously:  If  we  believe 
that  the  interests  that  are  entrusted  by  Nature  to 
women  may  also,  at  least  under  masculine  guidance, 
be  entrusted  by  men  to  them;  and  if  we  believe  that 
as  the  world  is  apparently  arranged  for  occupation  by 
both  sexes,  so  may  institutions  recognize  that  fact, 
we  shall  at  least  be  prepared  to  consider  the  question 
on  its  merits.  Doubtless  there  is  a hazard  in  any  rapid 
and  violent  reconstruction;  and  what  seems  to  be  feared 
is  a sudden  introduction  into  social  regulation  of  a soft 
sentimentalism  and  a one-sided  emphasis.  Even  Mr. 
Ellis,  who  is  generously  fair  to  feminism,  considers 
that  “nice,  pretty,  virtuous  little  laws,  complete  in 
every  detail,  seem  to  appeal  irresistibly  to  the  feminine 
mind.”  But  he  promptly  atones  in  a parenthesis,  that 
is  fairly  incandescent  in  its  illumination:  “(And  of 
course,  many  men  have  feminine  minds.)” 

If  we  accept  the  political  test,  we  must  recognize 
how  far  we  have  made  politics  a masculine  privilege, 
and  how  far  it  is  naturally  so.  Judged  by  appearances, 
the  legislative  function  is  sustained  by  cuspidoric  liba- 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


321 


tions;  and  if  one  were  to  argue  that  the  saKvary  inca- 
pacity of  the  weaker  sex  unfits  them  for  a place  in  the 
halls  of  state,  it  would  be  a grotesque  but  not  an 
unfair  caricature  of  many  an  argument  oratorically 
uttered  in  those  halls.  The  effect  of  politics  on  women 
is  a graver  matter.  It  resolves  itself  into  a matter  of 
proportion,  and  a matter  of  a fundamental  faith  in 
human  nature  and  in  the  institutions  and  ideas  estab- 
lished for  its  direction.  The  psychologist  can  afford 
to  believe  that  in  the  career  ordained  by  Nature,  sex 
has  been  too  long  tried,  is  by  this  time  too  well-poised, 
to  suffer  any  serious  disarrangement  by  the  exercise 
of  a modest  democratic  function.  Conviction  is,  in- 
deed, tinged  with  faith,  with  confidence  in  the  inher- 
ent rectitude  of  sex-endowment,  in  the  authenticity  of 
the  feminine  mind.  The  question  also  intrudes  whether 
objectifying  their  social  interests  may  not  prove  for 
women  a desirable  corrective  for  feminine  failings  and 
cloisterings;  it  may  well  be  so.  The  feeling  that  one  is 
exercising  an  obhgation  as  well  as  a right  is  more  con- 
genial to  a sense  of  responsibility  than  the  uncertain 
enjoyment  of  privilege.  Unquestionably  women  will 
bring  to  all  their  activities  a feminine  technique  and 
a feminine  attitude,  which  will  prove  disturbing  to 
vested  masculine  ways,  confident  with  “the  confi- 
dence of  their  insensibilities.”  The  justification  of 
equal  suffrage  wiU  depend  upon  the  ability  of  women 
to  dispossess  themselves  of  their  failings,  in  behalf  of 
the  public  interest,  as  well  as  men  can  dispossess  them- 
selves of  theirs.  Upon  this  referendum  the  poUs  are 
open. 

The  political  application  is  important  in  its  own 


322  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


right,  and  is  furthermore  pragmatic  and  direct.  Votes 
bring  a certain  range  of  issues  to  decision,  or  place  them 
for  trial  in  partial  and  progressive  fulfillment.  They 
stimulate  reflection  and  reveal  the  inconsistencies  and 
bias  of  established  institutions.  This  is  their  educational 
service;  apart  from  this,  politics  by  no  means  supply 
the  significant  avenue  for  the  contributions  of  femi- 
nism, desirable  and  undesirable.  The  great  highways 
of  ideas  that  direct  social  attitudes,  mental  discipline, 
aesthetic  taste,  the  sense  for  the  human  superiorities, 
are  far  more  comprehensive,  far  more  momentous.  In 
this  light  the  feminization  of  the  absorbent  minds  of  the 
young  by  a too  large  preponderance  of  women  among 
school-teachers  is  a serious  weakness  of  the  school-sys- 
tem. The  opinion  seems  to  prevail  that  if  only  there 
are  a sufficient  number  of  xmspecialized  and  axe-grind- 
ing committeemen  on  the  school-board  to  introduce 
the  masculine  element  of  domination,  it  matters  Httle 
who  does  the  teaching.  The  feminization  of  literature, 
aided  by  the  paradoxical  situation  that  women  have 
more  time  or  inclination  to  read,  the  increasing  differ- 
entiation of  women’s  magazines  and  women’s  pages, 
is  also  a step  in  the  wrong  direction.  The  aggressive 
phases  of  a “woman’s  rights”  movement  are  unwhole- 
some. They  agitate  sex-antagonism.  These  protago- 
nists resist  any  measure  of  segregation  in  education, 
ignoring  the  fact  that  the  real  segregation  takes  place 
spontaneously  in  the  elections  of  men  and  women;  they 
insist  that  women  shall  be  exposed  to  the  same  mis- 
takes as  men,  holding  that  so  long  as  the  two  sit  side 
by  side  in  rigid  consciousness  of  equal  opportunity  for 
instruction  that  is  not  quite  suited  to  either,  all  is  well. 


THE  FEMININE  MIND 


323 


And  in  the  larger  aspects  of  these  questions  informing 
us  “Why  Women  Are  So,”  or,  “What  Eight  Million 
Women  Want,”  there  is  the  same  tendency.  It  is  ag- 
gravated by  a feministic  version  of  the  past,  pre- 
senting the  history  of  the  sexes  as  a continuous  and 
malicious  domineering  of  women  by  men.  These  rhe- 
torical triumphs  over  men  are  misguided;  they  have 
given  rise  to  a brand  of  feminists  who  hold  that  men 
and  women  are  substantially  alike,  only  that  men  are 
peculiar.  They  lead  nowhere  and  lead  away  from  a 
discriminating  and  helpful  view  of  the  theories  and  the 
conditions  that  confront  us.  They  serve  to  prove  the 
dishke  of  impartial  analysis,  which  is  one  of  the  serious 
charges  that  the  masculine  ventures  to  advance  against 
the  feminine  mind. 

The  essential  desirable  effort  is  to  shape  the  social 
order  to  the  needs  and  capacities  of  both  sexes,  and 
especially  to  encourage  in  that  order  those  influences 
that  promote  the  higher  types  of  satisfaction  in  which 
both  sexes  have  a parallel  interest.  For  these  are  what 
make  life  most  worth  living,  make  the  significant  dis- 
tinction, not  between  men  and  women,  but  between 
low-grade  and  high-grade  men  or  women;  and  in  that 
gradation,  between  the  many  shades  and  grades,  the 
sorts  and  conditions,  that  bridge  the  contrast.  To 
make  the  world  safe  for  the  higher  values  of  life  may 
appear  too  pretentious  a formula;  but  something  of 
this  order,  more  modestly  framed,  is  what  is  aimed 
at  in  the  right  disposition  of  the  specialized  qualities 
of  men  and  women,  and  the  equally  right  disposition 
of  their  common  nature,  common  interests,  common 
strivings,  common  capacities,  common  failings.  All 


324  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


this  must  be  recognized  in  terms  of  the  several  insti- 
tutions — occupational,  educational,  religious,  and,  in 
the  highest  sense,  social  — which  are  the  recognized  in- 
struments of  human  progress.  What  is  wanted  is  not 
a melting-pot  of  human  quality  in  which  laboriously 
developed  products  shall  lose  their  distinctive  form, 
but  an  alembic  of  such  psychological  potency  that  all 
the  baser  qualities  shall  be  transmuted  into  gold.  In 
such  a consummation  the  elemental  masculine  and 
the  elemental  feminine  will  not  disappear,  but  be  de- 
veloped to  their  choicest  expression. 

The  supreme  issue  of  feminism,  and  that  which 
gives  it  a timeliness  beyond  all  other  phases  of  its  in- 
terest, lies  in  its  pacific  contribution.  Women,  like  all 
the  morally  responsible  nations  in  the  vanguard  of 
civilization,  are  irrevocably  bound  to  the  settlement 
of  controversies  by  peaceful  measures.  Women  may 
be  more  affected  by  the  unspeakable  horrors  of  war; 
men  may  be  more  affected  by  its  irrationality.  Join- 
ing forces  they  reinforce  the  greatest  campaign  that 
the  world  has  ever  witnessed,  — the  war  for  the  ex- 
termination of  war.  Here  lies  the  largest  masculine 
responsibility  — the  imperfect  reorganization  of  the 
male  to  suit  the  conditions  of  modern  thought,  the 
unbalanced  development  of  the  male,  strengthening 
ingenuity  and  the  mighty  forces  of  control  of  Nature, 
with  imperfect  control  of  the  moral  forces  that  alone 
can  wisely  direct  them.  Again  citing  Mr.  Ellis:  “We 
must  realize  that  there  can  be  no  sure  guide  to  fine 
living  save  that  which  comes  from  within,  and  is  sup- 
ported by  the  firmly  cultivated  sense  of  personal  re- 
sponsibility. Our  prayer  must  still  be  the  simple,  old- 


THE  FEIHININE  MIND 


325 


fashioned  prayer  of  the  Psalmist:  ‘Create  in  me  a clean 
heart,  O God!  ’ — and  to  hell  with  your  laws!  ” Women 
will  forgive  the  mascuhne  expletive  for  the  sake  of  the 
feminine  sentiment.  The  charge  remains  that  men, 
called  upon  to  spend  their  largest  energies  in  subjugat- 
ing Nature,  have  continued  the  habit  of  subjugation 
by  subjugating  women  and  other  men,  and  not  them- 
selves. To-day  the  unrestrained  cry  of  the  male  re- 
sounds clamorously  if  yet  sensitively  in  the  Nietzsches, 
stridently  in  the  Treitschkes,  diabolically  in  the  Bern- 
hardis,  shamelessly  in  Teutonic  representatives  of  press 
and  pulpit  and  academy,  with  fanatic  insanity  in  the 
ruthless  sword-bearers  of  Germany,  and  ruinously  to 
all  the  values  of  life  and  living  in  those  who  listen  to 
their  sacrileges  of  humanity,  defended  with  a perversity 
that  by  comparison  makes  Mephistopheles  a scrupu- 
lous saint.  If  there  was  from  the  beginning  of  time  an 
ordained  hour  when  the  cry  of  the  male  should  listen 
humbly  and  devoutly  to  the  cry  of  the  female,  that 
hour  has  now  rung.  “Nature,”  says  Mr.  EUis  in  a 
happy  summary,  “has  done  her  best  to  make  women 
healthy  and  glad,  and  has  on  the  whole  been  content 
to  let  men  run  somewhat  wild.”  Manhke,  men  have 
taken  advantage  of  their  privileges  and  abused  them. 
The  more  innocent  abuses  may  be  tolerantly  accepted; 
the  menace  of  the  larger  ones  has  never  before  been 
realized.  In  the  councils  of  peace  that  shall  sit  in  high 
conclave,  determining  in  Olympian  parliament  the 
fate  of  humanity,  there  will,  in  all  likelihood,  be  no 
woman  delegate.  But  invisible,  yet  responsible,  a coun- 
sellor will  be  present  in  the  spirit  of  the  feminine  mind. 


XI 

MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 

The  controversy  of  militarism  versus  pacifism  is  large 
in  extent,  far-reaching  in  root  and  branch.  It  com- 
mands the  tensest  thought  of  the  day  and  the  anxious 
vista  of  to-morrow.  It  is  here  to  be  reviewed  in  argu- 
ment and  circumstance  as  it  affects  the  alert  modern 
mind.  What  affects  that  mind  may  have  a variable 
logical  value  and  a shifting  psychological  pertinence; 
standards  of  judgment  must  be  correspondingly  elas- 
tic. Arguments  derive  their  momentum,  their  “con- 
vincing ” energy,  from  the  spirit  and  genius  of  the  atti- 
tudes of  their  champions.  The  concrete  points  of  view 
of  militarists  and  pacifists  determine  the  course  of  the 
controversy.  The  appeal  of  ideas  becomes  more  signifi- 
cant than  the  push  and  pull  of  events;  as  “always  the 
thought  is  prior  to  the  fact.”  The  controversy  is  Janus- 
faced, looking  backward  to  wars  and  their  provocations, 
forward  to  measures  that  will  make  war  remote.  Prec- 
edents count  heavily  when  they  accumulate  rapidly 
and  pertinently.  This  cannot  be  the  case  for  the  wars 
of  great  nations  and  the  rapid  modernization  of  ideas 
and  conditions  to  which  alike  the  nations  and  the  wars 
are  responsive.  For  foresight  as  well  as  insight  “fifty 
years  of  Europe  ” is  immeasurably  “better  than  a cycle 
of  Cathay.”  The  psychological  perspective  must  be 
maintained;  to  its  composition  the  contemporary,  the 
national,  the  personal  allegiances  contribute. 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


327 


It  is  the  taking  thought,  in  times  of  war,  of  the  ori- 
gins of  war  and  peace  that  becomes  the  proper  study 
of  mankind.  In  the  presence  of  the  world- war,  projects 
of  hand  or  mind  unrelated  to  war-aims  seem  remote. 
Yet  the  student  of  conviction  owes  a logical  as  well  as 
a personal  loyalty;  must  recognize  the  one  without  re- 
linquishing the  other.  The  overwhelming  movements 
of  war  decentralize  reason;  they  disturb  the  legitimate 
influence  of  principles  upon  attitudes  and  practice; 
they  move  policies  away  from  theories  and  toward 
conditions.  Yet  the  obligation  to  inquire  into  causes 
and  to  set  the  mental  household  in  order  is  strengthened 
in  serious  moments.  A right  view  of  militarism  is  as 
important  as  a right  view  of  this  war;  the  principles 
underlying  peace  are  as  important  as  any  concrete 
peace-terms. 

By  such  consideration  war  and  peace  cease  to  be 
incidents  or  issues  however  momentous,  and  become 
still  more  momentous  as  general  conditions  of  the  exis- 
tence and  welfare  of  peoples.  The  values  at  stake  be- 
come the  essential  and  eternal  values  of  life  and  the 
enhancement  of  living,  that  we  call  civilization.  Of 
such  values,  material,  intellectual,  aesthetic,  social,  po- 
litical, and  moral,  the  moral  ones  assume  the  central 
place;  the  right  protection  of  hmnan  rights  becomes 
the  paramoimt  issue.  That  historically  the  rights  of 
men  to  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness  have 
been  strengthened  by  the  issues  of  war  is  as  clear  as 
that  they  have  been  assailed  by  such  organized  na- 
tional force.  That  the  inclination  so  to  defend  them 
is  an  integral  part  of  hiunan  nature  is  as  clear  as  that 
the  same  impulses  may  be  summoned  to  ignore  and 


328  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


override  them.  If  justice  lies  predominantly  with  one 
warring  faction  or  nation,  it  as  clearly  does  not  lie 
with  the  other;  and  there  have  been  as  many  unjust 
as  just  wars.  War  as  a means  to  determine  justice  or 
to  enforce  it  must  be  measured  against  other  means  to 
the  same  end.  But  the  complication  of  social  forces, 
though  always  referable  to  human  motives,  modifies 
without  impugning  such  clear-cut  issues.  For  issues 
must  become  part  of  the  conscious  struggle;  and  the 
dramatic  and  compelling  crises  of  war  may  be  the  most 
direct,  if  not  under  the  circumstances  the  only  way 
of  incorporating  them  into  the  social  consciousness. 
Such  incorporation  carries  with  it  not  only  the  tense 
emotional  and  romantically  sentimental  values  at- 
taching to  great  heroic  enterprises,  but  also  the  height- 
ened sacrificial  attitudes  and  warm  cohesive  sense  of 
patriotism,  which  in  other  contacts  and  interests  may 
be  as  authentic,  but  fail  to  attain  the  same  pitch,  to 
enlist  the  same  popular  appeal,  to  arouse  the  same 
socialized  sense  of  a cause  embraced  and  won.  The 
irrationality  of  war  may  be  demonstrable  and  yet  leave 
substantially  intact  the  persistent  thrill  of  its  triumphs, 
moods,  and  employments. 

But  all  this  makes  war  enthusiasm  intelligible  rather 
than  the  military  policy  justifiable.  To  discover  and 
analyze  the  psychological  attractions  of  war  is  one 
matter;  to  sit  in  judgment  upon  the  logical  defenses 
of  war  is  quite  another.  Both  procedures  affect  the 
course  of  controversy;  together  they  constitute  the 
rationalized  psychology  of  militarism  and  pacifism. 
How  far  the  complex  and  variable  adherence  to  either 
cause  is  psychologically,  and  how  far  logically  deter- 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


329 


mined,  is  a nice  question  for  the  individual  examiner  of 
his  own  convictions  as  well  as  for  the  critic  of  typical 
positions.  Pacifism  and  militarism  are  alike  played 
upon  by  abundant  sentiment.  A passionate  devotion 
to  peace  is  as  mighty  a motive  for  spiritual  endeavor 
as  the  comparable  and  more  conspicuoi;sly  heroic  de- 
votion to  war.  Much  as  we  value  the  rich  thrills  of 
intense  living,  those  of  us  responsive  to  the  logical  re- 
sponsibilities of  conduct  feel  the  strong  undercurrent 
of  reason,  the  driving  force  of  a consistent  world-pohcy 
that  must  be  enthroned  as  the  arbiter  of  human  des- 
tiny. We  cannot  await  the  die  of  fate,  but  must  pro- 
ject a course  and  do  our  bit  in  exercising  a rational 
control  — a control  of  impulses,  of  interests,  of  affairs. 
We  thus  feel  the  obhgation  to  review  the  pacific  forces 
and  the  militaristic  ones  in  our  common  nature,  in  the 
institutions  that  we  support,  in  the  ordering  of  the 
mind’s  allegiances.  It  is  this  obligation  intensified  by 
the  spectacle  of  the  embattled  nations,  in  which  none 
are  spectators  but  all  combatants,  that  determines  the 
controversy  which  is  here  to  be  presented  as  a psycho- 
logical confiict  of  forces.  The  tragic  moments  of  the 
impressive  and  frightful  drama  recede;  but  in  their 
place  the  momentous  consequences  of  right  thinking 
appear  no  less  tremendous  in  the  far-flung  measures  of 
national  and  humanitarian  policy. 

I 

In  the  perspective  of  the  day  the  conflict  between 
militarism  and  pacifism  occupies  the  commanding 
position.  The  world-war  makes  it  the  supreme  con- 
troversy of  our  generation.  Yet  the  champions  of  the 


I 


330  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


opposed  positions  are  not  inclined  to  show  their  colors 
unmistakably.  The  hesitation  has  a one-sided  source. 
In  profession  all  or  nearly  all  are  pacifists;  nobody 
wants  war,  few  defend  it  unreservedly  as  an  institu- 
tion; many  regard  it  as  inherent  in  human  nature,  and 
the  preparation  for  it  a prudent  national  insurance 
against  disaster;  there  is  a further  fear  that  its  removal 
as  a contingency  would  weaken  the  social  structure  and 
tradition,  and  relax  the  virile  energies  of  men.  The  pa- 
cifists who  come  in  overwhelming  numbers  to  enlist  in 
the  cause  of  peace  show  a divergence  of  principle  and 
measures  that  divides  them  as  sharply  as  those  who 
hesitate  to  join  their  ranks.  The  articles  of  faith  to 
which  the  two  parties  respectively  subscribe  are  at 
times  much  the  same,  and  as  often  quite  incompatible. 
A liberal  pacifist  may  be  a close  and  not  uncongenial 
neighbor  to  a mild  militarist.  The  extreme  militarist 
regards  the  extreme  pacifist  as  an  obstinate  and  mis- 
guided enemy  to  the  nation  and  the  nation’s  cause;  and 
the  unlovely  estimate  of  the  tendency  of  the  opposed 
view  is  cordially  reciprocated.  There  would  appear  to 
be  a radical  divergence  and  a sharp  controversy.  Yet 
when  summoned  to  debate  the  two  parties  are  com- 
monly bent  upon  conciliation,  upon  a middle  road  of 
moderation  and  compromise  leading  to  a common  goal. 
Spcvjific  positions  as  held  by  specific  persons  would  in 
one  interpretation  be  assigned  to  the  militarist  and  in 
another  to  the  pacifist  camp.  So  involved  a situation 
requires  illumination;  the  removal  of  misunderstand- 
ing is  the  first  step. 

A certain  measure  of  clarification  is  readily  attained; 
positively  by  definition,  negatively  by  avoiding  a nar- 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


331 


row  and  unfair  usage  of  the  two  terms.  In  no  sense  is 
the  controversy  a verbal  one;  with  a decent  regard  for 
logic  and  a fair  treatment  of  honest  opinions,  the  essen- 
tial features  remain  distinct.  Ignorance  and  prejudice 
are  chief  among  the  gross  sponsors  of  misunderstand- 
ing. To  use  either  term  as  a sneer  or  an  accusation  or 
an  execration  is  not  an  argument,  but  at  best  a dis- 
guised bilhngsgate.  The  temptation  to  express  an  opin- 
ion by  the  simple  use  of  a classification,  with  the  word 
“damn”  as  a convenient  adjective,  may  be  a relief  to 
one’s  feelings,  but  it  is  not  an  aid  to  thought.  The  emo- 
tion that  inspires  the  condenmation  may  make  it  more 
or  less  venial;  the  existence  of  the  temptation  is  a sign 
of  weakness,  not  of  strength.  Such  extreme  defection 
from  logical  standards  may  be  ignored  in  the  present 
survey. 

Next  in  order  of  unpardonable  sin  is  the  assimilation 
of  either  position,  as  ordinarily  championed,  with  an 
extreme  or  absolute  adherence,  — thus  making  the 
uncompromising  partisan  in  either  camp  the  typical 
supporter  of  the  doctrine.  The  type  of  the  ultimate 
extreme,  the  unbalanced,  monomaniac  extreme,  is  the 
fanatic.  There  are  undoubtedly  fanatical  militarists, 
and  fanatical  pacifists;  neither  group  contributes  to 
the  sanity  or  the  comfort  or  the  progress  of  the  world, 
though  the  one  order  of  fanatic  may  be  more  innocent, 
and  present  more  redeeming  qualities  than  the  other. 
The  absolute,  uncompromising  types  of  partisans  in 
this  world-wide  controversy  that  engages  as  does  no 
other  the  vast  and  deep  resources  of  our  emotional 
nature,  must  be  recognized,  so  far  as  they  remain  well 
within  a liberal  interpretation  of  sanity.  But  the  over- 


332  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


whelming  majority  of  militarists  are  not  absolute  mili- 
tarists; and  the  overwhelming  majority  of  pacifists  are 
not  absolute  pacifists.  To  imply  in  any  degree,  without 
ample  evidence  and  justification,  that  an  avowed  mili- 
tarist is  an  absolute  militarist  is  an  insult  and  an  in- 
jury, — an  accusation  logically  unsound  and  morally 
unfair;  to  associate  pacifism  with  the  extreme  position 
of  the  small  minority  of  absolute  pacifists  is  worse,  be- 
cause the  implication  is  more  uncalled  for  and  more 
apt  to  lead  to  further  and  more  seriously  unfair  impli- 
cations. 

Pacifism  presents  the  more  pertinent  instance  of  the 
fallacy  and  the  injustice  of  making  the  extreme  the 
measure  of  the  mean,  in  that  it  is  the  actual,  almost 
(within  recent  days)  the  common  practice.  For  this 
reason  a digressive  step  in  exposition  is  necessary.  The 
tendency  to  pose  the  ordinary  orthodox  pacifist  as  an 
absolute  pacifist  is  presumably  more  a matter  of  stu- 
pidity than  of  malice;  it  could  not  proceed  far  without 
an  element  of  both. 

If  we  were  not  at  war,  the  factors  of  the  controversy 
between  militarism  and  pacifism  would  easily  appear 
in  their  right  relations.  War  disturbs  the  judicial  atti- 
tude in  two  ways:  it  interprets  arguments  narrowly 
for  their  bearing  upon  immediate  issues,  and  these  in 
turn  for  their  strengthening  (or  weakening)  of  a policy 
already  embraced,  and  embraced  with  all  the  concen- 
trated determination  of  loyalty  and  interest  and  the 
defense  of  cherished  values  that  are  threatened.  It 
thus,  secondly,  sets  the  arguments  in  a seething  mass  of 
tense  emotions;  it  plays  upon  them  a stream  of  senti- 
ment carefully  fostered  by  the  social  ideals.  As  indi- 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


333 


viduals,  we  are  naturally  and  rightly  approved  if  we 
respond  to  this  mass  influence;  we  are  naturally  and 
rightly  regarded  with  suspicion  if  we  remain  indifferent 
or  hostile  to  it.  In  such  tremendously  potent  issues, 
the  emotions  remain  central;  in  the  one  direction  they 
reach  for  the  support  of  reason;  in  the  other  they  ex- 
tend to  the  confirmation  of  action.  War  makes  it  of 
vital  consequence  that  we  should  act,  and  act  with 
promptness,  enthusiasm,  and  determination.  Argu- 
ments, above  all  logical  refinements,  seem  irrelevant. 
War  is  a trial  of  faith  by  deeds.  War  imposes  restric- 
tions of  speech  and  influence;  it  curtails  desirable  lib- 
erties at  every  point.  A state  of  war  indicates  that  the 
accredited  system  of  national  and  international  control 
has  temporarily  broken  down;  its  guarantees  are  threat- 
ened, in  part  impaired.  Under  the  danger  to  the  com- 
monwealth the  rights  and  privileges  which  are  ordi- 
narily secure  must  likewise  yield.  Everything  is  affected 
by  reason  of  the  solidarity  of  political  and  economic 
and  broadly  social  and  particularly  moral  and  individ- 
ual rights  to  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happi- 
ness. There  cannot  be  and  there  should  not  be  busi- 
ness as  usuhl,  or  pleasure  as  usual,  or  occupation  as 
usual,  or  insistence  upon  privilege  as  usual.  The  entire 
social  system,  especially  in  a democratic  country,  is 
conceived  and  adjusted  for  peace;  it  is  inevitably  vio- 
lently disarranged  in  times  of  war.  There  is  no  reason 
to  ask  for  exemption  from  this  concession  on  the  part 
of  convictions  and  the  accustomed  manner  of  their  ex- 
pression and  advocacy.  But  like  all  restrictions  and 
concessions,  the  test  of  their  value  lies  in  the  wisdom 
of  their  exercise.  These  considerations  suggest  the 


334  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


unique  place  of  convictions  in  war-time.  Convictions, 
true  or  false,  worthy  or  unworthy,  make  war  possible, 
and  under  stress  actual.  Convictions  maintain  the 
combatants  in  action,  sustain  their  morale,  support 
sacrifice,  and  keep  loyalty  alive.  Convictions  that  faU 
in  with  war  aims  are  approved;  those  that  oppose  or 
lessen  the  belief  in  the  cause  are  disapproved;  if  seri- 
ous and  permitted  to  influence  action  or  attitude  against 
the  national  interest,  they  constitute  treason. 

Yet  if  the  stern  actuality  of  war  were  permitted  to 
obliterate  or  override  all  other  values,  life  would  soon 
be  reduced  to  chaos,  and  civilization  would  disappear. 
Nothing  is  clearer  than  that  in  war-time  the  system 
of  values  which  in  one  respect  we  call  justice  or  fair 
play,  in  another  honor,  in  another  morality,  in  yet 
another  religion,  is  carried  along  with  the  banner  under 
which  the  citizen-soldier  is  enlisted.  Without  the  in- 
fluence of  these  values  upon  the  spirit  of  war,  upon  the 
cause  of  war,  upon  the  conduct  of  war,  and  upon  the 
discussion  of  war,  there  would  be  no  distinction  between 
a just  and  an  unjust  war,  between  a righteous  and  a 
diabolical  war.  War  may  and  must  modify  the  appli- 
cations of  justice,  honor,  morality,  religion,  and  is  liable 
to  distort  them;  but  it  cannot  ignore  them.  Speaking 
as  Americans,  convinced  that  the  forces  of  liberty,  jus- 
tice, and  right  shall  ever  determine  action,  we  insist 
upon  their  recognition,  and  are  fighting  for  them.  We 
are  convinced  that  they  must  prevail.  That  convic- 
tion is  an  integral  part  of  the  moral  capital  of  our  war. 
We  do  not  unreservedly  and  without  consideration  set 
loyalty  to  a legally  declared  war  above  aU  other  obli- 
gations; that  is  not  done  by  responsible  governments 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


335 


attaching  value  to  convictions  reached  in  the  spirit  of 
liberty,  or  to  the  cherished  interests  of  civilization. 
For  this  reason  we  can  conscientiously  aid  the  Ger- 
man people  to  rebel  against  the  violations  of  the  laws 
of  nations  and  morality  which  the  German  Govern- 
ment directs  and  defends.  In  so  doing  we  are  asking 
them  to  desert  one  type  of  national  loyalty,  not  in  dis- 
loyalty, but  in  the  spirit  of  a truer  loyalty,  no  less 
national  but  respectful  of  other  loyalties.  For  the 
German,  as  for  the  German  sympathizer,  it  is  a tragic 
choice  between  treason  to  country  and  treason  to  law 
and  morality;  but  the  choice  must  be  made.  The  re- 
demption of  the  proper  choice  lies  in  the  elevation  of 
the  loyalty  to  a finer  quality  and  a sturdier  conviction. 
These  considerations  must  remain  in  the  background 
of  judgment,  if  the  issues  between  militarism  and  paci- 
fism are  to  be  rightly  judged. 

But  war  is  not  only  a national  uprising  for  a great 
purpose;  it  is  a particular  manner  of  uprising.  Its 
methods  are  determined,  ruthlessly  determined.  There 
arises  the  deadliest  kind  of  antagonism,  that  of  means 
and  end;  there  may  be  in  some  minds  the  stanchest 
belief  in  the  end,  and  the  strongest  opposition  to  the 
means.  Under  the  stress  of  war,  positions  in  regard  to 
the  merits  of  pacifism  and  militarism  are  shaken;  the 
issues  become  complicated  and  confused.  Such  an 
internal  antagonism  may  occur  in  other  controversies, 
but  when  it  occurs  has  by  no  means  the  same  practi- 
cal bearing.  Before  1914  the  most  militant  operations 
reported  in  the  daily  press  were  those  of  a group  of 
women  claiming  equal  suffrage.  On  other  occasions 
advocates  of  the  rights  of  labor  have  resorted  to  mili- 


336  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


taristic  methods.  Many  believers  in  the  rights  of  women 
and  in  the  rights  of  labor  approved  the  cause  and  dis- 
approved the  means.  Their  positions  commanded  re- 
spect; for  ends  and  means  in  these  conflicts  might  be 
separately  considered.  With  the  declaration  of  war 
there  is  no  choice  of  means;  it  is  itself  a decision  that 
the  ends  cannot  be  otherwise  secured,  though,  obvi- 
ously and  importantly,  it  does  not  follow  that  in  war 
military  methods  alone  should  be  exclusively  relied 
upon,  and  all  others  abandoned.  The  evidence  that 
other  means  have  been  patiently  and  conscientiously 
attempted,  serves  to  justify  the  declaration  of  war. 
Public  opinion  and  political  policy  continue  to  operate 
despite  the  break  in  diplomatic  relations  and  the  in- 
dustrial blockade.  Points  of  view  permeate  even  in  the 
trenches  and  prepare  the  minds  of  men  for  the  nego- 
tiations of  the  future. 

By  virtue  of  these  circumstances,  the  controversy 
between  pacifism  and  militarism  is  bound  to  be  pro- 
foundly altered  by  a state  of  war.  This  result  may  not 
be  logical;  it  is  merely  psychological  and  inevitable. 
To  an  absolutely  detached  intelligence,  it  might  appear 
merely  and  solely  as  a disclosure  of  human  frailty. 
Every  practical  mind  acknowledges  it,  though  without 
succumbing  to  it  wholly.  The  attempt  to  analyze  the 
merits  of  the  controversy  between  militarism  and  paci- 
fism is  even  a more  binding  obligation  in  times  of  war 
than  in  times  of  peace.  The  obligation  imposed  is  that 
of  rising  as  far  as  we  can  above  the  two  temptations  — 
the  one  that  of  too  immediate  and  narrow  an  applica- 
tion of  principles,  the  other  that  of  too  complete  a sur- 
render to  an  emotional  impulse.  By  such  resistance 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


337 


we  show  a loyalty  to  reason  — a loyalty  with  which  no 
cause  can  so  ill  afford  to  dispense  as  that  of  a just  war. 
Reason  assures  us  that  we  may  acknowledge  our  in- 
stincts without  worshiping  them.  It  is  as  futile  as  it 
would  be  pointless  to  consider  the  issues  of  militarism 
and  pacifism  in  any  other  bearing  than  upon  the  pres- 
ent world-war,  which  has  diverted  not  only  the  re- 
sources but  the  thoughts  of  men  as  has  no  other  event 
of  history.  It  would  be  equally  irrelevant  to  approach 
the  discussion  from  any  other  point  of  view  than  that 
of  the  unquestioned  righteousness  of  the  Allied  cause, 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  convinced  faith  in  the 
moral  values  which  the  Allies  support,  and  which  the 
German  position  denounces  in  principle  and  violates 
in  action  when  speciously  protesting  an  adherence.  It 
would  be  well  in  our  considerations  to  dispense  with 
the  hot  emotional  indignation  against  the  monstrous 
crimes  for  which  a German  militaristic  policy  is  re- 
sponsible, though  we  have  no  intention  to  dispense 
with  this  invaluable  moral  capitalization  of  our  ener- 
gies in  the  actual  task  before  us.  For  in  controversial 
issues  there  is  a hierarchy  of  value,  and  an  inner  shrine 
where  desecration  is  too  serious  to  be  contemplated 
with  calm  abstraction.  There  are  values  which  cannot 
be  questioned,  without  ceding  the  conditions  indis- 
pensable to  right  thinking  and  right  living.  Here  there 
can  be  no  compromise,  no  abatement.  To  a detached 
intelligence  such  an  attitude  may  appear  as  prejudice, 
or  it  may  appear  as  faith;  to  the  practical  intelligence 
that  is  here  addressed,  it  is  the  acknowledgment  of  the 
position  from  which  alone  a profitable  taking  thought 
is  possible. 


338  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


Thus  limited  and  thus  inspired,  the  survey  of  the  con- 
tentions of  militarism  and  pacifism  for  a share  of  the 
regulation  of  our  thinking  that  shall  determine  in  times 
of  war  as  in  times  of  peace  our  ways  of  life,  our  atti- 
tudes, our  perspective  of  values,  our  employments  of 
mind  and  hand,  may  contribute  to  the  understanding 
of  the  genesis  of  our  convictions  and  their  psychological 
sanction. 

II 

Resuming  the  direct  exposition,  we  face  the  peculiar, 
indeed  the  paradoxical  situation  that  the  actuality  of 
the  war  has  distorted  the  interpretation  of  the  pacifist 
position  to  a caricature  that  would  be  grotesque  were 
it  not  so  tragic  in  its  consequences.  The  resulting  in- 
version may  be  stated  as  that  of  prejudging  action  by 
profession,  or  even  — far  less  legitimately  — by  the 
name  of  a profession.  When  an  avowed  pacifist  enlists 
in  the  army,  the  unreflecting  comment  holds  that  he 
is  inconsistent  or  has  abandoned  his  pacifism.  The 
more  logical  conclusion  is  that  under  proper  circum- 
stances a pacifist  may  become  a soldier  as  consistently 
as  any  one  else.  The  more  completely  logical  conclu- 
sion is  that  the  adherence  to  principles  which  make  him 
a pacifist  and  the  decision  to  enlist  are  derived  from 
separate  though  not  unrelated  reservoirs  of  his  stores 
of  conviction.  The  distinction  involved,  though  seem- 
ingly refined,  is  actually  simple  and  is  of  the  order  com- 
monly made  by  the  average  mind.  Even  more,  the 
average  mind  is  decidedly  prone  to  reason  by  the  prag- 
matic method  of  “from  action  to  principle”  and  not 
the  reverse.  That  “actions  speak  louder  than  words” 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


339 


is  the  common  rule,  but  is  in  this  case  strangely  re- 
versed; that  is  the  paradox.  The  actions  are  ignored, 
hushed,  or  misinterpreted,  because  of  the  banner  under 
which  they  proceed;  the  bystanders  look  at  the  banner, 
and  not  at  the  procession. 

Such  paradox  is,  however,  itself  not  uncommon.  It 
is  one  of  the  phases  of  conviction  that  must  constantly 
be  considered;  for  it  is  nothing  more  or  less  than  a 
variety  of  prejudice.  It  is  not  the  simplest  variety  of 
prejudice,  such  as  results  from  either  plain  dislike  or  a 
hasty  conviction  that  runs  ahead  of  the  evidence  or 
disregards  it.  Its  genesis  is  somewhat  more  complex. 
In  its  simplest  and  crudest  form,  the  argument  may 
be  outlined  thus:  A pacifist  believes  in  peace;  the  nation 
is  at  war;  consequently,  a pacifist  is  opposed  to  the 
national  position.  And  in  further  consequence  (as- 
suming a still  duller  wit,  a greater  ineptitude  for  the 
process  of  argument),  the  paeifist,  if  consistent  and  un- 
resisted, would  obstruct  the  government,  and  weaken 
the  national  cause  through  his  obstinate  adherence  to 
the  principles  of  peace.  If  it  be  objected  that  in  an 
essay  dealing  with  pacifism  and  militarism  as  a proper 
controversial  issue  addressed  to  an  intelligent  reader, 
such  elementary  and  palpable  fallacies  have  no  place, 
the  only  reply  is  a frank  apology.  Unquestionably, 
except  under  the  mental  distortions  of  war,  no  reason- 
able being  would  be  tempted  to  argue  in  this  childish 
fashion.  But  the  effect  of  war,  as  of  any  great  sweep- 
ing emotion,  is  to  lower  decidedly  the  critical  level  of 
reasoning;  and  we  may  as  well  meet  the  fact  in  this 
connection  as  elsewhere. 

It  is  an  interesting  reflection  that  this  twentieth-cen- 


340  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


tury  war  may  be  the  first  that  has  had  to  face  in  any  real 
strength  the  position  of  pacifism  as  an  essential  part  of 
the  mental  and  moral  equipment  of  thinking  men.  It  is 
more  than  likely  that  former  wars  were  generally  ac- 
cepted and  supported  with  little  conscious  resistance; 
we  know  that  some  wars  were  welcomed.  Opposition 
was  confined  to  the  justification  of  this  or  that  quarrel 
as  a proper  basis  for  war.  The  growth  of  the  resistance 
to  war  as  war  is  of  course  the  direct  work  of  pacifism. 
Every  citizen,  whatever  his  share  in  the  conflict  of  to- 
day or  whatever  the  reflections  that  led  to  his  decision 
to  enter  into  the  conflict,  has  been  decidedly  affected 
by  the  principles  of  pacifism.  He  was  and  is  under  the 
influence  of  pacifistic  hesitations,  reservations,  over- 
coming of  resistances,  that  are  strong  or  weak  accord- 
ing to  his  nature,  his  reflections,  his  outlook  upon  the 
values  of  life.  These  vary  in  status  from  the  very  strong 
to  the  very  weak;  every  one  is  more  or  less  of  a pacifist 
in  the  sense  of  feeling  the  resistances  to  war  that  moral, 
economic,  and  other  considerations  have  established. 
Just  how  strong  such  resistances  must  be  to  make  it 
proper  for  one  to  call  himself  a pacifist  is  an  idle  ques- 
tion, certainly  not  a significant  one.  The  pacifist  justi- 
fies these  resistances,  rationalizes  them,  and  upon  them 
rears  a political  philosophy  that  shall  incorporate  them. 

To  gain  a sense  of  how  principle  and  practice  may 
react  upon  one  another  we  may  consider  the  analogous 
conviction  that  might  make  one  a vegetarian  outright, 
or  leave  an  aversion  to  coarse  fleshy  cuts  and  joints,  or 
a constant  if  moderate  repugnance  actually  overcome 
when  meat  is  eaten.  But  vegetarianism  is  substantially 
only  a practical  matter  — a practice  following  from  a 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


341 


certain  philosophy  of  food.  It  is  free  from  large  bearings 
upon  the  constitution  and  spirit  of  the  social  order.  We 
can  practice  vegetarianism  individually,  but  not  so 
militarism;  and  pacifism  equally  has  its  importance  in 
its  collective  social  bearing.  When  such  is  the  case,  the 
essence  of  the  position  lies  in  its  scope,  with  an  elastic, 
complex,  and  at  times  uncertain  application  to  the  prin- 
ciples and  their  practice.  In  vegetarianism  not  alone  do 
actions  speak  louder  than  words,  but  there  is  substan- 
tially only  action;  though  one  may  be  led  to  adopt  the 
practice  for  somewhat  varied  reasons.  The  arguments  of 
a “health”  vegetarian  are  different  from  those  of  a 
“moral  scruple  ” vegetarian;  their  relations  remain 
cordial.  Thus  identity  of  practice  may  follow  from  di- 
versity of  principle,  and  close  similarity  of  principle  lead 
to  moderate  diversity  of  practice  with  comparable  con- 
sistency. 

To  retmn  to  the  argument:  the  diflSculty  is  not  only 
to  put  it  plausibly,  but  to  be  assured  that  it  is  put 
naturally,  as  it  actually  lies  in  the  minds  of  those  in- 
fluenced by  it.  Doubtless  the  practical  phase,  as  in  all 
popular  arguments,  is  prominent  in  consciousness.  Now 
the  “action  ” side  of  pacifism  in  ordinary  times  of  peace 
hardly  appears,  or  at  best  negatively  as  a refraining  in- 
fluence, possibly  on  obscure  occasions  in  turning  the 
other  cheek  to  the  smiter.  In  war-time,  however,  the  ac- 
tion appears  in  the  position,  however  sporadic,  of  the 
conscientious  objector  or  the  active  obstructionist.  The 
popular  mind  seizes  upon  this  as  the  pacifist  position  in 
action,  and  by  the  usual  fallacy  identifies  pacifism  as 
the  principle  which  inevitably  or  at  least  consistently 
leads  to  such  practical  action.  The  fact  that  the  op- 


342  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


position  to  the  war  may  be  due  (is  notoriously  so  in  far, 
far  more  numerous  cases)  to  economic,  political,  or  other 
reasons,  is  for  the  most  part  ignored  or  obscured.  Paci- 
fism is  brought  into  the  group  of  movements  antagonis- 
tic to  war  propaganda  and  even  receives  the  brunt  of  the 
opprobrium.  To  pause  for  an  analogy:  In  the  Boer  War 
there  was  in  England  a very  considerable  opposition  to 
the  war,  but  the  pro-Boers  were  not  seriously  accused 
of  disloyalty.  Their  defection  from  the  cause  did  not 
endanger  the  national  position;  and  there  was  no  temp- 
tation to  call  them  pacifists.  The  absurdity  of  the  con- 
clusion would  have  been  apparent.  The  absurd  be- 
comes plausible  by  reason  of  the  changed  conditions, 
predominantly  because  of  the  huge  emotional  factor 
and  the  vital  menace  that  obtain  in  this  world  cam- 
paign. It  may  be  a compliment  to  the  stretfgth  of  paci- 
fism that  it  should  be  singled  out  as  the  center  of  attack; 
but  the  compliment  is  as  undeserved  as  it  is  unwelcome. 

The  fallacy  or  the  confusion  is  of  course  a limited  one. 
Nobody  argues  that  because  some  of  the  opposition  to 
this  war  is,  or  is  believed  to  be  due  to  pacifism,  there- 
fore all  of  it  is.  Fallacies  are  not  of  this  blank,  staring, 
obvious  quality.  The  pro-German  feeling  is  clearly 
unrelated  to  the  pacifist  feeling;  a sufficiently  strong 
pro-German  sympathizer  might  have  welcomed  Amer- 
ica’s entry  into  the  war  on  the  German  side,  while  re- 
garding it  as  unjustifiable  on  the  Allied  side.  A still 
larger  mass  of  feeling  and  opinion  results  from  the  con- 
viction that  the  true  policy  for  America  was  that  of 
neutrality;  it  points  to  the  two  and  a haK  years  of  the 
actual  maintenance  of  this  policy  as  a defense  of  its 
claims.  So  capricious  is  popular  phraseology  that  this 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


343 


phase  of  conviction,  unquestionably  the  largest  of  the 
group  that  fails  to  support  the  national  position  or  does 
so  reluctantly  or  with  reservations,  has  received  no 
name.  In  addition,  there  is  a group  whose  opposition 
to  the  war  is  based  upon  the  method  of  its  declaration, 
the  fact  that  it  was  not  done  by  the  express  vote  of  the 
people.  If  then  we  enumerate  (1)  the  pro-German 
objection  to  this  war,  (2)  the  neutralist  objection  to 
this  war,  (3)  the  social-democratic  objection  to  this  war, 
(4)  the  pacifist  objection  to  this  war,  we  may  not  be 
accurate  in  the  designations,  but  they  make  it  plain 
that  a fair  or  large  similarity  of  conclusion  may  have 
its  origin  in  very  different  philosophies.  But  the  im- 
portant, the  overlooked,  the  critical  point  is  that  while 
the  position  of  the  first  three  orders  of  objectors  is  not 
only  clear  but  undeniably  applies  to  them  as  a class, 
that  is  far  from  being  true  for  the  fourth  group  with 
which  alone  we  are  concerned. 

Since  the  pacifist  objection  is  to  war  as  war,  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  objection  extends  to  this  war  and  how 
far  it  does  so  is  altogether  undetermined.  Only  an 
actual  census  of  opinion  can  decide.  To  any  one  con- 
versant with  the  American  situation,  it  is  unmistak- 
able that  the  proportion  of  pacifists  who  carry  their 
protest  against  war  as  war  to  opposition  to  this  war 
is  very  small  indeed.  The  proportion  depends,  as  we 
saw,  upon  the  denominator:  that  is,  upon  the  answer  to 
the  questions.  Who  are  pacifists?  How  strong  must  be 
one’s  belief  in  the  validity  of  the  pacifist  arguments 
to  be  so  denominated?  One  estimate  may  be  as  good  as 
another.  In  a liberal  sense  it  may  be  that  of  the  ten  or 
fifteen  or  twenty  million  persons  in  the  United  States 


344  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


who  have  thought  enough  of  the  matter  to  have  an 
opinion,  ninety  per  cent  are  pacifists.^  If  the  meaning 
of  the  term  is  limited  to  a more  outspoken  adherence, 
a less  reserved  allegiance,  a lesser  hesitation  to  carry 
the  pacifist  principles  far  along  toward  the  influence 
of  conduct,  the  percentage  would  fall  decidedly,  but 
may  still  be  regarded  as  a majority.  If  one  has  in  mind 
only  the  members  of  pacifist  societies  and  persons  un- 
enrolled of  like  opinion,  the  percentage  would  of  course 
be  much  lower.  Clearly  the  argument  has  slight  bear- 
ing until  we  reach  the  last  class,  the  thoroughly  con- 
vinced, enthusiastic  pacifists.  From  all  the  evidence 
available  the  percentage  of  these  who  oppose  America’s 
entry  into  this  war  is  very,  very  small  indeed.  It  may 
be  as  high  as  one  in  ten,  it  may  be  as  low  as  one  in  a 
hundred.  The  odium  that  has  been  aroused  against 

* This  conclusion  may  perhaps  be  more  acceptably  put,  if  stated 
in  the  converse  terms.  By  just  as  good  logic  as  that  by  which  the  paei- 
fist  is  condemned,  it  follows  that  one  who  is  not  a pacifist  is  a mili- 
tarist; and  it  follows  with  like  logic  (or  the  lack  of  it)  that  a militarist 
is  one  who  believes  in  and  approves  the  position  which  the  German 
militarists  have  taken,  and  which  is  responsible  for  the  present  up- 
heaval with  all  its  terrible  erimes  and  consequences.  To  say  that 
there  are  not  ten  in  a hundred  of  Americans  who  would  enroll  them- 
selves in  this  group,  in  any  sense,  is  certainly  not  an  exaggeration. 
Very  well  then;  if  not  in  this  group,  they  are  in  the  other,  and  thus 
are  pacifists.  The  reasoning  in  the  abstract  is  sound;  the  fact  that  it 
is  not  adjusted  to  the  situation  is  preeisely  the  same  objeetion  that 
obtains  in  regard  to  the  pacifists.  Indeed,  in  a rough  adjustment, 
there  is  no  tenable  objection  to  the  statement  that  ninety  per  cent 
at  least  of  Americans  are  far  more  pacifists  than  they  are  militarists, 
and  that  independently  of  whether  they  find  it  more  to  their  liking 
to  call  themselves  militarists  than  pacifists;  or  whether  — and  this  is 
perhaps  nearer  to  the  actual  situation  — they  object  more  to  being 
called  pacifists  than  to  being  called  militarists.  They  feel  more  eon- 
fident  that  their  positions  will  not  be  misunderstood  if  they  are 
called  militarists  than  if  they  are  called  pacifists.  But  their  actual 
position  is  the  same  whatever  the  name  that  they  accept  or  refuse  to 
accept. 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


345 


pacifism  is  not  based  upon  the  practical  positions  actu- 
ally taken  by  its  adherents.  It  has  no  bearing  whatever 
on  the  positions  of  ninety  per  cent  of  -the  avowed,  mili- 
tant pacifists,  carrying  the  banner  of  their  cause  in 
war-time  as  in  times  of  peace.  If  the  meaning  of  the 
term  be  extended  to  include  milder  pacifist  sympathiz- 
ers, it  has  no  bearing  upon  ninety-nine  per  cent  so 
denominated.  For  the  step  from  an  opposition  to  war 
as  war  to  an  opposition  to  this  war  or  any  particular 
war  is,  of  course  and  obviously,  an  extremely  variable 
conclusion,  and  subject  to  just  that  uncertainty  and 
complexity  of  circumstance  which  constitutes  the  in- 
terest and  the  difficulty  of  all  controversies.  ^ The  para- 

^ Whatever  the  faets  as  to  the  proportion  of  war-pacifists  among 
the  total  body  of  pacifists,  this  argument  certainly  deals  leniently 
with  the  logic  of  those  who  regard  pacifism  and  opposition  to  this  war 
as  synonymous.  Pacifists  — this  regrettably  common  judgment 
seems  to  hold  — must  oppose  every  war,  must  oppose  America’s 
entry  into  the  war,  must  be  opposed  to  conscription,  and  presumably 
are  looking  for  safe  ways  to  oppose  their  government  and  give  aid 
and  comfort  to  the  enemy,  despite  the  fact  that  this  enemy  is  above 
all  their  enemy  — an  enemy  which  is  the  most  violently  militaristic, 
the  most  anti-pacifistic  force  that  has  ever  been  established.  Surely 
if  any  one  thus  holding  ever  stopped  to  think,  he  would  see  as  plainly 
as  daylight  that  the  consistent,  the  convinced  pacifist  must  be  far 
more  determinedly,  far  more  violently  opposed  to  the  position  of  a 
militaristic  Germany  than  any  one  can  be  who  has  thought  less 
deeply,  cared  less  warmly  for  the  values  of  peace.  But  the  obstinate 
anti-pacifist  is  so  convinced  of  his  opposition  to  the  pacifist,  that  he 
is  sure  that  whatever  he  himself  stands  for  must  be  the  opposite  of 
what  the  pacifist  stands  for.  He  is  so  impatiently  sure  of  his  conclu- 
sion that  he  does  not  care  to  inquire  whether  pacifists  hold  the  posi- 
tions he  ascribes  to  them  or  not.  This  common  judgment  not  only 
prejudges  the  facts,  but  declines  to  consider  the  relation  between 
principles  and  their  application.  Emulating  the  modernity  of  wire- 
less commimication  the  anti-pacifist  takes  a logic-less  flight  from 
prejudiced  premises  to  prejudiced  conclusion.  There  is  no  ready  way 
to  bring  this  judgment  within  the  scope  of  logic.  It  may  come  about 
gradually  by  observing  the  many  persons  of  respected  judgment  who 
hold  a very  different  view  of  pacifism. 


346  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


dox  remains:  the  vast  army  of  patriotic  pacifists  is 
ignored;  the  insignificant  exceptions  are  alone  con- 
sidered. Such  are  the  tragic  possibilities  of  a strong 
prejudice  and  a weak  sense  of  logic. 

Ill 

With  the  removal  of  this  gross  and  unfortunate  mis- 
conception of  the  spirit  and  the  practice  of  pacifism, 
the  controversy  may  be  restored  to  the  clearer  vision 
that  would  obtain  were  we  not  at  war,  were  our  minds 
less  troubled,  less  overpowered  by  the  ominous  situa- 
tion revealing  clearly  and  drastically,  that  unless  we 
defend  by  the  force  of  arms  the  cause  of  reason  and 
sanity  and  law  and  order  and  right  and  morality,  the 
values  of  life  are  notably  menaced.  The  writing  on  the 
wall  is  so  incandescent  that  we  sometimes  forget  that 
the  warning  is  pointedly  directed  to  war  itself,  that  the 
instrument  of  our  fight  and  the  enemy  that  we  are 
fighting  are  one  and  the  same. 

“We  needs  must  combat  might  with  might. 

Or  might  would  rule  alone.” 

The  philosophy  of  militarism  has  its  advocates. 
They  should  be  attentively  if  protestingly  heard. 
Their  fatherland  is  Germany.  Professor  Woodbridge 
Riley  thus  presents  their  position.  The  movement  be- 
gins with  an  ambitious  triumvirate.  Hegel,  “the  pope 
of  speculation,”  hails  in  Germany  the  synthesis  of  the 
thought  of  Greece  and  the  action  of  Rome.  His  philos- 
opher’s stone  is  the  absolute,  the  one  uniting  prin- 
ciple that  reconciles  opposites  and  harmonizes  con- 
tradictions. Hegel’s  grandiose  generalizations,  his 
lordly  sweeping  aside  of  troublesome,  inferior  realities. 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


347 


his  metaphysical  autocracy,  left  their  toxic  impress  on 
German  thought,  inclined  it  to  the  self-delusion  that 
finds  a Freudian  satisfaction  in  vaunting  phrases  to 
smother  ugly  or  imwelcome  shortcomings  or  remon- 
strances. The  doctrine  and  the  mood  become  articu- 
late in  Nietzsche,  himself  an  embodiment  of  irrecon- 
cilable contradictions  — an  invalid  body  and  a mind 
of  heroic  intentions.  Serving  in  the  ambulance  corps 
in  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  at  the  close  of  a busy  day 
with  the  wounded,  he  heard  a sudden  thunder  and  saw 
the  dash  of  a cavalry  regiment  in  full  charge.  “Then,” 
he  writes  to  his  sister,  “ I felt  for  the  first  time  that  the 
strongest  and  highest  Will  to  Life  does  not  find  expres- 
sion in  the  miserable  struggle  for  existence,  but  in  a 
WiU  to  War,  a WiU  to  Power,  a Will  to  Overcome.” 
Thus,  “the  soul  has  skiU  to  pluck  out  of  battle,  sweet 
and  glorious  truths.”  Nietzsche’s  is  not  so  much  a phi- 
losophy of  militarism  as  a militaristic  philosophy.  With 
power  glorified  and  might  supreme,  war  is  life  at  its 
fullest,  its  truest  expression;  and  he  who  embodies  the 
martial  qualities  is  on  the  way  to  becoming  a super- 
man. The  forces  of  so-called  civilization  tending  away 
from  this  ideal  — which  also  reflects  the  actual  rise  of 
man  through  combat  from  primitive  club-rule  to  the 
modern  embattled  nations  — are  to  be  despised.  The 
morality  of  Christians  is  a morality  of  slaves;  and  dem- 
ocracy is  the  refuge  of  weaklings.  In  worth  the  individ- 
ual superman  outweighs,  as  he  scorns,  the  claims  of 
the  masses.  He  suffers  no  obstacles  to  his  Will  to  Power; 
he  stands,  not  lawless,  but  above  the  law,  beyond  the 
realm  where  obtains  for  lesser  mortals  the  distinction 
of  good  and  evil. 


348  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


While  the  Nietzschean  conceptions  are  developed 
for  the  most  part  in  a lofty,  remote,  intellectual  strain, 
at  times  with  an  aesthetic  absorption  in  the  imagina- 
tive creation,  they  approach  the  confines  of  applica- 
tion temptingly.  They  are  readily  used  in  justification 
of  positions  sustained  by  cruder,  coarser  motives, 
prompted  by  harsh,  relentless  instincts.  The  pragmatic 
intent  of  Nietzsche’s  philosophy  may  be  uncertain; 
its  actual  influence  is  not.  Its  finer  abstract  features, 
modeled,  it  may  be,  for  an  ideal  composition,  were 
interpreted  as  the  portrait  lines  of  the  figure  of  Ger- 
mania. Possibly  not  as  a prime  motive,  but  no  less 
with  constant  sympathy,  and  occasional  direct  appli- 
cation to  the  case  of  Germany,  Nietzsche  gave  the  aid 
and  comfort  of  a definite  programme  and  a dramatic 
venture  to  the  ambitious  war-lords  of  his  country.  Like 
himself,  his  countrymen  were  susceptible  to  high- 
reaching  formulae,  accepting  them  as  a philosophic  con- 
firmation of  political  desires.  He  became  the  prophetic 
force  in  German  militarism  — the  pen  in  the  service 
of  the  might  of  the  sword. 

The  policy  of  militarism  received  its  historical  sanc- 
tion in  the  person  of  Treitschke.  Germany  is  boldly 
acclaimed  as  the  superman  among  nations,  and  the 
State  exalted  to  an  Hegelian  synthesis  absorbing  and 
overriding  the  individual  wills.  Deutschland  must  pre- 
vail liber  alles  within  and  without;  its  superiority  im- 
poses a God-derived  duty,  makes  it  a God-chosen  nation, 
bound  by  no  laws  but  those  of  its  own  success.  Actions 
which  in  others  would  be  crimes  are  expiated  and  moral- 
ized when  committed  by  the  chosen  instrument  of  hu- 
man destiny.  “War  is  both  justifiable  and  moral  . . . 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


349 


the  ideal  of  perpetual  peace  is  not  only  impossible 
but  immoral  as  well.”  “War  is  a drastic  medicine  for 
mankind  diseased.”  The  State  is  built  for  war  and 
the  military  power  is  the  only  force  to  be  recognized. 
Stone-deaf  from  childhood,  Treitschke  is  absolutely 
unresponsive  to  any  claims  of  pity  or  justice.  He  be- 
comes the  apostle  of  what  we  now  recognize  grimly  as 
ruthlessness  and  unscrupulousness.  The  moral  defect, 
paralleling  the  physical  one,  sets  his  mind  negatively 
to  ignore  consideration  of  means,  which  are  ever  to  the 
exclusively  political-minded  justified  by  the  end.  The 
voice  is  stiU  the  strident  Nietzschean  voice,  but  the 
hands  are  the  coarse  hands  of  Treitschke. 

The  only  possible  super-climax  to  this  relentless  phil- 
osophic structure  would  be  the  direct  mihtary  appli- 
cation of  its  principles.  Of  this  the  spokesman  is  Bern- 
hardi.  He  translates  the  philosophy  into  the  terms  of 
military  practice.  Might  is  the  supreme  right;  treach- 
ery and  strategy  are  one;  war  is  biologically  noble  and 
necessary;  brutality  is  negligible;  peace  is  unworthy; 
treaties  are  scraps  of  paper;  small  nations  are  parasitic; 
Germany  is  the  heroic  savior  of  mankind;  other  peo- 
ples are  contemptible  and  will  remain  so  untd  Teuton- 
ized;  such  is  Kultur.  Bernhardi’s  world  is  an  abso- 
lutely militarized  world;  in  it  there  are  no  values  but 
those  estabhshed  and  cherished  for  military  ends. 

There  would  be  little  purpose  in  adding  examples  of 
the  complete  sway  of  this  set  of  doctrines  over  the 
minds  of  eminent  professors,  statesmen,  publicists, 
men  of  letters  and  of  science,  men  of  the  cloth  and  of 
the  bench,  since  Germany  by  an  act  of  war  converted 
principles  into  practice.  The  world  at  large  stands 


350  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


aghast  at  the  issue,  is  stupefied  by  the  collective  epi- 
demic of  mind  and  morals.  The  convincing  depositions 
are  those  made  without  the  excuse  of  loyalty  to  a 
cause  espoused;  the  responsible  utterances  are  those 
deliberately  leading  the  German  mind  to  its  undoing, 
and  the  German  people  to  the  abyss  of  national  dis- 
aster. If  such  be  militarism  in  action,  argument  is 
sacrilege;  the  twentieth-century  will  have  none  of  it.^ 

IV 

It  would  be  a logic  cabined,  cribbed,  confined,  that 
would  conclude  that  such  is  the  inevitable  issue  of  the 

* This  detailed  consideration  of  Prussian  militarism  may  seem 
disproportionate,  for  the  reason  that  such  a militarism  is  not  a gen- 
eral but  a specific  position.  If  all  the  other  great  nations  of  the  world 
announced  an  adherence  to  their  supremacy  above  the  rest  of  man- 
kind, their  contempt  of  other  nations,  their  superiority  to  all  laws  of 
morality  and  a covenanted  international  code,  and  consequently  pro- 
ceeded to  enforce  these  imperial  pretensions  by  the  force  of  arms,  the 
entire  industries  of  the  world  would  be  absorbed  in  military  prepara- 
tions, and  civilization  would  cease.  The  Irrationality  of  a Prussian 
type  of  militarism  would  seem  to  exclude  it  from  a rational  contro- 
versy. But  here  again,  pragmatic  considerations  enter.  Prussian 
militarism  may  be  considered  as  the  extreme  of  a position  which  in 
restrained  application  plays  an  actual  part  in  continuing  the  mili- 
tary policies  of  nations,  and  in  shaping  the  convictions  of  those  who 
support  such  measures.  At  the  same  time  it  proves  for  all  time  that 
militarism  unrestrained,  militarism  as  a philosophy  of  the  State,  is 
doomed  as  definitely  as  the  Germany  that  has  provoked  its  destruc- 
tion. A demonstration  on  so  monstrous  a scale  excludes  any  counter- 
argument. Had  Germany  refrained  from  such  suicidal  demonstra- 
tion, it  would  have  been  far  more  difficult  to  convince  men  that  such 
a possibility  was  inherent  in  the  principles  of  a relentlessly  consistent 
militarism,  if  once  it  secured  a hold  upon  a national  imagination,  and 
had  prepared  the  way  for  its  realization  by  the  studied  destruction 
of  the  forces  that  make  for  sanity,  justice,  and  liberty.  It  is  for  these 
reasons  that  an  account  of  Prussian  militarism  as  a philosophic  con- 
struction plays  its  part  in  shaping  present-day  convictions,  even 
though  these  convictions  are  concerned  with  measures  conceived  in 
a wholly  different  temper. 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


351 


principle  of  miKtarism  — a logic  parallel  to  that  iden- 
tifying pacifism  with  a supine  non-resistance.  The 
actual  claim  of  militarism  in  a complicated  world  is  far 
more  tempered.  The  appeal  is  to  history,  to  political 
constitution  and  economic  rivalry,  to  moral  quahty, 
to  a frank  facing  of  reahty  and  a prudent  security. 
The  historical  claim  is  uncontested.  “History  is  a 
bath  of  blood.”  The  early  and  in  part  persistent  mo- 
tives of  war  are  direct.  Conquest  is  the  nobler  term, 
piracy  the  franker  one;  slaves  and  wealth  in  more  prim- 
itive days,  empire  and  colonies  in  later  ones,  are  the 
spoils  of  the  victor.  Ambition  among  the  rival  victors 
makes  war  a challenge;  in  the  verdict  lies  the  national 
fate,  as  well  as  the  progressive  struggle  of  humanity 
through  the  dominance  of  the  superior  race.  The  mili- 
tary technique,  the  mihtary  ideal,  the  military  profes- 
sion, enlists  the  abihty  and  the  valor  of  strong  men; 
the  venture  of  war  makes  the  unity  of  the  nation.  The 
modern  mind  raises  the  question  of  the  cost,  and  reads 
the  answer  also  in  the  course  of  historical  evolution 
which  spreads  equally  over  peace  and  war  and  takes  its 
set  from  the  conquests  of  mind.  Modem  invention,  born 
of  the  arts  of  peace,  has  so  vastly  increased  the  dead- 
liness of  war  as  to  multiply  beyond  the  grasp  of  the 
imagination  the  cost  of  war.  Before  1914  the  mihtarist 
argument  maintaining  that  the  result  was  worth  the 
price,  also  that  some  nationally  vital  kinds  of  social 
values  and  hiunan  qualities  cannot  be  otherwise  se- 
emed, had  a plausible  sanction;  now  the  past  and  the 
futme  belong  to  different  worlds.  Before  1914  wars 
were  confined  to  local  issues;  now  an  issue  big  enough 
to  precipitate  a war  seems  destined  to  take  on  the 


352  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


proportions  of  a world-war.  The  increased  cost  of  war  in 
lives,  money,  suffering,  and  ruin  of  so  much  of  what 
men  hold  dear,  as  presented  in  the  ledger  of  the  world- 
upheaval  of  1914,  makes  a radical  revision  of  judg- 
ment inevitable,  and  sets  conviction  definitely  in  the 
pacifist’s  favor.  The  historical  argument,  by  sheer  over- 
weight of  the  parallel  forces  of  evolution,  has  worn  itself 
out. 

The  traditional  political  and  economic  grounds  of 
militarism  are  less  and  less  likely  to  determine  the  con- 
victions of  men  in  future  considerations.  They  illmni- 
nate  the  past  and  constitute  the  difficulty  of  the  adjust- 
ment of  tradition  and  the  status  quo  to  the  beliefs  of  the 
present.  They  are  offset  by  the  growing  forces  of  in- 
ternationalism which  are  set  strongly  in  the  opposite 
direction,  and  are  certain  to  revise  the  machinery  of 
political  and  economic  policies.  The  political-economic 
grounds  as  sources  of  friction  may  still  incline  men  to 
believe  in  war  as  the  inevitable,  certainly  the  constant 
menace,  while  wholly  convinced  that  war  is  neither  de- 
sirable nor  serviceable  in  the  very  solutions  in  which 
it  is  enlisted.  Statesmen  convinced  of  the  paramount 
infiuence  of  economic  factors  in  shaping  political  policy 
are  laboring  to  minimize  the  tendency  to  use  armed 
force,  even  though  they  continue  to  think  in  terms  of 
armaments.  The  view  that  prevails,  prevails  in  all 
camps  with  increasing  majorities,  is  against  the  fatal- 
istic conception  of  the  function  of  war  in  modern  polit- 
ical and  economic  adjustments.  The  recognition  is 
clear  and  well-nigh  universal  that  war  as  an  enterprise, 
equally  with  war  as  an  ordeal,  or  war  as  the  inevitable 
court  of  last  resort,  is  essentially  subject  to  the  same 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


353 


motives  and  evolutionary  conditions  that  have  civil- 
ized all  other  social-political  relations.  As  the  institu- 
tion of  war  becomes  more  and  more  incongruous  to  the 
spirit  of  that  evolutionary  process,  and  as  warfare  by 
its  deadhness  destroys  so  large  a range  of  organized 
interests,  the  national  poUcies,  reflecting  the  convic- 
tions of  men,  will  refuse  to  support  it,  eventually  re- 
fuse to  consider  it.  Yet  equally  must  we  recognize  that 
the  masses  of  men  and  a considerable  share  of  the  lead- 
ers of  men  will  continue  to  think  of  the  causes  of  war 
and  the  possibihty  of  war  in  traditional  terms,  and  re- 
gard as  Utopian  the  efforts  of  those  who  are  as  strongly 
convinced  as  they  are  determined  that  these  efforts 
shall  succeed.  What  needs  to  be  emphasized  is  that  con- 
viction without  determination  lacks  courage;  that  what 
makes  the  project  Utopian  is  thinking  it  so.  And  if 
it  be  so,  the  pacifist  adds,  the  alternative  is  between 
Utopia  and  Hell. 

Let  it  be  remembered  that  even  though  war  is  a real 
contingency,  there  never  is  war,  but  only  this  or  that 
war,  with  this  or  that  aggressor  and  this  or  that  de- 
fender, and  a specific  casm  helli.  The  particular  war 
arises  because  the  friction  that  represents  its  “cause” 
is  pushed  by  ambition,  or  hope  of  prompt  and  large 
advantage,  or  the  domination  of  a military  policy,  or 
the  growing  impatience  with  a tangled  situation,  to  a 
declaration  of  war.  Under  a differently  directed  set  of 
motives  the  war  could  as  easily,  far  more  easily,  have 
been  averted,  and  some  other  form  of  settlement 
reached.  The  friction,  however  strong,  depends  for 
its  ripening  into  war-motive  upon  the  support  of  a mili- 
taristic trend,  itself  based  upon  the  ambition  or  the 


354  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


philosophy  or  the  psychology  of  a people  and  its  mode 
of  rule.  The  futility  of  war  as  a solution  of  the  diffi- 
culties which  are  supposed  to  “cause”  it,  has  been 
abundantly  demonstrated  by  Mr.  Norman  Angell. 
Even  when  liberal  allowance  is  made  for  the  consid- 
erable exaggeration  of  the  inability  of  the  issues  of  war, 
which  are  not  all  “spoils,”  to  accomplish  their  avowed 
purpose  — of  which  Mr.  Angell  is  guilty — and  with 
like  allowance  for  the  stretching  of  the  militaristic 
argument  beyond  its  legitimate  implication  (which 
renders  it  easy  to  demolish  — a common  fault  in  the 
pacifist  arguments),  enough  remains  to  warrant  the 
title  of  Mr.  Angell’s  book:  “The  Great  Illusion.” 

As  the  problems  which  an  actual  war  is  supposed  to 
settle  become  greater,  involving  the  greater  interests 
of  the  greater  nations,  the  illusion  and  the  menace  be- 
come greater.  With  equal  truth,  William  James  tells 
us  that  “war  becomes  absurd  and  impossible  from  its 
own  monstrosity,”  and  Mr.  Angell,  that  it  becomes  so 
from  its  own  futility.  The  twentieth-century  convic- 
tion so  strongly  favors  a non-militaristic  form  of  settling 
national  disputes  that  the  political-economic  defense 
of  the  war-function  is  reduced  in  bearing,  is  removed 
in  pertinence  for  future  policy  to  a point  at  which  the 
student  of  conviction  may  leave  it  to  its  natural  and 
inevitable  decline.  Historically  it  remains  an  argu- 
ment in  the  service  of  militarism  so  long  as  men’s  minds 
are  engrossed  by  precedents  with  a feeble  grasp  of  the 
vulnerability  of  precedents  under  altered  situations, 
particularly  under  altered  conceptions  of  human  aims. 
A more  critical  historical  sense,  a keener  interpretation 
of  the  economic-political  organization  of  the  modern 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


355 


State,  retires  it  to  a diminishing  as  well  as  an  illusory 
importanee. 

More  pragmatic  considerations  in  defense  of  war 
are  those  urged  by  the  moderate  and  responsible  mili- 
tarists, who,  in  addition  to  massing  the  fatalistic,  the 
economic,  the  political,  the  disciplinary,  and  the  moral 
arguments,  place  a well-considered  philosophy  of  force 
at  the  base  of  their  structure.  Of  this  position  Cap- 
tain Mahan  is  a fair  exponent.  The  initial  considera- 
tion is  that  the  affairs  of  men,  the  national  affairs  par- 
ticularly, cannot  be  managed  without  the  use  of  force, 
and  of  force  nationally  organized.  This  the  new  type 
of  constructive  pacifist  concedes  and  takes  his  place 
— though  possibly  not  unreservedly  — with  Captain 
Mahan.  The  more  orthodox  non-resistant,  older  type 
of  pacifist  rejects  the  view,  and  relies  upon  the  perfec- 
tion of  international  law  and  the  removal  of  war  as  a 
national  provision  to  bring  about  the  social  order  that 
will  secure  peace,  and  exclude  force  in  the  military 
sense.  The  militarist  concedes  that  force  is  best  exer- 
cised through  law  when  laws  are  adequate,  yet  holds 
that  the  appeal  to  force  as  a possible  resort  strengthens 
the  law,  vitalizes  diplomacy,  supports  the  progres- 
sive measures  of  civilization.  The  position  which  Wil- 
liam James,  as  a pacifist,  takes  from  the  moral  side: 
“Let  the  general  possibility  of  war  be  left  open,  in 
Heaven’s  name,  for  the  imagination  to  dally  with.  Let 
the  soldier  dream  of  killing,  as  the  old  maids  dream 
of  marrying,”  — the  militarist  supports  as  a political 
stabilizer.  The  removal  of  war  as  a possibility,  he 
argues,  would  weaken  the  political  structure  and  leave 
it  open  to  serious  impairment  from  many  sides;  it 


356  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


would  withdraw  the  backbone  from  the  political  frame- 
work. At  the  same  time  it  would  depreciate  the  strong, 
virile  qualities  indispensable  to  a worthy  race;  it  would 
undermine  the  sense  of  nationality;  it  would  profoundly 
alter  the  sovereignty  of  the  State.  These  arguments 
are  real  and  serious  in  that  they  raise  the  question 
whether  under  present  conditions  the  abolition  of  war 
might  not  be  open  to  loss  and  danger,  not  alone  the 
danger  of  too  radical  a reconstruction,  but  of  less  prompt 
and  just  settlements  of  international  disputes  than  have 
resulted  in  the  past  from  war,  and  particularly  from  the 
bloodless  conflicts  in  which  the  threat  of  war  proved 
decisive.  The  reply  concedes  the  point  so  far  as  urging 
provisions  for  bringing  to  bear  the  same  intercession  of 
force  exercised  in  a modified  temper,  free  from  the  com- 
plications of  national  jealousies.  Pacifism  accepts  the 
obligation  to  preserve  the  eflScient  machinery  of  inter- 
national relations;  it  accepts  the  obligation  to  trans- 
form international  regulation  as  a whole,  not  crudely 
to  operate  by  simple  removal  of  an  overgrowth. 

The  militaristic  argument  naturally  and  properly 
addresses  itself  to  the  proposed  substitutes  for  war, 
particularly  to  arbitration.  It  has  no  diflficulty  in  in- 
dicating the  fallibility  and  limitations  of  the  judi- 
cial procedure.  The  militarist  must  not  assume  that 
arbitration  proposes  to  dispense  with  diplomacy;  he 
must  fairly  face  the  question  whether  diplomacy  under 
a pacifistic  predisposition  (which  favors  open  public 
discussion)  will  not  prove  to  be  as  serviceable  as  dip- 
lomacy under  the  assumptions  of  a militaristic  even- 
tuality (which  is  favorable  to  secret  agreement).  The 
antithesis  of  arbitration  and  armament,  or  of  law  and 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


357 


war,  is  false  as  well  as  partial.  A constructive  pacifism 
is  not  so  limited  in  resources;  arbitration  is  far  more 
significant  as  an  elastic  principle  than  as  a set  device. 
It  is  essential  that  constructions  of  such  momentous 
bearings  be  considered  as  totals  of  consistent  archi- 
tectural plan,  with  the  details  framed  in  sympathy 
with  the  underlying  conception.  To  inject  details  or 
apply  criticisms  derived  from  a foreign  source  is  to 
violate  the  logic  of  the  scheme.  The  militaristic  con- 
ception of  the  protection  of  the  social  order  relies  upon 
the  balance  of  power  as  its  constructive  device;  the 
pacifistic  conception  is  set  toward  an  international 
control,  a league  of  nations.  Yet  a strong  case  could 
be  urged  for  a “balance  of  power”  construction  to  in- 
clude the  essential  protective  demands  of  the  pacifist 
statesman,  while  retaining  the  values  on  which  the 
militarist  sets  store;  and  the  powers  of  the  “league  of 
nations”  could  be  so  determined  as  to  remove  the  chief 
(though  not  all)  objections  which  the  militarist  urges 
against  the  project.  All  of  which  shows  that  when  prin- 
ciples approach  application  in  a proposed  project,  — 
as  yet  xmtried,  — a certain  measure  of  concession  is 
possible.  The  coherence  and  promise  of  the  scheme 
depends  so  largely  upon  the  spirit  of  its  administra- 
tion — and  that  spirit  is  now  so  strongly  imbued  with 
pacifist  trends  — that  the  future  is  indefinitely  more 
secure  from  the  menace  of  war  on  either  basis  than  was 
the  past.  The  Hberal  militarist  will  insist,  not  upon 
organization  for  war,  but  only  upon  the  benefits  and 
protection  that  such  organization  secures,  upon  retain- 
ing the  strong  national  unity,  the  essential  sovereignty, 
of  each  nation;  the  pacifiust  will  make  every  concession 


358  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


that  does  not  weaken  the  solidarity  of  the  forces  that, 
once  made  institutionally  strong,  will  of  themselves 
make  war  so  anomalous  in  principle,  so  hopeless  in 
practice,  that  it  will  make  little  difference  whether  it 
is  abrogated  by  decree  or  not.  For  both  militarist  and 
pacifist  (always  excepting  the  relentless  Prussianized 
protagonists)  are  agreed  that  unjust  and  needless  wars 
' — war-upheavals  under  imperial  plots  against  weaker 
nations  — shall  be  made  impossible  at  whatever  cost. 

So  much  of  application  seems  necessary  to  give  the 
issue  of  militarism  and  pacifism  the  realistic  setting 
that  the  present  crisis  and  the  considerations  of  its  ulti- 
mate settlement  demand.  As  a rule  the  sources  of  con- 
viction, which  is  the  matter  in  hand,  are  not  notably 
illuminated  by  a discussion  of  the  adjustments  which 
the  opponents  might  agree  upon  in  a spirit  of  compro- 
mise in  court  or  out  of  it.  But  when,  as  in  this  contro- 
versy, the  actualities  of  war  or  peace  so  overshadow 
the  formulae  of  militarism  and  pacifism,  this  compel- 
ling circumstance  may  well  be  enlisted  to  vitalize  the 
logical  and  psychological  discussion.  For  indirectly,  if 
not  directly,  the  turning-point  in  the  practical  deci- 
sions of  thoughtful  men  will  center  about  their  mental 
responses  to  arguments.  The  forces  now  at  work  are 
making  pacifists  or  militarists  as  never  before.  Even 
in  the  thick  of  war  men  realize  that  militarism  deter- 
mines war  more  than  war  establishes  militarism;  and 
that  a permanent  peace  is  dependent  upon  an  enduring 
pacifism.  Yet  here  also  there  is  a temperamental  as 
well  as  a logical  contrast.  In  the  light  of  the  world-war 
the  militarist  will  conclude  that  despite  our  advanced 
culture,  no  nation  is  safe  without  adequate  military 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


359 


preparedness;  the  pacifist  will  eonclude  that  other  and 
more  adequate  guarantees  must  be  provided,  and  thus 
further  reduce  and  make  it  safe  to  reduce  the  signifi- 
cance of  armaments  and  the  military  spirit.  Logic  and 
psychology  seem  destined  to  maintain  their  rival  claims 
imtil  the  psychology  of  human  nature  has  more  deeply 
absorbed  the  logical  impulses,  or  until  nations  agree 
by  effective  provisions  that  the  interests  which  they 
regard  as  supreme  shall  no  longer  be  at  the  mercy  of 
unrestrained  ambition  or  the  precarious  balance  of 
threat  and  proteetion. 

V 

The  moral  benefits  of  war  play  a large  part  in  the 
militaristic  arguments.  In  them  war  represents  the 
disciplined  life,  the  strong  life,  the  sacrificial  life,  the 
stern,  sharp  decision  and  the  bold  venture  of  fate  and 
fortune.  War  brings  forward  the  deep,  ancient  trends 
that  have  supported  the  race  in  its  great  enterprises. 
It  makes  a direct  appeal  to  sentiment  and  romance; 
it  consolidates  the  interests,  arouses  the  national  sense, 
quickens  the  loyalties  of  men.  It  moulds  the  conscious- 
ness and  shapes  the  traditions  of  a people.  The  quali- 
ties that  it  enlists  are  the  more  keenly  needed  as  their 
occasion  recedes  from  the  ordinary  employments,  es- 
pecially from  the  dull  industrialism  of  the  latter-day 
world.  Hence  the  need  for  a “moral  substitute  for 
war”  which  James  urged  prophetically  upon  a compla- 
cent age.  In  so  urging  he  concedes,  though  a pacifist, 
that  war  is  “human  nature  at  its  highest  dynamic.” 
“Its  horrors  are  a cheap  price  to  pay  for  rescue 
from  the  only  alternative  supposed,  of  a world  of  clerks 


360  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


and  teachers,  of  co-education  and  zo-ophily,  of  ‘con- 
sumers’ leagues’  and  ‘associated  charities,’  of  indus- 
trialism unlimited  and  feminism  unabashed.  No  scorn, 
no  hardness,  no  valor  any  more!  Fie  upon  such  a 
cattle-yard  of  a planet!”  One  further  concession  must 
be  made : that  these  moral  benefits  of  consecration  to  a 
cause  belong  not  to  the  army  alone,  but  to  the  people 
at  large,  who  share  in  the  sacrifice,  the  loyalty,  the  com- 
mon possession  and  the  massive  emotional  stirring. 

The  other  side  of  the  shield  bears  a message  equally 
significant.  The  moral  losses  of  war  make  as  formidable 
a footing.  The  cruelty,  the  brutality,  the  excesses  of 
war  make  it  a life  as  strong  in  vice  and  temptation  as 
in  the  possibilities  of  heroism.  “Single  men  in  bar- 
racks don’t  grow  into  plaster  saints.  ” Over-drilled 
discipline  may  weaken  initiative,  and  make  men  unfit 
for  other  service;  authority  may  brutalize;  military- 
mindedness  may  lead  to  scorn  of  qualities  indispensable 
to  manhood.  War  is  not  made  up  of  supreme  mo- 
ments; it  enforces  much  from  which  the  moral  sense 
recoils  or  suffers  permanent  injury.  Were  it  not  for 
the  resistances  made  strong  in  the  moralization  of 
peace,  which  the  citizen-soldiery  offers  to  these  temp- 
tations, their  effect  would  be  far  more  disastrous. 
Tough-mindedness  has  its  evils  no  less  than  tender- 
mindedness its  compensations. 

On  the  social  side  of  collective  benefits,  we  do  not 
abandon  the  hope  that  causes  otherwise  defended  may 
come  to  enlist  the  same  devotion,  the  same  consecra- 
tion; and  even  though  they  lack  notably  in  their  ap- 
peal, they  entail  no  loss,  suffer  no  impairment  of  the 
very  qualities  which  are  offered  in  defense  of  war.  Yet 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


361 


the  arguments  thus  too  formally  marshaled  are  de- 
tached from  their  source,  and  the  accounting  is  by  that 
reason  false.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  how  much  of  the 
redemption  of  war  is  due  to  the  issues  of  peace.  The 
modern  mind  thinks  at  once  of  the  Hague  tribunals  and 
the  international  agreements  which  have  moulded  the 
moral  spirit  of  the  martial  life,  by  limiting  the  very 
violations  inherent  in  the  conflicts  of  war.  Men’s  moral 
impulses  and  restraints  move  as  a whole,  as  a part  of 
the  evolutionary  push  that  receives  its  impetus  domi- 
nantly from  the  moral  gains  of  the  peaceful  life.  The 
martial  virtues  and  the  military  character  reflect  the 
moralized  social  order  under  which  men’s  minds  move 
to  action  in  whatever  cause.  The  soldier  carries  the 
qualities  of  the  American,  the  Briton,  the  Frenchman 
with  him;  and  these  qualities  of  his  tradition  and  train- 
ing must  be  credited  in  fair  measme  not  alone  with  the 
mitigations  of  warfare  but  with  the  valor  and  nobility 
of  his  conduct  as  a soldier.  The  sense  of  fair  play  and 
justice  and  chivalry  and  honor  are  fashioned  in  the 
daily  intercomses  of  men,  in  the  adjusted  relations  of 
peaeeful  callings.  The  moral  revival,  though  realized 
in  the  hard  experience  of  war,  derives  its  strength  from 
the  spiritual  resources  made  strong  in  the  pursuits  of 
peace. 

The  conclusion  is  reinforced  from  many  sides.  We 
observe  once  more  that  the  reaction  to  the  appeal  of 
war  takes  its  quality  compositely  from  the  character  of 
those  who  respond.  If  we  credit  these  to  war,  we  must 
credit  to  it  also  the  utter  degradation  of  the  German 
army  in  all  ranks,  even  more  responsibly  in  those  who 
give  than  in  those  who  carry  out  the  fiendish  commands. 


362  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


The  spectacle  is  no  less  revolting  in  the  civil  and  dip- 
lomatic authorities  than  in  the  military  ones.  It  is 
common  to  lay  this  moral  bankruptcy  to  the  militari- 
zation of  the  German  mind  in  all  its  operations;  to  such 
moral  depths  can  a people  descend  through  a mili- 
tarism unredeemed.  Clearly  the  manner  in  which  a 
people  responds  to  the  military  conscription,  the  mili- 
tary transformation  of  the  standards  and  employments 
of  mind  and  hand,  is  a crucial  test  of  its  moral  quality 

— raising  to  heroic  stature  virtues  well  wrought  in  the 
fiber  of  a free  and  healthy-minded  citizenry,  or  debas- 
ing to  servile  shamelessness  those  vitiated  by  a “might 
is  right”  discipline,  betrayed  by  a deliberate  demoral- 
izing policy  conceived  in  the  interests  of  defense  of 
militarism. 

These  terrible  lapses  are  not  looked  upon  as  the  in- 
evitable consequences  of  war;  by  no  means.  Properly 
moralized  nations,  when  driven  to  war  or  electing  war 
as  the  lesser  evil,  are  as  competent  as  they  are  deter- 
mined to  demonstrate  that  such  is  not  the  case.  But 
as  temptations  and  liabilities  they  may  properly  be 
reckoned  in  balance  to  the  assets  of  war.  Likewise  in 
appraising  the  assets,  the  pacifist  is  justified  in  em- 
phasizing how  much  of  the  intensive  uplift  finds  its 
source  in  the  moral  rebellion  against  the  injustice,  the 
oppression,  the  cruel  wrongs  of  the  aggressor.  It  is  not 
the  bare  fact  of  being  at  war  that  summons  Americans 
to  a patriotic  enthusiasm  (the  Spanish  war  aroused 
a very  different  psychological  response),  but  the  in- 
herent appeal  of  the  cause  for  which  they  are  fighting, 

— the  indignation  against  the  vicious  tyranny  that 
they  are  determined  shall  perish  from  the  earth.  For 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


363 


such  to  be  the  case,  one  of  the  belligerents  must  have 
contributed  as  positively  to  the  attack  upon  the  cher- 
ished values  of  civilization  as  the  others  contribute  to 
their  defense.  The  moral  accounting  of  war  has  a 
double  entry.  Clearly  the  inherent  iniquity  of  war 
leaves  so  large  a balance  on  that  side,  that  its  redemp- 
tion by  qualities  of  merit  or  its  past  service  is  hopeless. 
The  moral  benefits  of  war  cannot  save  it,  though  they 
may  well  lead  to  the  conviction  that  they  shall  be  saved, 
so  far  as  may  be,  in  the  service,  the  conscripted  service, 
if  need  be,  of  peace.  It  is  idle  to  maintain  that  we  can 
assent  to  war  in  the  interest  of  the  heroie  qualities  or 
the  national  solidarity  which  it  admittedly  favors. 
The  point  is  not  — as  one  pacifist  argues  — that  we 
should  not  consider  setting  houses  on  fire  for  the  sake 
of  the  possible  heroism  of  firemen,  which  is  a false 
analogy;  but  that  admitting  the  inherent  (though  lim- 
ited and  dangerous)  moral  redemption  associated  with 
war,  we  cannot  admit  that  these  offset  in  the  moral 
field  or  beyond  it  the  equally  inherent  losses  and  its 
common  degradations.  War  remains  iniquitous  de- 
spite its  redemption  by  fine  qualities,  its  thrilling  ro- 
mance, its  active  quickening  of  the  loyalties  of  men. 
For  these  values  we  must  look  elsewhere;  their  day  is 
done  in  the  older  setting;  the  national  structure  of  the 
futme  must  provide  for  them  otherwise  or  submit  to 
their  partial  loss.  National  loyalty  will  survive,  though 
reinterpreted  in  the  international  loyalty  that  finds  its 
strongest  claim  in  the  removal  of  the  menace  of  war. 

The  “pentecost  of  disaster”  remains;  the  war  moves 
to  its  fierce  and  uncertain  conclusion.  From  it  we  may 
derive  not  “sweet  and  glorious”  but  bitter  and  chas- 


364  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


tening  truths.  We  witness  and  share  in  the  unreserved 
sacrifice  in  effort,  in  money,  in  hardship,  in  blood  and 
anguish.  We  accept  the  demonstration  and  resolve 
that  these  mighty  powers  shall  be  trained  to  the  devo- 
tions of  peace : that  the  hero-worship  of  the  soldier  shall 
remain  enshrined,  yet  share  that  shrine  with  the  heroes 
of  humanity  in  the  same  cause  of  honor,  justice,  and 
liberty.  The  justification  of  war  lies  in  the  removal 
of  wrongs  which  it  accomplishes.  Wars  of  liberation, 
whether  from  bondage  of  man  to  man,  of  protest  to 
tyranny,  of  the  emancipation  of  the  spirit  — and  only 
these  — take  their  place  with  the  great  achievements 
of  great  men  and  great  peoples  in  the  progress  of  civili- 
zation. The  resolve  is  strengthened  that  these  shall 
come  to  men  not  with  less  sacrifice  or  effort,  but  with 
less  cruelty  and  crime.  Surely  there  is  enough  injus- 
tice, enough  needless  suffering,  enough  mean  ambi- 
tion, enough  brutal  ignorance  and  crass  bullying  in  all 
phases  of'  the  social  stucture  to  enlist  the  fighting 
instincts  and  the  martial  enthusiasms  of  men.  Truly 
valor  will  change  the  form  of  its  expression  but  not  its 
value  or  its  service.  Such  transformation  is  precisely 
the  force  by  which  man  has  risen  from  his  low  estate 
and  changed  the  face  of  the  earth.  He  gains  material 
control  and  social  control  by  the  exercise  of  compar- 
able qualities  differently  applied.  The  control  of  his 
own  nature  is  the  goal  set  by  pacifism. 

VI 

In  the  conduct  of  argument  the  pacifist  has  faced  a 
difficult  task.  He  has  had  to  prepare  the  minds  of  men 
for  a mode  of  looking  at  the  evolution  of  the  past  and 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


365 


the  constitution  of  the  present  order,  that  runs  counter 
to  the  usual  habit.  War  as  a possibility  has  been  woven 
into  the  fabric  of  national  coherence;  its  elimination, 
threatened  to  leave  not  a gap,  but  a weakening  of  aU 
the  strands.  If  followed  to  its  logical  conclusion  paci- 
fism would  require  a reconstruction  of  the  concept  of 
nationality,  would  re-interpret  the  rights  and  privi- 
leges and  the  mode  of  intercourse  of  a nation  among 
the  nations.  To  make  pacifism  actual  would  imply  a 
radical  reformation  of  institutions  as  well  as  of  concep- 
tions, but  by  no  means  a revolution.  The  step  would 
be  but  the  confirmation  and  convergence  of  forces  well 
under  way.  The  earlier  arguments  were  bent  upon  in- 
tensifying the  sentiment  against  the  cruelties,  injus- 
tices, and  irrationalities  of  war;  next  in  order  came  the 
emphasis  upon  the  futilities  of  war,  the  economic  futil- 
ity, the  political  futility,  the  biological  futility:  that 
most,  if  not  all  of  the  alleged  profits  of  war  were  illu- 
sory; that  it  settled  boundaries  and  racial  questions 
imwisely  and  temporarily,  often  with  increasing  aggra- 
vation; that  its  burdens  fell  inost  heavily  upon  the 
fittest  and  eliminated  them  from  survival.  The  later 
stages  of  the  argument  became  constructive  — a pro- 
posal of  measures  by  which  the  problems  inclining  to  a 
military  solution  could  be  otherwise  and  more  fitly  and 
endnringly  solved.  Throughout,  the  growing  incon- 
gruity of  war  with  the  spirit  of  the  modern  social  order, 
the  growing  impossibility  of  war  by  reason  of  its  cost 
and  the  interdependence  of  nations,  directed  considera- 
tion to  the  constructive  measures  of  pacifism. 

In  this  evolution  it  was  natural  that  the  pacifist 
should  for  a time  assume  the  negative  role  of  the  anti- 


8C6  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


militarist.  The  justification  is  clear:  that  peace  estab- 
lishes its  own  defense.  Peace  is  the  acknowledged  pre- 
condition for  the  welfare  of  art  and  science,  of  industry 
and  the  pursuit  of  happiness.  Its  interruption  is  a dis- 
aster; war  is  the  institution  that  needs  defense.  If 
reason  could  decide,  all  that  is  needed  is  to  show  the 
monstrous  folly  of  war  and  the  futility  and  cruelty  and 
human  waste  of  war,  and  the  argument  for  pacifism  is 
won.  So  far  we  may  agree  that  tiie  burden  of  ’^roof  is 
rightly  assigned:  that  it  would  be  pointless  to  set  forth 
the  benefits  of  peace  in  a survey  of  pacifism.  They 
will  be  granted  in  full  measure  in  the  assumptions  of 
every  discussion.  If  war  is  inevitable,  peace  is  much 
more  so.  What  the  pacifist  is  called  upon  to  set  forth 
is  the  defense  of  peace  against  the  militaristic  attacks, 
and  his  own  constructive  policy  for  the  future;  like- 
wise his  interpretation  of  the  past  and  of  the  social, 
political,  and  intellectual  forces  now  operative. 

The  arguments  confronting  the  pacifist  are  naturally 
the  converse  of  those  that  he  goes  boldly  to  find  in  the 
enemy  camp  and  seeks  to  put  to  rout;  but  when  thus 
converted,  they  present  a somewhat  different  front. 
The  moral  argument  appears  as  the  corruption  in- 
herent in  an  enduring  peace  freed  from  the  stiffening 
discipline  of  war.  “The  certainty  of  peace  ” — not  the 
actual  state  of  peace  — “ would,  before  the  expiration 
of  half  a century,  engender  a state  of  corruption 
and  decadence  more  destructive  of  men  than  the  worst 
wars.”  It  appears  also  in  the  inability  of  the  peace  rou- 
tine to  summon  the  highest  virtues  upon  a large  scale. 
“ In  peace  man  belongs  to  himself.  He  knows  no  other 
law  than  his  personal  interest.  He  no  longer  has  any 


mLITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


367 


other  occupation  than  to  seek  his  own  good.  The  great- 
est virtue  is  self-abnegation,  the  spirit  of  seK-sacri- 
fice,  and  it  is  in  armies  during  war  that  that  virtue  is 
practiced.  It  is  not  only  the  individual  whom  war  en- 
nobles, but  also  the  entire  nation.”  “War  regenerates 
corrupted  peoples,  it  awakens  dormant  nations,  it 
rouses  self-forgetful,  self-abandoned  races  from  their 
mortal  languor.  In  aU  times  war  has  been  an  essential 
factor  ‘n  civihzation.  It  has  exercised  a happy  influ- 
ence upon  customs,  arts,  and  sciences.”  “Unless  . . . 
war  is  the  divinely  appointed  means  by  which  the  en- 
vironment may  be  adjusted  imtil  ethically  ‘ fittest  ’ and 
‘best  ’ become  synonymous,  the  outlook  for  the  human 
race  is  too  pitiable  for  words.”  “Yet  unless  human 
nature  shall  have  been  radically  modified  in  the  course 
of  evolution,  unless  it  shall  have  attained  a moral 
strength  and  stature  unknown  at  present,  it  appears 
certain  that  the  attainment  of  this  much  desired  uni- 
versal peace  will  be  as  the  signal  for  the  beginning  of 
universal  decay.”  ^ 

Arguments  of  this  order  are  as  difficult  to  refute  as 
to  establish.  In  terms  of  evidence,  incidents  and  prece- 
dents are  far  from  comparable  and  may  be  selected  as 
readily  on  one  side  as  on  the  other:  virile  nations  that 
are  peaceful,  and  warring  nations  not  notably  virile, 
are  as  readily  cited;  for  such  instances  are  question- 

1 The  6rst  two  citations  are  from  German,  the  last  two  from  Eng- 
lish writers.  In  specific  arguments  the  militarists  of  the  two  countries 
are  often  in  close  accord.  But  the  setting  of  such  citations  in  the  Ger- 
man writers,  even  in  the  more  responsible  ones,  shows  a more  uncom- 
promising position  than  obtains  among  the  English.  Arguments  of 
moral  and  national  benefit  are  more  incidental  to  the  German  pre- 
sentation, in  which  the  “might  is  right”  doctrine  dominates,  while 
they  are  frequently  central  in  English  considerations. 


368  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


able  by  reason  of  the  uncertainty  of  terms  and  the 
classification  under  these  terms  of  the  complications 
of  human  qualities.  Precedents  and  parallels  are  usu- 
ally set  with  a backward  reference  and  a one-sided 
emphasis;  presumably  they  add  little  to  conviction, 
but  serve  to  reinforce  prepossession.  The  fact  is  that 
historically  war  has  always  entered  into  the  scheme  of 
human  affairs,  as  circumstances  to  be  endured,  cher- 
ished, or  embraced.  Men  have  always  thought  in  terms 
of  possible  wars;  they  have  expected  them  or  dreaded 
them;  plotted  for  them  or  boldly  entered  upon  them. 
The  charge  that  wars  have  been  provoked  to  distract 
from  internal  dissensions  and  as  a deliberate  means  of 
arousing  enthusiasm  for  a cause  is  frequently  made, 
and  doubtless  in  some  instances  is  true.  To  construct  a 
warless  history  of  mankind  would  be  a speculative  in- 
dulgence. If  from  all  this  one  gathers  that  human 
nature,  as  well  as  man-made  institutions,  has  had  a 
gory  nurse,  and  that  human  qualities  have  been  tried 
and  selected  by  the  ordeals  of  battles,  the  conclusion 
is  sound,  but  offers  slight  guidance  for  present-day 
conviction.  The  argument  is  too  detached,  too  abstract, 
too  unadjusted  to  conditions  and  the  changing  forces 
of  human  progress  to  carry  any  definiteness  of  appli- 
cation. In  the  nature  of  things  there  can  be  no  con- 
vincing parallel  history  free  from  the  incidents  of  war; 
and  causes  settled  without  war  seem  inconclusive  evi- 
dence on  the  other  side,  since  the  nations  exercising 
them  have  also  shared  in  the  war- tradition.  What  the 
modern  mind  emphasizes  is  that  history  can  never  re- 
peat itself.  Each  apparent  repetition  is  part  of  a newer 
cycle,  on  a different  level  of  advance.  Even  a parallel 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


369 


evolution  of  a race  of  men  accomplishing  a parallel 
civilization  entirely  without  warfare  in  some  pacific 
Utopia  (which  the  militarist  would  despise),  such  as 
might  occur  upon  the  planet  bearing  so  inappropriate 
a name  as  Mars,  would  be  of  no  avail.  The  rejoinder 
would  be  ready  that  conditions  and  human  nature 
must  be  very  different  among  Martians  than  on  this 
distressful  planet  of  ours.  Obviously  we  do  not  go  far 
on  this  route. 

If  we  turn  to  analogous  phases  in  the  actual  historical 
evolution,  we  can  obtain  a more  instructive  parallel 
by  observing  the  kinds  of  issues  for  which  wars  have 
been  fought.  Historians  who  write  history  in  terms  of 
the  advances  of  the  human  mind,  like  Lecky  and  White, 
furnish  the  proper  evidence  and  its  interpretation. 
They  point  out  that  religious  differences  were  at  one 
time  fertile  causes  of  war;  that  differences  of  dogma 
were  real  enough  to  make  men  fight  for  them  or  wage 
war  on  heretics.  That  kind  of  war  is  now  unthinkable 
among  civilized  peoples,  though  in  this  world-war  it 
has  still  played  a part  under  provocation  in  the  fanati- 
cal Near-East.  Wars  for  sheer  piratical  conquest  by 
unprovoked  invasion  would  not  be  tolerated;  and  the 
question  as  to  what  virtues  might  be  furthered  by  such 
enterprises  would  not  be  permitted  to  arise.  The  only 
remaining  motive  for  war  is  the  patriotic  one;  and  Lecky 
observes  that  the  irrationality  of  the  religious  senti- 
ment on  the  one  hand  and  of  the  patriotic  sentiment 
on  the  other,  and  their  interaction,  constitute  the  core 
of  the  moral  history  of  mankind.  If  the  sentiment  of 
patriotism  could  be  similarly  rationalized,  similarly 
liberalized,  the  attitude  toward  war  for  this  cause  would 


370  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


approach  the  feeling  that  now  obtains  toward  a reli- 
gious war.  The  parallel  is  not  complete,  cannot  be  so, 
and  leaves  untouched  the  question  of  the  ultimate  de- 
fense of  the  soil  and  the  home.  Yet  it  is  a true  argu- 
ment in  that  it  sets  forth  how  the  gradual  elimination 
of  the  accredited  causes  of  war  would  render  all  other 
considerations  of  minor  importance. 

Similarly,  if  we  take  up  one  by  one  the  pacifist  ver- 
sion of  the  arguments  for  war,  we  should  be  arguing 
that  war  does  not  select  the  strong  and  best;  rather 
it  weeds  them  out  by  destruction  and  leaves  the 
weaker  members  to  be  the  progenitors  of  the  coming 
generations.  We  should  be  arguing  that  wars  for  de- 
fense cannot  occur  without  an  aggressor;  so  that  the 
aims  of  the  pacifist  to  make  aggression  increasingly 
diflScult  and  futile  is  the  complete  answer  to  that  de- 
fense. We  should  be  arguing  that  the  natural  combat- 
iveness of  men  under  the  prevailing  order  is  less  and 
less  responsible  for  the  outbreak  of  war,  though  it  may 
be  relied  upon  to  summon  recruits  when  by  other 
measures  war  has  been  provoked.  We  should  be  argu- 
ing that  armaments  prevent  wars  only  when  the  re- 
course to  war  as  a threat  is  itself  a menace.  We  should 
be  arguing  that  the  internal  differences  that  arouse  a 
people  to  desperate  measures,  or  again  the  just  up- 
rising of  a people  in  open  and  armed  rebellion,  are  the 
very  conditions  which  a proper  social  policy  would 
prevent,  once  the  energies  of  men  were  enlisted  in  a 
convinced  pacific  determination.  We  should  be  argu- 
ing that  the  alleged  superiority  of  a nation  inviting  it 
to  convert  that  excellence  into  a might  must  be  aban- 
doned for  a live-and-let-live  policy,  indeed  for  the  pro- 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


371 


lection  by  the  greater  nations  of  the  smaller  ones,  if  the 
world  is  to  go  on  at  all ; and  that  such  policy  is  already 
incorporated  into  the  platform  of  all  civilized  peoples. 
We  should  be  arguing  that  if  adequate  protection  is  to 
remain  adequate,  each  nation  anxious  for  an  increas- 
ing margin  of  safety  and  never  completely  certain  of 
its  allies  in  the  uncertainty  of  what  is  a defensive  and 
what  an  offensive  war,  can  only  command  perfect  se- 
curity by  making  itself  a little  stronger  than  the  other, 
in  an  impossible  progression.^  And  we  should  be  con- 

1 There  is  a phase  of  the  “defense”  argument  for  war  that  pre- 
sents a paradox  in  the  argument  and  an  inconsistency  in  its  adher- 
ents. It  invites  a like  danger  in  its  refutal.  That  for  every  defense 
there  must  bean  aggression  is  clear.  Novicow  puts  it  thus:  A man’s 
first  duty  is  not  to  defend  his  country;  his  first  duty  is  not  to  attack 
the  country  of  another.  But  this  evades  the  issue,  in  that  one  cannot 
control  the  other  man’s  country  nor  in  private  quarrels  the  other  man; 
so  that  the  question  of  preparing  for  such  an  event  remains.  Mr. 
Angell  accuses  his  “wise”  critics  of  committing  themselves  to  some 
such  statement  as  this:  “The  nations  of  Europe  will  shortly  be  en- 
gaged valiantly  defending  their  homes  against  the  armed  hosts  who 
resolutely  refuse  to  attack  them.  This  Armageddon  will  be  particu- 
larly murderous  and  the  battles  particularly  appalling  because  each 
army  has  for  years  been  training  itself  to  leave  its  neighbor  alone. 
They  will  all  defend  themselves  heroically  to  the  last  man  against 
the  attacks  which  nobody  will  consent  to  make.”  And  again  he  re- 
plies to  the  charge  of  the  militarist  that  “the  peace  of  the  world  de- 
pends upon  the  armed  forces  of  the  nations  ” by  interpreting  this  to 
mean  that  “ if  the  nations  had  no  armies,  the  wars  between  them  would 
be  appalling.”  As  a satire  upon  the  one-sidedness  of  some  of  the  argu- 
ments for  war,  this  is  fair  and  to  the  point.  But  it  does  not  reach  the 
core  of  the  actual  situation  or  the  actual  policies  and  convictions.  Un- 
til the  entire  question  of  attack  and  defense  is  placed  upon  a differ- 
ent footing  of  probability,  the  measure  of  defense  is  likely  to  be  rated 
by  the  estimated  probability  of  failure  to  persuade  the  potential 
aggressor  to  desist.  Tliat  the  same  preparation  is  available  for  attack 
as  for  defense  means  that  in  playing  one  game,  we  are  really  playing 
two;  and  the  difficulty  in  holding  to  the  original  intention  may  be  a 
valid  argument  for  providing  for  that  intention  in  a less  dangerous 
manner.  It  is  true  that  one  cannot  so  shoot  as  to  miss  the  mark  if 
it  is  a cow  and  hit  it  if  it  is  a deer;  but  that  does  not  prove  that  a 


372  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


stantly  pointing  to  parallels  in  which  police  force  has 
replaced  military  force  to  the  enduring  benefit  of  all 
concerned.  We  should  be  pointing  out  that  in  all  the 
parallel  sources  of  human  friction,  involving  the  same 
pugnacious  impulses,  war  has  been  gradually  elimi- 
nated as  a form  of  arbitrament,  from  duels  and  feuds, 
from  local  and  partisan  struggle;  that  when  recourse  is 
taken  to  the  power  of  might  (apart  from  the  exercise 
of  a personal  police  force  of  self-defense),  we  look  upon 
it  as  a regrettable  lapse  from  the  established  order, 
whether  it  occurs  in  lynchings  or  riots,  in  strikes  or 
incipient  revolutions.  The  elaborations  of  these  refu- 
tals  make  up  a considerable  body  of  the  literature  of 
pacifism.  They  are  accessible  to  all  and  have  played 
an  important  part  in  its  growing  influence.  Yet  their 

gun  is  useless.  The  pacihst  must  be  careful  not  to  commit  in  refutal 
the  same  order  of  plausible  fallacy  as  the  militarist  succumbs  to  in 
defense.  On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Angell  is  quite  right  in  accusing  the 
rather  aggressive  militarists  who  are  always  insisting  that  their  pri- 
mary aim  is  peace,  of  a glaring  inconsistency  when  they  throw  the 
weight  of  their  influence  unreservedly  in  favor  of  military  protection, 
and  decline  to  consider  with  like  seriousness  other  measures  in  the 
interest  of  the  cause  of  peace. 

Mr.  Angell  uses  the  analogy  of  religious  wars  to  refute  another  com- 
mon militarist  misconception.  One  might  argue  that  the  Huguenots 
were  glorious  in  that  they  brought  out  the  noble  qualities  of  martyrs, 
also  their  fighting  qualities.  To  the  alleged  implication  that  the  paci- 
fist would  not  have  advised  them  to  fight,  Mr.  Angell  replies:  “Of 
course  no  one  means  that  they  should  not  have  fought,  but  we  all 
mean  that  they  should  not  have  been  compelled  to  fight.  It  is  a noble 
thing  to  see  a man  go  to  the  stake  for  his  faith,  but  it  is  a vile  thing 
that  he  should  be  compelled  to  do  so.  The  resistance  to  the  Inquisi- 
tion was  magnificent;  the  fact  of  the  Inquisition  was  an  abomination.” 
The  argument  that  the  Greeks  displayed  the  qualities  necessary  to 
resist  the  Persians  cannot  overlook  the  fact  that  the  Persians  had  the 
qualities  inclining  them  to  destroy  the  culture  of  Greece.  Attack 
and  defense  are  everywhere  two-sided;  which  means  that  they  must 
be  considered  together.  Their  treatment  under  a militaristic  and 
under  a pacifistic  conception  are  separate  constructions. 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


373 


power  to  carry  conviction,  as  indeed  the  willingness  to 
expose  one’s  mind  to  their  appeal,  remains  subject  to 
the  temperamental  inclination  that  disposes  one  con- 
genially toward  pacifism  or  keeps  one  immune  to  its 
doctrines. 

Argument  can  do  little  more  to  produce  conviction; 
the  spreading  of  the  campaign  as  a proselyting  force 
must  do  the  rest.  If  the  impression  already  made  is 
limited  in  proportion  to  its  inherent  strength,  the  cause 
must  be  found  in  the  logic  of  long-established  institu- 
tions, vested  interests,  and  the  mental  inertia  which 
they  cherish,  not  in  a spirit  of  worship  of  tradition,  but 
of  a conservative  prudence.  As  the  abolitionists,  or 
the  “equal  suffragists,”  had  a long  career  of  unpopu- 
larity, an  uphill  campaign  against  thick  prejudice  to 
overcome,  before  their  cause  became  serious,  respected, 
and  at  length  dominant;  and  as  long  before  a decision 
was  reached  by  conflict  of  arms  or  opinions  or  ballots, 
the  causes  were  first  and  firmly  established  in  the  minds 
of  men,  and  only  later  in  their  practical  policies  and 
decisions,  so  must  pacifism  pass  through  the  same 
evolution.  Events  may  hasten  or  they  may  retard  the 
issue.  The  essential  step  in  their  hastening  that  argu- 
ment can  perform  to  strengthen  the  psychology  of 
conviction,  is  to  face  the  logic  of  reality  and  by  plau- 
sible construction  induce  reflective  minds  to  enter  upon 
the  venture. 


VII 

The  culminating  aspect  of  militarism  and  pacifism 
is  reached  when  these  principles  and  their  establish- 
ment are  considered  with  reference  to  the  systems  of 


374  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


government  with  which  they  congenially  assimilate. 
What  is  the  nature  of  the  institutional  forces  and  what 
the  underlying  principle  of  political  rule  which  readily 
incorporate  and  are  moulded  by  the  policies  of  mili- 
tarism, and  what  is  the  nature  of  the  forces  favorable 
to  pacifism?  Answering  in  terms  of  tendencies,  and 
neglecting  unessential  qualifications,  militarism  is  con- 
sistently enlisted  in  the  support  and  structure  of  abso- 
lutism; pacifism  is  the  natural  ally  of  democracy.  Shall 
the  will  of  the  dynastic  ruler  or  the  will  of  the  people 
prevail?  The  case  of  Germany  is  the  extreme  but 
the  significant  extreme  instance.  Admittedly  Germany 
represents  the  militarized  form  of  absolutism.  In  the 
Teutonic  conception  the  State  absorbs  the  individual, 
subordinates  all  personal  to  State  interests.  It  makes 
for  paternalism,  wise  and  unwise,  for  petty  ofllcialdom 
and  domineering  bureaucracy,  for  pedantry  and  arro- 
gance, no  less  than  for  military  dominance  and  its 
counterpart  — a servile  docility.  The  central  factor 
in  the  institution  is  the  dynastic  supremacy,  which 
when  exercised  in  the  temper  of  a fanatical  Kaiser,  self- 
appointed  as  the  vicar  of  Providence,  overshadows  the 
political  as  well  as  all  other  phases  of  the  system.  With 
this  conception  thus  circumstanced,  the  imperial  am- 
bition and  ruthless  aggressiveness  follow  inevitably; 
and  the  army  becomes  the  autocratic  embodiment  of 
the  will  of  the  State.  The  existence  of  such  a system 
implies  a complete  subordination  of  the  citizens,  a sup- 
pression of  liberty  of  thought  and  action  in  other 
temper,  a thorough  indoctrination  of  the  people  in  the 
dynastic  prerogative.  That  type  of  absolutism  can  be 
maintained  only  by  a rigorous  military  rule. 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


375 


It  does  not  follow  that  militarism  leads  to  absolu- 
tism, or  absolutism  to  militarism  xmreservedly.  The 
absolutist  form  of  government  freed  from  an  ambitious 
imperialism  might  confine  the  military  rule  to  internal 
regulations.  Yet  historically  and  actually  such  a sup- 
position is  improbable;  the  interdependence  as  well  as 
the  rivalry  of  the  nations  of  the  modern  world  makes 
it  so.  The  absolutist  system  and  the  militaristic  rule 
develop  congenially  and  consistently.  The  decline  of 
absolutism  is  the  indispensable  condition  for  the  reduc- 
tion of  militarism.  Upon  this  conclusion  the  humanely 
reflective  nations  of  the  world  are  agreed.  Absolutism 
is  the  chief  defender  of  the  most  dangerous  form  of 
militarism.  Its  danger  is  the  more  menacing  for  the 
reason  that  any  one  nation,  if  powerful  and  unre- 
stricted in  its  preparations,  can  precipitate  a war, 
while  it  requires  the  concert  of  all  to  maintain  peace. 

Beyond  this  sanctioned  premise,  conclusions  are 
complex.  Yet  a fmther  conclusion  appears:  that  armies 
and  the  policy  of  their  support  form  an  international 
interest,  and  must  eventually  yield  to  an  international 
regulation.  Under  the  present  order  the  existence  of  a 
large  and  eflBcient  army  is  compatible  with  a moderate, 
a liberal,  even  a skeptical  attitude  toward  militarism. 
A democratic  government  pacifically  inclined,  might 
welcome  a relief  from  an  excessive  military  burden;  yet 
may  find  it  necessary  to  maintain  a powerful  military 
establishment,  for  the  very  reason  that  it  cannot  be 
assmed  of  the  same  temper  in  its  neighbors  and  has 
no  adequate  means  of  controlling  them.  Moreover  such 
a nation  will  have  liberahzed  its  military  organization 
and  have  made  it  an  expression  of  the  same  civilizing 


376  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


principles  which  have  brought  about  its  political  democ- 
racy and  its  protection  of  individual  liberty.  Such  a 
nation  will  have  developed  a high  regard  for  the  mili- 
tary profession,  and  have  assigned  honorable  place 
to  the  protective  funetion  of  the  State.  The  army  as 
an  instrument,  along  with  others,  of  the  freely  deter- 
mined will  of  the  State  is  a vastly  different  matter  from 
an  army  as  tyrant  and  master.  The  essential  attitude 
toward  militarism  cannot  be  inferred  from  the  size  of 
the  national  army  or  the  measures  for  maintaining  it, 
but  from  the  spirit  of  its  organization  and  its  accredited 
place  in  the  political  structure.  Militarism  makes  large 
armies;  but  large  armies  may  be  an  uncertain  evidence 
of  a militaristic  conviction.  The  distinction  between  a 
police  force  and  an  army  is  familiar.  Independently  of 
size,  equipment  or  organization,  the  two  may  have  a 
common  purpose  so  long  as  they  are  protective  and 
defensive.  The  very  conception  of  a police  force  is  the 
existence  of  a common,  well-understood  will.  The  ac- 
credited uses  to  which  a police  force  will  be  put  are 
likewise  understood.  In  the  case  of  an  unusual  upris- 
ing when  the  civilian  police  force  is  inadequate,  the 
military  force  may  be  called  upon  without  changing  the 
nature  of  the  proceeding.  An  army  exists  primarily  to 
repel  an  invading  foreign  force;  it  is  prepared  to  resist 
aggression  from  without.  But  just  there  lies  the  dan- 
gerous distinction  between  defense  and  oflPense;  it  is 
the  uncertainty  of  the  temper  in  which  that  distinc- 
tion will  be  made  that  arouses  the  suspicion  of  the  en- 
tire military  system,  as  at  present  conceived.  In  such  a 
country  as  Germany  the  very  scale  and  thoroughness 
of  the  preparations  argue  against  a merely  defensive 


MILITAEISM  AND  PACIFISM 


377 


intention.  So  aggressive  is  the  very  organization,  so 
complete  the  hold  upon  the  popular  mind,  that  a vast 
army  organized  for  action  becomes  restless  under  in- 
activity, and  at  length  eagerly  looks  to  the  day  — “der 
Tag  ” — when  it  can  try  its  strength.  That  charge 
would  not  apply  to  all  large  armies;  as  ever,  the  temper 
of  the  organization  decides. 

But  the  temptation  to  use  force  when  force  is  there 
to  be  used,  together  with  the  awful  magnitude  of  its 
power,  remain  sources  of  temptation.  In  pioneer  days 
when  everybody  carried  a “gim,”  shooting  was  fre- 
quent; going  unarmed  may  at  times  be  inconvenient, 
but  an  unarmed  community  is  safer  than  an  armed 
community.  The  comparison  cannot  be  applied  with- 
out large  qualifications,  to  national  situations;  but  the 
principle  holds.  The  conclusion  is  conceded  that  in 
many  a situation  the  use  of  force  is  indispensable,  but 
the  limitation  of  its  use  even  more  so.  A constructive 
pacifism  not  only  agrees  to  this,  but  urges  the  neces- 
sity of  a police  force  to  restrain  combative  and  lawless 
impulses,  to  provide  for  emergencies  which  no  system 
is  adequate  to  prevent.  Pacifism  in  its  practical  tem- 
per, far  from  assuming  a universal  pacific  disposition 
or  the  readiness  of  all  nations  to  come  under  its  sway, 
insists  that  this  ugly  quarrelsomeness  and  natural 
pugnacity  shall  be  brought  under  adequate  institu- 
tionalized authority;  only  thus  can  they  be  counter- 
acted, if  need  be,  nullified  by  force.  Hence  the  demand 
for  an  international  police-force  to  keep  the  peace 
between  nations;  such  force  shall  act  in  the  national 
sphere  — different  as  it  is  — in  the  same  interests  as 
the  law  upholds  in  the  quarrels  of  groups  and  individ- 


378  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


uals.  The  pacifism  of  to-day  is  intensely  practical- 
minded  and  is  made  increasingly  so  by  the  stress  of  the 
war  and  the  issues  awaiting  immediate  settlement. 
Its  supreme  purpose  is  to  incorporate  into  that  settle- 
ment some  distinct  and  adequate  pacific  guarantee, 
framed  not  in  the  older  temper  of  give  and  take  — so 
prone  to  degenerate  to  shrewd  barter  and  secret  con- 
nivance — but  in  the  spirit  of  an  international  convic- 
tion definitely  opposed  to  settlement  by  war.  That 
same  practical-mindedness  focuses  its  attack  upon  the 
aggressive  menace  of  war  (since  the  cry  of  “forced  upon 
us”  must  as  often  be  the  hollow  excuse  of  a hypocritical 
lie,  as  it  is  an  approach  to  the  truth),  and  consequently 
places  the  limitation  of  armaments  as  a measure  of 
prime  importance  in  its  programme.  In  brief  the  day 
of  the  pacifist  statesman  is  at  hand;  not  the  least  sig- 
nificant mission  of  pacifism  is  the  redemption  of  states- 
manship.^ 

If,  then,  the  world  is  so  nearly  agreed  that  the  most 
ominous  incitations  to  war  shall  be  intercepted,  the 
most  serious  aggravations  reduced,  the  principles  of 
democracy  and  the  self-determination  of  peoples  se- 

* The  discussion  of  pacifism  in  the  sphere  of  practical  politics  is 
obviously  the  next  stage,  already  heralded.  It  cannot  be  included 
here.  Yet  mention  should  be  made  of  a punitive  weapon  to  be  used 
in  the  prevention  of  war,  which  pacifism’supports:  the  economic  boy- 
cott. The  object  is  to  make  clear  to  any  recalcitrant  nation  tending 
to  an  aggressive  war,  the  economic  failure  that  will  result;  it  offers 
the  alternative  of  swords  or  ploughshares.  It  takes  advantage  of 
the  modern  interdependence  of  nations,  and  offers  an  economic  sub- 
stitute for  war  as  a part  of  the  policy  of  a practical  pacifism.  It  gives 
a new  tone  to  Weltpoliiilc  and  will  doubtless  enter  into  the  platform  of 
a league  of  nations.  For  economic  profit,  while  not  the  cause  of  war, 
is  apt  to  be  the  stake  for  which  war  is  played.  Withdrawal  of  the 
stake  seconds  the  withdrawal  of  armament. 


MILITARISM  AND  PACIFISM 


379 


cured,  armaments  limited,  a league  of  nations  or  some 
equally  strong  guarantee  devised,  small  countries  pro- 
tected and  great  ones  freed  from  temptation  or  means 
to  use  their  strength  imjustly,  the  arguments  for  mili- 
tarism and  pacifism  seem  needless,  and  only  retrospec- 
tively significant.  For  a more  fortunate  generation  that 
may  come  to  be  the  case;  at  present  it  is  far  from  being 
so.  It  is  precisely  when  principles  are  moving  prom- 
isingly toward  practice  that  a controversy  attains  its 
truest  pertinence,  and  the  examination  of  positions  is 
most  needed. 

The  unprincipled  action  of  Germany  in  the  first  in- 
stance by  making  war,  in  the  second  instance  by  the 
German  conduct  of  war,  in  the  third  instance  by  the 
German  mode  of  defense  of  its  war  and  its  lawlessness, 
and  in  many  more  instances  by  the  shocking  demon- 
stration not  alone  of  the  horrors  of  warfare  thus  spon- 
sored, but  still  more  convincingly  of  the  complete  sub- 
version of  every  moral  interest  of  civilization,  — by 
such  drastic  logic  has  the  chief  protagonist  of  militarism 
made  the  case  of  pacifism  versus  militarism  incandes- 
cently  clear,  brutally  obvious.  From  this  extreme 
assault  the  cause  of  militarism  will  never  recover;  the 
association  of  militarism  with  Prussianism  wiU  long 
reflect  the  stigma  of  the  one  back  upon  the  other.  By 
demonstrating  the  terrible  consequences  of  militarism 
carried  to  its  ruthless  extreme,  Germany  has  given  the 
death-blow  to  the  cause  that  she  espoused.  Without 
the  unspeakable  infamy  of  that  desecration,  the  world 
might  but  slowly  have  realized,  indeed,  have  flatly  re- 
fused to  consider  that  the  principles  of  any  system  of 
government,  even  in  the  chaos  of  war,  could  have  such 


380  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CONVICTION 


an  issue.  Any  argument  setting  forth  such  a menace 
as  a possibility  seriously  to  be  considered  woxild  have 
been  dismissed  as  the  ghastly  dream  of  a febrile  misan- 
thrope. And  yet  when  we  recover,  as  best  we  may, 
from  the  staggering  blow  to  om  faith  in  a partially 
redeemed  humanity,  we  become  responsibly  aware 
that  the  practical  problem  facing  the  thinkers  of  all 
nations  cannot  take  its  complexion  from  this,  any 
more  than  from  any  other  extreme  position.  We  must 
learn  once  again,  even  as  we  resolve  upon  its  extinc- 
tion, to  think  of  militarism  in  more  temperate  mood, 
in  a fairer  consideration  of  the  place  of  force  nationally 
and  internationally  organized,  in  an  imperfectly  ad- 
justed politically-minded  world.  For  by  adjusting  our 
convictions  to  the  clear  reality  of  fact  we  prove  the 
practical  worth  of  reason,  — our  loyalty  to  intelligence 
as  the  sane  control  of  the  highest  interests  of  mankind. 

Thus  reflecting  we  become  responsibly  aware  of  the 
folly  of  trusting  to  any  set  of  principles  unadjusted  to 
the  situation  to  which  they  are  to  be  applied;  we  be- 
come responsibly  aware  that  we  do  not  compromise  an 
end  by  applying  ourselves  conscientiously  to  the  con- 
struction of  the  safest  means,  nor  forsake  a goal  by 
scrupulous  attention  to  the  wisest  route.  We  become 
responsibly  convinced  that  if  pacifism  is  limited  to  a 
conviction  that  at  all  hazards  war  must  instantly  cease 
and  our  own  swords  be  turned  to  ploughshares,  whether 
the  swords  of  the  enemy  be  sheathed  or  sharpened,  such 
narrowness  of  vision  makes  any  approximation  to  peace 
indefinitely  remote.  We  become  responsibly  content 
to  move  slowly  and  wisely,  if  assured  that  each  step 
secures  the  direction  of  our  progress.  Yet  we  are  still 


MILITAKISM  AND  PACIFISM 


381 


more  responsibly  alert  to  the  critical  need  of  a critical 
hour,  and  are  prepared  to  break  with  the  past  in  a bold 
venture  for  the  future.  Indeed,  the  supreme  need  is  for 
men  of  large  vision,  determined  to  establish  a war-freed 
world.  Pacifism  calls  for  its  heroes  in  no  uncertain  tones, 
calls  for  them  in  the  thimder  of  war  to  enlist  in  the  army 
of  the  embattled  nations  resolved  to  win  the  war  that 
shall  end  war. 

This  battle-cry  of  a distressed  world  appeals  with  a 
special  claim  to  the  convinced  pacifist;  it  demands  a 
higher  than  national  patriotism.  Not  forsaking  the 
one,  but  infusing  it  with  a quality  of  sympathy  for  all 
nationally  patriotic  endeavor,  it  proceeds  upon  the 
multiplied  security  of  pledged  allies  to  demand  the 
sacrifice  of  the  unlimited  sovereignty  of  one’s  own  na- 
tion for  the  cause  of  the  unlimited  sovereignty  of  hu- 
manity. The  nations  that  lead  in  such  a movement, 
heralding  the  day  of  the  international-mindedness  of 
all  responsible  peoples,  wiU  prove  their  devotion  to  the 
inspiration  of  pacifism.  Darkened  as  that  conviction 
may  well  be  by  the  increasing  menace  that  the  victory 
may  prove  inconclusive,  even  that  the  forces  of  might 
by  the  very  treachery  and  frightfulness  that  is  their 
strength,  may  extend  their  power  over  a world  unpre- 
pared to  resist  such  a diabolical  attack,  that  convic- 
tion may  yet  find  hope  in  the  settled  determination 
which  the  world-war  has  scarred  upon  the  agonized 
hearts  of  men.  The  responsible  idea  of  democracy  re- 
mains: to  make  the  world  safe  for  pacifism. 


INDEX 


As  this  index  is  necessarily  confined  to  topics  of  general  character 
for  which  accepted  terms  vary,  the  analytical  table  of  contents  should 
be  constantly  consulted  in  connection  with  the  index. 


Absent  treatment.  See  Christian 
Science. 

Absolutism,  375  £E. 

./Esop,  144. 

.(Esthetic,  6,  7. 

Alchemy,  14. 

Allies,  the,  337. 

America,  50. 

Angell,  Norman,  354,  371  (note), 
372  (note). 

Animal  intelligence,  actual  per- 
formance, 180-88;  alleged  per- 
formance, 180-88;  compared 
with  child  intelligence,  175-77, 
177-80;  nature  of,  174-76,  188- 
90. 

Animal  magnetism.  See  Magnet- 
ism, animal. 

Anthropology,  and  character,  166- 
72. 

Anti-vaccination,  257-60. 

Anti-vivisection,  xii,  257-60. 

Arbitration.  See  War  and  sub- 
stitutes. 

Arens,  Edward  J.,  200,  201. 

Aristotle,  42,  141,  158  (note). 

Astarte,  57. 

Astrology,  14,  136,  143,  144. 

Babylon,  37. 

Bacon,  55  (note). 

Bacon,  Friar.  See  Friar  Bacon. 

Bahnsen,  Julius,  170. 

Bain,  Alexander,  cited,  169  (note). 

Balfour,  Arthur  James,  cited,  70 
(note). 

Belief,  and  congeniality,  43;  and 
the  social  impulse,  42;  and  tra- 
dition, 43;  and  verification,  44; 
fixation  of,  40  ff.  See  also  Con- 
viction. 


Bell,  Charles,  164. 

Beringer,  12. 

Berkeley,  Bishop,  55  (note). 

Bernhardi,  General  von,  349. 

Black  Art,  228-30. 

Blavatsky,  Mme.,  56. 

Boer  War,  342. 

Bonaparte,  Prince  Roland,  115. 

Braid,  James,  145. 

Br’er  Rabbit,  144. 

Brown,  Lucretia  L.  S.,  200. 

Buckle,  cited,  65. 

Burdach,  K.  F.,  170. 

Burton,  cited,  140,  141. 

Butler,  Bishop,  75,  77. 

Cagliostro,  56. 

Cardan,  Jerome,  142,  143,  145, 
158  (note). 

Carlyle,  cited,  137. 

Carrington,  Hereward,  104,  114. 

Cams,  K.  G.,  171. 

“Case”  method,  the,  ix,  9 ff.,  220; 
of  alcohol,  246  ff.;  of  indulgence, 
21,  246  ff.;  of  militarism  and 
pacifism,  21 ; of  Paladino,  101  ff. ; 
of  the  feminine  mind,  21;  of 
tobacco,  246  ff. 

Charleston,  57. 

Chiaia,  Professor,  103. 

Christian  Science,  33,  192,  197  ff.; 
and  absent  treatment,  209  ff.; 
menace  of,  213-17;  theory  of, 
209|ff. 

Clarke,  F.  W.,  cited,  64  (note). 

Clifford,  W.  K.,  cited,  70. 

Compromise,  241.  See  Practice. 

Conduct.  See  Conviction  and 
conduct. 

Consistency.  See  Conviction  and 
consistency. 


INDEX 


3M 


Controversy,  and  knowledge,  22; 
and  predilection,  22;  logical 
basis  of,  20  £f . ; practical  aspects 
of,  246-50;  psychological  basis 
of,  20  S.  See  also  Conviction 
and  controversy. 

Convention.  See  Conviction  and 
convention. 

Conviction,  sesthetic  factor  in,  82; 
and  conduct,  7-9;  and  conform- 
ity, 3;  see  also  Convention;  and 
consistency,  30  £f.,  85  ff.,  91  ff.; 
and  convention,  viii,  2-4;  and 
controversy,  20  ff.,  218-24, 
246-50;  and  emotion,  x,  1;  and 
fanaticism,  84;  and  logical 
prestige,  77  £f  ; and  motives,  27; 
and  objective  belief,  10;  and  the 
occult,  31  ff . ; and  practice,  39  fiE., 
64  ff.;  and  prepossession,  118; 
see  also  Will  to  Believe;  and 
reserved  areas,  17,  88  £f.;  and 
satisfaction,  5 flf.,  9,  84;  and  sen- 
timent, 25,  26,  264  ff.;  and  the 
subconscious,  26,  27;  and  the 
subjective  attitude,  10,  121, 
129;andsympathy,48ff.,70,  71; 
Freudian  view  of,  26-30;  growth 
of,  34,  35, 40  ff.,  49, 130;  general 
psychology  of,  1 ff.,  15  ff.;  logic 
of,  vii,  79  ff.,  87,  95  ff.,  113-16, 
122,  129,  161,  342  ff.;  personal 
aspects  of,  24  ff.;  psychology 
of,  80  ff.,  84  ff.,  97-100,  101- 
03,  124  ff.;  service  of,  78;  sup- 
ports of,  6,  7. 

Copan,  38. 

Credulity,  antidote  of,  73;  as  to 
fact,  53-56,  64  ff.,  71  ff.;  as  to 
theory,  51,  64  ff.,  71  ff.,  94  ff.; 
background  of,  63  ff . ; dramatic 
types  of,  52  ff.  See  also  Fallacy 
and  false  beliefs. 

Crusaders,  12,  52  (note). 

Darieux,  Dr.,  115. 

Darwin,  Charles,  128,  148  (note). 

Death  prayer,  192,  193  (note). 

Deception,  54;  cases  of,  56  ff., 
106  ff.;  psycliology  of,  110  ff. 

De  Fontenay,  M.,  104  (note). 

De  Morgan,  cited,  50  (note),  64. 


De  Rochas,  Colonel,  104  (note). 

Descartes,  163. 

Dessoir,  Dr.  Max,  110, 165  (note). 

Digby,  Sir  Kenelm,  65  (note). 

Dowie,  John  A.,  256. 

DUrer,  Albrecht,  139  (note). 

Earle,  John,  cited,  133. 

Eastman,  Dr.,  201. 

Eddy,  Mrs.  Mary  Baker  Glover, 
33,  191,  195-207,  209,  210,  213; 
personal  delusions  of,  191, 199- 
206. 

Education,  and  democracy,  221  ff.; 
control  of,  224  ff. 

EflBgy,  hanging  in,  192. 

Egypt,  37. 

Eliot,  George,  132. 

Ellis,  Havelock,  cited,  302,  320, 

Qat; 

“Emiie,”  59. 

Emotion.  See  Conviction  and 
emotion. 

Empedocles,  133. 

Ethological  Journal,  159  (note). 

Ethological  Society,  159  (note). 

Evans,  E.  P.,  cited,  58  (note). 

Evil  eye,  192. 

Fallacy  and  false  beliefs,  9 ff.,  14. 
See  also  Credulity. 

Fatist,  222. 

Feminine,  endowment,  282,  284; 
and  disqualification,  312,  315; 
and  feminism,  316  ff.;  and  poli- 
tics, 320  ff.;  and  sex  specializa- 
tion, 285-88;  mind,  302  ff.;  sup- 
porting qualities  of,  302,  304. 

Flammarion,  Professor,  104 
(note) . 

Flourens,  153. 

Food,  avoidances,  255;  and  aesthet- 
ics, 252-54,  261;  and  drugs, 
256  ff.;  and  indulgence,  254; 
and  physiology,  251,  271;  and 
poison,  255;  and  sentiment,  261. 

Fossils,  “case”  of,  11-13. 

Foster,  Dr.,  204. 

Foster,  Sir  Michael,  cited,  165 
(note). 

Fouille,  Alfred,  cited,  165  (note). 

Franco-Prussian  War,  347. 


INDEX 


385 


Frederick  the  Great,  64. 

Freud,  Dr.  Sigmund,  26,  27. 
Freudian,  26-32. 

Friar  Bacon,  222. 

Galen,  137,  138,  162,  163. 

Galileo,  42,  150. 

Gall,  Dr.  Franz  Joseph,  149,  150, 
152-56,  158,  166. 

German,  x,  335,  337,  342,  344, 
(note),  350. 

Germany,  345  (note),  346,  348, 
349,  350  (note),  374,  376,  379. 
Goethe,  146. 

Greeks,  297,  372  (note). 

Hall,  G.  Stanley,  cited,  165  (note). 
Hall,  Marshall,  164. 

Haller,  164,  165. 

Harvey,  14,  138,  140,  164. 
Hauser,  Kaspar,  59,  60. 

Hawaii,  192. 

Hegel,  346. 

Hellenes,  44. 

Helmholtz,  164. 

Heresy,  225-28. 

Hippocrates,  14,  128,  133,  134, 
137,  162,  163. 

Hodgson,  Dr.  Richard,  cited,  160 
(note). 

Holmes,  Dr.,  49  (note),  54,  55 
(note). 

Holy  Land,  12. 

Homoeopathy,  83. 

Huarte,  cited,  170. 

Huguenots,  372  (note). 
“Hmnors,”  134,  135. 

Huxley,  53,  55. 

Hypnotism,  196. 

He  Roubaud,  104. 

Index  Expm-gatorius,  42. 
Indulgence,  and  the  environment, 
265  ff.,  277-79;  and  excess,  268; 
and  suppression,  273  £f.;  and 
temperance,  269-72;  psychol- 
ogy of,  246  fif. 

Inquisition,  42. 

Intolerance.  See  Tolerance. 

James,  William,  cited,  70,  78,  354, 
355,  359. 


Jeanne  d’Arc,  58. 

“Jim  Key,”  176,  181-83,  187. 
Jogand-Paves,  Gabriel,  56. 
Jonson,  Ben,  cited,  139  (note). 

Kant,  Immanuel,  170. 

Keller,  Helen,  67. 

Kennedy,  Richard,  198,  200,  201. 
Kipling,  Rudyard,  cited,  280. 
Klages,  L.,  cited,  165  (note). 
“Kluge  Hans,”  176, 178, 183, 184. 

Lavater,  Johann  Caspar,  129, 145- 
49,  151,  152,  158  (note),  166. 
Le  Bon,  Professor,  112,  115,  116, 
123. 

Le  Brun,  148  (note). 

Lecky,  349,  369, 

Leo  XHI,  56. 

Leonard,  Mrs.,  205  (note). 
Lessing,  170. 

Leuba,  Professor,  cited,  105  (note). 
Levy,  A.,  cited,  165  (note). 

Locke,  John,  138. 

Lodge,  Sir  Oliver,  cited,  104,  112. 
Logic,  evolution  of,  10,  15,  34,  35, 
38  ff.;  imperfect,  10  fif.;  of  con- 
viction, see  Conviction,  logic  of; 
distinctions,  6,  7;  sense,  8,  39. 
Lombroso,  Professor,  103,  104. 
Lotze,  Hermann,  171. 

Lowell,  J.  R.,  cited,  44,  74. 
Lucian,  74. 

Lucifer,  57. 

MacDougal,  Professor,  cited,  165 
(note). 

Magnetism,  animal,  191-217. 
Mahan,  Captain,  355. 

Majendi,  164. 

Malapert,  cited,  165  (note). 
Manipulations,  196-99. 

Masonic  Sisters,  57. 

Maxwell,  Dr.  J.,  104  (note). 
Medicine,  and  the  temperaments, 
137  ff. 

Mental  malpractice,  201-03.  See 
Christian  Science. 

Mesmer  and  mesmerism,  193-96. 
Militarism,  326  ff.;  and  concep- 
tion of  the  State,  373  ff.;  as  po- 
litical stabilizer,  355-57;  at- 


386 


INDEX 


tack  upon,  352-55;  German  ex- 
pressions of,  346-50;  tempered 
defense  of,  350  ff . See  also  Paci- 
fism. 

Mill,  John  Stuart,  cited,  169  (note) . 

Miller,  Professor,  cited,  119. 

Milmine,  Miss,  cited,  202  (note), 
206  (note). 

Mind-cure,  15. 

Moll,  Dr.  A.,  cited,  110,  111. 

Moral,  6,  7. 

Morley,  Lord,  cited,  46,  49. 

Morselli,  Professor,  104  (note). 

Muller,  Johannes,  170. 

Myers,  F.  W.  H.,  cited,  104,  111. 

Nervous  system,  162  fif. 

Newton,  150. 

Nietzsche,  347,  348. 

Novicow,  cited,  371  (note). 

Noyes,  Dr.  Rufus  K.,  201. 

Nuremberg,  59,  60. 

Ohio,  serpent  mound  of,  38. 

Pacificism,  326  ff.;  and  conception 
of  the  State,  373  ff.;  as  means 
and  end,  336;  as  reservation, 
^341;  constructive  aspects  of, 
378;  defense  of,  364  ff.;  different 
I orders  of,  330,  341-46;  distorted 
views  of,  338  ff.;  fanatic  types 
of,  331;  triumph  of,  380.  See 
also  Militarism. 

Paladino,  Eusapia,  18,  31,  102- 
12,  116-21,  123,  124. 

Palmistry,  14. 

Paracelsus,  138. 

Paulhan,  cited,  165  (note). 

Peace,  contributions  of,  364  ff. 
See  also  Pacifism. 

Peirce,  C.  S.,  cited,  39,  41,  45. 

Perkins,  55  (note). 

Persians,  372  (note). 

Pertelote,  139  (note). 

Phi  Beta  Kappa,  306. 

Phrenology,  14,  81,  82,  137,  149- 
55;  and  hypnotism,  154;  practi- 
cal applications  of,  155-59. 

Physiognomy,  14,  136,  141  ff., 
145^9. 

Pius  IX,  56. 


Pompeii,  38. 

Porta,  Giovanni  Baptista  della, 
144,  145,  158  (note). 

Poyen,  Charles,  196. 

Practice,  39  ff  .-47 ; and  expediency, 
70  ff . ; and  theory,  67  ff .,  222-24, 
238-40.  See  also  Conviction 
and  practice. 

Prepossession,  see  Will  to  believe. 
See  also  Convietion  and  prepos- 
session. 

Prestige,  125, 126. 

Pseudo-science,  136,  142  ff.,  155- 
59,  213-17. 

Psychical  research,  16. 

Psychology,  and  temperament, 
117  ff.  See  also  Conviction,  per- 
sonal aspects  of. 

Puritanism,  263. 

Quimby,  “Dr.”  P.  P.,  195,  198, 
203  (note). 

Reason.  See  Sensibility. 

Reserved  areas.  See  Conviction 
and  reserved  areas. 

Ribery,  Th.,  cited,  165  (note). 

Richet,  Professor,  103,  104,  110. 

Riley,  Professor  Woodbridge,  346. 

Romans,  297. 

St.  Andrews,  Bishop  of,  142. 

Salem,  200. 

Satisfaction.  See  Conviction  and 
satisfaction. 

Schiaparelli,  57. 

Scriptures,  42. 

Sensibility,  and  reason,  6. 

Sex,  traits,  288  ff.;  and  civiliza- 
tion, 299-302;  derivative,  289; 
feminine,  296-99;  interpreta- 
tion of,  313,  314  ff.;  masculine, 
291-96;  tests  of,  306  ff.;  trans- 
ferred, 290,  292-96,  299-301. 

Shand,  A.  F.,  cited,  165  (note). 

Sidgwick,  Professor,  cited.  111. 

Singapore,  57. 

Society  for  Psychical  Research, 
105  (note).  See  Psychical  Re- 
search. 

Socrates,  67,  141. 

Speech,  freedom  of,  xii,  225  ff. 


INDEX 


387 


“Spirit”  theory  of  disease,  135. 

Spoiford,  Daniel,  200,  201,  204. 

Spurzheim,  Dr.  Johann  Caspar, 
149,  150-52,  155,  157,  158,  160. 

Stael,  Mme.  de,  302. 

Stanhop>e,  Earl  of,  59. 

Sternberg,  cited,  165  (note). 

Stetson,  Mrs.  Augusta  E.,  207, 
208. 

Supernatural  powers,  31,  75  fiP.; 
belief  in  personal,  16-19;  in  ani- 
mals, 1^20,  173  ff.;  physical 
cases,  18,  89,  90,  107,  ff. 

Supporting  qualities.  See  Femi- 
nine mind,  supporting  qualities 
of. 

Suppression.  See  Indulgence  and 
suppression, 

Smyivals,  16  ff.,  49. 

Swedenborgians,  94. 

Sydenham,  138. 

Sylvius,  138. 

Taboo,  3. 

Taxil,  Leo,  56,  57,  58. 

Temperaments,  13,  14,  133  ff.; 
literary  expressions  of,  139, 140. 

Theophrastus,  131,  132,  133. 

Theory.  See  Practice  and  theory. 

Tolerance,  xi,  33,  88,  93,  276.  See 
also  Consistency. 

Tradition.  See  Convention;  Be- 
lief. 


Treitschke,  348,  349. 

Trent,  58. 

Universities,  230-32,  234-37. 

Vatican,  56. 

Vaughan,  Diana,  57,  58. 

Vaughan,  Thomas,  57. 

Vesalius,  138,  163. 

Voltaire,  12  . 

WaUace,  Alfred  Russel,  160  (note). 

Wallas,  Graham,  cited,  165  (note). 

War,  and  moral  values,  334;  and 
substitutes,  356-59;  and  the 
judicial  attitude,  332;  causes  of, 
369-72;  moral  defense  of,  359  ff . ; 
moral  causes  of,  360-64;  objec- 
tions to,  343  ff.  See  also  Mili- 
tarism. 

WeUs,  H.  G.,  1. 

Whately,  cited,  69. 

Whitby,  C.  J , cited,  165  (note). 

White,  Andrew  D.,  cited,  12 
(note),  46,  165  (note),  369. 

Will  to  believe,  75  ff.  See  also 
Conviction  and  prepossession; 
Supernatural  powers. 

Willis,  138,  163. 

Xantippe,  302. 

Yoimg,  Brigham,  93. 

Zopyrus,  141. 


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